Chapter 2: Accounting for the Difference
8. Conclusion
The research in this chapter established the likely impacts of the Upper Mekong (Lancang) dam cascade as described in the scientific literature available, and the
associated costs and benefits of those impacts. This, in turn, allows for the research to examine potential frameworks on impact science that are available to decision-makers within China in regards to hydropower development. These various frameworks will be examined in relation to the policies, campaigns, statements made in regards to the Upper Mekong cascade as a potential gauge of the role of science in decision-making in
domestic hydropower development in the next chapter.
The research questions for this chapter have been addressed through a thorough examination of the available literature on the cascades current and potential impacts on the Mekong basin. While limited to a smaller number of articles than those available for a truly complete literature review on the subject, the research covers the major, and some of the more subtle, disputes within the scientific literature on and so represents a fair
80
assessment of the current state of research on the subject. The chart below addresses the first research question of this chapter, “what variations exist (if any) in the scientific literature on the Lancang Cascades impacts (current and potential)?”
Scientific findings and frameworks
Hydrology
Significant existing impacts
Insignificant current impacts
(+) Wet to dry season flow shift (-) Wet to dry season flow shift
Manwan, Dachaoshan, and Jinghong dams have already noticeably change the hydrological regime
None of the dams have had a noticeable impact on the weekly, monthly, and annual timescale
Increased navigation, flood prevention, irrigation opportunities
Poses risk to SE Asia’s food security via decreased agricultural production & fishing yields; negative impact on ecosystem and biodiversity; changes to river morphology
Sediment
Significant existing impacts
Insignificant current impacts
(-) Future impacts to sediment flow
Manwan, Dachaoshan, and Jinghong dams have already noticeably changed the sediment flow past Chiang Saen
The Mekong is currently able to absorb increased sediment flow from Yunnan, likely through both the Upper Mekong dams and natural “buffering”. Chiang Saen has been experiencing a general sediment decrease since the pre-dam era.
A complete Upper Mekong cascade will lead to an eventual decrease from China to as low as 5% of natural sediment flow volume.
81 (+) Future impacts to sediment
flow
China is significant source of sediment
China is not main source of sediment in Lower Mekong
A complete Upper Mekong cascade will lead to an eventual decrease of the sediment flow, benefiting navigation and expulsion of flood water
The Upper Mekong in China is responsible for roughly 50% of downstream sediment in the Lower Mekong.
The Upper Mekong in China is not the primary source of Lower Mekong sediment, due in part to coarseness of the silt.
Ecosystem
Dams will create a physical barrier for migrating fish, and change migration signals for the fish, negatively impacting spawning rates.
Four principals of ecosystem impacts, sediment decreases, and channel clearing will decrease the biodiversity of the Mekong
Decrease in fish habitats for animal and plant species more specifically attuned to the flood pulse and habitat distribution
Social
Communities will benefit from opportunities created from improved access to infrastructure, job opportunities, and compensation money
A number of communities will be forced to subsist on poorly quality land and/or go into jobs for which they have no training (less embodied wealth). Populations will be more reliant on less stable jobs.
A generally decline in quality of life as psychological stress, wealth disparities, and gender gaps grow, while relational wealth declines.
Chart 2: A summary of scientific consensuses.
82
In turn the second research question of this chapter, “if differences in findings are present, what are the sources of those differences?” As to be expected with scientific literature the differences, at least for the biophysical impacts – impacts to the hydrology, sediment flow, and ecosystem of the Mekong – derived from differences in the available datasets, and the methods used to make conclusions. For the most part, the responses to the data were measured, practical, and rarely went beyond what the data could describe to be the truth of the matter, again as to be expected with scientific literature.
The interesting finding, with nearly all of the articles, was that despite relative disagreement over the impacts of the existing dams on the Mekong as it is now, there seemed rather unanimous agreement that the completed cascade will definitely have profound influence on the Mekong in the future. The difference lies with the emphasis on what these changes will bring, and to what extent. The positives of the dams construction almost entirely to socioeconomic, and to a lesser extent geopolitical, impacts. The
benefits being the electricity produced from the dams, improved navigation, improved irrigation opportunities through higher dry season flows, and flood protection from lower wet season flows. The future negative impacts of the Lancang fall almost entirely on the biophysical, as seen above.
“Considering the estimations on the cumulative hydrological and sediment related changes caused by the Lancang-Jiang cascade together with further hydropower development, it is not difficult to foresee that the Mekong River Basin is subject to undergo massive changes. The hydropower development will have various negative but also positive impacts on multiple sectors. It will be challenging task for the Mekong countries to balance between the pros and cons of the hydropower development.”
(Rasanen et al 2012, 3509).
These impacts, along with those associated with land use changes, both positive and negative, will be experienced within the basin over the coming years and decade as the cascade nears full completion, while the impacts of climate change will be experienced on a much longer timescale but with concurrent influences.
83
This general basis of the science behind the impacts establishes the foundation for more pointed inquiry into the decision-making process and its use of science. In the next chapter, this information will be contextualized to the landscape of hydropower
development policies within China, and the influence – or lack thereof – on the decision-making process over time.
84
Chapter 3: Parallel Policy Streams & Actors’ Use of Science
This chapter seeks to understand both the dominant parallel policy streams surrounding hydropower development on the upper Mekong, and also the relevant actors and their positions relative to decision-making. In addition, their use of scientific
discourse on dam impacts will be identified and analyzed. Through this examination, it will become possible to offer answers to the following questions originally asked by Magee (2005): first, what counts as water science? Second, to what degree is such science counted in development, management, and policy decisions? Each of these questions also raises further questions of who decides what water science is, and who decides how much it counts in the decision-making process? An examination of relevant actors and their positions will be examined to understand the changing use of scientific discourse over time and its use, or lack thereof, within development decisions, and subsequent promotion and/or defense of these decisions.
The placement and use of science within decision-making cannot be examined without first understanding the context in which hydropower development exists within China therefore, to begin this chapter I will lay out the primary policy streams that have shaped hydropower development in China.
1. Contextualizing Hydropower Development
The science behind the cascade and its impact is inextricably linked with political campaigns, development, domestic energy needs, and other environmental problems.
Therefore, before exploring the use of science in relation to hydropower development policy, the context and framework by which hydropower development on the Lancang first needs to be explained. The following subsections trace other policy streams, frameworks, and policies that legitimize large-scale hydropower development on the Upper Mekong within China. Much of these trends focus on a push by the central government for modernization through hydropower exploitation, a process Chinese scholars and officials are quick to point out occurred within western states in the US (Magee 2006a). Hydropower’s role in the United States’ rise in economic and political
85
prominence is often cited as “justification that China should be allowed to exploit its own abundant hydropower resources as part of its ‘peaceful ascent’ as a new world power”
(Magee 2006a, 192).
1.1 Domestic Energy Needs and the “Send Electricity East” Campaign
By 2050, the total consumption of primary energy in China is expected to reach the energy equivalent of roughly 3.9-4.9 giga tons of coal (Kang et al 2013). The demand for electric power within China has increased significantly since the late-1990s, when the influence of economic reforms came into full swing. The main driver of this growth in energy demand arose from the industrial sector, but also through an increasing Chinese middle class with more disposable incomes. Hydropower currently supplies roughly 16%
of China’s total electricity (Rosen and Houser 2007), reaching roughly 249 GW
(exceeding combined installed capacity of the USA, Canada, and Brazil) in 2012 (Hennig et al 2013), and is viewed as a key source of power for continued development. Within Yunnan itself, >90GW of hydropower is planned, with almost half installed (Hennig et al 2013).
Figure 6: Growth of China’s installed power and hydropower capacity (Source: Hennig et al 2013, 586)
4.3. Transmission lines . . . 591
PR China's GDP growth has been the highest in the world for years. The rapidly growing economic development is inevitably accompanied with an increasing demand for energy in general and electric power in particular. China has been fast developing its energy sector in order to sustain its impressive economic growth and provide electricity for the most populated state.
The challenge of the rapidly growing energy and power sector in the 21st century is unique worldwide. A key issue within the present and future energy sector strategy is to generate and supply electrical energy for the rapidly growing economy and urban population, as well as mitigating carbon emissions. Finding a proper solution for this energy bottleneck will determine the economic, social and sustainability future of China.
In 1980, in the early years of China's economic liberalization, it had merely 66 GW of installed capacity, today it has 1139 GW globally the largest capacity (seeFig. 1). This extremely fast growth is unparalleled in the world. Presently, China adds a new installed capacity in less than two years that is comparable to the entire installed capacity of a strong West European economy like Germany or France. Despite this strong growth, China's power sector faces temporary cyclic shortages. The latest were in 2002–
2005 and in 2010–2011.
With the breakup of the former Chinese Ministry of Energy in 1997 and the subsequent State Power Corporation in 2002, Chinese power generation was separated from the grid but also from the project planning. As a result of these reforms, large state owned holdings emerged in their field. These holdings control about half of the Chinese power market and are becoming increasingly active on a global scale.
China's primary energy resource is still coal. About two third of the installed capacity is thermal power (mainly coal, but also gas
and petroleum); its share in the energy production output is even higher. Although China's coal use grows fast and steadily, over the last years the country closed about 77 GW of old, small or inefficient thermal power plants. Aside from the massive devel-opment of thermal power stations, China is seriously working in diversifying its power mix and reducing the ratio of carbon emissions.
These developments place regenerative energy, mainly hydro-power, in a prominent role in China's present and future energy sector strategy. China has an ambitious target of meeting 15% of its primary energy demand with renewable energy by 2020. This share should be increased to 20% in 2030. In that scenario the role of hydropower in power generation is substantially greater than any other renewable energy technology.
Therefore, the present growth and dynamic of China's hydro-power sector is in a dimension which is globally unique. In 2012 an immense 249 GW were generated by hydropower (see Fig. 1).
In the global context China ranks first and has by far the highest installed hydropower capacity and the largest annual growth.
These 249 GW are so high that it exceeds the cumulative installed capacity of the USA, Canada and Brazil, which rank directly behind China (see Fig. 2). Over the last years China added in average between 15 and 20 GW/year in new hydropower capacity[1].
Within China, the province of Yunnan, plays a key role in its future hydropower scenario. Yunnan has been implementing 490 GW of hydropower, of which currently almost half is installed. At present makes Yunnan one of the largest hydropower generating regions worldwide. Additional Yunnan has an unique geographic and geopolitical setting. It is characterized by its unique bio-, geo- and ethnic diversity as well as by its six important basins, four of which are international. These unique features have caused a special scientific interest in Yunnan's hydropower development[1–5].
We aim to analyze three major objectives. First, we study the present state of Yunnan's specific and unique hydropower development. Second, we compare social and environmental
Fig. 1. Growth of China's installed power and hydropower capacity (selected years). Fig. 2. Comparison of the installed capacity and generated electricity of the four leading hydropower nations in 2012.
T. Hennig et al. / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 27 (2013) 585–595 586
86
As Magee (2006a, 2006b) posits, regional development in Guangdong may also be a primary driver behind Yunnan’s hydropower development, as a number of political campaigns aimed at both poverty alleviation and a redistribution of energy resources drive development. Several long-standing development campaigns relate directly to this energy transfer drive: “Send Electricity East” (西電東送), “Send Yunnan Electricity to Guangdong” and “Send Tibetan Electricity Outward”. The first two campaigns
mentioned are of particular importance, as they are the most prevalent among hydropower related policies. All of the campaigns are attempts to harness the power potential of China’s western rivers to continue to meet the large power demands from the large cities in the east, specifically those in Guangdong (Magee 2006a; Tilt et al 2009).
The “Send Western Electricity East” began in the 1980s out of central authorities attempts to tap Yunnan’s Yuan River. During that time, authorities stated, “developing the abundant hydropower resources of western China is a necessary choice for the economic and social development of the country” (Magee 2006a, p64). In June 1988 and April 1991, two meetings between the Guangdong and Yunnan electric power authorities, and government planners from Beijing, created the “Two Provinces, Four Sides
Agreement” (兩省四方協議). The agreement called for cooperation between Yunnan, Guangdong, and central power authorities to make Yunnan – specifically through the construction of the Xiaowan and later the Nuozhadu dams – into a key electricity
producing base for sending electricity to south-central China (Guangdong) (Magee 2006a;
China News 2009). The transfer did not begin until June 1993 by the then Yunnan
Electric Power Group, when the first seasonal electricity from Yunnan to Guangdong was sent (Magee 2006a).
After the launch of the Western Development Campaign in 2000 (described below), the transfer project was prioritized among the second set of major projects in 2001 (Magee 2006a, 2006b; China News 2009). According to Peng (2004), by the
beginning of 2004 Yunnan had increased generation capacity dedicated to Guangdong by 500% since 1993, from 300 MW to 1,800 MW. Over that ten year period, among the five provinces in the China Southern Power Grid (Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Hainan, and Guangdong), Yunnan accounted for 40% of the sales to Guangdong over the 10th
five- 87
year plan (FYP) (2001-2005). Indeed, the dams of the Upper Mekong (Lancang) cascade were singled out as specific and necessary components of campaign, with the 1350 MW Dachaoshan called a “strong solider” in the “army of power plants” providing electricity for the program (Chen 2003), along with justifications for the Xiaowan dam being based on the Guangdong electricity market (Yang 2001; Magee 2006a). Indeed, Guangdong province alone invested roughly 35 million RMB in preliminary planning and design work for the Xiaowan dam and Changzhou hydropower station in Guangxi (Pang 2001;
Magee 2006a).
China’s domestic energy needs, especially those of the large economic center of Guangdong, provided a clear incentive for the authorities in Yunnan, Guangdong, and Beijing to address the electricity needs of the region. Magee (2006a, 2006b, 2011), suggests that beyond the desire to helped the relatively impoverished Yunnan develop, and to provide Guangdong with a needed electricity, central authorities in Beijing may have sought to make the provinces more reliant on one another. Guangdong has spent significant amount of time securing electricity transfer agreements southwestern
provinces, both investing the most money in the program and likewise being the greatest recipient of regional electricity exports (Magee 2006a). Indeed, the province receives roughly 30-40% of its electricity from outside the province, 10% of which derives from the program (Magee 2006a, 2006b). As Yunnan has become other sole net exporters of electricity in the region, it is clear that the province became a major focus of Guangdong province. With the completion of the Xiaowan in 2010, power dedicated to Guangdong from Yunnan reached roughly 10,000 MW, further confirmed Yunnan’s role as a “battery”
for southeast China, a concept seen again in Yunnan’s role as an integrative force with southeast Asia, described below.
The problem stream of development and energy needs in southeast China provided a strong incentive by all the governmental bodies involved – Yunnan, Guangdong, and Beijing – to use Yunnan’s vast hydropower potential to address the problem. Decision-makers in all three areas quickly created and enhanced the “Send Western Electricity East” policy as a rather direct policy stream solution. Hydropower, as seen several times below, fell into a very receptive and encouraging politics stream in which the energy source was viewed nearly as a “win-win” situation for both Yunnan and
88
Guangdong. As will be further supported below, large-hydropower projects a number of times fell in line with developmental goals of the central government, even despite changes to strategies and course changes.
Map 3: A nation-wide map from the electricity transfers from western China to eastern China via large transmissions lines
(Source: Henning et al 2013, 588)
range of climatic settings, this region is one of the core areas around the world for hydropower development.
China's hydro bases are well suited for cascade and stage development of river basins. Considering that potential with other parameters, like submergence, related costs of relocation, con-struction costs of dams and transmission lines, etc. China has given priority in the early surveys to developing the Yellow River, the upper Yangtze, the Hongshui and the Wu rivers. In later surveys, as well as in the context of China's ambitious Western Development Program, the following rivers were favoured: Jinsha/upper part of Yangtze, Lancang/Mekong, Dadu, Yalong and Nu/Salween. In early
2011 China officially announced ideas of developing the Yarlung Tsangpo as one of the country's largest hydropower bases.
One challenge of hydropower development is the uneven intra-and inter-annual runoff distribution, which causes large differ-ences between the rainy and dry seasons. This results in a large quantity of non-beneficial spillage during the rainy season and deficient generation in the dry season. In that period, hydropower must be supplemented, mainly by thermal power. To reduce this discrepancy, China invests large sums in the construction of pumped storage systems. Compared to large scale hydropower stations, the large scale pumped storage projects are mainly
One challenge of hydropower development is the uneven intra-and inter-annual runoff distribution, which causes large differ-ences between the rainy and dry seasons. This results in a large quantity of non-beneficial spillage during the rainy season and deficient generation in the dry season. In that period, hydropower must be supplemented, mainly by thermal power. To reduce this discrepancy, China invests large sums in the construction of pumped storage systems. Compared to large scale hydropower stations, the large scale pumped storage projects are mainly