4. Security issues and the military asymmetry of the Cross-Strait
5.2 The concept of asymmetric triangles
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second Taiwan Strait crisis, in which the fightings concentrated on the islands of Matzu and Jinmen or Quemoy, which were under Taipei’s governance. Neither of the conflicts ended in heated war, although it could have happened, and Washington took the ROC’s side in both crises, aiding Taipei against the PLA, the Chinese army and helping resolve the starting conflicts.
In the upcoming years, the intonation of the bilateral connections between Washington and Taipei and Washington and Beijing started shifting. The importance of future relations between the US and the PRC was realized by both parties and connections were slowly established. Richard Nixon’s official visit to China in 1972 and the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué were the first direct steps taken to the normalization of the relations. Shortly afterwards, in 1979, officially diplomatic ties between Washington and Taipei were cut and such connections were established between the US and China. However, non-official relations still held Washington and Taipei together.
Additionally, in the same year, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was passed by the Congress of the US. As part of this act, Washington promised to keep protecting Taiwan and to maintain the unofficial relations. It also maked the US’s responsibility to answer any nonpeaceful attacks and threats that the island may receive. Furthermore, weaponry and arms sales to Taiwan were promised, to strengthen the ROC’s defenses.
Peaceful connections were and are maintained ever since, with the intonation of the connections occasionally shifting for various reasons. The third Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 is the only notable event that bought major changes in the relations, at least for a given time. Beijing held missile testings in the seas near the islands of Taiwan to show its disproval of the ROC’s possible actions to gain a more important role in the international community and to influence the results of the first democratic elections held in 1996. The US came to aid Taiwan, but the breakout of an actual conflict was yet again avoided.
5.2 The concept of asymmetric triangles
The theory of asymmetric triangles challenges the traditional view of international relations the same way the concept of asymmetric connections did: it is based on the
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thought that not all interacting participants are equal, or notedly are equal in sense of their power. (Womack 2010)
The theory of international triangular relationships was developed by Lowell Dittmer in the beginning of the 1980s, taking the connection between the Soviet Union, the US and China as bases. Triangular relations have to meet certain criteria if they are to be placed into this theoretical framework. All three included parties have to be rational states with full sovereignty. Developments in the bilateral connections between any two actors have to be relevant to the third party. The three actors’
national securities have to be at stake and concerned. (Womack 2010, Wu 2000) Despite the fact that the fulfillment of the first criteria may be questioned – concerning Taiwan’s sovereignty – several scholars have taken US-China-Taiwan triangular relations when describing their thoughts on this concept.
A differentiation has to be made between hard and soft triangles. In the prior, the individual, bilateral relations of the countries have major effects on the connections to the third state. In the case of soft triangles, the relationship to the third party influences the bilateral relations but do not determine them. The US-China-Taiwan triangle – a mini-triangle - is a unique one as the connections forming a triangle can clearly be seen and as the relationship can be dated back several decades. Any changes in any of the three bilateral relations had and have an effect on the third actor and its connections. As a result, the connection between any two states that are examined has to receive special attention. It has to be mentioned that a fourth party, Japan can be listed as an additionally distant actor of the currently studied connection. (Womack 2010)
Looking at Lowell Dittmer’s strategic triangle typology, four separate types can be identified: ménage à trois (all three members are amities), marriage (two hostile connections and a friendly one), romantic triangle (two amities and one enmity) and unit veto (all connections are belligerent). (See Figure 4.1) Within these four types, six roles can be identified, of which one is taken by each actor in the triangular relations:
friend, partner, outcast, wing, pivot and foe. With these types and roles a three state connection can be studied. Amity and enmity between the other two parties is usually both suitable for the third player, the latter protecting it for the other two actors allying against it. (Womack 2010)
All triangular connections come with a payoff for the states. This payoff can be raised by increasing the role of the actor, which can be done by turning hostile
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triangle, in which the actor that operated the changes would have a better position. The most stable triangle, where there are no losers and the payoff is minimized for all parties is the ménage à trois. (Womack 2010)The difference between the powers and the capabilities of the three actors can be introduced for the theory to match the connections in reality. The three parties – X, Y and Z – can be related in four ways: symmetrical triangle (X=Y=Z), single-head dual asymmetric triangle (X>Y=Z), twin-head dual asymmetric triangle (X=Y>Z) and triple asymmetric triangle (X>Y>Z). Keeping good connections to a stronger state is more valued than with a weaker country. The advantages and disadvantages that the party, which results in stability being what the strongest actor of the three decides it to be. An asymmetric triangle can only last long if it the situation satisfies the greatest state. (Womack 2010)
Placing the US-China-Taiwan connection into the asymmetric triangular theory, it can be concluded that, with occasional tilting on the PRC’s direction, the US is continuously balancing between the two other states. This makes it the pivot in Dittmer’s romantic type of triangle. In the power built up, it is assumed that the US is the strongest, leaving even China behind, so the triangle can be drawn up as the following: X>Y>Z, making it a triple asymmetric triangle and all bilateral relations asymmetric. This has been the unchanged situation since 1972. This can be so, because the US is comfortable with its pivot status, hence it has not tried to change the built up of the triangle. (Womack 2010)
As the above conclusion is made, romantic type and triple asymmetric triangles should be studied more thoroughly. As described in the section introducing the theory of asymmetry, acknowledgment for deference (AFD) brings equilibrium into bilateral asymmetric connections. In triple asymmetric relations, this equilibrium exists between the pivot, X and the two states it connections with, in other words it can be found in the XY and XZ relations. (See Figure 4.2) However Y and Z do not have
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that is what Z wants. This is the relationship that X has to intervene in. (Womack 2010)This state of XY, XZ connections had to be fought for and earned as well and presently it is because these AFD relations are secured that YZ cannot reach similar equilibrium. Looking at this from Z’s perspective, it did not defer to – but maybe will in the future – however it wanted to have Y’s acknowledgment but got X’s instead. As the connection is made, the strongest power, X, will not see Z pressured by Y. Y could have challenged X in the past, but they have settled in an AFD connection, so Y cannot oppose X’ protection of Z. However X is not only capable of limiting Y, but can also push Z into a direction that it finds suitable, as through the AFD connections, it can affect both Y’s and Z’s actions. X can prevent the other two states settling their differences by any means and enforce a status quo. In other words, it is X stopping YZ to become an AFD relation. The stability of XY and XZ will destabilize YZ. The triangle is held together by X. (Womack 2010)
Despite the statements above, the status of the pivot is not always easy and X will gain less with this position, as the other countries will with theirs. The ratio of costs and benefits may after some point seem too low for X, leading to a decision of parting with the pivot’s position. This is especially true when the relationship between Y and Z escalates and X needs additional resources and capabilities to prevent a possible conflict, adding to X’s already high costs. X may be an unwilling pivot, with only finding itself in that situation, presumable through its separate connections to Y and Z.
(Womack 2010)
Multilateral connections come with uncertainty. This uncertainty can be lowered by negotiations and coordination among the parties. In triangular connections it is especially important to pay attention to the bilateral relations and to construct and follow coherent policies in their connections to the other two actors. Besides the international aspects of the three party relationships, the domestic reception of the triangular connection and the efforts that are placed into maintaining the triangle has to be mentioned. (Womack 2010)
X’s limited benefits and relatively big burden mostly likely will not be welcomed in its domestic politics. The situation may be labeled as stuck and the government of X may be pushed into a certain direction by its political circle and its public. These directions could be a final peace reached between Y and Z or X taking either’s side
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prior the situation would be secured, resulting in less responsibility for X. Taking Y’s side may end in Z yielding to Y and forming an AFD connection. Siding Z would give a more complex picture with a stronger Z and a possible hostile Y. As a final scenario, X could just exit the triangle and leave it to Y and Z to resolve their belligerent connection. (Womack 2010)Y’s position in the triangle can be summarized by one word: frustration. If not for X’s presence, it could have solved its “Z problem”. The public of Y is antipathetic towards X’s involvement, but are still aware of the other country’s greater power. Y can either accept X’s presence and the peace that it wants to achieve or convincing X to take its side. It can also raise the costs of protecting Z, until a certain point where X finds it too expensive to defend the smallest of the three. As a final and rather long running alternative is for Y to wait until X values their relations above the triangle and Z and so would let Z fall into the hands of Y. In the first two scenarios Y acknowledges X’s superior role and so are pro-X. The latter two are anti-X, accordingly would be costly for Y to achieve and may result in a closer connection between X and Z. (Womack 2010)
Z is vulnerable in the triangle. Y does not acknowledge, in other words disregards its autonomy and its ally, X, has friendly connections with Y. It wants to end this uncertain situation by minimizing the risk and by reducing the anxiety that weighs on it. Z knows its current autonomy is the result of X’s efforts and wonders what would happen to it without the greatest state in the triangle. Z has three choices to choose from to achieve its goal: get X’s unquestionable support against Y, somehow initiate a conflict between Y and X or start a conflict with Y, hoping that X will run to its aid.
The help of X is not certain and this could also be a decision made by Z’s desperation to end the tension. As an addition option, Z could look for an ally against Y outside the triangle, involving a fourth participant. (Womack 2010)
It has to be noted that Yu-Shan Wu, when discussed the US-China-Taiwan triangular connections, pointed out two particular flaws in the logic of the above described theory and its application in the current triangle. The concept does not take the domestic factor and changes into consideration, perhaps just in X’s case. Wu stresses the importance of these possible changes in the cases of democratic US and Taiwan, but the shifting of political attitudes can also occur in China. Another blemish is the theory’s inattention towards the international system outside the triangle and the
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PRC is Y and Taiwan being the weakest Z out of the three. It should be noted here that the type of asymmetric triangle chosen to describe these relations may be a false one.It can be argued that the US is not necessarily stronger or greater than China or at least not in every aspect. As a result, this triangle would fall under another category, the twin-head dual asymmetric triangle (X=Y>Z), with Taiwan still being the weakest, but with X and Y, the US and the PRC, being equal, to at least some extend.
As in the above described theory, the triangular connection was placed into the triple asymmetric category, this will be accepted and used for the following parts of the current chapter. If the decision of shifting the US-China-Taiwan triangle into the twin-head dual asymmetric type was made, a different analysis would have to be built and presented. This not being the purpose of the current thesis, the discussed triangle will be treated as a triple asymmetric one. However, the fact that the present situation may change is acknowledged and it can be stated that in the future, this triangle may shift towards being a twin-head dual asymmetric typed triangle.
As mentioned in the section of the description of the asymmetric connections theory, it has to be noted here as well that other scholars have also been examining the asymmetric nature of given triangular relations. Yu-Shan Wu’s work can be discussed again here.
In one of his articles, Wu describes Lowell Dittmer’s concept and broadens it, with taking the economic and military powers of the three actors into framework of the theory and merging the concept with a realist viewpoint. With this shift, the study of the bilateral and the multilateral aspects of the relations change as well, leaving the traditional construction of the theory behind. This shift also allows Wu to build up a more complex picture and study in the given topic, which he does through examining alliances that form and break apart among the three states of the strategic triangle. (Wu 2011)
The theory is applied to the alliance system of East Asia during and after the Cold War period, up till 2009-2010, forming between China, the Soviet Union, the US and the collective of Taiwan, Korea and Japan, while extending the concept of triangular relations by including a greater number of actors. (Wu 2011)
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