The concept of representedness helps to direct our attention from the
container-centered approach to a subject-centered one in understanding how well EU
citizens are being represented. We can thus refrain from placing blames on either the European or the national level. Concerns over democratic deficit are no longer about whether there is or there isn’t one. The concept of representedness allows us to compare the degree to which interests of citizens are reflected in public policies before and after decision-making power is transferred to the European level.Abandoning the either/or dichotomy, the representedness approach highlights the importance of focusing on the room for improvement in designing institutions and making policies that can better represent citizens.
The previous sections have established that in the absence of conditions
mechanisms/conducive to the working of accountability, the degree to which citizen interests are reflected in public policies has decreased due to the reduced possibilities for citizens to hold policy makers accountable once decision-making power is
transferred to the European level. Treating the EU as an independent regulator meant to be insulated from voters is equally problematic because, unlike in the domestic context, the superimposed EU is not ensconced in a corresponding society. Yet it is important to note that the loss of representedness may not have been caused entirely by European integration per se: it is quite possible that globalization would have created an even greater hiatus between interests of citizens and policy outcomes had the EU not stepped in. This is not to say that however the current design and practices are they are necessarily the best possible design and practices in reflecting citizen preferences. The subject-centered approach reveals how representedness is lost in the
way when the transfer occurs. In this section I focus on the missing links and possible ways to regain the representedness of citizens.
Whether we look at the loss of representedness through the institution design
(discussed in section one) or the failure to gain representedness by way of enhancing problem-solving capacity (discussed in section two), voters’ inability to understand and influence policy output seems to be the key. Without sufficient publicity of decision making, even if there are periodical elections, they cannot be seen as an effective retrospective way of rewarding or sanctioning politicians (Strøm, 2000). In addition, publicity of decision making can even change representatives’ policy preferences. Having to be prepared to justify their standpoints publicly renders representatives more committed to beliefs and values that are generally acceptable (Elster, 1998). However, publicity may have this effect only if representatives consider voters competent (Setälä, 2006).
Whenever information, knowledge, publicity of decision making, and voter competence were made an issue in EU governance, scholars unconvinced of the existence of the EU’s democratic deficit would quickly point out that voters are ignorant not just about European affairs: In the domestic context voters have limited knowledge about the impact of policies on their welfare when casting votes in national and local elections as well (Becker, 1958, 1983; Peltzman 1976; Stigler, 1975). If voter ignorance is not considered as detrimental to the representedness of citizens at the national level, neither should it be at the European level.
Indeed, in most democracies, citizens’ control over policy makers is at best highly imperfect. When voters have incomplete information, the chains of accountability can never work well enough to induce representation. Accordingly, elections are far from sufficient in insuring that governments would do their best to maximize citizens’
interests (Fearon, 1999; Manin, Bernard, Przeworski, and Susan 1999b, pp. 44-50).
Imperfection in the working of the chains of accountability, however, does not render
accountability irrelevant. The fact that chains of accountability become lingering threads when decision-making power is transferred to the EU still has significant implications. Where voters possess only limited substantial information and knowledge about issues and candidates, they tend to follow elite cues and rely on party identification when casting votes. Using heuristics and informational shortcuts is considered both efficient and rational for voters given limited time, energy and ability (Bartels, 1996; Downs 1957, p. 259; Lupia, 1994; 2001; 2006; Popkin, 1991, p.14).That domestic voters have something to refer to when exercising their power of
democratic control even in the absence of substantial information and knowledge is crucial information in assessing whether some citizen representedness is being lost when the policy-making power is transferred to the EU. Taking availability of
substantial information and heuristics and informational shortcuts as the key
elements of voter competence, I demonstrate how citizen representedness is reduced when voter competence decreases.
Based on the voter competence view, it is reasonable to assume that if
(1) Accessing substantial information is as—but not more—difficult for citizens in the European context as it is in the national context,
(2) Citizens can compensate for the lack of information and knowledge by following elite cues and party identification in the EU as they can within their own countries,
then handing policy-making power to the EU should have little impact on the representedness of citizens. The reality, however, is that not only is it significantly more difficult for citizens to obtain information regarding policies made by the EU than by their own governments, but using elite cues and party identification as informational shortcuts is also much more difficult at the European level. I will
analyze the latter first. To the extent that voters fail to process on their own substantial information on issues and policies, elite cues and party identification become the main factors in determining whether those considered accountable for policy outcomes will be rewarded or punished by voters. Given the homogeneity of elite views on
European integration as reflected in positions of political parties and mainstream media (Parsons, 2007, p. 1139), not only are voters left with a narrow range of choices at elections, but picking up elite cues and voting according to party identification will also not yield different policy outcomes.
Even if positions on European integration among domestic political parties are sufficiently pluralistic and elite cues can be followed in a meaningful way, the low availability of substantial information still constitutes a problem for voter competence.
This is because voters do not rely exclusively on elite cues and party identification at all times. If voters simply cast their votes as were instructed by parties or elites they most identify with, accountability becomes irrelevant. Under such circumstances, whether public policies are made at national or European level would make little difference; as far as voters have elites they trust and parties they identify with, the level of representedness would appear to be maintained regardless of the level in which decision-making takes place. Studies have shown, however, voters do not simply cast their votes as were instructed by the political parties and elites they most
identify with without exercising any independent judgments. Rather, parties and elites serve only as a filter for voters to interpret policy implications assess past
performance. In other words, while voters’ assessment of the compatibility of a proposition or a candidate is heavily influenced by parties and elite cues, a direct relationship still exists between issues/policies on the one hand and the average, not-very-knowledgeable voters on the other. The more knowledgeable a voter is about issues and policy implications, the more capable she is in assessing the compatibility of a proposition or a candidate with her own preferences (Hobolt, 2009; Harrington, 1993; Popkin, 1991, p. 14). Information, in other words, can be filtered by elites and parties, but not replaced by them.
Hence, to the extent that voters do exercise independent judgments it matters if information regarding policies and issues is readily available. To the extent voters are taking shortcuts through parties and elites, it matters what it is that parties and elites are filtering for voters. At the national level, whether voters bother to receive and process information regarding policies and issues or not, such information is usually readily available. The same cannot be said about the EU. At the national level, parties and elites filter for voters what is being debated at the domestic political and public policy arena. At the European level, parties and elites still filter for voters what is being debated at the domestic political arena. It is in this sense that accountability is considered to be functioning satisfactorily at the national but not the European level.
With reduced voter competence, the representedness of citizens is unlikely to remain at the same level when policy-making is shifted to the European level.
Conclusion
Is there room for improvement in bringing EU policies closer to citizens’ welfare and interests? The prevalent what is, is right mentality presumes the EU institution design to be good enough and that citizens are being well represented. According to this view, the reduced opportunities for citizens to influence policies are worthwhile given that the necessarily capable regulatory EU state is bound to solve more problems and take better care of citizens. This paper used the concept of representedness to gauge the loss and gain occurred since policy-making power was transferred to the EU. Through the examination of institutional design where a loss of representedness is thought to have occurred, and the problem-solving capability of the EU where a gain of
represented is thought to have taken place, I found that while there is overwhelming evidence for the loss of representedness, such loss rarely transforms into increased
problem-solving capability as planned. In order to bring citizen representedness back as much as possible to the Pareto front line, a lot more institutional creativity is required to mend the loss of citizen representedness. Given that the reason for the loss and the failure to gain citizen representedness can both be traced to the low voter competence, more attention needs to be paid to voter competence in the future reforms of the EU. If democracy originally meant ‘the capacity to act in order to effect change lay with a public composed of many choice-making individuals,’ or simply ‘the capacity of a public to do things’ (Ober, 2008, p. 5; p. 12), then ignorance and low voter competence should not be treated as a given, but something the
government needs to work on to capacitate the community in order to gain the
‘democratic advantage’ against rivals and competitors.
About the Author
Chien-Yi Lu, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 64 Wan Shou Rd., Wen Shan District, 11666, Taipei, Taiwan; email: cyl@nccu.edu.tw
Notes
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the UACES Exchanging Ideas on Europe 2010—Europe at Crossroads in September 2010 at the College of Europe, Bruges
1 Such as policing financial markets, controlling the risks of new products and new technologies, protecting the health and economic interests of consumers, reducing environmental pollution, etc. Majone, 1994, 85.
References
Bartels, Larry. (1996) ‘Uninformed Voters: Information Effects in Presidential Elections’, American Journal of Political Science 40 (1), 194-230.
Becker, Gary S. (1958) ‘Competition and Democracy’, Journal of Law and
Economics 1, 105-9.
Becker, Gary S. (1983) ‘A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 371-400.
Bekkers, V., Dijkstra, G., Edwards, A. and Fenger, M. (2007) ‘Governance and the Democratic Deficit: An Evaluation’, in Governance and the Democratic
Deficit – Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices,
edited by V. Bekkers, G. Dijkstra, A. Edwards and M. Fenger. Aldershot:Ashgate, 295-312.
Bekkers, V., Dijkstra, G., Edwards, A. and Fenger, M. (2007) Governance and the
Democratic Deficit – Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Practices, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bevir, Mark. (2010) Democratic Governance. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dahl, Robert. (1971) Polyarchy—Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Downs, Anthony. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York:
Harper-Collins.
Elster, Jon. (1998) ‘Deliberation and Constitution Making. In Deliberative
Democracy’, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fearon, James D. (1999) ‘Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians:
Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance’, In Democracy,
Accountability, and Representation, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan C.
Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 55-97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harrington, Joseph E. (1993) ‘Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections’, American Economic Review 83, 27-42.
Hayek, Friedrich A. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic
Review 35, 519-30.
Hilson, C. (2006) ‘EU Citizenship and the Principle of Affectedness’, in R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione, and J. Shaw (eds.), Making European Citizens—Civic
Inclusion in a Transnational Context. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.
56-74.
Hix, Simon. (1998) ‘Elections, Parties and Institutional Design: A Comparative Perspective on European Union Democracy’. West European Politics 21 (3), 19-52.
Hobolt, Sara. (2009) Europe in Question—Referendums on European Integration, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jolly, M. (2007) The European Union and the People, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Katz, Richard, S (2001) ‘Models of Democracy—Elite Attitudes and the Democratic Deficit in the European Union’, European Union Politics 2(1), 53-79.
Keohane, R., Macedo, M. and Moravcsik, A. (2009) ‘Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism’, International Organization, 63(Winter), 1-31.
Kritzinger, S. (2003) ‘The Influence of the Nation-State on Individual Support for the European Union’, European Union Politics 4 (2), 219-241.
Lupia, Arthur (1994) ‘Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections’, American Political
Science Review 88(1) 63-76.
Lupia, Arthur. (2001) ‘Dumber than Chimps? An Assessment of Direct Democracy of Voters’, in L.J. Sabato, H.R. Ernst, and B.A. Larson (eds) Dangerous
Democracy? The Battle over Ballot Initiatives in America. New York:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Lupia, Arthur. (2006). How Elitism Undermines the Study of Voter Competence.