In this chapter, I consider Aristotle’s discussion of our responsibility for moral char-acter in Nicomachean Ethics (EN) III 5. Aristotle argues that we are responsible for our moral character, but it is unclear how much we are responsible for it. I provide an interpretation of EN III 5, and propose that Aristotle holds the full responsibility thesis:
that since our moral character is formed through our actions, we are fully responsible for our moral character, even if we are affected by things that are not up to us (e.g., our upbringing, family background, early education, etc.).
The question asked in this chapter is this: whether we are fully or partly respon-sible for our character, given that Aristotle says that virtues and vices are up to us (1113b7), and that we are affected by things not up to us, for example, our nature.
Susan Sauvé Meyer, in her book Aristotle on Moral Responsibility, endorses the view that Aristotle holds a qualified responsibility thesis: that we are only partly re-sponsible for our moral character. Since things that are not up to us can affect our characters, we are therefore not fully responsible for our character. On the other hand, I argue that Aristotle actually holds a full responsibility thesis: that we are responsible for our moral character no matter what. True, there are indeed these things that are not up to us and can affect our characters. Yet the presence of these things that are not up to us does not lessen or undermine our responsibility. We are fully responsible for the characters we form, and we are praised and blamed accordingly.
In what follows I first present my interpretation of EN III 5, and propose that Ar-istotle actually holds the full responsibility thesis. Then I reconstruct Meyer’s
inter-pretation of EN III 5. In the next section, I give a reading of συναίτιοί (synaitioi) as
‘joint cause’ rather than ‘co-cause’, and argue that my reading is consistent with what Aristotle says throughout EN III 5. Drawing on my interpretation, I shall point out that Meyer’s view might make Aristotle inconsistent: since she omits the statements Aristotle made in 1115a1-4, which imply the full responsibility thesis. By considering two possible real-life cases, I will contrast my interpretation with Meyer’s, and show that Meyer’s interpretation may cause some uneasiness and result in counter-intuitive judgments about how one is responsible for her character while mine will not run into these problems.
I
In EN II, 1 Aristotle gives an account of virtue of character:
Virtue of character [i.e., of ethos] results from habit [ethos]; hence its name ‘ethi-cal’, slightly varied from ethos. (1103a17-18)
Virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against nature. Rather, we are by nature able to acquire them, and we are completed through habit. Further if something arises in us by nature, we first have the capacity for it, and later perform the activi-ty. This is clear in the case of the senses; for we did not acquire them by frequent seeing or hearing, but we already had them when we exercised them, and did not get them by exercising them. Virtues, by contrast, we acquire, just as we acquire crafts, by having first activated them. For we learn a craft by producing the same product that we must produce when we have learned it; we become builders, for instance, by building, and we become harpists by playing the harp. Similarly, then,
we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions. (1103a24-1103b2)32
Note that virtues are perfected by our own practicing virtuous actions. Now we turn to EN III, 5. There, Aristotle first gives a preliminary account of our responsibility for character. We are responsible for our character fundamentally because moral charac-ters are formed through our actions; further, whether or not we perform these actions are up to us, as Aristotle notes:
For when acting is up to us, so is not acting, and when no is up to us, so is yes.
And so if acting, when it is fine, is up to us, not acting, when it is shameful is al-so up to us; and if not acting, when it is fine, is up to us, then acting, when it is shameful, is also up to us. (1113b8-10)
Since it is our actions that form our character, and it is up to us whether or not to per-form those actions, it is therefore up to us to per-form certain kind of character. And thus both virtue and vice are up to us (1113b7).
Aristotle believes that this account can be further justified by the fact that legis-lators ‘impose corrective treatments and penalties on anyone who does vicious actions’
(1113b25) and they ‘honor anyone who does fine actions’ (1113b27). These practices are as such precisely because legislators hold this view that actions are up to us; and since actions are up to us, we are praise- or blame-worthy for these actions that origi-nates from us as agents. However, Aristotle specifically excludes actions that are
32 Unless otherwise noted, translations are all taken from Irwin 1999. With regard to my original translations, I try to keep them conservative in light of available translations and other scholarly litera-tures. My references include Irwin 1999, Reeve 2014, Rowe and Broadie 2002 and Ross 1923.
‘forced or is caused by ignorance’ (1113b26), for those actions are not up to us and not voluntary. Here Aristotle is referring back to EN III 1, where he says ‘things coming about by force or because of ignorance are involuntary’ (1110a1-2). In other words, actions whose first principles are not in us are considered not to be voluntary, and thus we are not responsible for. The same logic applies to moral characters. Since we form our character through performing actions, if we are to be responsible for our action, then the actions must be done voluntarily; and if we are to be responsible for our characters, then the foundation of these characters must be some voluntarily ac-tions. So if we refer back to the very first action that we made, that very first action should equally be made voluntarily. As Aristotle points out in the case of a drunken person: if his drunkenness is brought about by his own voluntary action, that is, he gets drunk all by himself—drinks unlimitedly—then he is responsible for this state of drunkenness; although he may not be responsible for what he does when he is drunk, since he is in a state of ignorance, he is still responsible for getting drunk in the first place.
So far, we can make a preliminary conclusion: one is responsible for her charac-ters because her characcharac-ters are formed through her actions. The moment she starts to engage in performing actions, she is thereby responsible for her moral characters.
Aristotle immediately considers a possible objection to this view, which claims that the drunken person is simply not taking care of himself. So he should not be re-sponsible for his drunkenness (1114a2-3). Aristotle argues against this objection, claiming again that this person is still responsible for his state of carelessness, since this is the way of life he chooses to live in the first place. He goes on to remind us that each type of activity will produce that type of person (1114a7), and our continually practicing a certain type of activity will make us that particular type of person. So
granted that this drunken person is careless, he still should be responsible for his carelessness, since this state of carelessness is brought about by himself through his own actions. Further, Aristotle even claims that when someone S is engaging in cer-tain type of activity, she should already know which type of state of character would this activity brings about. For example, if S decides to φ, then she should already know—at the point of deciding to φ—which state of character corresponds to φ and will be cultivated by her performing φ.
Thus far, we do have a clearer picture of Aristotle’s view: since both virtue and vice are formed through our constantly performing a certain type of action, and we know that each type of action corresponds to a particular type of state, and we per-form φ voluntarily, then we are responsible for the corresponding φ-state of character that is brought about by our decision to do φ (and successfully doing it).
Having argued for the first-step of moral cultivation, Aristotle turns to consider another possible objection to his view in 1114a31. The objection goes like this:
Someone might say that we all pursue the apparent good but are not in control of the appearance; that, rather, whatever sort of person someone is determines how the end appears to him (1114a31-b1).
Here, Aristotle considers the objection that there is something about us that is not up to us, and we are not responsible for whatever that brings about.
And his conclusion of this objection appears in a short paragraph in 1114b15-25. What is interesting, though, appears in 1114b24, in which he says “we are co-causes (συναίτιοί) of how our states are”. It is not clear right away what might be the co-causes. We know that we are one of the co-causes, what is the other one?
Right before 1114b24, Aristotle says that “let us suppose that [how] the end [appears]
is natural, but virtue is voluntary because the virtuous person does the other things voluntarily. In either case, vice will be no less voluntary than virtue; for the bad per-son, no less than the good, is responsible for his own actions, even if not for [how] the end [appears]” (1114b17-22). On face value, Aristotle is conceding the point that, in-deed, how things appeared to you may not be up to you. However, Aristotle insists on the point that since virtues and vices both are brought about through our actions, and since actions are up to us, we are still responsible for both virtues and vices. So Aris-totle here seems to be indicating that we are not fully responsible as the first-step view may suggest. Our responsibility for character is actually lessened, since we are only co-cause of our character. There is a part of the cause that is not up to us. We are, in this sense, not fully responsible.
But we should not jump to this conclusion at this point, since the chapter does not end here. At the end of EN III, 5 Aristotle says:
Actions and states, however, are not voluntary in the same way. For we are in control of actions from the beginning to the end, when we know the particu-lars. With states, however, we are in control of the beginning, but do not know, any more than with sicknesses, what the cumulative effect of particular actions will be. Nonetheless, since it was up to us to exercise a capacity either this way or another way, states are voluntary. (1114b30-1115a4)
Aristotle appears to be stating an even stronger position on responsibility for our characters. Previously, in 1113a4-1114b1, Aristotle says that when someone S de-cides to φ, she should already know—at the point of deciding to φ, which state of
character corresponds to φ and will be cultivated by her performing φ. But here, Ar-istotle is not stating that S should already be known; rather, he states that even if S does not know the corresponding relation between action φ and φ-state, S is still re-sponsible for her character (which, in this case, would be the φ-state of character). In other words, you are responsible for your character unqualifiedly. Thus I suggest that Aristotle is not backing down; he rather is strengthening his stance: S is really fully responsible for her character no matter what.
Now I will turn to Meyer’s interpretation, and then present my own interpreta-tion.
II
Meyer, in her Aristotle on Moral Responsibility, distinguishes two kinds of responsi-bility for character: full responsiresponsi-bility and qualified responsiresponsi-bility. Full responsiresponsi-bility is the thesis that “an agent is responsible for her character in the deepest sense, in which the moral quality of an agent’s character is in no way due to factors beyond her control” while a qualified responsibility is the thesis that an agent is “responsible for our characters in a qualified way (on the assumption that our early moral education has already identified to us that correct goals to pursue)”.33 Meyer argues that Aristo-tle is claiming that we are only qualifiedly responsible for our moral character.
Meyer argues that since Aristotle’s account of responsibility for moral character relies heavily on character formation, and since states of character are formed by ha-bituation, Aristotle therefore concludes that what is process of character formation satisfies the voluntariness requirement for responsibility; that process originates in the
33 Meyer 2011, 126.
agent, and the agent knows what he is doing.34 But, she also admits that this account may face the problem that we are not in control of some conditions by which we might be influenced, and these conditions may so deeply intertwined with our living environment that we are influenced by them right from our birth. Admitting this, Meyer argues that Aristotle thinks that our early moral educators should compensate for these disadvantageous conditions;35 it is their job to take control of those external conditions and put everyone in a situation that helps us develop moral characters.
Holding fixed our growing environment, Meyer argues for a two-stage view of character formation through reconstructing an argument in Book X, where, she be-lieves, Aristotle points out two stages in our character formation:36
That is why laws must prescribe their upbringing and practices; for they will not find these things painful when they get used to them. Presumably, however, it is not enough if they get the correct upbringing and attention when they are young;
rather, they must continue the same practices and be habituated to them when they become men. Hence we need laws concerned with these things also, and in general with all of life. (1179b34-1180a4)
Meyer argues that the first stage of our moral formation is the stage in which our up-bringing and practices are prescribed by laws.37 During this stage our character edu-cation is under the control of our parents or other educators, or even the state. But, she argues, this first stage is not sufficient for the formation of moral character, since
“they must continue the same practices and be habituated to then when they become
34 Ibid, 123.
35 Ibid, 123.
36 Ibid, 124.
37 Ibid, 124.
men”. Thus, Meyer argues that there is a second stage of character formation, which is the stage when we are “men”. During this stage we continue to practice certain types of actions, and through habituation, and we thereby form our character.
It is in this way we are only qualifiedly responsible for our moral character.
Since we are truly responsible for our characters only when we reach the second stage, when we have already received proper moral education. The first stage of formation clears those hostile conditions up for us, and in this stage we are provided with ample education, proper growing environment and presumably the knowledge about the correlation between types of activities and moral characters. Having these, we are ushered in the second stage of character formation, in which our moral characters would be solidified through our continually performing certain types of actions and activities, and through our habituating those actions and activities. It is in this second stage that we really are responsible for the outcomes.
Thus Meyer gives us a clear picture of Aristotle’s account of responsibility for character. She apparently puts Aristotle’s view in EN III, 5 within a larger Aristotelian moral and political theory, argues for a two-stage view of character formation, and thereby argues for qualified responsibility. Meyer could object that she does not have this grand picture of ideal polis prescribed by Aristotle in his moral and political trea-tises. Indeed she might not hold this premise when arguing for her two-stage view.
But I shall argue that her interpretation is mistaken, that Aristotle does not hold a qualified thesis of responsibility for character. Reason for this claim that Meyer is mistaken is this: she left a tiny bit of EN III, 5 out in her interpretation, and that bit is crucial when we are trying to make clear exactly which thesis Aristotle really holds when he is talking about responsibility for character. Again, Aristotle actually holds a full responsibility thesis, and that Meyer is mistaken because she omitted the very last
paragraph in EN III, 5.
III
In this section I will present an alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s thesis about responsibility for action. And it would be helpful to first make sense of Aristotle’s different claim in EN III, 5, which is the tension between the first-step view, the claim of συναίτιοί and the concluding paragraph in 1114b30-1115a4. I will suggest that he is in fact consistent on the view that we are fully responsible for our character, and nothing really lessens our responsibility.38
A way to make sense of this tension is to figure out what συναίτιοί means in 1114b24. Etymologically, the prefix συν- can be rendered into English as ‘co-‘, ‘to-gether’, or ‘joint(ly)’. And αίτιοί is the plural form of the noun αἴτιος, which mainly means ‘cause’ or ‘author’. This word is also used in EN III, 5 as ‘responsible for’.
There are two general ways to translate this term; either rendered it into ‘co-cause’39,
‘joint cause’40, or ‘contributing cause’41. The difference between the two translations is subtle. Co-cause has the sense that the two causes mutually cause something to be
38 Aristotle uses this word in other places, including: Physics 192a13, R. P Hardie and R. K. Gale take it as ‘joint cause’, here Aristotle is talking about the first principle of things, and stating that the matter is a joint cause with the form, together brings about all things; De Anima 416a14, J. A. Smith renders it as ‘concurrent cause [of growth]’, here Aristotle is arguing that fire is not the principle cause of opera-tive force. Instead fire is only a ‘concurrent cause’ while the principle cause should be the soul; Gene-alogy of Animals 782a26, Arthur Platt translated it as ‘helping cause’, here Aristotle is talking about the causes of thickness and thinness of hair, and he maintains that skin is the principle cause while mois-ture is a helping cause, together they explain why some animals have thick hair and some thin; in 783b18 and 783b21, Platt renders the word in ‘causes also contribute to [the condition of leafs]’, here Aristotle is talking about the causes that can explain the changes in leafs; PMA 634a17, and Metaphys-ics 1015a21, W. D. Ross takes it as ‘a condition’, here Aristotle is explaining the notion of ‘necessity’.
38 Aristotle uses this word in other places, including: Physics 192a13, R. P Hardie and R. K. Gale take it as ‘joint cause’, here Aristotle is talking about the first principle of things, and stating that the matter is a joint cause with the form, together brings about all things; De Anima 416a14, J. A. Smith renders it as ‘concurrent cause [of growth]’, here Aristotle is arguing that fire is not the principle cause of opera-tive force. Instead fire is only a ‘concurrent cause’ while the principle cause should be the soul; Gene-alogy of Animals 782a26, Arthur Platt translated it as ‘helping cause’, here Aristotle is talking about the causes of thickness and thinness of hair, and he maintains that skin is the principle cause while mois-ture is a helping cause, together they explain why some animals have thick hair and some thin; in 783b18 and 783b21, Platt renders the word in ‘causes also contribute to [the condition of leafs]’, here Aristotle is talking about the causes that can explain the changes in leafs; PMA 634a17, and Metaphys-ics 1015a21, W. D. Ross takes it as ‘a condition’, here Aristotle is explaining the notion of ‘necessity’.