2. Historical summary and placing the Cross-Strait relations into
2.2 Brief historical summary of the connection between China and
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2. Historical summary and placing the Cross-Strait relations into the framework of the asymmetric connections theory
2.1 Introduction
The following, shorter chapter aims to summarize two questions: the brief recapitulative section on the history of the conflict between Taipei and Beijing and placing the two mentioned territories’ connection into the asymmetric connection theory. The latter is supposed to serve as a descriptive part of the political asymmetry between the PRC and the ROC. Domestic political asymmetry cannot be discussed.
There is not comparative ground for political contrasting, at least not in the context of the theory that serves as the basis of this current thesis. This is only possible in the international sphere. This will be done through Womack’s concept that has been described in the previous chapter. In other words, the general relations between China and Taiwan will be placed into the theory of asymmetric connections.
2.2 Brief historical summary of the connection between China and Taiwan
In the following chapter, the current and near-past aspects of the economical and military relations of the territories on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will be discussed. Of course, the sections will include brief introductions of the history and the development of the given areas, but the focus will be the present situation. This will especially be true in the military section, where the main point of interest will be the latest modernizational steps taken by both Taipei and Beijing which contribute to the strengthening of both armies. For this reason, it has to be here in separate chapter, that a short summary of the history of events that formed the currently studies relationship into what it is today has to be given.
The earliest decades of the discussed connection can be described as rather hostile times. According to Yu-Shan Wu, the policies in every possible area of the two sides were the complete contrary of the other in the connection that was embedded in the Cold War. Nothing proves this more clearly than the first two Taiwan Strait conflicts
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in 1954-55 and in 1958. On the mainland, different plans were made thought to years for “liberating” or reuniting Taiwan. Same plans on invasions were constructed in Taipei, destroying the communist rule on the mainland. These intentions can be labeled as the continuation of the Chinese civil war, but on the sides of the Taiwan Strait, making China – as mentioned in the introduction chapter – a divided nation. An actual conflict could have broken out at any given time. The level of hostility has decreased since then. These peaceful developments were broken during the third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96. (Copper 1997, 2013, Wu 2000) In the previous decade, Chen Shui-bian’s and the DPP government’s actions caused frictions between the two parties, but peaceful connections were restored under the Kuomintang (KMT) rule and Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency.
Different views on the recent history of China are among the sources of the hostility. The PRC’s rightful or not rightful claim of the islands and the ROC’s legal status are all questioned as a result of this. Scholars from the mainland only view Taiwan’s history since and in context of its connections to the other side of the Taiwan Strait. These interactions and elementary administrative system established on the island are the reasons they give for Beijing’s right to reunify Taiwan. Shared culture is another factor that is often bought up to support the assured connection between the mainland and the island. (Copper 1997)
Taiwanese exports are divided by their opinion on this subject. Several studies emphasize the early migrations from China and the Manchu rule, but no significant evidence of organized Chinese colonization or occupation has been found before the Manchu rule. (Copper 1997) Nevertheless, it can be stated that recently lot of attention has been given to the research of the island’s early history, presumably broadening the group who acknowledge the connection between the two territories but do not necessarily see tight relations interlinking the mainland and the island in early historical times.
Another dividing matter is the rightfulness of the Japanese occupation. Chinese experts tend to characterize the Treaty of Shimonoseki as an unjust conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese War and the Japanese rule on the island following that. Taiwanese scholars tend to disagree with these thoughts. These differences in opinions may seem to have little importance, but they have a major impact on the views of many. (Copper 1997)
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The legal status of Taiwan following the Second World War is also a debated point.
The main question here is the succession of the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. The island was given the prior as the latter did not exist yet at that time. But on the mainland, the ROC’s rule was replaced by the PRC, making the status of Taiwan questionable. (Copper 1997)
In the following decades, the ROC found itself in a very difficult situation, with the majority of the countries in the world, originally having connections with Taiwan, establishing official relations with Beijing. These were the first steps taken towards Taiwan’s isolation in the international community. According to Chinese scholars, with this the foreign governments acknowledged that the island belongs to the PRC, strengthening Beijing’s claim. This was followed by expelling of the ROC from the United Nations and the PRC taking Taipei’s place in the organization, with the majority of the remaining states cutting their ties with Taiwan. (Chen et al. 2005, Copper 1997, Tien 1989)
The US remained the only greater power that still had official relations with Taipei.
But Washington’s slow connection building with the PRC foretold the faith of the island. The 1972 Shanghai Communiqué aimed for “the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides”. From 1973 Washington had quasi-official relationship with both governments. This was followed by the establishment of official relations between Washington and Beijing in 1978 and the cutting of such ties with Taipei. (Copper 1997, Rubenstein 1999, Shanghai Communiqué 1972) However the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was passed in 1979, which is discussed in the chapter of this thesis, describing the triangular connections of US-China-Taiwan.
Taiwanese scholars emphasis the already mentioned fact that the PRC did not exist at the end of the Second World War and the treaties signed that ended the Japanese rule did not specify to whom the island should be returned or given to. They also state that Beijing never took actual steps to invade the main island of Taiwan, only the smaller ones that were or are under the jurisdiction of Taipei, proving that the PRC has no claim over the island. The ROC also qualifies for all the criteria of a nation state:
territory, population, government – which is stable in Taiwan’s case – and international, diplomatic recognition. (Copper 1997) The fulfillment of the last listed criteria can be questioned as the ROC is only recognized by a handful of states and its participation in international organizations is also limited.
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Looking at the recent events and evolution of the connection, as mentioned above, hostility was followed by tightening of the ties that connect the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
In the beginning, Taipei was solemnly committed to this notion. It wanted for the US and the international community to have a positive impression of the ROC by the willingness to open towards Beijing. Domestic reasons – shifts in both Taipei’s and Beijing’s political sphere – and international causes – the end of the Cold War – contributed to the changing in the nature of Cross-Strait relations. The flow of goods, people and investments increased, transportational ties were established, economic integration deepened with time, radical point of views and actions of the governments on both sides were ceased and negotiations started. China moved towards to ides of peaceful unifications and Taiwan proclaimed the end of the war with the mainland.
Organizations – Taipei’s Straits Exchange Foundation and Beijing’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait - were founded to coordinate the tightening of the connection. (Copper 1997, 2013)
Wu notes that the PRC adopted the system that used to characterize Taiwan, when Mao Zedong’s totalitarianism shifted into Deng Xiaoping’s authoritarian system.
Meanwhile the ROC started its development into the capitalist democracy that it is today. (Wu 2000)
However the above listed different point of views influence the relations in several matters including the sovereignty of the ROC, where Taiwan views itself as a nation state, while China sees it as one of its provinces. It is the reason the concept of “one country, two systems” was introduced, if the two territories were to be reunited.
According to this formula, under the rule of Beijing, Taiwan would be able to maintain the system and builtup that it currently possess, but limitations would be set, especially considering its foreign and defense sectors. Taiwanese politicians and scholars reject this proposal, list numerous areas were the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could limit Taiwan’s promised freedom if this system was to be established on the island and came up with possible plans of their own, for example the framework of
“one nation, two equal governments”. (Copper 1997, 2013)
The connection since then was gone through “ups and downs”. After issues of smaller scale of both negative and positive intonation like the “1992 consensus” and Lee Teng-hui’s “Go South” policy, the third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96 influenced the connection. This was followed by meetings of more peaceful nature and the
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campaigns of the candidates of the presidential elections of 2000, where slogans of peace were popularized. Chen Shui-bian’s presidency bought another era of hostilities with itself. The president claimed that there are two sovereign states in the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and a referendum will be set to decide the future of the island.
Chen was reelected in 2004, promising to push for the ROC’s complete independence and setting a referendum discussing Taiwan’s United Nations membership. Beijing’s reply involved both international and domestic sphere. The prior was seeking the US’s help against Chen, while the latter one was passing of the Anti-Secession Law, claiming that the PRC is willing to use force if Taiwan does declare its independence.
However Beijing was also willing to imply more peaceful means. (Copper 2013) In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential elections, with the slogan of “no independence, no unifications, no war”, which he lived up to in the coming years.
Peaceful relations were restored. The connection went beyond restoring and a strengthening process started, of which the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is a perfect example. (Copper 2013)