2 Literature Review
2.2 China and Its Ethnic Minority Groups
This is perhaps inevitable, considering Xinjiang’s location and the diverse variety of peoples who have occupied it.
2.2 China and its Ethnic Minority Groups
In his book, China’s Minority Cultures, Colin Mackerras provides a good overview of non-Han peoples living in China. Fifty-five officially recognized minority groups live in China, but they only comprise about eight percent of the population.42 It is important to note that these 55 groups do not represent all of the minorities in China.
The current classifications have not changed since the 1970s43, and the PRC based them on Joseph Stalin’s model of ethnic minority classification.44 Many other ethnic groups have applied for official minority status, but the government has only recognized one since laying out its original classification system.45
Mackerras points out that China’s minority groups differ from one another quite substantially. He states, “Their [the minorities’] living places range from the very high and dry planes of Tibet to the tropical regions of Hainan.”
The PRC’s reasons for refusing minority status to other groups have never been clear.
46 He goes on to
point out that minorities differ from one another in ethnicity, language, religion, and culture.47
42 Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 3
Some minorities have assimilated quite thoroughly into mainstream
43 Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 3
44 Dru Gladney, 1998. p. 109
45 Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 3
46 Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 4
47 Colin Mackerras, 1995. p. 4
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Chinese culture. The Hui are a good example. Although they are Muslims and a recognized minority group, the Hui live in Chinese cities, work with the Han, and have largely accepted being a part of Chinese society.48
How do Han Chinese view ethnic minorities? Dru Gladney argues that Han literature, media, and education tend to depict ethnic minorities as “exotic and erotic”
others.
On the opposite end of the spectrum are the Tibetans and the Uyghurs. Although this is a general statement, it is the author’s impression that the majority of ethnic minorities in China are content to be a part of the PRC.
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Ildiko Beller-Hann’s essay, Temperamental neighbors: Uyghur-Han Relations in He also argues that Han Chinese tend to view minorities as being in need of education and culture. Gladney claims that the PRC media depicts ethnic minorities as colorful and innocent, dancers and singers happily living under their benevolent and more sophisticated Han superiors. Although this paper is focused on the influence of education on Uyghurs, the author cannot resist making the following observation: if Dr. Gladney’s argument is valid, then it is fair to say that regardless of how it influences ethnic minorities, the PRC’s education system is effective on mainstream society.
48 Dru Gladney, 1998. p. 110
49 Dru Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities” in The Journal of Asian Studies, 1994, p. 93
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Xinjiang, Northwest China, examines the interaction between everyday Han and
Uyghurs living in Xinjiang. He visits an oasis town called Urukzar, which has a large number of both Han and Uyghur residents. His observations focus on the perceptions that the two sides have of one another, both positive and negative. It is an interesting study on how stereotypes develop, and on how normal people coexist in an environment often fraught with social tension.
Shan Wei and Chen Gang wrote an essay titled The Urumqi Riots and China’s Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang. This essay was useful in that it discussed and criticized
the government’s approach to Xinjiang. The opening pages of this article relate the seriousness of Xinjiang: the authors point out that after the Urumqi riots in 2009, PRC president Hu Jintao cut short his visit to Europe and returned to the PRC.50
50 Shan Wei and Chen Gang, The Urumqi Riots and China’s Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang (East Asian Policy, July/September, 2009) p. 15
The essay also points out that the PRC rejected calls for mediation from Turkey, saying that the issue was an internal one. This reflects the PRC’s desire to keep any and all foreign influence away from Xinjiang. Although these writers are from Singapore, their views seemed to support the PRC stance. Even when the writers criticized PRC policy, they appeared to support the ultimate goal of integration. The article cited preferential policy as a source of tension, claiming that it bred resentment among the Han Chinese. The article argues that preferential policies give unfair treatment
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in favor of the Uyghurs. The writers even go so far as to imply reverse discrimination against the Han. This view is too simple and broad. The writers also argue very persuasively that the PRC must treat religion with genuine respect.
They claim that until the PRC respects Islam, any preferential policies will be ineffective. The author agrees with this point entirely, and will discuss it later in this thesis.
Nicolas Becquelin’s essay Staged Development in Xinjiang discusses the next phase of the PRC’s settlement of Xinjiang. While his essay does not relate directly to the topic of education, it is valuable for its insights into China’s ‘Open Up the West’
drive.
Becquelin argues that China’s current strategy is a continuation of what began in the 1990s.51
Interestingly, Becquelin notes a shift in the PRC’s rhetoric towards Xinjiang.
He says that before the 1990s, the PRC denied that it was deliberately sending Han In that decade, the PRC made huge strides in migrating Han settlers into Xinjiang, developing Xinjiang’s infrastructure, and exploiting its natural resources. What we are seeing now, he says, are the PRC’s attempts to consolidate its gains from the 1990s. This reflects the slow and methodical approach that the PRC has to its western development strategy.
51 Nicolas Becquelin, Staged Development in Xinjiang, in China’s Campaign to “Open Up the West:”
National, Provincial and Local Perspectives (The China Quarterly, 2004) p. 44
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settlers to Xinjiang in order to colonize it.52 The PRC previously claimed that any increased Han population in Xinjiang was due to “seasonal migrants.”53 Now, policy makers speak openly of the ‘sinicization of Xinjiang,’ and see Han migration as an integral part of that strategy. He cites a PRC article which “…explicitly acknowledged that the state was now aiming at fostering increased migrations to national minority areas in order to dilute the ethnic populations in the border areas and strengthen national unity.”54
Becquelin tells us that according to Marxist theory, an increased standard of living will quell ethnic tensions. In other words, if minorities have more economic opportunity, they won’t cause trouble. This has, Becquelin says, been the official PRC argument for some time. Becquelin now cites another interesting change in the PRC’s perception. The PRC now acknowledges that increased development in Xinjiang will create more ethnic strife and unrest.
It is possible that this reflects the PRC’s growing confidence in its ability to control the region.
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Michael Friderich wrote an essay titled Uyghur Literary Representations of Xinjiang Realities. In it, he looks at Uyghur literature in order to disseminate how
the Uyghurs perceive themselves. He also makes interesting observations on how In Becquelin’s mind, this change in PRC rhetoric is very significant.
52 Nicolas Becquelin, 2004. p. 54
53 Nicolas Becquelin, 2004. p. 54
54 Nicolas Becquelin, 2004. p. 60
55 Nicolas Becquelin, 2004. pp. 60-61
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the Uyghurs view their relationships with China, the West, and nearby Islamic elements. Friederich argues that Uyghur poets fear that their culture is under attack.56 He points out that writing poems about Uyghur culture and history resemble a “high-wire act.”57
Also interesting were Friderich’s comments on cultural isolation. He argues that location and politics have led the Uyghurs to feel cut off from the rest of the world. Firstly, anything that the Uyghurs get from the West comes via China. It is translated by Chinese scholars and – one can assume – scrutinized very closely before being passed on to Xinjiang.
Anything written by Uyghurs about culture or history comes under intense Chinese scrutiny. Because of political sensitivities, this can hardly be surprising.
58 Some Uyghurs are, Friederich claims, “…unable or
unwilling to read in Chinese.” If texts are only provided in Mandarin, this surely makes it difficult to absorb anything from the West.59 Secondly, contact with neighboring Islamic nations is, of course, closely monitored and generally discouraged.
56 Michael Frederich, Uyghur Representations of Xinjiang Realities, in Situating the Uyghurs Between China and Central Asia (Ashgate Publishing, 2007) p. 94
57 Michael Frederich, 2007. p. 94
58 Michael Frederich, 2007. p. 102
59 Michael Frederich, 2007. p. 103