美國對台軍售戰略意涵之研究 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 美國對台軍售戰略意涵之研究 A Study on the Strategic Implication of US Arms Sales to Taiwan. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Student: LIU Ying-Mei Advisor: Dr. WANG Ding-Shu. 中華民國 104 年 12 月 December 2015.

(2) 美國對台軍售戰略意涵之研究 A Study on the Strategic Implication of US Arms Sales to Taiwan 研究生：劉盈梅指導教授：王定士. Student: LIU Ying-Mei Advisor: Dr. WANG Ding-Shu. 國立政治大學. 碩士論文. 學. ‧ 國. 政治大亞太研究英語碩士學位學程立. er. io. sit. y. ‧. Nat. A Thesis. n. Submitted to International a Master’s Program invAsia-Pacific Studies. i l C n hengchi U National Chengchi University. In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement For the Degree of Master in China Studies. 中華民國. 104. 年 12. December 2015. 月.

(3) Acknowledgements Since I have great interest in war movie, I always have strong desire to study national security and arms sales. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude towards my advisor Dr. WANG Ding-Shu for his encouragement and professional advice. He has been great helpful to my thesis. Secondly, I would like to thank my classmate Ku and staffs of IMAS, all of them are friendly and helpful. Studying at IMAS increased my knowledge and expanded my international perspective. Last but not least I want to thank the brothers and sisters in my church as well. They have prayed for my thesis for over a. 政治大. year. I can’t do this alone without their prayers.. This thesis is dedicated to God. I can never thank God enough. God is my strength, my. 立. power and my cornerstone. Without God, I would be hopeless.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(4) Abstract US arms sales to Taiwan has always been a controversial issue. It gets involved in complicated interactions among the United States, Taiwan and China. It is also related to Taiwan’s security and safety. The United Stated did not stop arms sales to Taiwan on the basis of “Taiwan Relations Act.” after breaking off the diplomatic relationship. Although “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué” restricts U.S. support to Taiwan, the actual amounts of arms sales are still considerable increased. Taiwan’s arms procurement relies on. 政治大 against Taiwan. Moreover, US arms sales to Taiwan 立. U.S. deeply under the circumstances of China’s not giving up using the force shows the military. alliances of two countries. In the 21st century, China’s growing economic,. ‧ 國. 學. political and military capabilities have impacted on the Asia-Pacific. ‧. geopolitics. The United States provides Taiwan with defensive weapons based on its own interests and strategic considerations. US “Pivot to Asia”. y. Nat. sit. policy has not only the diplomatic security and economic considerations, but. er. io. also shows the U.S.-led Asia-Pacific region ambition. Recently, the United. n. States initiates a series ofa lTaiwan-US military exchanges. It shows that the iv. n U i e United States must take counter measures n g c hto respond to Chinese fast layout. Ch. in the South China Sea. That is why the strategic role of Taiwan for the American “Pivot to Asia” policy is re-valued. Taiwan will have more reasons to apply for the purchase of US weapons in the future based on defense needs.. Key words: US Arms Sales; Taiwan Relations Act; U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué; China’s Rise; Pivot to Asia.

(5) TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction.......................................................................................................1 1.1 Research Motivation and Research Purpose.................................................................1 1.2 Hypothesis Proposition and Research Framework.......................................................3 1.3 Literature Review and Methodology……....................................................................5. Chapter 2: History and Evolution of US Arms Sales to Taiwan Policy............................13 2.1 From1950-1979 U.S. Military Cooperation with Taiwan and Arms Sales to Taiwan Before Breaking off Diplomatic Relations.................................................................13. 政治大. 2.2 From 1980 to 1991 after Breaking off Diplomatic Relations with Taiwan................18. 立. 2.2.1 President Carter Administration (-1981)…………………………………….....19. ‧ 國. 學. 2.2.2 President Reagan Administration (1981-1989)………………………………..20 2.3 The Arms Sales to Taiwan during the Post-Cold War-From 1992 to the Present. ‧. Situation......................................................................................................................22 2.3.1 The Case of F-16 Fighters Arms Sales in 1992 (President George H.W. Bush. Nat. sit. y. Administration)…………………………………………………………………..22. io. er. 2.3.2 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis (President Clinton Administration)…………..24 2.3.3 President George W. Bush Administration’s Decision of Arms Sales in 2001..24. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. 2.3.4 F-16 A/B Upgrade Program and F16 C/D Fighters……………………………26. engchi. 2.3.5 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate (President Obama Administration)……….27 2.4 Summary......................................................................................................................30. Chapter 3: The Impact of China's Rise on the Asia-Pacific Strategic Pattern...................32 3.1 The China's Asia-Pacific Strategic Thought and the Analysis of Military Force........32 3.1.1 China’s Asia-Pacific Strategic Thought………………………………………..32 3.1.2 The Analysis of Military Force………………………………………………...37 3.2 The Strategic Threat of China's Rise to the Asia Pacific Region ...............................42 3.2.1 The Strategic Implication of China’s Rise……………………………………..42 3.2.2 The Strategic Threat of China's Rise to the Asia Pacific Region……………....46.

(6) 3.3 China's Attitude and Role towards US arms sales to Taiwan......................................55 3.4 Summary......................................................................................................................59. Chapter 4: Strategic Implication of US Arms Sales to Taiwan..........................................60 4.1 Strategic Implication of US “Pivot to Asia” Policy.....................................................60 4.2 Taiwan's Key Position in US “Pivot to Asia” Policy...................................................70 4.2.1 Taiwan’s Strategic Position…………………………………………………….70 4.2.2 Taiwan's Key Position in US “Pivot to Asia” Policy…………………………..72 4.3 The Present and Future Situation of Obama Administration Arms Sales to Taiwan Policy............................................................................................................................77. 政治大 4.3.2 Military Cooperation, Exercises……………………………………………….78 立 4.4 Summary…..................................................................................................................80 4.3.1 Major Arms Sales………………………………………………………………77. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter 5: Conclusion........................................................................................................81. ‧. References……………………………………………………………………………..…86. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(7) Chapter 1 Introduction. 1.1 Research Motivation and Research Purpose. Research Motivation. 政治大 that it gets involved Taiwan’s homeland security issue. The defense force of a country is 立. US arms sales to Taiwan has always been an issue worth studying. One reason is. the most important security guarantee and it is also related to every people's safety. This. ‧ 國. 學. issue causes my first research motivation.. However, after United States breaking off diplomatic relations with the Republic of. ‧. China in 1979 and the termination of 1980 “Sino-US Mutual Defense Treaty”, US arms. y. Nat. sales has become one of the most important factors to protect Taiwan's security. The U.S.. sit. and Taiwan signed “Taiwan Relation Act” to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive. n. al. er. io. character.1 PRC and the U.S. signed “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué” in 1982 to claim. i n U. v. “the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy. Ch. engchi. of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms.”2 The U.S. domestic law experts stressed that the Communiqué is not an international agreement and it is non-binding for both sides. Not only is the Communiqué unprecedented in American history, but also it is unique in the world. What kind of the restrictions did the“U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué “cause to Taiwan about the issue of arms procurement? It is worth discussing. Besides, Taiwan does not want to be destroyed and ruled by China, and Taiwan does not want to give up independence, either. Taiwan’s arms procurement relies on the U.S. deeply under the circumstances of China’s not giving up using the force against Taiwan. Moreover, US arms sales to Taiwan are 1. Taiwan Relation Act, Section 2 (b) (5). U.S.-PRC JOINT COMMUNIQUE′, August 17, 1982. 2. 1.

(8) affected by the China’s intervention which has become even more important issue. This is my second research motivation. The third research motivation is geopolitics. Taiwan needs to form an alliance with the U.S. The alliance is beneficial and necessary for both sides which need to work together in international defense and security mechanism. US arms sales to Taiwan show the military alliances of two countries.. Research Purpose According to above-mentioned issues, the purpose of this research is trying to answer the following questions:. 立. 政治大. Taiwan’s arms procurement is restricted to the “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué”. ‧ 國. 學. requirements. The United States should gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. But the Bush Administration sold Taiwan 150 F-16 fighter jets in 1992 which did not agree with. ‧. “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué” requirements. Why did the U.S. Government disregard China's opposition in this case? In recent years, the China’s rapid political, economic and. sit. y. Nat. military growth has impacted on the international area and the Asia-Pacific region. It has. io. er. become the powerful competitor to the United States. China also increases the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to threaten Taiwan. The United States gradually. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. adjusted its global strategy to hold back China’s threat to the Asia-Pacific region after. engchi. Obama was in power. Under the circumstances, the United States should be reasonable to increase arms sales to reduce the military power differences across the Taiwan Strait. On the contrary, it has been three years not to sell weapons to Taiwan until the end of 2014, let alone F-16C / D fighter jets. What is the reason for this change? The question can be resolved to the following related logical sub-questions: (1)What kind of the restrictions does the “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué” cause to Taiwan about the issue of arms procurement? (2)In 1992 the Bush administration sold 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan. What is the reason behind that? (3)In recent years, China’s growing economic, political and military capabilities have been the threat to Taiwan. After Obama was in power, he promoted “Pivot to Asia”. 2.

(9) strategy. It is reasonable to say that the United States should pay attention to Taiwan, but the U.S. reduces arms sales to Taiwan. What is the reason for this situation?. 1.2 Hypothesis Proposition and Research Framework Hypothesis Proposition. 政治大 importance of strategic position. The delicate function of Taiwan has contributed to 立 maintain the balance of power in the East Asia in some respects. The considerations of. Taiwan is located in the East Asia and the U.S. pays attention to Taiwan because its. ‧ 國. 學. US arms sales to Taiwan depend on the stability of this region by taking different measures of policy adjustments.3. ‧. This proposition can be resolved to the following related logical sub-propositions:. y. Nat. (1) The U.S. signed the “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué” with China which is based on the. io. sit. global strategy and maintains relationship with China .The restriction has more symbolic. n. al. er. meaning than real meaning for Taiwan. As long as the US Government intends to transfer. i n U. v. arms to Taiwan, the “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué” imposes little restriction on sales of weapons.. Ch. engchi. (2) In 1992, President George Bush agreed to sell 150 F-16A / B fighters to Taiwan. The reason behind that is to save at least three thousand employees jobs of General Dynamics Corporation. Besides, the Bush Administration had the election pressure and creation of jobs consideration in Texas. Moreover, China has rapidly expanded arm force and arms procurements SU-27 fighters from Russia. The real reason of US sale of F-16 fighter jets was to consider military balance in the Asia-Pacific region. (3) Under close relations of cross-strait and the rise of China circumstances, the reason behind the US delay sale of F-16C / D fighter jets is the eased cross-strait relations and there is no urgency to sell F-16C /D fighter jets or other high-tech weapons to Taiwan 3. 邵宗海(2001，6 月)。美國對台軍售政策對兩岸關係的影響。中山人文社會科學期刊，9(1)，5。. 3.

(10) although China's growing military power. President Obama's policy priorities are to revitalize the US economy, put pressure on RMB appreciation, reduce the trade deficit between the United States and China, and withdraw troops from Afghanistan. Taiwan issue is not the first priority. Dan Blumenthal, former US Defense Department in charge of cross-strait affairs in 2004, also the member of“US-China Economic and Security Review Commission”, noted that the only reason of the delay sale of F-16 C / D fighter jets is President Obama himself. President Obama and former President George W. Bush are both not “reluctant to upset China”.4. Research Framework. 政治大. The paper is based on the above-mentioned related logical sub-propositions to. 立. design the following logical outline sections, which is divided into five chapters.. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter 1: The first chapter is the introduction which includes the research motivation and purpose, hypothesis proposition and research framework, literature review and. ‧. research methodology.. Chapter 2: History and Evolution of US Arms Sales to Taiwan Policy:. y. Nat. sit. This chapter discusses the historical background and origins of US arms sales to Taiwan;. er. io. from 1950 to 1979, US military cooperation with Taiwan and arms sales to Taiwan before. al. v i n C hthe arms sales toUTaiwan during the Post-Cold War relations with Taiwan, then discusses engchi -from 1992 to the present situation. n. breaking off diplomatic relations, from 1980 to 1991 after breaking off diplomatic. Chapter 3: The Impact of China's Rise on the Asia-Pacific Strategic Pattern: The chapter discusses the China's Asia-Pacific strategic thought, then analyzes the military force of China, the strategic threat of China's rise to the Asia Pacific region, and finally China's attitude and role towards US arms sales to Taiwan. Chapter 4: Strategic Implication of US Arms Sales to Taiwan: This chapter discusses the strategic implication of U.S. “Pivot to Asia” policy, then analyzes Taiwan's key position in US “Pivot to Asia” policy. And finally discusses present. 4. 林正義(2010，12 月)。台美關係:F-16 C/D 個案觀察。變動中的亞太局勢與台灣的戰略地位。新世紀智庫論壇， (52)，66-67。. 4.

(11) and future situation of Obama Administration arms sales to Taiwan policy. Chapter 5: Conclusions: This chapter will summarize the results and findings of the study.. 1.3 Literature Review and Methodology. Literature Review. 政治大 from Taiwan's thesis and journals, and also from mainland China's books and journals. 立 English literature is mainly from journals, news and networks. There are political. The thesis includes Chinese and English literature. Chinese literature is mainly. ‧ 國. 學. purposes, economic purposes and international diplomatic strategy purposes behind the US arms sales to Taiwan; Lin,Yen-Che noted in 1988: Since the 1930s, the United States. ‧. arms export causes a close relationship with foreign policy, and even after the end of the. y. Nat. World War II, it has become a foreign policy tool. Today's military sales system evolves. sit. from “Foreign Assistance Act” in 1954 and adds the “Foreign Military Sales Act” and. er. io. “International Security Assistance and Arms Export Con-trol Act” to the act. The act. al. v i n the training of military personnelCand software. The United States foreign arms h eother ngchi U n. includes from the visible “weapons” defense equipment to invisible technology services,. exports can be divided into “security assistance” and “sales” categories. The former is free, and the latter is not free which is divided into “direct commercial sale” and “foreign military sale”. There are two reasons for foreign governments’ preferences to use “foreign military sale” approach: (A)The United States Department of Defense can help to provide complete weapon system transfer. (B)This approach is the contract signed by the U.S. Department of Defense and manufacturers, so it has the export guarantee from the U.S. Government. The United States is located at the international hegemony of force which expects to play the role of international policeman. The decision-making process is diplomatic secret. 5.

(12) because the different motivation of every arms export case. For many years policymakers revealed US foreign arms sales motivation and purpose, as listed below: (1) To support the allies. (2) To promote regional balance of power. (3) To strengthen US political influence. (4) To establish close relations with foreign military leaders. (5) Economic factors. (Including stabilization of the military-industrial productivity of U.S., sharing the cost of weapons, the balance of foreign trade and accumulation of oil and money.) (林岩哲，1988) There are many reasons behind arms sales to Taiwan, such as domestic political. 政治大 policy. It is difficult to say that they are completely determined by a single reason. It 立 should be combined with above-mentioned reasons. Hereby the literature described as reasons, economic reasons and the considerations of international situation and foreign. ‧ 國. 學. below:. Lin, Cheng-Yi proposed that the Bush Administration decided to sell F-16 fighters. ‧. to Taiwan because on July 14, 1992, Texas Congressman Joe Barton received the General. y. Nat. Dynamics Corporation’s petition to abandon the Bush Administration restrictions on F-16. sit. fighters sales to Taiwan. Senator Lloyd Bentsen also lobbied for selling F-16 fighters to. er. io. Taiwan in order to save the jobs of three thousand employees in General Dynamics. n. al. i n C h e(林正義，1993) decided to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan. ngchi U. v. Corporations. Bush Administration had the pressure from Texas constituency then. Professor Chen, I-Hsin discusses the reason for sales of US F-16A / B fighter jets and E-2T aircraft to Taiwan is the change of the international situation. Bush also realized that the U.S. should sell the weapon systems to Taiwan which they did not sell before because the end of Cold war and the change of international situation. Most importantly, the U.S. became the only super power that it dared to sell weapons to Taiwan ten times more than before without considering China’s reaction after the end of the Cold War. During the Post-Cold War, US arms sales to Taiwan was obviously more advanced than that in the Cold War. There are a lot of reasons for that, but the most important reason is the change of the international situation without doubt. (陳一新，1995) Chinese scholars analyzed that the Bush Administration's sale of F-16 fighter jets to. 6.

(13) Taiwan in 1992 changed the policy of US arms sales to Taiwan. It also reflected the intention of US strategic policy toward China after the end of Cold War. The United States lost the greatest external threat cause the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The ideological basis during the Cold War of US foreign strategy no longer existed, so the strategic interest was the dominant factor of US arms sales to Taiwan. (張清敏、羅斌輝， 2006) Navy Lieutenant Colonel Chia, Chih-Chung notes that Taiwan's security has great interest for American strategic balance in Asia-Pacific region. For example, “Washington Post” analyzed on February 5, 2001, President Bush and President Reagan hoped to change the security of the global balance of power in the country starting from the root. 政治大 strategy idea was: “The strategy with both efficiency and thoughtfulness can find the 立 basic reason the instability, and then defuse tensions before causing conflict situation.” and took a strong leadership to maintain relations with allies. Bush's national security. ‧ 國. 學. This argument also proposed the central idea of arms sales to Taiwan.5(賈智中， 2004) The former defense minister Tsai, Ming-Hsien: “Facing the rapid expansion of the. ‧. China’s military force and the military defense budget increases over a percentage of. sit. y. Nat. annual double-digit, not only the military balance in the Taiwan Strait is beneficial to China little by little, but also have a significant impact and the challenges to the. io. n. al. er. Asia-Pacific security and defense of the U.S. and Japan. If the U.S. refuses to sell F16-C /. i n U. v. D fighter jets and submarines to Taiwan, that will jeopardize Taiwan’s energy of. Ch. engchi. self-defense. The People's Liberation Army can have more energy from their current offshore strategy to extend to the maritime strategy, including a wide depth of their strategy across the U. S., Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines Asia-Pacific defense first island chain, and direct threat to the US-Japan strategic advantage in the Asia and Taiwan, but it is also a major challenge to the U.S., Japan security agreement”.6(蔡明憲， 2011) Yang Ying analyzes that US arms sales to Taiwan has several reasons. One of the reasons is the commercial interests. “Taiwan is fairly large from 1996 to 2003 into arms market in eight years. Taiwan’s military purchase is total nearly US$ 20 billion which. 5 6. 賈智中(2004)。從華美軍售看中、美政治角力。國防雜誌，(20)1。蔡明憲(2011，9 月)。美國軍售台灣的戰略意義與省思-兼論美、台、中的戰略調整與評估。新世紀智庫論壇， 55。. 7.

(14) ranks second in the world. Since 2003, the Department of Defense budget is US$ 17.75 billion. US arms sales to Taiwan has always been the big fat for US arms trade. For example, in 1993 the U.S. sold Taiwan four E-2T airborne early warning aircraft about the amount of US$ 900 million, the average price of each aircraft was more than US$ 200 million dollars. In 1998 the U.S. sold Taiwan four S-70C anti-submarine helicopters up to NT$2.4 billion. In addition to earning high profits, arms sales to Taiwan also enables enterprises to maintain production status and offer some jobs. It also becomes a considerate factor of the US economy. Besides, the U.S. often sells less advanced and less important weapons to Taiwan at high price, even sells Taiwan the P-3C anti-submarine aircraft which stops producing. This is not only able to solve a lot of elimination of. 政治大 Cho, Hui-Wan and Yang Shih-Yueh analyze that the President Bush was in power 立 then approved the a large amount of the arms sales to Taiwan. It is considered to be one armaments process problems, but also to make a profit.”7(楊穎， 2006). ‧ 國. 學. major breakthrough in US-Taiwan relations. And furthermore, the low quality of US arms sales to Taiwan is not only lower than that of the U.S., but is also lower than other. ‧. countries which the U.S. sold. The consideration of US arms sales to Taiwan is to keep. y. Nat. the cross-strait military force balanced, but the U.S. balance of military power does not. n. al. er. io. Taiwan's defense force.8 (卓慧菀、楊仕樂，2003). sit. need to maintain cross-strait equal quality and quantity military force, as long as maintain. i n U. v. Kerry Dumbaugh in “Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy. Ch. engchi. implications” analyzes that U.S. Sales to Taiwan have been a useful U.S. policy lever in U.S.-Taiwan-PRC relations. The future US arms sales may have been significant implication for cross-strait ties. A story from Taiwan newspaper alleged that the U.S. military officials worry about the potential military exchange between Taiwan-PRC would provide PRC with opportunity to learn U.S. military technology sold to Taiwan and jeopardize future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.9(Kerry Dumbaugh, 2009) Shirley A. Kan, the specialist in Asian Security Affairs, analyzes that during the. 7. 楊穎(2006，10 月)。中美建交以來美國對台軍售問題。理論觀察，5，32。卓慧菀與楊仕樂(2003，11-12 月)。美國小布希政府對台軍售之分析:維持兩岸軍力平衡。問題與研究，42(6)， 67、81。 9 Dumbaugh, K. (2009, November 2). Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications (pp. 21-22). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 8. 8.

(15) Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996, the PLA’s provocative exercises and missile test-firings that were directed against Taiwan. Congress has increasingly asserted its role vis-a-vis the Administration in determining security assistance for Taiwan. The Pentagon has assessed Taiwan’s defense needs, starting a dozen studies from 1997 to early 2004. Congress could inquire such reports to decide the arms sales to Taiwan. The Defense Secretary has told Congress in required annual reports on PRC military power that the balance of forces across the Taiwan Strait has continued to shift to the PRC’s favor in recent years. After Ma Ying-Jeou became President in May 2008, despite the closer cross-strait engagement between Taiwan and China, the PLA’s build-up opposite Taiwan has continued, and the deployment of advanced capabilities opposite the island has not eased. 10( Shirley A. Kan,. 政治大 Denny Roy, a senior research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 立 who specialized in China-related security issues, points out the arms sales raise questions 2014). ‧ 國. 學. about fundamental strategic assumptions in the cross-Strait standoff. “American anxiousness that Taiwan moves quickly to purchase the weapons on offer is based on the. ‧. assessment that Taiwan needs to counter the growing military imbalance on favor of the. y. Nat. People’s Liberation Army. The underlying assumption is that balance causes peace by. sit. deterring China from attacking, while and an imbalance favoring China would encourage. er. io. Beijing to opt for military solution.” ”The arms sale issue itself will not be the cause of. al. n. v i n episodes in postwar history that C have U but persistent undercurrents of h eexposed h imild n11g cthe. long-lasting or serious damage to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, but it is one of the several. mutual suspicion and confliction interests”. (Denny Roy, 2004). The comments of this thesis about the above-mentioned Chinese and English literatures are listed as below: According to the above-mentioned China and Taiwan scholars’ literature, the thesis finds out that the reasons behind US arms sales to Taiwan are political reason, international situation reason, strategic reason, and economic reason. Taking President Bush’s decision to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan in 1992 as the case study, although it was. 10. 11. Kan, Shirley A.(2014,March 3).Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990(pp.3-4,pp.26-27).Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Roy, D. (2004, April). U.S.-Taiwan Arms Sales: The Perils of Doing Business with Friends. Asia-Pacific Security Studies, 3(3), 1-4.. 9.

(16) to create the jobs opportunity in Taxes, there were also accompanied by the President Bush’s personal interest considerations - to win the Texas votes. He also did not want Taiwan to purchase Mirage fighters from France. Economic interest is not the main purpose of US arms sale to Taiwan. The economic profit of the fighters sales to Taiwan is still helpful to the United States, but because the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, the U.S. did not need to cooperate with China against the Soviet Union. China is not as strategically important as it used to be. This is the result of US global strategy adjustment and the change of international situation. Advanced fighters sales to Taiwan was not just to solve the unemployment problems of workers and President George Bush’s wish to win 32 votes in Texas. From the western scholars’ point. 政治大 which the U.S. worries that the cross-strait military exchanges which might reveal 立 military science and technology secrets to China. They also analyze from the angle of the of view, they analyze the impact of US arms sales to Taiwan from the point of view. ‧ 國. 學. cross-strait military balance to access whether to sell arms to Taiwan or not. Even after President Ma Ying-jeou was in power, cross-strait relations are getting closer and under. ‧. the premise of China’s not giving up the force against Taiwan. The United States will. y. Nat. continue to sell arms to Taiwan. As a matter of fact, US arms sales to foreign countries. n. al. Ch. engchi. er. io. weapons to counter balance between China and Taiwan.. sit. have the diplomatic strategy consideration. The U.S. will continue to provide Taiwan with. i n U. v. Methodology. Theory The theory of the thesis is national security theory. National security is a concept that the government should protect and preserve its citizens and territory against the national crises from outside. It has involved a lot of complex issues, including coordinating military power, economic power, diplomacy, energy security, environment. 10.

(17) security and political power in ways that are beneficial to the nation as a whole.12 There are various definitions of national security. Walter Lippmann (1943) defined that “a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war”. According to Charles Maier (1990), national security is defined as: “National security... is best described as a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and well-being.”13 Harold Brown enlarged the definition of national security: “National security then is the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms;. 政治大. to protect its nature, institutions, and governance from disruption from outside; and to. 立. control its borders.”14. National security policy must be amended to respond to the changing security. ‧ 國. 學. environment and challenges, that is, the policy is to construct a national strategy for sustainable survival and development in order to cope with immediate and potential. ‧. threats. It can form the guidance of future national development principle by using the. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. security strategy.. Approach. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In this study, a geo-strategic approach will be applied. Taiwan is located in the central link of first island chain. And, therefore, possesses a geopolitical strategic position in the Southeast China Sea. Abandoning Taiwan would likely fail to ameliorate the Sino-U.S. relationship and considerably enhance China’s military and geostrategic position in Asia. It would also erode American credibility in the Indo-Pacific and add fuel to an ongoing regional arms race.15 If China mastered Taiwan, it could control the Pacific. 12 13. 14. 15. Kallen, S.(2008). National Security (p.12). San Diego, CA: ReferencePoint Press. Romm, J. (1993). The Concept of National Security. In Defining national security: The nonmilitary aspects (p. 5). New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Brown, H. (1983). Thinking about national security: Defense and foreign policy in a dangerous world. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Rehman, I. (2014, February 28). Why Taiwan Matters. Retrieved April 8, 2015, from. 11.

(18) Ocean. This will be a direct threat to the United States, but also shows the importance of Taiwan's status. Against the above-mentioned background, this study is aim at examining and analyzing the significance of US arms sales to Taiwan from the geo-strategic position of Taiwan.. Method The method of this thesis is literature analysis. The method is to use existing major papers, books, official documents to understand how the evolution it is from the past to the present based on the past historical background, and then infer how the evolution it is from the present to future by present information. This paper also sorts out and analyzes. 政治大. from known information and predicts the future.. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971. 12. i n U. v.

(19) Chapter 2 History and Evolution of US Arms Sales to Taiwan Policy. From 1950s to 1960s during the Cold War, Taiwan was an American outpost of anti-communist. After the outbreak of Korean War in 1950, US General Douglas. 政治大. MacArthur once considered Taiwan as “unsinkable aircraft carrier”. From 1970s to 1980s,. 立. the United States and the People’s Republic of China were allies in order to balance. ‧ 國. 學. Soviet Union. Taiwan has become the suppressed object of US national defense and military diplomacy. After collapsing of the Soviet Union, Russia is no longer a threat to. ‧. U.S. and mainland China is rising to become the economic and military hegemony. Mainland China has never given up using military force against Taiwan. US Government. Nat. sit. y. was aware of threat from mainland China. Due to the balance of power and national. io. er. interest considerations, US arms sales to Taiwan policy have become a very important diplomatic tool to achieve policy goal.16. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2.1 From1950--1979 U.S. Military Cooperation with Taiwan and Arms Sales to Taiwan before Breaking off Diplomatic Relations After Republic of China moved to Taiwan, the U.S. President Harry S. Truman announced on January 5, 1950, that the United States would not become involved in any dispute about Taiwan Strait, and that he would not intervene in the event of an attack by 16. 參考臧承祖(2002，1 月)。美國對台軍售與兩岸互動關係 1982-1996(頁 9)。國立政治大學外交學系戰略與國際事務碩士在職專班論文，未出版，台北。. 13.

(20) the PRC17. However, after the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, Truman declared that the “neutralization of the Straits of Formosa” was the best interest of the United States, and he sent the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent any conflict between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, effectively putting Taiwan under American protection.18 The U.S. did not give Taiwan military aid until the Korean War on June 25, 1950. Under the “Military Assistance Program” (MAP)19, the U.S. conducted free transfer weapons to Taiwan and other allies from 1950 to 1965. Especially after the 1954 “Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty” was signed, the arms transfers from the United States to Taiwan were without hindrance.. 政治大 Agreement Draft” decided to send consultants to Taiwan to assist in the training of our 立 country’s troops. The US representative Karl Lott proposed military aid to Taiwan, the. On January 3, 1951, the United States Government under the “Sino-US Mutual. ‧ 國. 學. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and an exchange of letters on February 9, was the “Sino-American Mutual Agreement”. On May 1 was established “U.S. military. ‧. Assistance advisory Group/Republic of China on Taiwan”. The first head was Major. y. Nat. General Williams C. Chase.20. sit. In March 1952, President Truman pointed out that the United States must give. er. io. military aid to the government of the Republic of China in order to enhance resistance to. al. n. v i n C h that there wouldUhave the value of US$230 million of China. The President also indicated engchi invasion when he reported to Congress about the US military assistance to the Republic. military supplies to transfer to five Southeast Asian countries at the end of the same year, including Taiwan.21 In October 1952, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group had announced that they would hand over a group of fighters to Taiwan.22. From 1953, after U.S. President Eisenhower won the presidential election, Taiwan-US military cooperation got into another new milestone. The U.S. military 17. The Cold War Museum. (2010, June 15). Retrieved June 13, 2015, from http://www.coldwar.org/articles/50s/taiwan_crisis.asp. 18 Truman, H. (1956). Years of trial and hope: 1946-1953 (pp. 369-381). New York: Doubleday. 19 參考臧承祖(2002，1 月)。美國對台軍售與兩岸互動關係 1982-1996(p.9)。國立政治大學外交學系戰略與國際事務碩士在職專班論文，未出版，台北。 20 鄧克雄主編(2008)。美軍顧問團在臺工作口述歷史 (頁 10)。台北:國防部。 21 (1952 年 3 月 7 日)。中央日報，版 1。 22 (1952 年 4 月 9 日)。中央日報，版 1。. 14.

(21) advisory group announced that they would strengthen military aid in 1953. Taiwan sent trained officers to the United States and the United States also sent officers to Taiwan. The United States offered the F-84, F-86 fighters which replaced Taiwan’s P-51, P-47, and P-25 fighters.23 Especially the F-86 Sabre fighters’ speed could exceed the speed of sound, which were Taiwan’s first fighters capable of exceeding the sound barrier. These fighters brought Taiwan’s air force into the beginning of the jet age. The fighters equipment supply, logistics and the flight training were supported by the US Military Assistance Advisory Group. 24 On December 24, 1954, the United States and the Republic of China signed the “Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty” to prevent PRC from attacking over Taiwan and. 政治大 This left some loopholes in security treaty and gave the opportunity of Chinese 立 Communist to invade. In January 1955, the Chinese Communist Party invaded Dachen coming into force on March 3, 1955. Kinmen and Matsu were not protected by the treaty.. ‧ 國. 學. Island on the purpose of testing the United States. During this time the “Sino-US Mutual Defense Treaty” had not been approved by the Senate, so the President Eisenhower sent a. ‧. letter to Congress on Jan. 24 to ask the request for the authority to use the military force if. y. Nat. necessary to defend Taiwan, Penghu and related area, which was the “Formosa. sit. Resolution” and was adopted on January 28. According to “Taiwan's Resolution”, if the. er. io. Taiwan Strait crisis happened, as long as the US President judged that PRC ‘s attack to. al. n. v i n 25 C hto assist the outer U President could use US armed forces e n g c h i islands of Kinmen and Matsu.. outer islands of Kinmen and Matsu was a direct invasion of Taiwan and Penghu, the. The most noteworthy is that the United States provided our country with three key. military equipment or weapons during second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. The first important military equipment was shipped from the Mediterranean U.S. Sixth Fleet floating dry dock. This advanced heavy equipment was to make our Navy supply boats unload in a relatively safe landing and the right time of transportation and supply operations. The second important equipment was the eight-inch howitzer. This caliber of howitzer had long range of firing nuclear bomb and had a significant deterrent effect to PRC. The third important equipment was sidewinder air to air missile which was the 23 24 25. (1953 年 6 月 16 日)。中央日報，版 1。鄧克雄主編(2008)。美軍顧問團在臺工作口述歷史 (頁 147-151)。台北:國防部。陳一新(1995)。斷交後的中美關係 (頁 104-105)。台北: 五南。. 15.

(22) latest developed by the United States.26 Before 1966 Taiwan accepted most of free military aid from the United States. In the late 1960s, the U.S. Government gradually changed military weapons transfer program from “Military Assistance Program”(MAP) to “Foreign Military Sales Act”. The Nixon Government has also advocated using American experience, advice and technical resources to assist the allies. In February 1973, Taiwan got permit from Northrop Aircraft Company to assemble a group of about 100 F-5E jet fighters. The parts of the plot and the tail assembly would be made in Taiwan. The other components were made in the United States and then exported to Taiwan to do the final assembly. Taiwan and U.S. signed an agreement because there was an assembly plant in Taiwan.27 The United States military. 政治大 Before 1970, Taiwan acquired a lot of weapon systems from the United States 立 which were not only to maintain military balance with China, but also to maintain local aid terminated since June 1974.. ‧ 國. 學. advantage.28. The following table was Taiwan’s major weapon systems which were provided by. ‧. the United States from 1950 to 1970.. 300 M-24 300 M-41 286 M-48 A3/A5 Cannon: 50 M-101(105mm) 90 M-59(155mm) 30 M-115(203mm) Self-propelled guns: 100 M-108(105mm) 110 M-109A1(155mm) Mortar: 100 M-29(81mm) Recoilless guns: M-67(90mm) 500 M-40 Type 51(106mm) Reconnaissance aircraft: 20 L-19 To-air missile: 26 27 28. Air force. aChaser: i vFighter: 100 P-47 l C 8 US Gearing n 100 P-51 h8 eUS(DDG) nGearing 80 F-80C gchi U. n. Tank:. sit. Navy. er. io. Army. y. Nat. Table 1. (DDG) 6 US Summer(DD) Amphibious landing ship: 22 US LST 511 1 Cabildo LSD 4US LSM-1 Logistic supply ship: 4 Tanker ship 2 Repair rescue ship Antisubmarine aircraft: 20 S-2 E/G. 陳一新(1995)。斷交後的中美關係 (頁 177-179)。台北: 五南。 (1973 年 2 月 14 日)。聯合報，版 2。陳一新(1995)。斷交後的中美關係 (頁 177)。台北: 五南。. 16. 40 F84G 150 F-86D 20 F-86D 100 F-100D 100 F-104A 50 F-104G 100 F-5A/B Reconnaissance aircraft: 6 RF-80C 6 RT-33 6 RF-84G 6 RF-101C 6 RF-104G.

(23) 36 54. Nike missiles Hawk missiles. 4 U2 Trainer: 60 T-28A 60 T-33A 42 T-34C Helicopter: 20 CH-19 Transport: 30 C-46 30 C-47 2 C-54 1 C-118 50 C-119G 15 C-123B/K To-air missile: 500 AIM-9 Sidewinder missile. Source:陳一新(1995)。斷交後的中美關係(頁 178)。台北:五南。. 政治大. In 1972, President Richard Nixon signed “the Shanghai Communiqué” (上海公. 立. 報)with PRC. The U.S. made a concession to PRC which would sacrifice the interest of. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan.. The terms of which about Taiwan are listed below:. ‧. “....The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstruction the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China. y. Nat. sit. is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been. er. io. returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no. al. v i n C h Government firmly be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese e n g c h i U opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two government,” “two n. other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. Forces and military installations must. Chinas,” and “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.” On December 15, 1978, the President Carter’s Administration published the establishment of diplomatic relations with PRC since January 1, 1979. The U.S. recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China. President Carter Administration singed “Taiwan Relations Act” (TRA) on April 10, 1979. The terms of which about maintaining Taiwan's security and defense materiel are listed below: “Sec.2(b)(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than. 17.

(24) peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific are and of grave concern to the United States. (5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character. Sec.3(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. (b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendation to the President and the Congress.”. 政治大 an important interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, also told the people of 立 Taiwan that the United States did not abandon Taiwan. The U.S. will continue to provide. The U.S. clearly told People's Republic of China by TRA that the United States has. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan with defensive weapons and facilities.. ‧. sit. y. Nat. 2.2 From 1980 to 1991 after Breaking off Diplomatic. n. al. er. io. Relations with Taiwan. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. On August 17, 1982, the U.S. and PRC signed “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué “. US arms sales are subject to the strict restrictions of this Communiqué. The article which is related arms sales to Taiwan is listed below: “(6)Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United Stated Government States that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that is arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time of a final resolution. In so station, the United States acknowledges China’s consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.”. 18.

(25) Before U.S. and PRC published “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué”, the United States had guaranteed through appropriate channels to Taiwan's six assurances on July 14, 1982. The Six assurances were: 1. The United States would not set a date for ending arms sales to the Republic of China (ROC); 2. The United States would not hold prior consultations with the People's Republic of China regarding arms sales to the ROC; 3. The United States would not play a mediation role between the PRC and the ROC; 4. The United States would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act; 5. The United States would not alter its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan (i.e.. 政治大 maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States 立 Government does not challenge that position.”); and “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait. ‧ 國. 學. 6. The United States would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.. ‧ er. io. sit. y. Nat. 2.2.1 President Carter Administration (-1981). Due to the “Taiwan Relations Act”, the U.S. sells only defensive weapons to. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Taiwan. That is the reason why the offensive weapons are excluded. Taiwan had been. engchi. suffered refusal from the United States when Taiwan applied to purchase F4, F16 fighters and Harpoon missiles.29The Carter Administration rejected Taiwan’s application because F4 aggressive combat radius of over 1,000 miles. Besides, under the protests of China and pressure from Congress, the Carter Administration did not decide to sell FX fighters to Taiwan. They decided to extend the current the U.S. and Taiwan F-5E fighter joint production line temporarily for another three years. 30. 29 30. 林正義(1993，9 月)。八一七公報後美國對台軍售政策。歐美研究，23(3)，31。張清敏(2006，4 月)。美國對台軍售政策研究-決策的視角(頁 120)。北京: 北京世界知識出版社。. 19.

(26) 2.2.2 President Reagan Administration (1981-1989) In January 1982 the Reagan Administration did not sell FX (F5G or F16/J79) fighters because they were not necessary for Taiwan's military needs. F5E fighters were able to transcend the PRC’s MiG-21.31 The Reagan Administration decided to extend the production line to manufacture F5E fighters to replace the decision of selling FX fighters to Taiwan. In 1983, the U.S. decided to sell $ 800 million of defense materials to Taiwan. This amount was higher than the amount of any previous years which included the total amount of 30 co-production F5E and F5F fighters, 66 F-104G fighters, 12 C-130 transport aircraft. Not only did it reduce the harm to Taiwan from “US- PRC Joint. 政治大. Communiqué”, but it also made Taiwan feel relieved.32. 立. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. Table 2: US major arms sales to Taiwan from 1979 to 1991. 1980. 31. 32. al. Ch. sit. Navy. er. Army. n. 1979. io. Year. y. Nat. (including transfer, lease and authorized production). n engchi U. iv. Air force. (1)Co-production of 48F-5E / F fighters (2)Maintenance F-100D, F-104G fighters, C-119G transport aircraft. (3)500 Maverick air to ground missile.. (1)14M-110A2 8-inch howitzer (2)840 air defense missile chaparral and related equipment (3)TWO2 pop-up anti-armor missiles (4)Hawk missile and related equipment. Barnett, A. Doak. (1981).The FX Decision: "another Crucial Moment “in U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations (p2, 41), Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 拉沙特(著)，魏良才(譯)(1985，2 月)。台灣關係法評估。亞洲與世界文摘月刊，2(20)，16-22。. 20.

(27) (1)164 armored personnel carriers (2)72 mortar vehicles (3)31 command vehicles. 1983. 1984. Upgrade M-48 A3 / A5 tank. 1985 1986. 1987 1988. 立. 政治大. 88 SM-1standard one-to-air missile. Hummer multipurpose military vehicle 110 M-60A3 tanks. 1991. sit. Nat. 1.陳一新(1995)。斷交後的中美關係(頁 193)。台北:五南。. F-5E,F-104,C-130 radar. ‧. Source:. 學. 1990. (1)170 SM-1 standard-air missile (2) 4 Gearing-class destroyer 24 S-70C Sikorsky Thunder hawk 262 anti-aircraft missile sea clump of trees (1)Upgrade 27 S2-E / G antisubmarine aircraft performance (2)2 S2-Tanti-submarine aircraft (3)8 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate. ‧ 國. 1989. (1)60 F-5E / F (co-production) (2)66 F-104Gfighter (3)200 IDF (assist in the production) AIM-7F Sparrow medium-range air to air missile 12 C-130 Hercules transport aircraft F-5E, F-100, T-33, T-28 radar and parts. y. 1982. io. http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/worldfms.html. n. al. Ch. engchi. 21. er. 2.U.S. Arms Transfers: Government Data. Retrieved January 31, 2015, from. i n U. v.

(28) 2.3 The Arms Sales to Taiwan during the Post-Cold War-From 1992 to the Present Situation. 2.3.1 The Case of F-16 Fighters Arms Sales in 1992 (President George H.W. Bush Administration). Background (1)The change of international situation is the challenge to US arms industry:. 政治大 from the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and those countries were 立 After the end of Cold War, many countries found out that they got enough weapons. unlikely to use the weapons during Post-Cold War. So the whole world military spending. ‧ 國. 學. began to decline, and the global arms market suddenly shrank. However, the United States cut down the military spending which could cause the shrinkage of domestic arms. ‧. market. The arms manufacturers gradually turned to the international market. Many. io. (2)The change of military balance in the cross-strait:. n. al. y. er. foreign arms sales to support US domestic arms production.33. sit. Nat. people in the Bush Administration advocated that the U.S. Government should expand. i n U. v. China purchased 24 SU-27 fighters from the Soviet Union in March 1992, however,. Ch. engchi. Taiwan's aging and accident prone fleet of F-104 and F-5E were outdated. These conditions might have an impact on the military balance of power in the cross-strait. (3)Election situation in the U.S.: In May 1991, President George H.W. Bush's election support rate was up to 82%, but in January 1992 his support rate fell to 50%. His support rate again fell from 39% to 35% within a month of April. President Bush could not help but focus on the domestic affairs.34. 33 34. 參考張清敏(2006，4 月)。美國對台軍售政策研究-決策的視角(頁 187-193)。北京: 北京世界知識出版社。 Ross, R. (2001), “The Origins of Engagement: The Bush Administration” in Making China Policy (p.33), New York: Rowman and Littlefield.. 22.

(29) The Issue On July 14, 1992, the U.S. Congressman Joe Barton received a petition from administrator of General Dynamics Company in Fort Worth. He required the Bush Administration to abandon F16 fighters selling restrictions of Taiwan. The U.S. Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the State Council also subsequently formed a group to assess the arms sales case. By the end of July, President Bush said that he would re-evaluate whether to sell F16 fighters to Taiwan or not. Senator Lloyd Bentsen was also lobbying to sell F16 fighters to Taiwan in order to save the jobs of General Dynamics Company at least three thousand employees. Department of Defense and intelligence units were the strongest supporters of selling F16 fighters to. 政治大 1992, in Washington's arms sales to Taipei consultative talks, the U. S. refused to sell F16 立. Taiwan. President Lee Teng-hui wrote to President Bush to strive for F16. In early July. fighters to Taiwan. After mid-July, the Bush Administration decided to sell F16 fighters to. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan due to Texas constituency pressure. Besides, the U.S. Department of Defense concerned for the military balance in the cross-strait because PRC purchased SU-27. ‧. fighters from Soviet Union.. y. Nat. The U.S. State Department spokesman Joseph Snyder explained, due to inability to. io. sit. provide Taiwan with logistical parts such as F5E and F104. They had to sell F16 fighters. n. al. er. to Taiwan. President George H. W. Bush said that the United States sold F16 fighters to. i n U. v. Taiwan in order to maintain peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region which did not. Ch. engchi. violate “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués”. The United States has provided adequate defense capabilities for Taiwan in order to maintain confidence between Taiwan and mainland China and reduced tensions between them. The United States will recognize the one-China policy and the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China.35. 35. 林正義(1993，9 月)。八一七公報後美國對台軍售政策。歐美研究，23(3)，38-39。. 23.

(30) 2.3.2 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis (President Clinton Administration) In early May 1995, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed a resolution to require the Clinton Administration to allow President Lee Teng-hui’s private visit.36President Lee Teng-hui visited and delivered a speech on “Taiwan Democratization Experience” at Cornell University in June. The speech called PRC as “mainland”total of four times in Taiwan;“Republic of China”, “Republic of China in Taiwan”,“On Taiwan, The Republic of China” total of 18 times. The speech spread to the world through CNN media and let the world know the fact of the Republic of China in Taiwan. 政治大. existence, breaking the PRC’s containment.37This event caused “1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis”. The PRC conducted missiles tests from July 21 to 26 in an area 60 kilometers. 立. north of ROC-held Pengjia Islet. President Clinton ordered ships into the region in March. ‧ 國. 學. 1996. USS Nimitz and USS Independence carrier battle groups were present in the region. The U.S. Government quietly expanded unprecedented high level sensitive military. ‧. relationship with Taiwan since 1979. The broader exchanges have increased attention to “software”, including discussions over strategy, training, logistics, command and control,. y. Nat. er. io. AZ.38. sit. etc. Since 1997, Taiwan’s F-16 fighter pilots also have trained at Luke Air Force Base,. al. n. v i n CBush 2.3.3 President George W. Decision of Arms h e nAdministration’s gchi U Sales in 2001. In April 2001, President Bush approved arms sales to Taiwan for: 8 diesel-electric submarines; 12 P-3C Orion anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft ; 54 Mark-48ASW torpedoes; 44 Harpoon submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles; 144 M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers; 54 AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles; AN/ALE-50 electronic countermeasure (ECM) systems for F-16s; and 12 MH-53 mine-sweeping. 36. 37 38. 林正義(1998)。1995 年~1996 年臺海危機:美國國會的反應.中美關係專題研究 1995-1997 (頁 157-185). 台北: 中央研究院歐美研究所。 (1995 年 10 月 1 日)。中國時報，版 2。 Kan, Shirley A.(2014,March 3).Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990(pp.2).Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.. 24.

(31) helicopters. From 2001 to 2004, the execution amount of US arms sales to Taiwan was 3.7 billion. The amount ranked the third of US foreign military sales at the same time. From 2005 to 2008, the execution amount of US arms sales to Taiwan was 3.9 billion; the amount ranked the fourth of US foreign military sales at the same time.39 The main military sales executed projects are listed below:. Helicopter On October 3, 2008, President Bush notified Congress of the proposed Foreign Military Sale (FMS) program of 30 Apache helicopters for a total value of $2.532 billion. Taiwan singed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance for the Apache in 2009.40. 立. Kidd -Class destroyers. 政治大. ‧ 國. Kidd -Class destroyers for about $875 million.41. ‧. Submarine. 學. In November 2002, the Bush Administration notified Congress of the sale of four. y. Nat. sit. As for the sales of submarine, despite the Bush Administration approved to sell 8. er. io. diesel-electric submarines, the U.S. manufacturer no longer produces those submarines.. al. n. v i n C h 42 Taiwan‘sUlegislators Lin Yu-fang(林郁方) whether Taiwan would procure submarines. engchi As a result, a team from navy’s International Program Office arrived in Taipei to discuss. required Taiwan’s navy to arrange for six of the eight submarines to be built in Taiwan using technology transfers. 43 But in 2006, articles appeared alleging that the U.S. Navy. failed to effectively implement the diesel sub program for Taiwan, in part to protect the nuclear-powered submarine capability. 44 On October 3, 2008 after the KMT’s Ma 39. 40 41. 42 43. 44. Kan, Shirley A. (2010, August 31).Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process(pp.1-6).Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Updated August 31,2010. (2010, April 12). Defense News. Kan, Shirley A. (2014, March 3).Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990(pp.8-10).Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. (2003,October 31) .Taipei Times. Central News Agency, November 2, 2003. Kan, Shirley A.(2014,March 3).Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990(pp.12).Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Minnick, W.,(2006,February 15).Taiwan Claims U.S. Navy is Sabotaging SSK Plans. Jane’s Defense Weekly ; Come Clean on Subs. editorial, Defense News.. 25.

(32) Ying-jeou became president in May, the Bush Administration did not submit for congressional review the pending submarine design program. 45 Also in January 2010, President Obama did not submit for congressional review the pending program for a submarine design when he notified Congress of five other programs. 46. 2.3.4 F-16 A/B Upgrade Program and F16 C/D Fighters Taiwan submitted a Letter of Request to U.S. in November 2009 to upgrade F-16 A/B fighters. This program would not add new planes to replace old fighters. President. 政治大. Ma Administration’s priority were for new F-16 C/Ds, not for only upgrade. On. 立. September 21, 2011, President Obama Administration formally noticed Congress of three. ‧ 國. 學. programs to upgrade 145 F-16A/Bs, continue to train Taiwan’s F-16 pilots at Luke Air Force Base, and to sell spare parts for F-16A/Bs, F-5E/Fs, C-130Hs, and IDFs.47 The. ‧. program to upgrade includes AESA (active electronically scanned array radars), JDAMS (joint direct attack munition), AIM-9X missiles, JHMCS (joint helmet mounted cueing. sit. y. Nat. system), AN/ALQ-213 electronic warfare management system, and HAVE GLASS 2,. io. er. F100-PW-229-EEP engine change project. The upgrade program is expected to be completed in 2021. After the upgrade, the Taiwan Air Force's military strength expects to. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. compete with the People's Liberation Army fighter J20 and J31. Taiwan and U.S. signed a. engchi. 3.8 U.S. billion dollars contract in 2013. The US Air Force takes charge of upgrading the function of Taiwan's 145 F-16 fighters. When US troops comes to abandon the implementation of performance improvement plan, the arms suppliers continue to spread the message that the Taiwan will increase the budget. Military officials say that there is no going bake since the contract is signed. Taiwan is confident that the budget will be implemented in accordance with developed plan and try not to increase in price. Taiwan questions the US Air Force many times about abandoning upgrade case and is informed. 45. 46 47. Kan, Shirley A. (2014, March 3). Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990(pp.15).Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Bader, J.(2012). Obama and China’s Rise. Washington :Brookings Institution Press. Kan, Shirley A. (2014, March 3). Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990(p.24-25).Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.. 26.

(33) that Taiwan's rights and interests will not be affected.48 Since 2006, Taiwan has been trying to request to procure F16 C/D fighters to increase its F-16 force. The Bush Administration refused to accept a formal Letter of Request (LOR) for F-16C/D fighters, after Taiwan tried to submit one in June to July 2006, February 2007, and June 2007.49 The Obama Administration did not approve Taiwan's application of procurement for 66 F-16 C/D fighters case. ”Washington Times” reported that the opposition from the State Department. Although Taiwan and the US Congress strongly asked US to sell F-16 C/D fighters, President Obama decided not to sell the new models but to help to upgrade the function of Taiwan's F-16C/D instead. “Washington Times”pointed out that the officials of White House National Security. 政治大 operational function of F-16C / D far exceeds F-16A / B. This does not match the 立 Council offered the assessment advice to Obama. One of the assessment results is that the. “Taiwan Relations Act” section 2 “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive. ‧ 國. 學. character”.50In 2014, Apple Daily reported that Taiwan originally wanted to buy F-16C / D fighters from United States. Now Taiwan decides not to buy even if the United States. ‧. agrees to sell. It will not be necessary for Taiwan to buy. Due to the delay sales of US. sit. y. Nat. F-16 C/D fighters to Taiwan, Taiwan is ready for not changing new fighters for the next 20 years. Taiwan intends to rely on the existing IDF, Mirage 2000, and the F-16 A/B to. io. n. al. er. maintain air defense. The air force will also modify F-16A / B in the future. Rumor has it. i n U. that the function of F-16A/B will have 80% of F-16C / D.51. Ch. engchi. v. 2.3.5 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate (President Obama Administration) It has been more than three years for the Obama Administration’s arms sales to Taiwan since 2012. According to the convention, it has become a new record since 1979. On December 4, 2014, the United States Senate approved the “Taiwan Relations Act. 48 49 50 51. (2014 年 4 月 4 日)。聯合晚報。 (2007, November 2). Liberty Times. (2011 年 9 月 17 日)。中國時報。 (2014 年 8 月 11 日)。蘋果日報。. 27.

(34) Affirmation and Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2014” to authorize President Obama to sell Taiwan four Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. This issue breaks the record of not selling weapons to Taiwan for three years. 52On December 18, President Obama signed the “Taiwan Relations Act Affirmation and Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2014”to confirm the sales transfer of four Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. There were USS Taylor FFG-50, USS Gary FFG-51, USS Carr FFG-52 and USS Elrod FFG-55. This transfer act becomes the law officially. Taiwan and U.S. both expect to complete the related procedure in 2015. The first sales transfer to Taiwan , “Taylor FFG-50” and “Gary FFG-51”, will be named after the great man to memorize Shen, Pao-Chen(沈葆禎) and Lo, Fu-Hsing (羅福星).. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Year. ‧. Table 3: Major U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan from 1993 to the present Item. sit. n. al. er. io. 52. y. Nat. 1993. 12 C-130H transport aircraft 38 Harpoon anti-ship missiles Logistics support services for 40 leased T-38 trainers 4 E-2T Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft Logistics support services for MADS 150 MK-46 Mod 5 torpedoes Weapons, ammunition, and support for 3 leased frigates MK-41 Mod Vertical Launch Systems for ship-based air defense missiles. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1994. 80 AN/ALQ-184 electronic counter measure (ECM) pods MK-45 Mod 2 gun system. 1995. 6 MK-75 shipboard gun systems, 6 Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems Supply support arrangement. 張國威(2014 年 12 月 9 日)。3 年未對台軍售歐巴馬要破零。Retrieved January 18, 2015, from http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20141210000878-260301. 28.

(35) 1997. 1998. Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment communications system 30 TH-67 training helicopters 30 sets of AN/AVS-6 night vision goggles 465 Stinger missiles 55 dual-mounted Stinger launcher systems 300 M60A3TTS tanks 1,299 Stinger surface-to-air missiles 74 Avenger vehicle mounted guided missile launchers 96 HMMWVs (high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle) 110 MK-46 MOD 5 anti-submarine torpedoes 54 Harpoon anti-ship missiles 1,786 TOW 2A anti-armor guided missiles 114 TOW launchers 100 HMMWVs 21 AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters 13 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Armed Scout helicopters Pilot training and logistics support for F-16 fighters Spare parts for various aircraft 3 Knox-class frigates 1 MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System 28 Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and targeting pods for F-16 fighters 58 Harpoon anti-ship missiles 61 Dual-mount Stinger surface-to-air missiles 131 MK 46 Mod 5(A)S anti-submarine torpedoes 9 CH-47SD Chinook helicopters 240 AGM-114KS Hellfire II air-to-surface missiles 5 AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS radio systems, 5 Intelligence Electronic Warfare systems 5 HMMWVs Spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, and IDF aircraft 2 E-2T Hawkeye 2000E airborne early warning aircraft Modernization of the TPS-43F air defense radar to TPS-75V configuration 162 HAWK Intercept guided air defense missiles 39 Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and targeting pods for F-16 fighters 48 AN/ALQ-184 ECM pods for F-16s 146 M109A5 howitzers, 152 SINCGARS radio systems 200 AIM-120C AMRAAMs for F-16 fighters 71 RGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship missiles Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE) communication system 50 Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems (JTIDS) terminals (a version of Link 16) for data links between aircraft, ships, and ground stations 40 AGM-65G Maverick air-to-ground missiles for F-16s 40 Javelin anti-tank missile systems and (360) Javelin missiles Logistical support/spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, and IDF aircraft 3 AN/MPN-14 air traffic control radars 54 AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles Maintenance and spare parts for aircraft, radars, AMRAAMS, other systems 182 AIM-9M-1/2 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles 449 AGM-114M3 Hellfire II anti-armor missiles to equip AH-1W and OH58D helicopters 290 TOW-2B anti-tank missiles 4 Kidd-class destroyers Multi-functional Information Distribution Systems (MIDS) (for Po Sheng). 立. ‧ 國. ‧. io. sit. y. Nat. 2000. 學. 1999. 政治大. n. al. er. 1996. 2001. 2002. 2003. Ch. engchi. 29. i n U. v.

(36) 2004. 2 Ultra High Frequency Long Range Early Warning Radars. 2005. 10 AIM-9M Sidewinder and (5) AIM-7M Sparrow air-to-air missiles continued pilot training and logistical support for F-16 fighters at Luke AFB. 2007. 218 AMRAAMs and (235) Maverick air-to-ground missiles for F-16 fighters 60 AGM-84L Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles 144 SM-2 Block IIIA Standard air-defense missiles for Kidd-class destroyers 12 P-3C maritime patrol/ASW aircraft Patriot configuration 2 ground systems upgrade 330 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile defense missiles 32 UGM-84L sub-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, IDF aircraft 182 Javelin anti-armor missiles upgrade of (4) E-2T aircraft (Hawkeye 2000 configuration) 30 AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters 173 Stinger air-to-air missiles 1,000 AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire missiles 114 PAC-3 missile defense missiles 60 UH-60M Black Hawk utility helicopters 12 Harpoon Block II anti-ship telemetry (training) missiles 60 MIDS (follow-on technical support for Po Sheng C4 systems) 2 Osprey-class mine hunting ships (refurbished and upgraded) Retrofit of 145 F-16A/B fighters, with 176 AESA radars, JDAMs, etc. Continuation of training of F-16 pilots at Luke Air Force Base Spare parts for F-16A/B, F-5E/F, C-130H, and IDF aircraft. 2008. 2010. 立. ‧ 國. 學. 2011. 政治大. ‧. Source: Kan, Shirley A. (2014, March 3). Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990(pp.55-58). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat 2.4 Summary. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. This chapter reviews the history and evolution of US arms sales to Taiwan. We can learn that the United States initially considered whether to continue to support our country or not since KMT government retreated to Taiwan. Because the outbreak of Korean War and the unique strategic position of our country, we became the ally of the U.S. to curb the communist forces. That was the reason why Taiwan could obtain large-scale arms sales and aid from the United States. After breaking off the diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, the United Stated did not stop arms sales to Taiwan on the basis of “Taiwan Relations Act.” Although “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué” restricts the U.S. support to Taiwan, we can see from history that the actual amounts of arms sales are still considerable increased, including the technology transfer, software and staff training. President George H.W. Bush sold 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan in 1992 and President George W. Bush agreed to sell 30.

(37) Taiwan many important weapons in 2001; we can learn that “U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué” is not that effective. In recent years, US arms sales to Taiwan dropped to 0 from 2012 to 2013 under the circumstances of China’s rise and the Obama Administration’s “Pivot to Asia” policy, in addition to four Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates case which was signed by President Obama in December 2014. It is worth exploring the reasons. This thesis will analyze the reasons in the following chapters.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 31. i n U. v.

(38) Chapter 3 The Impact Of China's Rise On The Asia-Pacific Strategic Pattern. Since the end of Cold War and the disintegration of Soviet Union, China has been realized that triangle strategic value which was formed by the U.S., China and Soviet. 政治大 level to the global level. Besides, China no longer has to worry about national survival. 立 In the 21 century, China’s growing economic, political and military capabilities enable Union has been reduced. China shifts the strategic thought from the Asia-Pacific regional 53. st. ‧ 國. 學. China to become a potential superpower. Every country in the world no longer ignores this rising country. The impact on the security of the Asia-Pacific also increases along. ‧. with the “China’s rise”. China's military strength growth will affect regional security, not. y. Nat. only in the Taiwan Strait but also in the South China Sea and East China Sea. In the long. io. sit. run, the biggest challenge to the United States Pacific Command is China.54. er. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part is to discuss the Asia-Pacific. al. n. v i n C h second part is toUdiscuss the impact and change of its own national biggest interests. The engchi. strategic approach and thought which China has been implemented and future plans for. China's rise in the Asia-Pacific region. The third part is to analyze the role and influence of China on the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan.. 3.1 The China's Asia-Pacific Strategic Thought and the Analysis of Military Force 3.1.1 China’s Asia-Pacific Strategic Thought. 53 54. 張雅君(1992，7 月)。中共對亞太基本形式的認知。後冷戰時期亞太地區權利關係之變化討論會，31(7)，4-5。美太平洋司令:中國軍利成長將影響區域安全(2010 年 5 月 6 日)。Retrieved July 2, 2015, from http://dailynews.sina.com/gb/news/int/cna/20100506/01151419270.html. 32.