形塑全球治理的未來：中國對世界銀行及亞洲開發銀行的策略 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學國際事務學院外交學系碩士班 Master of Department of Diplomacy, College of International Affairs, National Chengchi University 碩士學位論文 Master Thesis. 形塑全球治理的未來：中國對世界銀行及亞洲開發銀行的策略政治. 立. 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Shaping the Future of Global Governance: China’s Strategy towards World Bank and Asian Development Bank. er. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al 指導教授：盧業中博士 iv n Ch engchi U Advisor: Dr. Yeh-Chung Lu 研究生：黃詠晴撰 Student: Yung-Ching Huang 中華民國一一○年三月 March 2021 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(2) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(3) 摘要自 2013 年提出「一帶一路」倡議後，中國主導的基礎設施項目已從歐亞大陸、東南亞擴展到非洲、拉丁美洲和其他歐洲國家。各國意識到，該倡議暗示著中國可能會在地緣政治和經濟上擴大影響力，儘管該倡議對外宣傳是為了增強跨境聯繫和合作。一些國家已認知到發展金融（development finance）與外交政策緊密相連，為了確保國家在特定地區的影響力，他們開始對其外交政策進行調整或啟動新的發展援助計劃，以平衡中國在具有地緣政治優勢和經濟利益的地區的影響力。. 政治大. 儘管川普政府領導下的美國外交政策似乎對多邊主義持保留態度，並大幅削減了對國際. 立. ‧ 國. 學. 組織的預算，但據信中國正急切地擴大其多邊合作，為「一帶一路」倡議及其作為大國的能力不斷增強奠定了基礎。. ‧. 人們開始對透過多邊發展組織擴大中國影響力表示關切，因為這可能導致在組織內外執. y. Nat. er. io. sit. 行項目時，現有的自由主義價值觀受到侵蝕，並且組織行為與現有標準不符。在此背景下，本論文旨在更深入地討論中國在多邊組織中進行部署的基本原理，重點在於其對多邊發展銀 a. n. iv l C n hengchi U 行的行為，特別是其在基礎設施開發項目的決策影響力，並且提供相關部署會如何影響當前國際秩序的規範和標準的見解。. 關鍵字：多邊發展銀行，中國，世界銀行，亞洲開發銀行，制度設計，國際組織. i DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(4) Abstract After the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was proposed in 2013, China-led infrastructure projects have expanded from Eurasia, Southeast Asia, to Africa, Latin America and other European countries. States are aware that the Initiative implies possible expansion of Chinese influence geopolitically and economically although branded as enhancing cross-border connectivity and cooperation. Acknowledging that development finance is closely intertwined with foreign policies to ensure countries’ influence in specific regions, some states have started to make adjustments to their foreign policies or to launch new development aid plans to balance China’s influence in the. 政治大. regions they have geopolitical and economic interests.. 立. While the US foreign policy under the Trump administration seemed to hold reservations on. ‧ 國. 學. multilateralism and experienced significant cuts on budgets for IOs, China is believed to be eagerly. ‧. expanding its multilateral collaborations, laying foundations for the BRI and its growing competence. sit. y. Nat. as a great power.. er. io. Concerns have been raised about the expanding Chinese influence through multilateral. n. a l of liberal values and unconformity development institutions causing erosion of existing standards iv. n U i e h n c On this background, this thesis aims to while executing projects within the institutions andgbeyond.. Ch. deeper discuss the rationales behind Chinese deployments in multilateral institutions, with a focus on its effects on multilateral development banks’ behavior especially the decision-making of their infrastructure development projects, and to provide an insight on how the deployments impact the norms and standards of the current international order.. Keywords: Multilateral Development Bank, China, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Institutional Design, International Organization ii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(5) Table of Content Chapter I: Introduction. 1. 1.. Background and Context. 1. 2.. Purpose of Study and Research Question. 4. 3.. Literature Review. 5. 4.. Case Selection, Research Approach, Method, and Limitation. 20. Chapter II: Expanding through Multilateral Institutions: China’s Motive and Strategy in the Past Two Decades 27 1.. State Expansion in IR Theories. 27. 2.. China’s Domestic Interests and Foreign Policy Agenda. 29. 3.. The Importance of Participating in Multilateral Institutions for China. 33. 4.. Chapter summary. 立. 政治大. 53. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter III: Case Study - China in World Bank. 51. 2.. Voting behavior and preference aggregation in the World Bank. 54 57. y. World Bank’s formal structure. ‧. 1.. 58. sit. a Development Bank Chapter IV: Case Study - China in Asian. iv l C n h e n gand Asian Development Bank’s formal structure i U mechanism c hvoting. 77. China’s Norms and Standards Influence. 90. n. 1.. 69. er. China’s Norms and Standards Influence. io. 4.. Nat. 3. The influence of China’s coalition on project support: Metro Manila Flood Management Project, Additional Financing to PK: Tarbela 4. 78. 2. The influence of China’s coalition on project support: Georgia: Batumi Bypass Road Project, Tajikistan: Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Corridors 2, 3, and 5 (ObigarmNurobod) Road Project 81 3.. Chapter V: Conclusion: China’s Overall Strategy and Degree of Influence in WB and ADB. 97. 1.. The Spectrum of China’s Institutional Choices in WB and ADB. 97. 2.. China’s Influence on WB and ADB behaviors. 98. 3.. Contribution and Suggestion to Future Research. Reference. 101 103. iii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(6) Table of Figures Figure 1.1 The spectrum of China’s institutional choices. 20. Figure 2.1 AIIB’s Partnership Documents. 40. Figure 2.2 Top 8 countries voting power based on IBRD Subscriptions and Voting Power of Member Countries. 47. Figure 3.1 World Bank Organizational Chart. 55. Figure 3.2 World Bank Project Cycle. 56. Figure 3.3 China's institutional choices in the WB. 76. Figure 4.1 Asian Development Bank Functional Organizational Chart. 79. Figure 4.2 ADB Project Cycle. 81. Figure 4.3 China's institutional choices in the ADB. 96. 政治大 Figure 5.1 China’s institutional choices 立 in the WB. 98. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 5.2 China’s institutional choices in the ADB. 98. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. iv DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(7) Table of Tables Table 1.1 China’s influence in selected UN organizations in the field of development finance. 16. Table 1.2 China’s influence in selected UN organisations. 16. Table 3.1 World Bank’s Commitments and Disbursement to the East Asia and Pacific Region for Fiscal 2013-2020 63 Table 3.2 World Bank’s Commitments and Disbursement to the South Asia Region for Fiscal 20132020 68 Table 4.1 World Bank’s Project Approvals to Central and West Asia for Fiscal 2013-2019 Table 5.1 China’s Influence on the Degree of Change in MDBs Organizational Behavior. 立. 86 100. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. v DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(8) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. vi DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(9) Chapter I: Introduction 1. Background and Context Surging demands of infrastructure development have risen in the wake of structural transformation and economic development in developing countries. Especially after the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was proposed in 2013, Chinese-led infrastructure projects have expanded from Eurasia, Southeast Asia, to Africa, Latin America and other European countries. States are aware that the Initiative implies possible expansion of Chinese. 政治大. influence geo-politically and economically although branded as enhancing cross-border. 立. connectivity and cooperation. Acknowledging that development finance is closely. ‧ 國. 學. intertwined with foreign policies to ensure countries’ influence in specific regions, some states have started to make adjustments to their foreign policies or to launch new. ‧. development aid plans to balance China’s influence in the regions they have geopolitical. y. Nat. er. io. sit. and economic interests.. Notwithstanding the wide a discussion of the weakening of US-led liberal international. n. iv l C n h e n g cmore order as the United States has implemented protectionist policies on trade, pulled hi U. itself out of several previously joined multilateral deals and pursued more bilateral agreements, and enhanced the impact of its national DFIs rather than focusing on its activities within multilateral institutions1 out of the concern for its national interest being compromised in larger-scale multilateral collaboration, MDBs are still standing firm in the development aid environment especially sectors related to infrastructure development. The Global Infrastructure Outlook report initiated by G20 forecasts that global infrastructure. Daniel F. Runde and Romina Bandura. “The BUILD Act Has Passed: What’s Next?” Center for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/build-act-has-passed-whats-next (October 12, 2018). 1. 1 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(10) investment needs to reach $94 trillion by 2040, and the largest needs remain in Asia (over half of the total needs). 2 MDBs have started to develop closer collaboration through platforms such as the Global Infrastructure Forum and other regional development finance forums to mobilize resources for infrastructure development and ensure resilient and sustainable technologies and finance for the future of infrastructure development. By pooling the resources of several donors, the burden-sharing design of MDBs allows donors to share the large cost of development projects, thus allowing MDBs to provide development aid on a larger scale in funding and knowledge than many bilateral agencies.. 政治大. That said, the role of multilateral institutions in the infrastructure development sector where. 立. it is probably the most resource demanding could not be ignored.. ‧ 國. 學. While the US foreign policy under the Trump administration seemed to hold reservations on multilateralism and experienced significant cuts on budgets for IOs, China. ‧. is believed to be eagerly expanding its multilateral collaborations, laying foundations for. y. Nat. er. io. sit. the BRI and its growing competence as a great power. But what lies behind China’s pursuit of influence expansion? Realists believe that as a country grows more powerful with their. al. n. iv n C capabilities, will seek a new h ethey ngchi U. economic thus military. scope of influence that is. proportionate to their new power and in accordance to the change of power distribution.3 China’s rising power has a lot to do with its role of “world factory” over the decades which provides the economic drive by huge manufacturing and export growth. Although economic growth in the past decade has been impacted by industrial restructuring, China has not only surpassed Japan in 2010 to become and remain the second largest economy but has also. Global Infrastructure Hub. “Global Infrastructure Outlook – A G20 Initiative.” https://outlook.gihub.org/ (2017, 2018) 3 Randall L. Schweller. (2006). Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power. Princeton University Press. pp. 22-45. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rkxt 2. 2 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(11) became the largest exporter in the world.4 Now with a large economic capacity, China will have stronger chances and better resources to secure their expansion of interests, although that means they will have to undermine current international orders. For instance, the China 2025 Strategy and the BRI has spurred discussions on their impacts on international standards and institutions. Moreover, usually when countries wish to expand their influence across the globe, multilateral institutions become excellent arenas for them to execute their plans. They achieve higher influence by creating alternative nodes of international cooperation (in the. 政治大. case of China the AIIB and NDB) or expanding its engagement with existing ones. After. 立. the PRC government joined the UN in 1971, it continued to join several major development. ‧ 國. 學. finance institutions in the 1980s (IMF, WB, AfDB, and ADB). More recently, China’s. ‧. participation in IBD and EBRD has been associated with securing its interest in the BRI initiative. Besides expansion of membership, China’s share of contribution and voting. sit. y. Nat. power in major institutions have also increased. As of 2019, China has become the second-. er. io. largest contributor to the UN’s a regular and peacekeeping budget and is now holding the. n. iv l C n U with increasing over the years. In h e nWB, third-largest voting quota in the IMF, h iADB g cand terms of personnel engagement, China has deployed a current number of six officials with Chinese nationality as heads of UN several UN bodies. As the US tends to step down from leadership and the concerns of the international organizations being Chinese-characterized spurred, 5 the US could easily see those efforts by China as a threat to its international leadership and thus overall national interest.. 4. Data could be found on World Bank database. https://data.worldbank.org/ Kristine Lee, “Coming Soon to the United Nations: Chinese Leadership and Authoritarian Values.” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-16/coming-soon-united-nations-chinese-leadershipand-authoritarian-values (2019, September 20) ; 方冰. (2019, August 16). 美中在國際組織中影響力的此消彼長 A China Influence in UN. Voice of America Cantonese. https://www.voacantonese.com/a/CHINA- INFLUENCEIN-UN-20190802/5026316.html 5. 3 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(12) Concerns have been raised about the expanding Chinese influence through multilateral development institutions causing erosion of liberal values and unconformity of existing standards while executing projects within the institutions and beyond. On this background, this thesis aims to deeper discuss the rationales behind Chinese deployments in multilateral institutions, with a focus on its effects on multilateral development banks’ behavior especially the decision-making of their infrastructure development projects, and to provide an insight on how the deployments impact the norms and standards of the current international order.. 治 2. Purpose of Study and Research 政 Question. 大. the puzzle of Chinese influence on multilateral. 學. ‧ 國. This study aims. to 立 address. institutions/global governance by looking into three big research questions. First, what are. ‧. international organizations and what is the relation between IOs and states? Next, what is the formal structure and decision- making mechanism in the case study of MDBs, and how. sit. y. Nat. does China aim to utilize it to advance its interest? Finally, how has Chinese deployment. er. io. of its influence in the MDBsa imply a future appearance of global governance with China’s. n. iv l C n U studies focusing on organizational h einstitutions? growing participation in multilateral n g c h i Past. behavior primarily discussed mechanisms of institutional reform and behavioral change of IO itself, comparingly there is still a considerable improvement space for studies that focus on the nuances while a rising power is operating within those mechanisms. By applying existing models to recent changes in the MDB environment, state capacity from a common agency perspective can be further discussed. To be more comprehensive, the following detailed sections of questions are to be answered in this thesis: a. What are IOs and what is the relation between IOs and states? i. What are the relations between IOs and their principals (states)? 4 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(13) ii.. What are the reasons for a rising power to scale up its participation in multilateral institutions?. b. What are China’s strategies and deployments in the MDBs? i. Formal structures of the MDBs ii. China’s utilization of the decision-making mechanism to advance principal’s interest c. How has Chinese deployment of its influence in the MDBs imply the changes of future operation and appearance of global governance? i. Are there any expected norm or standard changes within the MDBs and beyond?. 立. 政治大. ii. How has the existing arrangement reacted to China’s growing institutional. ‧ 國. 學. influence?. ‧. 3. Literature Review. sit. y. Nat. a. Multilateral institutions. a. er. io. Choosing International organizations as the research subject, there is the need to. n. review past and current trends i v between foreign policy and l of studies on relations. n U i e h n c multilateralism. The review will cover thegdevelopment of the concepts of multilateralism. Ch. with a focus on international organizations as the expression type of regimes and institutions, and its relationship with national foreign policies and national interests from donor aspect. i.. Theories of international relations and multilateralism The transformation of world order in the post WWII era had provided impetus for studies and debates among researchers to boom, extending through the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1898 and the subsequence end of the Cold War, when multilateralism has become the central framework of studies covering the discussion of cooperation, 5 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(14) institutions, norm diffusion, and great power politics. Other than neorealism and neoliberalism—the two major paradigms which was also seen as insufficient in the discussion of multilateralism—new theories were being proposed by scholars who wish to bridge the theories guided by the materialism and idealism ontologies to form complementary approaches for further research on understanding the variety of multilateral arrangements.6 When multilateral arrangements first started to catch attention in the post-war era, functionalism with the concept of “ramification”7 emerged and came to serve as an. 政治大. explanation to closer cooperation of supranational institutions such as the United. 立. Nations that attempted to solve technical difficulties during the rebuilding of Europe.. ‧ 國. 學. On the basis of functionalism, Ernst. ‧. Haas then proposed new functionalism as an approach to study European integration and in a broader sense the creation of high political level supranational authorities.. sit. y. Nat. Considering the gap which functionalism had while explaining the process of. er. io. integration spillover from a a specific sector to higher and broader level integration, new. n. iv l C n U h e of functionalism threw in the factor and expectations of different n gshifting c h i interests national actors in the process of spillover, thus creating the political agency to move towards political integration.8. This functionalist emphasis on the spillover effect gave way to the development of the interdependence concept of neoliberal institutionalists in the 1980s, and the. Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52 (4): 887–917; Jeffrey T. Checkel. (2005). International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework. International Organization, 59(4), 801-826. Frank Schimmelfennig. (2005). Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe. International Organization, 59(4), 827-860. 7 David Mitrany. A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1943) 8 See Ernst Haas’ works on EU from the 1950s. 6. 6 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(15) acknowledgement that international actors come from multiple aspects (political, economic, private) and the growing indistinction between domestic and international issues further strengthened the concept of complex interdependence.9 This is not to say that neoliberal institutionalists adopt a different ontology from Neorealists. Both schools adopt a state-centric and rationalist ontology; yet neoliberal institutionalists see the positive effects of IOs mitigating distribution problems among member states, thus guaranteeing institutional cooperation. They did not ignore the discussion of “power”, neither had they replicated neorealists’ over emphasis on military power relations.. 政治大. Rather, power is reflected on the outcomes of various type of complex interdependence,. 立. composed of “sensitivity” and “vulnerability” as its two aspects.10 Moreover, neoliberal. ‧ 國. 學. institutionalists identified the functions of institutions to mitigate fears of cheating, disclose information, settle distributional conflicts by assuring absolute gains over time,. ‧. and reduce transaction cost that facilitate cooperation,11 thus differentiates itself from. y. Nat. er. io. sit. neorealists’ argument of ephemeral cooperation that reflects immediate interests of great powers.12 In sum, institutions are persistently affecting state activities as defined. al. n. iv n C by Keohane, ‘Institutions canhbe defined as persistent and connected sets of rules, engchi U formal and informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.’13. 9. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye. (1977). Power and interdependence: World politics in transition. Boston: Little, Brown. 10 Ibid. 11 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin. (1995). “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory”. International Security 20 (1): 39-51. 12 Stephen M. Walt. (1987). The Origins of Alliance. Cornell University Press; Robert O. Keohane. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press; John Mearsheimer. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19(3): 5-49; Robert O. Keohane & Lisa Martin. (1995). The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security 20(1): 39-51. 13 Robert O. Keohane. 1989. “Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics.” In International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, ed. Robert O. Keohane. Boulder: Westview Press.. 7 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(16) Meanwhile, the early stage of emergence of constructivist elements in the IR field attempts to break the dominant approach of seeing institutional collaboration as pure systemic work which by definition is the power distribution among actors. Several scholars have set forth this overarching theme by proposing studies from constructivist perspectives. Ernst Haas, John Ruggie, and Peter Haas had respectively treated their arguments that led to similar ends of strengthening collaboration with the construction of cognitive elements. Ernst Haas’ comprehensive discussion of regime formation follows a step by step. 政治大. progress from the identifying of issue area and motivations for actors to make issue. 立. linkages and create issue packages (which contains the degree of consensual knowledge. ‧ 國. 學. among experts and interconnection of goals identified by policy makers), thus. ‧. determining the cognitive path of issue-area formation, to policy-makers’ decision of regime type.14 John Ruggie pushed further by adding on empirical discussions that. sit. y. Nat. show structural and cognitive factors both contribute to the formation of regimes. He. er. io. uses the transformationaof international economic regimes before and after WWII to. n. iv l C n U interacts with each other. Holding h e neconomic argue that regimes and international g c h i order. a different view from hegemonic stability theory and distinguishing the “form” and “content” of international order, he argues that the structure of power distribution only predicts the former, not the latter. Therefore, if the power distribution changes or hegemony power declines, rules and procedures might change, but the normative framework of liberal economy is not necessary to change so long as the social purpose (consensual knowledge embedded in the society) is constant.. 15. Looking into. Ernst Haas. (1980). “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes.” World Politics, 32(3), 357-405. John Gerard Ruggie. 1982. “International Regimes,Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” International Organization 36 (2): 379-415. 14 15. 8 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(17) knowledge-shaping more nuanced, Peter Haas proposed an epistemic community approach to explain the ideational constructs of national interests and behavior. By arguing that focusing only on the structure of power would ignore the fact that states could adjust their interests and behaviors through learning and accepting new knowledge as their conduct, Haas identified “control over knowledge” and “norm diffusion”, both usually carried out by epistemic communities, dimensions of power that shapes international coordination.16 In short, for institutions to succeed, they all argued that knowledge plays the part of creating convergence of actors’ interests and. 政治大. between policy and content, basically deciding how the collaboration is holding. 立. together.. ‧ 國. 學. Later dialogues on combining rationalists and constructivists views are abundant. ‧. and progressive in explaining IOs role of normative convergence among actors. 17 Finnemore and Sikkink’s study centers on socialization, the key element of. sit. y. Nat. constructivist approach, and how it is achieved by norm diffusion and influences state. er. io. behaviors. As constructivists a they still look into the opposite of ideational factors. n. iv l C n h e nrelate material factors i Uexplain g c hand. whether and how. the behaviors within norm. dynamics, most importantly conformity. Not only have they introduced the norm “life cycle” as an analytical framework, including concepts such as “tipping point”, “critical mass”, “norm cascade”, and eventually internalization, in another word socialization, they also identified norm entrepreneurs and IO networks facilitating this process by ‘pressuring targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws to ratify treaties and by. 16. Peter Haas. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1-35. 17 Lisa Martin, & Beth Simmons. (2013). International organizations and institutions. In W. CarlsnaesT. Risse, & B. A. Simmons Handbook of international relations (pp. 326-351). SAGE Publications Ltd, https://www.doi.org/10.4135/9781446247587.n13. Handbook of International Relations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications; 2002. pp. 192-211.. 9 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(18) monitoring compliance with international standards’ 18 . Moreover, the linkage of international and domestic aspects on socialization has led the cleavage between constructivist and rationalist approach obvious and blurred at the same time. The term ‘‘strategic social construction’’, which is quite clear by their definition that ‘these actors are making detailed means–ends calculations to maximize their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize involve changing the other players’ utility function in ways that reflect the normative commitments of the norm entrepreneurs’19. Checkel went further to define internalization in a more detailed and middle-. 政治大. theoried way. Changing from the logic of consequences to the logic of. 立. appropriateness,20 socialization processes could be analyzed by the three mechanisms. ‧ 國. 學. including strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion. The purpose of. ‧. identifying potential synergies between constructivism and rationalism is now visible as strategic calculation is much more a self- interest based, materialist mechanism to. sit. y. Nat. approach this issue. However, the calculations might make up further explanations for. er. io. the influencing identity ato state behaviors as ‘dispositions become anchored as part of. n. iv l C n identity (thathis,e n internalized) g c h i Uand how. an individual’s. they shape this person’s. preferences and behavior towards new objects or issues are matters of debate’ 21 . Strategic calculations are mainly based on the incentives (rewards or punishments) including various kinds of conditionality, one of the most common is the granting of membership to international organizations, which is discussed more in another article. Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52 (4): 887–917. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Jeffrey T. Checkel. (2005). International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework. International Organization, 59(4), 801-826. 18. 10 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(19) by Schimmelfennig.22 Considering calculation alone couldn’t invoke change to logic of “appropriateness” since it is seen as instrumentally rational, in some conditions behavioral adaptation is possible to line up with community norms. It seems to be an explanation similar to the inertia of institutional effects that ‘It is possible that what starts as behavioral adaptation, may— because of various cognitive and institutional lock-in effects—later be followed by sustained compliance that is strongly suggestive of internalization and preference change’23. Shimmelfennig’s study takes a break from the constructivism-driven researches. 政治大. and shifts the focus on normative suasion and social influence of the IOs to strategic. 立. calculation for behavioral adaptation preceding the actual internalization/socialization.. ‧ 國. 學. He emphasizes the importance of “process” starting from reinforcement, in this case routinization and rationalization, which leads to the final type 1 and type 2. ‧. internalization proposed by Checkel.24 Moreover, we have to acknowledge that what is. y. Nat. er. io. sit. important to norm socialization not only happens at the international level as external factors to state actors but also domestic factors that make the most difference. With the. al. n. iv n C different combinations of constellations domestic level of states, it is still the h e n g cinhthe i U calculation on the political cost of domestic change and benefits on memberships that make reinforcement and conformity possible. International and domestic change are complementary to each other rather than surpassing each other. 25 Shimmelfennig’s article also did not completely shut out constructivist explanations on norm diffusions since it acknowledges internalization itself and the types of internalization; relatively,. 22. Frank Schimmelfennig. (2005). Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe. International Organization, 59(4), 827- 860. 23 See footnote 21. 24 Ibid. 25 See footnote 22.. 11 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(20) strategic calculation is also discussed as a mechanism by constructivists. It only suggested that strong evidence and process to internalization might come from domestic calculations. Theories as reviewed ranging within traditional IR paradigms mostly focused on the discussion of the efficiency to coordinate through IOs, how they alter states’ actions, and IOs’ resiliency during shifting power dynamics. Before the principal-agent model of IO was proposed, there was a lack of theory that can ‘explain organizational autonomy as well as responsiveness to the demands of member governments’ 26 .. 政治大. Considering the discussion of this thesis on China’s deployment of influence in MDBs,. 立. the changing of MDBs’ behavior accordingly, and eventually the effects on overall. ‧ 國. 學. global institutional structures and the interests of other state principals, it is necessary. ii.. Principals’ interest and their control over IOs. Nat. y. ‧. to conduct a review on principal-agent theory in the next section.. er. io. sit. Delegation to IO, a phenomenon that happens during IO formation, is ‘a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent in which the latter is a. n. iv l C n 27 empowered to act on behalf of h theeformer’. i U on this relation tie, P-A models are n g c hBased applied as an analytic framework to the causes and consequences of the interaction between principal (member state) and agent (IO) preferences. Deriving from the agency theory first applied in other subjects of social science (economy, comparative politics), Nielson and Tierney proposed a systematic P-A framework revolving the issues of common agency and delegation chain. Both issues generate the problem of agency. 26. Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney. (2003). Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. International Organization, 57(2), 241-276. Retrieved January 27, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3594852. 27 Darren G. Hawkins, Utah, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, (Eds.). (2006). Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.. 12 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(21) slippage. IOs’ rule and procedure provide the mechanism to solve coordination problems for collective action, however complex principal and delegation chain inevitably requires some compromise of principal preferences. 28 The process of preference aggregation therefore became a supporting argument of principals’ control over agency. Drawing on coalition theory, Lynne suggested that the majority voting rules in IOs designed by the principals give way to the preference aggregation of collective principals. Principals that are generally viewed as small/midsized and centrist- positioned are considered “pivotal” in the coalition model, as they. 政治大. are often the decisive players that influence the final voting results in IOs. 29 This. 立. implies that the voting outcomes which decides agency behavior will not always be. ‧ 國. 學. closest to the preference of the most powerful players among all. Thus, the coalition. ‧. model could be useful while we further consider Chinese attempts to influence organizational behaviors under the formal voting structures.. sit. y. Nat. The discussion of coalition highlights the necessity of considering factors to. er. io. coalition formation. Regional a groupings have added complexity to the individuality of. n. iv l C n h egroupings member states of IOs.30 Regional i Ubased on some extent of “proximity”, n g c hform where geographic proximity, economic and political ties should be taken into consideration. Those proximities may be the most obvious on regional groupings but can also go beyond a region, and eventually imply a rationale for coalitions in IOs. “Proximity” will therefore be set as the indicator to measure coalitions in this thesis.. 28. See footnote 26. Mona M. Lyne, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney. (2006). Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid. In Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, (Eds.) Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, pp. 4176). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511491368.003 30 Bob Reinalda, “Decision Making within International Organizations, An Overview of Approaches and Case Studies.” Paper for delivery at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), 29 th Joint Sessions of Workshops, (Grenoble, France, 6-11 April 2001). 29. 13 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(22) Studies focusing on agency preferences, which more relates to the discussion on organizational autonomy, have moved from focusing on agency strategies to circumvent principals’ control 31 and the institutional design that keeps the balance between IOs being dutiful agents or rogue actors32 to the relation of IOs’ degree of autonomy and their performance. Recent scholars have argued that high autonomy of IOs and their field staff actually has positive effects on IO performance,33 and the effort of achieving de facto autonomy rather than de jure autonomy through institutional design has also been explored.34. 政治大. There is a demand for more explanations for states (in the case here powerful states). 立. in face of the risk of agency slack choosing to conduct foreign aid through MDBs.. ‧ 國. 學. Milner’s study appeared to be useful and comprehensive in pulling together perspectives principal-agent. model,. hegemon. self-binding,. and. ‧. of. constructivist. norm. appropriation.35 Although Milner’s conclusion is generated by studying the interactions. y. Nat. er. io. sit. between domestic public opinion and state’s decision to allocate aid through multilateral channels on the case ofapost WWII America as a hegemon, it is assumed in this thesis. n. iv l C n h ewhen pertinent to expect similar results n gapplied c h i toUother great powers seeking to forward foreign policies through multilateralism. Notwithstanding, considering China to be the case study in this thesis, domestic. 31. Darren G. Hawkins, Brigham Young University, Wade Jacoby. (2006). How agents matter. In D. Hawkins, D. Lake, D. Nielson, & M. Tierney (Eds.), Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, pp. 199-228). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 32 Andrew P. Cortell, Susan Peterson. (2006). Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO. In D. Hawkins, D. Lake, D. Nielson, & M. Tierney (Eds.), Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, pp. 255-280). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 33 Dan Honig. (2019). When Reporting Undermines Performance: The Costs of Politically Constrained Organizational Autonomy in Foreign Aid Implementation. International Organization, 73(1), 171-201. 34 Ranjit Lall (2017). Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining the Performance of International Organizations. International Organization, 71(2), 245-280. 35 Helen V. Milner, & Dustin Tingley. (2011). “The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy.” Previous versions presented at 2010 ISA and IPES, Washington University at St. Louis, and Germany). 14 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(23) public opinion as a factor to support these three arguments should be reconsidered and modified as peer pressure coming from the international community since unlike democracies the authoritarian regime faces no need to cater its policy to its domestic constituents’ preference. Following the thread of various aspects of principal-agent relations, a rising power added into the context would require another review of its impact on organizational behavior change and the international order. The models of the engagement of a rising power in multilateral institutions will be reviewed, and recent studies and opinions on. 政治大. its impact will be proceeded in the next section.. 立. b. A rising power’s impact on institutional order. ‧ 國. 學. There is a burgeoning number of reports and debates about the effect of China taking. ‧. leadership in multilateral institutions. Firstly, on a larger issue scope, a United Nations with. sit. y. Nat. Chinese Characteristics has been assumed and studied, and the latest Clingendael Report published in December 2018 shows that China is exerting its influence through several UN. er. io. n. bodies and affecting the norm a and standard settings of those v different thematic areas. In relation to development. i l C n finance,hthe i U e nreport g c hconcludes. that China has been investing. resources in the orphanized agencies in the UN as tools to align its domestic interest with the UN agenda. Increasing influence in UN DESA, UNDP and UNIDO appears to be extremely beneficial to China as those agencies focus on economic development and development finance, which is perfect for legitimization of its BRI in tying together the BRI and UN standards (SDGs). As the leader positions in those agencies are mostly occupied by Chinese officials, voicing to support the BRI and aligning their agenda would be much feasible.36 For an overall image of how these investments and impact look like, Table 1.1. 36. Okano-Heijmans, Maaike & Putten, Frans-Paul. (2018). A United Nations with Chinese characteristics?. 15 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(24) specifically showed the distribution of Chinese influence and its effect on UN bodies related to development finance. Table 1.2 showed the distribution of Chinese influence and its effect on each UN body from three thematic case studies (human rights, development finance, and climate governance). Table 1. 1 China’s influence in selected UN organizations in the field of development finance China’s influence on norms and standards Moderate. Maximal. UNDP. Minimal. Moderate. 政治大. 立. Maximal. UNIDO. UN DESA. ‧ 國. 學. Chinese involvement. Minimal. Source: Maaike Okano-Heijmans & Frans-Paul van der Putten “A United Nations. ‧. Nat. io. sit. Table 1. 2 China’s influence in selected UN organisations. n. al. er. China’s influence on norms and standards. Ch. Minimal. Chinese involvement. Minimal. OHCHR. y. with Chinese characteristics?” (Dec. 2018), Clingendael Report, p.12.. i n U. Moderate. e n g cUNDP hi. v. Maximal. UNSC on climate security. Moderate. Maximal. (UNSC / UNGA on human rights) UNIDO. HRC UN DESA UNFCCC and the climate frameworks. Source: Maaike Okano-Heijmans & Frans-Paul van der Putten “A United Nations with Chinese characteristics?” Dec. 2018, Clingendael Report, p.12.. Clingendael Report.. 16 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(25) Secondly, in wake of the establishment of the BRI and the Asia Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), the debates on whether China is creating a “shadow” network of international organization to the existing liberal institution structure has not stopped since 2014.37 The global economic order after WWII reflected a dominating US power especially over development financing, with the US holding the largest share in the IMF and World Bank under the Bretton Woods system. On one aspect, the creation of AIIB and other new institutions led by China casts skeptical views on whether China is seeking to take over Western leadership in global orders, and whether the post-Cold War rhetoric of the structure. 政治大. of global governance/multilateral organizations — good governance,38 will be compromised.. 立. Doubts are predictable because the creation of new institutions also means an uncertainty of. ‧ 國. 學. the values and standards that would be upheld by a non-liberal and non-Western leader of the new sets of institutions. On the other aspect, the constant increase of Chinese staff and. ‧. ensuring of Chinese leadership in existing IOs provided a rhetoric for researchers and policy-. y. Nat. er. io. sit. makers to argue for China’s mere enthusiasm for the current system and purpose to ‘utilize these international bodies as platform to be involved in global rule-making and to gain more. n. al. of a voice for China.’. 39. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Recommendations for the IOs and the US to respond to the China challenge has been coming from various aspects. Some suggested that the US should redefine its role in the “core MDBs” and promote an empowered China within them to keep the core MDBs. Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s ‘Shadow’ Network of International Organizations.” The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/chinas-shadow-network-of-international-organizations/ (31st Oct. 2014) 38 Ngaire Woods. (1999). Good Governance in International Organizations. Global Governance, 5(1), 39-61. Retrieved January 27, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800219. The elements to ensure symmetry of power distribution and efficiency within the institution requires participation, accountability, and fairness, to be applied as principles. The implement of these principles in IOs has demonstrated that formal voting and management structures and informal maneuvers are equally important factors that have an influence on good governance. 39 Wei Liu, “China Wants More Chinese to Work in International Organizations.” The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/china-wants-more-chinese-to-work-in-international-organizations/ (24th Aug. 2018) 37. 17 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(26) dominating, not only to ensure further US interest but also the function of existing normsetting and collective actions40. Some also called for IMF reforms to give other developing countries and emerging markets a greater voice in decision-making. In avoidance of facilitating fragmented governance and standards, the United States as leader and G20 as platform should approve and provide guidance for IMF reforms.41 Others focused on the long-debated issue of China’s dual identity of being both a borrower from MDBs and a major lender to development countries. Arguing that China is reaping benefits through its recipient status at the expense of the poorest countries that really need the resources,. 政治大. researchers call for the US to take the lead in urging China to become strictly a donor state. 立. and ensuring an end to this double standard of the MDBs. 42. ‧ 國. 學. However, pointing out an assertive direction of China’s multilateral institution strategy to either position in this turmoil of debate seems impossible. Following China’s economic. ‧. growth and its discourse of becoming a responsible great power in global governance, its. y. Nat. er. io. sit. identity as a leading developing country has yet to change. As Xi Jinping delivered in his speech at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party, ‘China has provided entirely new. al. n. iv n C options for countries and nations inhthe world that hope e n g c h i U to accelerate their development and also maintain their own independence’ while balancing its interests of taking on the dual identity in global governance. Some scholars agreed that ‘China will remain in a grey zone between the existing liberal international economic order and the alternative world of South-South cooperation,’ 43 hedging between its interests of international standards. 40. Scott Morris. 2016. "Responding to AIIB: U.S. Leadership at the Multilateral Development Banks in a New Era" CGD Policy Paper 091. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. http://www.cgdev.org/publication/responding-aiib-us-leadership-multilateral-development-banks-new-era 41 Paola Subacchi, “The AIIB Is a Threat to Global Economic Governance.” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/31/the-aiib-is-a-threat-to-global-economic-governance-china/ (31th Mar. 2015) 42 Daniel Wagner, “Trump’s Development Bank Challenge.” International Policy Digest, https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/02/08/trump-s-development-bank-challenge/ 43 Hongying Wang. (2019). The New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: China’s Ambiguous Approach to Global Financial Governance. Development and Change, 50(1), 221–244. doi:. 18 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(27) aligned with the developed countries and the resource needed for its development goals tied closely with the rest of the developing countries. Given the fact that China appears to be utilizing a multichannel strategy towards its interests of complex identity, research attention should not be given only to the alternative institutions created by China, which recent studies of global institutional order have been largely focusing on. This thesis has found that while studies of China’s exertion of influence in the existing UN bodies have garnered, there is few thorough discussions of China’s exertion in existing MDBs. Nevertheless, models proposed by scholars to assess. 政治大. China’s overall behavior on the institutional order would be useful when throwing in cases. 立. of specific MDBs.. ‧ 國. 學. Ikenberry and Lim’s project on China’s institutional statecraft has identified some of. ‧. the most obvious motivations for a rising power to challenge existing rules and institutions. sit. y. Nat. of international order according to historical cases, while acknowledging China is facing a dense array of layered institutions—different from the institutional environment from those. er. io. n. rising powers dating backato the 1950s—that would prompt China to make complex v. i l C n U of building new institutions and h e n goncthe institutional choices.44 Although focusing h istrategy using AIIB as the case study, they offered an analytical repertoire of China’s institutional choices, ranging between the spectrum of remaining status quo or extreme opposition (See Figure 1.1).. 10.1111/dech.12473 44 G. John Ikenberry, Darren Lim, D 2017, 'China's emerging institutional statecraft: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the prospects for counter-hegemony', Brookings Institution, Project on International Order and Strategy, April.. 19 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(28) Figure 1.1 The Spectrum of China’s institutional choices STATUS-QUO STAKEHOLDER. AUTHORITYSEEKING STAKEHOLDER. Join, participate within existing rules and practices.. INSTITUTIONAL OBSTRUCTION. Join, seek greater voice through redistributing decision-making authority.. Join, alter, impede, or contain the pursuit of undesirable rules, practices, and norms.. OPPOSITION Outright opposition to or non-participation in existing institutional arrangements.. Source: Remade by the author referring to Ikenberry, GJ & Lim, D (2017), ‘China’s emerging institutional statecraft: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the prospects for counter-hegemony’, Brookings Institution, Project on International Order and Strategy, April.). 立. 政治大. The study concluded that under the current decline of multilateralism support from the. ‧ 國. 學. Trump administration, any attempts from China falling in the spectrum that is against the current order’s interest ‘…. will have greater prospects of success in the absence of any. ‧. attempt to counter by Washington. This could include obstructing the operation of existing. y. Nat. er. io. sit. institutions, ignoring them, or opposing them outright.’45 The power dynamic between the rising power and the hegemony in the institution arena also implies challenges faced by the. al. n. iv n C international horder. i U thus e n gThis c hthesis. multifaceted liberal. aims to assess the extent of. plausibility of this conclusion in a narrower aspect focusing on examining the middle options on the spectrum, by examining China’s behaviors in the MDBs, determine which category on the spectrum they have fallen into, and what it would mean to the existing international order.. 4. Case Selection, Research Approach, Method, and Limitation A. Case Selection. 45. Ibid.. 20 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(29) Current trends of studying the China effect on institutional environments either emphasize to look from a broader issue scope thus making the UN as a whole their case study, or stress on the impacts of newly created alternative institutions on existing institutional orders thus majorly taking the AIIB and the NDB as their cases. In this thesis the author plans to conduct a coherent and comprehensive research that leads to an objective evaluation of the Chinese dynamics within existing international institutions, which would include three main discussions: the motivation, the strategy, and operation. Current research seldom gives a comprehensive discussion on all three topics in one study.. 政治大. Thus, considering the urgent need of resources for infrastructure projects subsequent with. 立. China’s rising state capacity, MDBs will be a good aspect to cut in and lead to a conclusion. ‧ 國. 學. on the alteration of current development finance institutions. Also, to best reflect principals’ influence in IOs, it is necessary to pick cases in which the target principals’. ‧. interest and power is reflected significantly (in which China and the United States both. y. Nat. er. io. sit. hold major voting powers). Consequently, the picks of cases in this thesis will include two major MDBs which both China and the United States highly participate in: The World. al. n. iv n C Bank Group and the Asian Development representing global MDB and regional h e n gBank, chi U MDB respectively. As for the loan projects selected for additional discussion, aside from the geopolitical and issue proximities, the author also selected the cases based on media attention, project scale (most of the loan amount are divided equally between the AIIB and WB or ADB, except for the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Corridors 2, 3, and 5 Road Project in Tajikistan), and significancy (most of them are the first AIIB co-financed projects in the country). B. Research Approach 21 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(30) By reviewing both rational-ideational approaches to study international cooperation, the author has come to a decision that constructivism and classical realism would best explain the theme of power and change in this thesis. The compatibility of classical realists and constructivists has made the change of power structure and ideational factors dependent on each other.46 The defining of China’s state identity and prestige that influence the order of international organizations/global governance would be the core concepts that the author tries to discuss by examining China’s strategy towards MDBs. On the one hand, Hans Morgenthau acknowledges prestige as an “indispensable element of a rational foreign. 政治大. policy” which contributes to the pursuit of state power with diplomatic social intercourses. 立. practiced by states. 47 On the other hand, constructivists’ logic of appropriateness has the. ‧ 國. 學. perspective of intersubjective understanding stressing that ideas, norms, and discourse shape the identity perceived between states. Combining the core concepts of classical realism and. ‧. constructivism thus contributes to the discussion of China as a rising power utilizing. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. within MDBs.. sit. diplomatic tools to shape its identity and acquiring state prestige through state interactions. i n U. Ch. v. e nandg capproaches Consequently, fractionated results should be integrated to look into hi the questions we try to address here. An introduction to the variables of this research would be elucidated as follow: Independent Variable China as a rising power and its influence on the institutional order will be the root and motivation of the whole research. Therefore, the independent variable in this research will. See a comprehensive discussion on the Realist-Constructivism approach in J. Samuel Barkin. “Realist Constructivism”. International Studies Review. Fall 2003, Vol. 5 Issue 3, p325-342. 47 Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, W. David Clinton. Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace. Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education. 46. 22 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(31) be China’s power rise, indicated by economy and political strength, and especially in this thesis its position in international organizations. Identifying its power change thus motivation and capacity to put more resources into MDBs will be discussed in the next chapter. Milner’s study which pulls together perspectives of principal-agent model, hegemon self-binding, and constructivist norm appropriating addresses the reason for great powers to channel its foreign policy through multilateral institutions and would thus be adjusted in accordance with China being the case in this thesis. Intervening Variables. 政治大. Three intervention variables will be the main body of discussion in this thesis: voting. 立. behavior, coalition, and norm and standard setting. Each will be examined in the third. ‧ 國. 學. and fourth chapter respectively under the discussion of the case study MDBs. Voting. ‧. behavior will be discussed based on the concept of collective principals and preference. sit. y. Nat. aggregation by looking into the decision-making mechanisms, while coalition will be. n. er. io. measured with principal proximity and thus its effect on China’s behavior on project. will be measuring China’s. n U i e h n involvement gascthe Clingendael. al support, both taking a principal-agent perspective. On norm i v and standard setting, the author Ch. Report did on measuring. Chinese effects on UN norms (personnel change, rhetoric, etc.). Dependent Variable After the intervening variables are fully examined, we can now move to categorize them into groups of strategies and determine which parts of the spectrum shown in Figure 1.1 they fall into, and finally it is possible to discuss their influence on the current institutional order. The dependent variable can thus be defined as the degree of change in the MDBs organizational behavior which is affected by a rising power’s choice of strategy towards international institutions. This would give us a clearer picture of whether 23 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(32) or how a rising power’s interest clashes with the current order of global governance. C. Research Method a. Document analysis. The author plans to use qualitative research methods in this thesis. By conducting document analysis, literature or documents are systematically categorized and interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around an assessment topic. Document resources could be categorized into two kinds, primary and secondary, with the first conducted by direct researcher interpretation from raw materials and the latter. 政治大. adding a layer of researcher re- interpretation of existing scholarly interpretations.. 立. Considering that the result and discussion of this thesis are based majorly upon. ‧ 國. 學. understanding China’s deployment of its influence towards MDBs, the structure of. ‧. MDBs and China’s strategy has to be fully examined. Primary sources including data. sit. y. Nat. released by MDBs, government reports, and official statements will be collected and. er. io. interpreted to look into the intervening variables in this thesis. Secondary resources. n. a l journal articles, book chapters, such as think tank reports, i v and media reports will be n U i e h n gc interpreted and referenced to reach a conclusion.. Ch. D. Research Limitation a. Limitation on uncertainty of future. The influence of China’s rising power on the international order is an ongoing topic and is not expected to have a clear conclusion in the near future. The thesis could only include past until current information through the past two decades considering China as a rising great power in the international system has only been given more academic attention since around the 2000s, and also more adjustments on its strategies for multilateral institutions could be observed since then. However, there is little transparency and certainty 24 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(33) of information released by the PRC government on its future strategy with multilateral institutions, we could only make conjecture according to its shown behavior within the international order. b. Limitation on research method. Interpretation on documents could be beneficial while giving attention to the nuances of ideational factors in each document. However, research on international organizations will benefit a lot from large-N analysis, when quantitative methods and regression models could be applied to run data collection, which is not in the capability of this thesis. Thus,. 政治大. readers might find the case selection of this thesis limited to a certain degree and without. 立. the comparison of cases from much various sectors, themes, and countries.. ‧ 國. 學. Another significant limitation is that it is not in the capability of the author to retrieve official voting records from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. While. ‧. determining the strength and significance of the coalitions in the Banks, this thesis could. y. Nat. er. io. sit. only make assumptions according to the possible relationships of the countries involved. Regarding the data of World Bank members’ voting shares and annual loan approvals of. al. n. iv n C the Bank, this thesis focuses on the sub-institutions in the Bank, the IBRD and htwo e nmain gchi U IDA, for the sake of keeping the discussion straight forward without having to deal with potentially irrelevant data.. 25 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(34) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 26 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(35) Chapter II: Expanding through Multilateral Institutions: China’s Motive and Strategy in the Past Two Decades 1. State Expansion in IR Theories The questions of whether a state will pursue expansion, to what degree it will expand, and what the subsequent effects of its expansion are, are all questions that have been debated by schools of different theories for long. While every theory has some validity on the issue, classical realism and constructivism are the ones that shed more light on the current situation for China’s. 政治大. expansion of its influence and in the long run.. 立. We often assume a modern realist to be looking at issues from the lens of structural analysis. ‧ 國. 學. and attributing “power” to the accumulation of material elements. Following their logic, the. ‧. optimal strategy for a rational actor in the international political system will be seeking to. sit. y. Nat. maximize its security by becoming a regional hegemon. However, the current picture seems to be suggesting otherwise. While China continuously asserts its military muscles in the Asia Pacific,. er. io. n. its foreign policies also suggestaa long-term grand strategy ofv increasing interdependence with. i l C n e phenomenon, state actors in every region. To explain h this n g c h i Uit is most suitable to consider classical. realism, where to them expansion is of human nature, and that security is not the only goal they seek to reach. 1 Power, which they seek to maximize, contains the pursuit of legitimacy, international status, and prestige. Kirshner in his 2010 article on the approach to a rising China attempted to call for an unlimited vigilance towards China. By gathering scholars’ perspectives including Spykman, Carr, Morgenthau, Gilpin, Niebuhr, Machiavelli, and Hobbes on rising states, Kirshner concludes that. 1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, W. David Clinton. Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace. Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education.. 27 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(36) rising powers will always want one thing and one thing only — more. The aspects of expansion are especially unpredictable because “the self-definition of their interests will expand along with their increasing capabilities (and expectations of still greater power to come)”.2 His emphasis of the importance of “politics” in shaping mutual perception is also worth applying to this thesis while considering China’s participation in multilateral institutions and activities. Domestic politics and ideational variables matter, as “norms will not stop states from engaging in acts of barbaric aggression, but historical experience and perceptions of legitimacy nevertheless condition the way in which states interpret the meaning of each other’s actions”. 3 By participating. 政治大 actors, China is not only engaging 立in setting norms for a larger community but also trying to guide. in multilateral institutions and gradually transforming its position and rhetoric within international. ‧ 國. 學. others’ interpretations towards itself as a great power with high legitimacy to lead. Constructivist concepts add more specificities and dimensions to the discussion on mutual. ‧. interpretations between a rising state and others, and the continuous interest redefinition of the. y. Nat. io. sit. previous itself. Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that the mutual influence of actors’ utility function. er. is made happen by the process of socialization, which norm diffusion takes place. 4 Checkel’s. al. n. iv n C mechanisms of the logic of appropriateness the likeliness of “learning by doing” h e nalsog confirmed chi U. in shaping identity and preference, while lock-in effects are operating through behavioral adaptations. 5 Bearing that in mind, multilateral institutions do provide perfect platforms for a rising state to engage in large-scope norm practicing and identity shaping, bringing its own domestic interests and foreign policy agenda to the community and try to line them up with community norms, or reversely, engineering the norms to line up with their own agenda. Given 2. Jonathan Kirshner (2010) The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical realism and the rise of China. European Journal of International Relations 18(1): 53–75. 3 Ibid. 4 Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52 (4): 887–917. 5 Jeffery T. Checkel (2005). International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework. International Organization, 59(4), 801-826.. 28 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(37) the possibility of mutual influence, we are, in the case of China’s participation in multilateral institutions, trying to find the evidence that China is indeed swinging its influence in MDBs to maximize the interest of its own agenda. In the meantime, the trend of China taking more significant seats in multilateral bodies not only shows their dedication of being a norm entrepreneur but also fortifies their legitimacy of being a rule maker. It seems like China has made the international community believe that its interests are internalized with the common norms and that its preference has changed, or has been accommodated, in a multilateral institution that provides legitimacy among the international community, while in fact they might be trying to. 政治大 The following sections of 立 the chapter will be identifying the relations change of China’s. create an institutional environment that is in accordance with the “Chinese Model”.. ‧ 國. 學. domestic agenda and foreign policy in the past decade, providing the ground for the rest of the research on related case studies.. ‧. 2. China’s Domestic Interests and Foreign Policy Agenda. sit. y. Nat. A Turn in China’s Economic Statecraft and a Quest for the Legitimacy to Rule. er. io. n. From the late 20th CenturyaChina has opened up its economic environment to the world, v. i l C n h eof nitsgdomestic which boosted the improvement of some c h i Uproblems such as poverty and stagnant. economic growth. The influx of capitals and supply of labour had made China a major trading country since and eventually surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy in the world in 2010, despite the global economic crisis from 2007 to 2009. However, it was also the global economy crisis in the late 2000s that propelled the turn in China’s economic strategy. It was when they realized that they have become increasingly vulnerable in the international economy environment and that to keep its dominance in the global market, they have to ‘move beyond its reliance on “low-cost advantage” to gain a “comprehensive competitive edge”’ for becoming a. 29 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(38) strong trading power.6 Up to this point, we realize the sole discussion of China’s domestic interests in economic growth is insufficient for us to comprehend the whole matter of its policy turn. What came to take form was the tendency of China to implement a so-called “economic diplomacy”, involving the grand strategy of its foreign policies which contains many political outcomes. The change in China’s strategy not only altered the structure and trajectory of international economics, but the measures taken by them which includes the reconstruction of regional and bilateral orders has also been having influence on mutual perceptions between China and other international actors ever. 政治大 and working papers in previous立 years that call for the ability to allocate global resources and. since. The 12th Five Years Plan (2011-2015) took a turn in used terms and rhetoric, echoing studies. ‧ 國. 學. becoming a power that is competitive, and stated, in Heath’s words, that ‘China will actively take part in the draft in and amending of the international regulations and standards to increase its. ‧. influence in international economic and financial organizations.’7 China has since been on the. y. Nat. er. io. economic interests.. sit. way to pursue quality over quantity and competitiveness over mere interdependence for its. al. n. iv n C Actions since Xi Jin Ping ascendedhto leadership have e n g c h i Ubecome more obvious and measurable. on the integration of its economic strategy with its foreign policies, and the issue of maintaining economic growth that makes up the Chinese Communist Party’s ruling legitimacy has also become more urgent. The concept of the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” and the “Chinese Dream” proposed by Xi in 2012 set the ground for his firm attitude of the CCP regime entering an era of pursuing higher recognition and dominance in international economy and politics.8 There have been all kinds of interpretations from scholars, politicians, and the media. Timothy R. Heath. (2016). China’s Evolving Approach to Economic Diplomacy. Asia Policy, (22), 157-192. Retrieved January 25, 2021, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/24905122 7 ibid 8 習近平官方講話 6. 30 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(39) since Xi started the use of the term “Chinese Dream”, and although it’s as broad as an umbrella term, researchers have come to the agreement on interpreting it as a promise towards becoming a dominant power both domestically and globally. Simply judging from a comprehensive document, Xi’s speech in the First Session of the Twelfth National People's Congress, on one hand, indicates consolidating the CCP’s power and legitimacy domestically by promoting ‘economic, political, cultural, social, ecological, and technological improvements, all centering social economic construction, under the concept of socialism with Chinese Characteristics.’ 9 (中國特色社會主義) On the other hand, China’s global influence will be pursued by waving the. 政治大. flags of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit, always pursuing win-win strategies. 立. and peaceful developments, and taking up the responsibility of propelling peaceful international. ‧ 國. 學. development.10. ‧. This also indicates a turn from a materialistic end goal towards an idealistic end goal.. sit. y. Nat. According to Xi’s goal in the international arena, translating economic power into political influence has become China’s pursuit. Subsequently, with policies in line and sufficient material. er. io. n. capability, the regime reasonablyaseeks the legitimacy and prestige v to become a global hegemon.. i l C n h earenaiming Thus, in this case, simply saying that they i aU“strong trading power” with the ability g c hfor to control rules in the market isn’t enough. Heath went through the possibilities of the future trajectory of China’s economic expansion and the subsequent clash of economic security interests with the US but ignored the aspect of ideational factors that are in operation through those policies, which especially in the era of Xi should be given more attention to as a motivation for its expansion strategies. Xi has two signature policies combining China’s domestic and foreign interests, one serving. 习近平在第十二届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上的讲话. (2013, March 18). 中國共產黨新聞網. http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0318/c40531-20819774.html 10 Ibid. 9. 31 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.

(40) as the industrial foundation for realizing the Chinese Dream11 and focusing on the elevation of its market level in the global value chain, the China Made 2025, and the other advancing its regional and global influence by implementing a large quantity of foreign investment through development aid projects, the Belt and Road Initiative. First, China Made 2025 has showed its global competitors that China is on the road of becoming a competitive power rather than playing a complementary power in the market, while it plans to gain total control over its own future hightech development. Although MIC25 is being toned down in China’s official rhetoric since the happening of the 2018 US-China trade war where battles of technology development took much. 政治大 Standard 2035” for getting too much 立 international vigilance, the content of MIC25 is believed to. of its proportion, and its content is widely said to be realized either in the 13th FYP or the “China. ‧ 國. 學. be staying and being implemented in alternate policies. 12 Having their own R&D team and products on Information and Communications Technology, power equipment, robotics, and other. ‧. innovative technologies gives them the ability to tap its influence into other regions through. y. Nat. er. io. sit. collaborations and investments.13 The US-China trade war has also served as a catalyst in the decoupling process of US and Chinese firms, pushing the decreasing of economic. al. n. iv n C interdependence of those two great powers the division of labor between them in the market h ewhile ngchi U is gradually disappearing. That said, there is still a surfeit of supply for cheap labors in China’s labor market that needs to be consumed while the demand is already moving up the value chain and China is no longer aiming for labor-intensive manufacturing, which brings to China’s interests and motives behind the BRI. As this movement of national rejuvenation and turn of rhetoric for more assertive 11. Shannon Tiezzi. (2014, June 10). Xi: China Must Take Technological Future Into Own Hands. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/xi-china-must-take-technological-future-into-own-hands/ 12 Orange Wang. (2018, December 13). Beijing no longer requires local governments to work on ‘Made in China 2025’, but hi-tech ambitions remain. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/economy/chinaeconomy/article/2177856/beijing-no-longer-requires-local-governments-work-made-china 13 Max J. Zenglein, Anna Holzmann. (2019, July). Evolving Made in China 2025 China’s industrial policy in the quest for global tech leadership. Mercator Institute for China Studies. https://merics.org/en/report/evolving-made-china-2025. 32 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100391.