Demand-Side Legislation in a Supply-Side World: the Muddle over Illegal Immigration Policy - 政大學術集成

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(1)~. ~. 16-17).. l. Sinica for. for each of. .~~.~t~s*~~~:#~.~aa~m6. 1992Jf- 11 11. *~~_~t~S*~~~:*~~~4_~OO6 Demand-Side Legislation in a Supply-Side World:. The Muddle Over Dlegal Immigration Policy. Chih-Yu Cheng·. What does. Lawrence H. Nitz". don: Allen. ::olumbia. •. 4. i!{~.m{jff~£fIf ES Jj!f=j:ttJ*'!.1~ii*4* $-}fff~. ~gylJf~.fi!:~l!mttJlZa. fifES Suits f.~aql!im ' *{jff~ ~B-~M~'~£~WI!m~ttJ~*• •tt~A~.fl ~.fi!:~f~'ff~*ttJ~. .f~ , *{jff~• •~~afftaq ~fft.:t:E*U ~Ti1&Jfin~ l!iil:l !EJ~~ Le~ ~f~~ 00 1J ii:ttJli 0. to Invest 1 pp. 34 ~rnational. 0. ~1~o. lckground Working. Abstract. :rnational This empirical study investigates the determinants of :Iopment: Press for udies. George pp. 347. Mexican migration to the United States by using extant ag gregate data. Applying Suits' modeJ, it concludes that em ployment opportunities in the migrant-sending country have a greater effect on migration processes than opportunities in the migrant-receiving country. Finally, it suggests that makers of immigration policy shCluld attend to the magnitude of supply-side forces of migration while making policy decisions.. *~.AA~I~.**a~*.±,~~a~***~~~M~aao. * * Lawrence H. Nitz. $"I~. **(University of Hawaii)a~ N:.. -163. A'Jaa. 0.

(2) -. -. 1992Jf-1. Demand-Side Legislation in a Supply-Side World:. The Muddle over IUelal Immigration Policy. Table 1. Introduction During the policy debate over the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. ConcerJl. (IRCA), much attention had been directed toward the potential impact that mi grants would have on the United States. For instance, some groups held that mi. 1. Job D. grants' contributions to the decreased labor costs was a positive effect, strengthen ing the competitiveness of American products in global markets. Conversely, the. 2. Wage. proponents of banning illegal immigrants were concerned with job displacement, wage depression, and unbroken dependence of American industries on foreign la. 3. DepeJ. bor. Although the passage of IRCA had attempted to take into account both. Foreil. sides' concerns, it is not clear that the goal of IRCA--- cutting off the dependence. 4. Non-f. on foreign labor---will be achieved because its regulatory mechanism ignores both. Impal. the push and pull factors which drive migration. Table 1 summarizes the major concerns, debate foci, and highlights of the IRCA and its unsolved problems. We concentrate on the problem of ignoring the forces driving and/or attracting migration, to explore why the IRCA is not work able in solving the illegal immigration problem.. 1. Fami. 2. The 3. The are: 4. The 5. The. -164.

(3) 1992if-ll fl. ,»j. .~~.~t~.*~~~:4~8~A.~m~. Table 1--- Policy Concerns, Debate Foci, and Highlights of IRCA and Its Unsolved Problems. Highlights. Concerns. Debate Foci. l that mi trengthen-. l. Job Displacement. 1. Employer Sanctions. ~rsely,. the ,lacement,. 2. Wage Depression. 2. Amnesty. 2. Employer Sanctions. oreign la. 3. Dependence on. 3. Temporary Worker. 3. Amnesty. mnt both pendence. Foreign Labor. )fitrol Act. t that mi. I. Reunification. Program. 4. Non-economic Impacts. ores both. Its of the loring the [lot work-. 1. Family. J. 4. Temporary Worker Program·. Unsolved Problems. 1. Family reunification might become a lure for unneeded labor.. 2. The effect of foreign labor on the economy is uncertain. 3. The possible effects of the temporary worker program, especially when workers are allowed to work in non-farm jobs, are unclear. 4. The forces driving and/or attracting migration are not taken into account. 5. The effect of employer sanctions on employers needs further examination.. -165.

(4) 1992-+11 J It is obvious that there is a gap between legislative immigration policy and an understanding of the migrants who want to move to the United States. Most pol icy makers see the intent of migrants to find jobs in the destination as their sole motivation to migrate. This view easily justifies policies of employer sanctions to curtail employment opportunities in the destination for which seek to deter the in flux of unexpected migrants. Yet, it is doubtful that this perception, on which immigration policy is usually based, can provide a basis for effective limitation of illegal immigration. We must recognize that migrants' search for employment op portunities motivates only a partial explanation of migration across the border and indicates only the pull factors of migration. The push factors cannot be neg ligible. Demographic and mobility studies have argued that both push and pull fac tors can substantially explain migrants' motivations for moving back and forth be tween the origin and the destination, and many researchers have attempted to identify the specific factors stimulating migration. Nevertheless, much research in tended to gauge the magnitude of pull and push factors is confined purely to the oretical deduction. It is seldom capable of grounding explanations of international migration phenomenon on extant aggregate data (eg., Ethier, 1986). Other re search emphasizes only one-sided forces, and is unable to tell us whether supply side or demand-side forces would be more important (eg., Blejer et.al., 1978). Without understanding the relative magnitude that each force has on the migra tory process, we can see only a partial profile of migration between the United States and Mexico. Only when the rational choice elements on both sides of the migratory process are considered simultaneously can we provide solutions to the il legal immigration problem. Otherwise, no matter how restrictive an immigration policy might be, we should have no reason to expect that the migrant flow would be eased, especially the flow across the U.S.-Mexican border. In order to remedy this deficiency, we employ a variation of the Suits model (1985) to measure observed migratory flows and determinants of migration simul taneously. In the following, we will delineate the models designed for explicating the migration across the U.S.-Mexican border, then test and analyze the results of the models, and finally point out the policy implication inferred from the tests of. -166. the. model~. In Sui grant flow sector. n destination. pie will no ment is ex] equilibriun umemploy urban sectl. population. Web ployment between tl economic similar to. tor model from Mex. factors aff. Here, M\. fromH M stands for. ed equilib. where In.

(5) ~. 1992Jf-ll fl. y and an rIost pol heir sole. the models.. .~~.~t~~*~±~:#~8~4.~OO.. Expanding Suits' Sectoral Mobility Model. ctions to. r the in In which tation of. In Suits' model, one important factor explicitly employed to predict the mi grant flow is the unemployment rate in the destination of migration--the urban sector. The model, as commonly implemented, holds that unemployment in the. nent op. destination will deter migrants from the origin--the rural sector, insomuch as peo. : border be neg. ple will not move to a place with a lower labor income. Rising urban unemploy ment is expected to deter the out-migration from the rural sector and increase the equilibrium population in the rural sector. 1 As a result of incorporating the umemployment factor, the annual flow of migrants from the rural sector to the. pull fac. urban sector can be obtained as the difference between the equilibrium and actual. 'orth be. population in the rural sector (Suits, 1985).. Ipted to ~arch in r to the. national. We believe that models predicated on only a single factor, such as the unem ployment rate in the destination, cannot explain the complex migration process between the United States and Mexico. On the basis of the assumption that the. Ither re. economic relationship between the United States and Mexico can be regarded as. supply , 1978).. similar to the urban and rural relationship, we modify Suits'. migra-. well~efined. dual sec. tor model to explore the factors stimulating and/or deterring the out-migration from Mexico. In contrast with Suits' model, we incorporate both pull and push. United s of the ) the il. factors affecting the observed migratory flow. Our model is formulated as follows:. igration v would. Here, M*t represents the net number of people with the intention to migrate. ; model. simul llicating suIts of. 1. tests of. MOt = K {[b+b' (1- U ust ) - b" (1- Umt)]F*mt- Fmt-1 + Imt ) } + Et. (1). from (-) Mexico, but apprehended along the U.S.-Mexican border in year t. 2 U ust stands for the umemployment rate in the United States in year t.3 F*mt is estimat ed equilibrium population in year t, and derived from the equations as follows: 4 a) In F mt = a + a I In Pmt + a"ln Pumt+Et b) FO mt. =F. I. mt eLFt /Rmt. where In means logarithm. Fmt is fraction of labor force employed in Mexico in. -167. •.

(6) --. 199ZJf-ll. year t. Pmt and P ust are average productivity per worker of Mexico and the United. tual and. States in year t, respectively. The residual term E t is a vector consisting of vari. Mexico te. ables capable of influencing the fraction of labor force employed in Mexico. F·mt. Mexico. :. is the corresponding equilibrium Mexican population based on the estimation of. mal level. is calculated value from t.:quation (a). eLFt is the sum of civil. ployment. ian labor force in Mexico and the selected states in the United States in year t,. tion from. equation (a). and. ~t. F'mt. is the ratio of Mexican workers to Mexican population in year t. F mt-l. and Imt represent the Mexican population in the preceding year(t-1) and the natu. Were. rally increased Mexican population in the current year(t), respectively. k, b, b ',. to the Un. and b" are constants and statistically determined. U mt represents the unemploy. factor on. ment rate in Mexican urban areas in year t. We hypothesize that b' will be posi. the deterr<. tive because higher employment opponunities in the destination will increase the. This simpl. inflow of Mexican migrants, and bl! will be negative, as lower employment oppor. tion that t. On the ba. tunities in the origin would tend to force people to leave. The basic motivation expressed in this equation is that migrants' expectations of seeking economic profits both in the destination and in the origin directly in fluence their willingness to migrate, and indirectly determine the size of the equi librium population in the origin. In other words, people must choose to leave or to stay by comparing the prospects in both places of finding jobs. Of course, the. M\ = K {I. In theory,. equilibriun. will be nel. creased ou. unemployment rates in Mexico have been usually higher than those in the United States in past decades. Yet, recognizing difficulties in the process of migration might lead people to choose the place which has lower job possibilities but would make them feel more secure over the place with higher possibility of finding jobs. Note that in equation. (1). (1-Umt. ). acts as a deterrent to migration, and (1-U ust. ). as. a force attractive to migration from Mexico.. When tion of pr. Our approach, similar to Suits', stresses the importance of "optimal size of. number of. population" in the delineation of population mobility between areas. The model. on the Me. assumes that when the job market in one area has reached its highest capacity of absorbing workers, the area must emit the surplus labor to find jobs elsewhere. Based on this assumption, we can derive the equilibrium population in the model and predict that the popUlation in excess of the equilibrium population level would be forced or would volunteer to leave.s In addition, by considering both ac. -168. •. Stand, models ou of Mexica some peri For exam!.

(7) --. $Jl. .~~.~t~S*~~~:#~8K4.~W6. 1992-4'- 11 fJ. the United. tual and equilibrium population in the origin, we see that out-migration from. Ig of vari . F* mt [lCO.. Mexico to a substantial degree reflects the existence of population pressure in. :imation of m of civil. mal level of population that Mexico can retain, as a consequence of its lower em ployment opportunities, conditions become sufficient and necessary for outmigra. s in year t,. tion from Mexico.6. Mexico. In other words, when the actual population in Mexico exceeds the opti. t. F mt-l j. Were employment opportunities in the destination not to affect in-migration. the natu. '. k, b, b',. lnemploy ~ll. be posi. lcrease the. lent oppor. to the United States, a simple method to infer the effects of the unemployment factor on the equilibrium population in the origin would be to incorporate only the deterrent force--the possibility of finding jobs in the origin-- into the model. This simple approach is believed to be able explicitly to indicate the rational ac tion that people might take in face of employment opportunities available to them. On the basis of this assumption, we can formulate the equation as follows:. xpectations directly in ,f the equi. M\. =K. {[b - b"(1- U mt ) ] F mt - F mH + Imt) }+E t. (2). In theory, higher Mexican employment opportunities are expected to increase the equilibrium Mexican popUlation. We hypothesize that the coefficient of (l-U mt ). to leave or. will be negative , because the lower employment opportunities would lead to in. course, the. creased out-migration from Mexico.. the United ~ migration but would. Application to Mexico-U.S. migration from 1945 to 1985. nding jobs. 1-Uust ) as. When dealing with the immigrant problem, an explicit obstacle is the collec tion of proper data to fit into the models specified. Collecting even a limited. rlal size of. number of annual estimates of Mexican demographic data and economic statistics on the Mexican population requires reconciliation of multiple sources.7. fhe model ::apacity of elsewhere.. Standard sources were used for M*t, U us ,U m , and so forth.. We adopt the. the model Ition level. models outlined above to a longitudinal regression analysis. Because of sparseness of Mexican data, additional measures were taken to supplement data missing for some periods. (See also the Appendix for detailed explanation of the data set.). g both ac. For example, missing data for the size of Mexican civilian labor force (1945-1955). -169.

(8) -. -. 1992Jj=. was imputed from the average growth rates from 1945 to 1955.. ploymeJ when u. immign. Results and Analysis. ment ill. the peri By focusing on several states of the Union with high concentration of Mexican. both na. people as destinations of migration/the equations assessing the out-migration. born pe. from Mexico are estimated as follows:. Espensl. M· t = [.003 + .098 (1- Uust) (.048) (1.595). On. push fa. Rewriting equation (1') in the ususal stock-adjustment form, it becomes: MOt. = 0.48{[.063 + 2.042 (1- Uust) -. tors sec:. Mexico. 1.125(1-Umt)]FOmt- (Fmt-l+ Imt)}. MOt = [.095 - .056 (l-U mt )] FO mt - 0.49(Fmt_1+ Imt) (2.715) (-2.562) (-2.715). (I") (1'). immigr~. duce. III. the gap. diminis:. It can also be reduced to the alternative formulation:. In otht. (2"). should. 1. Equation (I") reveals that the annual flow of migration from Mexico would be. lateral (. 4.8% of the difference between equilibrium and actual Mexican population. Be. a close,. cause of the lower probability of finding jobs in Mexico, the negative sign of coef. policy (. ficient b" conforms to the theoretical expectation that declining local employment. diminisl. opportunities will give rise to increased mobility of people away from the origin.. the con. The positive sign of coefficient b' implies that lower employment opportunities in. reducin. the destination would deter the inflow of migrants. Contrary to Mexican job op. not onl. portunities, job opportunities in the United States turn out to be a statistically in. ing fon. significant determinant of the size of the eqUilibrium population, as expected.. by the. Therefore. we may conclude that employment opportunities in the migrant-sending. sible pt. country play a greater role in the determination of population mobility than those. and to. in the migrant-receiving country. The result of equation (2') enhances the reliability of the conclusion drawn above.. Because of the stronger pressure brought about by the decreasing em. -170.

(9) .JJl. 1992-+ 11.F]. .~~.~t~S*~~~:#~#~4.~m.. ployment opponunities in the origin, Mexican people often choose to leave even when unemployment is increasing in the United States. The fact that post-1920s immigration reached its peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s when unemploy ment in this country was growing rapidly supports this argument. In other words, the period from 1970 to 1982 in which the unemployment rates were rising rapidly. .f Mexican -migration. both nationwide and in California was also the period in which millions of foreign born people accounted for almost 20 percent of California's population (Muller & Espenshade, 1985).. (1/). On the basis of these two results, it might be fair to say that both pull and push factors are imponant in construing the population mobility, but the push fac tors seem to take a leading role in the case of migration between the U.S. and Mexico. This finding not only supports the view that the solution to the illegal. (1"). (2'). (2"). immigration problem facing both the U.S. and Mexico lies in seeking ways to re duce unemployment in the origin, but also suppons the argument that reducing the gap between economic opponunities in Mexico and the United States could diminish the flow of Mexican migrants (Blejer, Johnson, and Porzecanski, 1978). In other words, methods for increasing employment opponunities in Mexico should be of great concern to makers of U.S. immigration policy. Any simple uni. ) would be. lateral endeavor implementing restrictive immigration guotas or simply conducting. ilion. Be. a closed door policy would prove to be ineffective and wasteful. In the absence of. pI. of coef. policy designed to increase the employment levels in Mexico, the sole attempt to. nployment. diminish demand for alien labor in the migrant-receiving country fails to address. the origin.. the conflict between the inevitable inflow of migrants and the nativist agenda of. 1unities in. reducing dependence on foreign labor. Imposition of employer sanctions would. an job op isticaIly in-. not only be unable to prevent migrants from entry, but also makes migrants look ing forward to better economic conditions more vulnerable to possible exploitation. expected.. by the potential employers. Unless the border were tightly closed to stop any pos. nt-sending. sible penetration, myriads of illegal slum dwellers must likely emerge in U.S. cities. than those. and towns.. ion drawn !asing em. -171. :j. .I.

(10) -. -. 1992lf. Conclusion. By incorporating the unemployment rate of Mexican urban sector as an indi. l.Follo. cator of deterrent or driving force into the model,9 we can argue that Mexican mi. sense. grants would take both the employment opportunities in Mexico and in the Unit. tivati. ed States into account irrespective of their sectoral origins. Nevertheless, consid ering the magnitude of employment opportunities in both countries respectively, job opportunities in Mexico appear implicitly more important. In short, when thinking about whether to migrate or not, Mexican people would to a large extent consider first the possibility of finding jobs at home. Unemployment in the desti nation is relatively unimportant, especially since overpopUlation, poverty, and prox imity to the United States have been notable in encouraging migration from coun tries in Central America (Brown and Shue, 1983). In this paper, we have shown that in the case of migration between Mexico and the United States, job-seeking pressure generated from the origin appears to have greater effect on the migration across the border. This finding that the push factors have gradually become more significant is also revealed in immigration his tory.. Although the migrants would first consider employment opportunities in. their homeland, the migration proCess from the Mexican rural sector to the Unit. 2.Ther. immi. bordt peop. econc. destil. 3.Becal. there in a. 1. easie we u. cupal sian.. ed States or from the Mexican rural sector to the urban sector and onward to the. 4.Follo. United States that the migrants will choose cannot be fully identified. In order to. to aJ. develop a more adequate model of the migration process, we must tum to indi. thou:. vidual data, in the absence of more accurate aggregate data with respect to Mexi. estirr. can demographic mobility.l0. addil mar~. stitu appr 5."Op·. proc peal 6.Acc. -172. 1.

(11) $JJ. 1992-4'- 11 fl. *~~.~t~S*~~~:#~8~. •• ~m.. Notes. an indi. l.Following Suits' argument, the equilibrium farm population can be reached in a. exican mi-. sense that the farm and expected non-farm earnings are equalized without mo. IS. the Unit ~ss,. consid. ~spectively,. 10rt, when. lrge extent the desti and prox. Tom coun. tivating farm population to leave. 2.There is no appropriate estimate with respect to the annual inflow of illegal immigrants; therefore, we use the annual number of apprehendees along the border as a proxy estimate. The number is a proxy which indexed the volume of people who intend to migrate and suggests the trend of migrant flow under the economic and immigration law enforcement conditions in the origin and in the destination respectively. 3.Because of the unavailability of unemployment rates of the selected states, we. en Mexico appears to It the push ~ation. his. tunities in ) the Unit. therefore use Uust as a surrogate. People migrate in an attempt to locate jobs in a broadly defined labor market in the destination, although it might be much easier for them to be hired in a particular sector or occupation. For this reason we use the general labor market unemployment rate instead of particularly oc cupational unemployment rate as an indicator for people in the migration deci sion.. rard to the. 4.Following Suits (1985), we use these averages as surrogates in the two countries. [n order to. to allow estimation of the proportion of labor force working in Mexico, al. ern to indi. though the theoretical model demands marginal productivity. Because of the. :I: to Mexi. estimation of available data, we can employ only the average productivity. In addition, according to the property of Cobb-Douglas production function, marginal productivity is a proportion of average productivity; therefore, the sub stitution of average productivity for marginal productivity would not result in appreciable bias. 5."Optimal size of population" can sometimes be identified when the average product per worker or per capita in a popUlation community reaches its highest peak (Mishan, 1970:117-18). 6.According to the optimum theory of population, when the size of population. -173.

(12) -. -. 1992-+ 1]. exceeds the optimum level, the surplus population must move out in order to retake the pareto- optimal condition of the greatest real income of commodities and services per capita (Issac, 1947:71-74).. Blejer, M; 7.Existing data collections are available from such statistical sources as World Population Data Sheet(Population Reference Bureau, 1962-1988), United tions (U.N.) Demographic Yearbook(1948-1986),. Wor~Health. sis. j. Na. the. Statistics. non. Annual(World Health Organization, 1947-1984),World Table (World Bank, 1983) , Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics (U.N., 1967-1987) ,Statistical Yearbook (U.N., 1970-1983), International Financial Statistics (Inter national Monetary Fund, 1955- 1987), Yearbook of Labor Statistics. (Interna. tional Labor Office, 1950-1988), The Europa Yearbook (Europa Publication Ltd.. Brown, Pt. N.J.. Ethier, W can. , 1968-1988) Economic Survey of Latin America (U.N., 1963-1985), Statistical Abstract of the United States (1965- 1988), and Immigration and Naturalization Services Annual Report(1945-1987). 8.In terms of the Census population data, we select such states-- Texas, California,. Issac, Juli er. ~. Massey, 1:. Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Kansas--as the destinations for Mexican mi. Leg. grants, because of the high concentration of Mexicans in these states (more. viev. than 500 Mexican inhabitants in 1950). The high concentration of Mexican mi. Mishan, E. grants is believed to establish the network to attract the further inflow of Mexi. COl. can people to the United States (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1965. don. 1988). Muller, Tl 9.Using unemployment in the Mexican urban sector produces an estimate of the. ton,. unemployment coefficient which is more statistically significant than that for unemployment in Mexico as a whole.. Suits, Dal Mo. 10For example, in Massey's (1987) research work, a proper redesign of the regres sion model can reveal the motivations driving the migration across the U.S. Mexican border on the basis of micro analysis.. -174.

(13) ~. 199z.fUf]. .~~.~t~.*~~~:#~.~a.~m6. n order to. References. mmodities Blejer, Mario I., Johnson, Harry G., and Porzecanski, Arturo. ;v orld. ited. Na. Statistics ~ank, 1983) 1967-1987) (Inter (Interna. cation Ltd.. c., 1978. "An Analy. sis of the Economic Determinants of Legal and Illegal Mexican Migration to the United States", in Julian L. Simon eds., Research in PopUlation Eco nomics, V.1, (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, Inc.), pp. 217-31. Brown, Peter G. and Shue, Henry, ed., 1983. The Border That Joins,. (Totowa,. N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield), 254p. Ethier, Wilfred J., 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem", Ameri can Ecomonic Review, 76(1): 56-71.. atistical. uralization. Issac, Julius, 1947. Economics of Migration, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubn er & Co., Ltd.), 285p.. California,. exican mi ites (more [exican mi 'IV. of Mexi. ltes, 1965. Massey, Douglas S. (1987). "Do Undocumented Migrants Earn Lower Wages than Legal Immigrants? New Evidence from Mexico",International Migration Re view, 21:236-274. Mishan, E. J., 1970. "Does Immigration Confer Economic Benefits on the Host Country?" in Charles Wilson et at, Economic Issues in Immigration, don: The Institute of Economic Affairs), pp. 89-122. Muller, Thomas and Espenshade, Thomas J., 1985. The Fourth Wave,. late of the. (Lon. (Washing. ton, D.C.: The Urban Institute), 217p.. n that for Suits, Daniel B., 1985. "U.S. Farm Migration: An Application of the Harris-Todaro Model", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 33: 815-828. the regres the U.S.. -175.

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(15) JtJJ. 199zlf-11 fl. *~~.~t~C*~~~:#~8~a.~oo6. U us = U.S. unemployment rate (Statistical Abstrace of the U.S., 1965. el. Pm (,000). o 0.33 0.39 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.65 0.75 0.82 0.80 0.65 0.78 0.86 0.97 1.05 1.10 1.22 1.26 1.33 1.41 1.57 1.75 1.93 2.04 2.21 2.36 2.69 2.85. 1988. number of Mexican migrants «(INS Annual Report, 1945 ~ 1987). M*. =. Pus. = average productivity per worker of the U.S. (Statistical Abstract of the U.S. ., 1965 ~ 1988), tabulated by authors. CLFm= Mexican labor force ( Yearbook of Labor Statistics ILO 1950-1988; Eco nomic Survey of Latin America, 1963-1985) Um. Mexican unemployment rate (Yearbook of Labor Statistics ILO, 1950-1988; The Europa Yearbook, 1968-1988), tabulated by authors.. Pm. = average. productivity per worker of Mexico (Yearbook of Labor Statistics. ILO, 1950-1988; Statistical Yearbook, U.N., 1970-1983; and International Financial Statistics IMF, 1955-1987), tabulated by authors.. 3.19 3.75 4.71 5.61 5.47 4.86. 5.92 7.51 9.75 11.95 8.48 7.29 8.53 7.74. o. -177.

(16) *~**l. ¥. --. Fm (million). 1m (million). ME (million). 1992;y.1. Fm= Me:. Appendix A: Data Set (continued). year. JtIJ. U.l' CLFus (million). 1m = natl. She. Stal 1944 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70. 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86. 21.988 22.576 23.183 23.811 24.461 25.132 26.380 26.949 27.522 28.113 28.724 29.355 30.010 30.685 31.385 32.109 34.923 37.255 38.535 39.930 41.251 42.684 43.320 44.814 46.374 47.952 49.244 52.452 54.279 56.177 58.143 60.004 62.059 64.179 66.361 68.618 69.199 71.250 73.120 74.980 76.490 78.520 0. 0.519 0.565 0.552 0.689 0.683 0.679 0.757 0.726 0.786 0.816 0.961 0.970 1.059 1.071 1.043 1.192 1.205 1.258 1.302 1.344 1.441 1.484 1.530 1.561 1.605 1.579 1.647 1.773 1.869 2.113 2.089 1.819 1.911 1.929 1.928 1.846 2.012 2.106 1.981 2.196 2.035 2.111 0. -178. 0 6.791 6.995 7.205 7.421 7.644 7.954 8.174 8.380 8.600 8.886 9.106 9.332 9.563 9.785 9.985 10.221 10.521 10.800 11.031 11.285 11.515 11.753 12.000 12.299 12.734 13.198 13.781 14.125 14.739 15.295 15.700 16.236 16.857 17.351 17.909 19.121 20.043 19.683 19.572 20.092 22.940 23.667. 11.236 11.494 11.750 12.005 12.261 12.516 12.773 13.407 13.869 14.259 14.647 15.059 15.493 15.894 16.392 16.787 17.215 17.643 18.071 18.499 18.928 19.355 19.784 20.211 20.640 21.061 21.486 21.913 22.362 22.769 23.198 23.626 24.035 25.096 26.327 26.715 27.854 28.990 29.807 30.390 30.925 31.751 32.575. ME= nun 195. Am. CLFJ].S.

(17) Jtij. 1992""1111. ._~.~t~S*~~~:~~8~. •• ~mA. Fm= Mexican population in mid-year (World Population Data Sheet, 1962-1988;. U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1948-1986). CLFus (million). 1m. = natural increase of Mexican population in mid-year (World. Population Data. Sheet, 1962-1988; U.N. Demographic Yearbook,1948-1986; and World Health Statistics-Annual WHO, 1947-1984), tablated by authors.. 11.236 11.494 11.750 12.005 12.261 12.516 12.773 13.407 13.869 14.259 14.647 15.059 15.493 15.894 16.392 16.787 17.215 17.643 18.071 18.499 18.928 19.355 19.784 20.211 20.640 21.061 21.486 21.913 22.362 22.769 23.198 23.626. ME:: number of Mexican workers employed (Yearbook of Labor Statistics ILO., 1950-1988;The Europa Yearbook, 1968-1988; and Economic sUlVey of Latin America, 1963-1985), tabulated by authors. CLFJJ.S. civilian labor force (Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1965-1988).. ~4.035. ~5.096 ~6.327. !6.715 !7.854 !8.990 ~9.807. ,0.390 ,0.925 1.751 2.575. -179.

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