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Feature of Imperfect Competition of the Ming-Ch’ing Salt Market

Ts’ui-jung Liu*

This paper was first delivered at the Second Conference on Modern Chinese Economic History held at the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, on 5-7 January 1989, and then collected in Yung-san Lee and Ts’ui-jung Liu (eds.), China’s Market Economy in Transition (Taipei: The Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1990), pp. 259-327.

Introduction

Salt was a key commodity intimately related to politics and economic structure in traditional societies and the salt monopoly had a long history and in China since 119 B.C.1 Salt tax was one of the major items of government’s revenue in the Ming (1368-1643) and Ch’ing (1644-1911) periods. According to a study of Hsu Hung徐泓, in 1522-1566 the share of salt tax was 20-30% of the total revenue; in 1573-1619 there were increases of salt tax and at the end of that period, the share of slat tax was one half of 4 million taels of silver collected in the Treasury of the Board of Revenue; and in 1620-1643, the expected salt tax was 3 million taels which was almost equal to the amount of silver collected in the Treasury.2 According to estimates of Wang Yeh-chien王業鍵, in 1753 salt tax was about 8.8 million taels and accounted for 11.9% of the total Ch’ing government’s revenue and in 1908, the amount of salt tax was 45 million taels and accounted for 15.4% of the total revenue.3 These estimates indicated that salt was significantly related to the government’s revenue. Moreover, salt was one of staple commodities of domestic trade in this period. According to estimates of Wu Ch’eng-ming 吳承明and his collaborators, prior to the Opium War(1839-1842), the value of salt trade was 53.5 million taels which accounted for 15.3% of the total value of trade on domestic market (349.6 million taels), next only to that of grain (138.8 million taels, 39.7%) and cotton cloth (94.6 million taels, 27.0%).4 According to Adshead, the value of salt trade around 1901 was 100 million

*Research Fellow, the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. The author wishes to thank Wellington K. K. Chan and other participants of the conference for their comments and to Hsu Hung, Ho Hon-wai, Lai Chi-kong, James Lee, and Lin Li-yueh for materials they made available.

1

For a rather comprehensive study on the salt monopoly in Chinese history, see Ho Wei-ning 何維凝, 1966. For a concise discussion on Chinese salt administration in a comparative perspective, see S. A. M. Adshead, 1970.

2

Hsu Hung, 1982, pp. 562-568. Moreover, Ray Huang estimated that in 1570-1600 the silver of the Board of Revenue was about 2.6 million taels among which salt tax was 1 million taels, see Ray Huang, 1969, p. 104.

3

Yeh-chien Wang, 1973, p. 71, p. 74, p. 80.

4

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taels which was about equal to the value of rice traded inter-regionally and was only 30 million taels less than the value of native opium traded at that time and 69 million taels less than the total value of China’s export.5 These estimates in turn revealed that salt was closely related to people’s livelihood. In short, slat played an important role in economic life of the Ming-Ch’ing times.

Just because salt was so important, there were voluminous historical documents and many scholars had devoted to study this subject.6 Generally speaking, detailed studies on various aspects related to salt during the Ming period had been done by Hsu Hung and in the Ch’ing period by Chiang Tao-chang 姜道章, although the two scholars have different points of focus.7 Studies related to Liang-huai 兩淮salt region had been done by Saeki Tomi 佐伯富and Hsu Hung in great details of many aspects, and by Thomas Metzger from the aspect of government organization capability.8 As for the study on other salt regions, Ssu-ch’uan 四川has attracted more attention than the rest.9 There are also more studies on activities of major salt merchant groups.10 Moreover, there was a study on the modernization of salt administration in the early twentieth century.11

Obviously, this paper cannot be attempted to discuss all aspects related to salt during the Ming and Ch’ing periods, instead the focus will be on imperfect competition12 of the salt market. The approach is to investigate the operation of this imperfect competitive market through institutional changes and viewpoints of the Ming-Ch’ing contemporaries. If this paper can clarify phenomena related to the operation of official salt market, it might be helpful for our understanding of the market economy in Ming-Ch’ing times.

1983, p. 99 had been adjusted in the 1987 study.

5

S. A. M. Adshead, 1970, p. 13.

6

See Ho Wei-ning, 1951, for a comprehensive bibliography of historical documents.

7

See References for works of the two scholars. Chiang Tao-chang has another article on salt consumption (Nanyang University Journal, VIII-IX, 1974-75) and a doctoral dissertation on salt industry (University of Hawaii, 1975), but I am not able to consult these two works for the time being.

8

Saeki Tomi, 1956; Hsu Hung, 1972; Thomas Metzger, 1972.

9

See Chen Tsu-yu 陳慈玉, 1976, p. 611 for a brief list of studies on the Ssu-ch’uan salt region; also see Madeleine Zelin, 1988. Studies on other regions, see works of Wang Hsiao-ho 王小荷, 1986; Liu Chun 劉雋, 1933b; Liu Su-fen 劉素芬, 1987; Kung Yueh-hung 龔月紅, 1987; Wu Cheng-ming and Hsu Ti-hsin, 1987, sections 5 and 6 of are related to Ssu-ch’uan, Ho-tung, and Liang-huai. It is notable that a new journal (Yen-yeh-shih yen-chiu 鹽 業 史 研 究 ) specialized on history and technology of salt industry was published in 1986 in Szechwan.

10

See works of Fujii Hirosh 藤井宏, 1953-54; Ping-ti Ho, 1954; and Terada Takanobu 寺田隆信, 1972.

11

See Adshead, 1970.

12

Adopted from Joan Robinson, 1933. Huang Jen-yu 黃仁宇 said that before the nineteenth century China’s economy was “non-competitive” which was not the meaning referred here, see 1982, p. 492. It should be noted that by adopting the term “imperfect competition”, I do not mean to apply Robinson’s models vigorously in this paper, but just to show that the salt market was not “highly competitive” as other commodity markets described by some papers in this conference.

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The salt market in Ming-Ch’ing times was different from other commodity markets just as pointed out by Wang Ch’ing-yun 王慶雲 (1798-1862):

Those who trade are all known as merchants. However, it is only in the salt trade that there is restriction of volume so that it cannot be more or less; there is specification of area of distribution so that it cannot be north or south; and there are officials who inspect at one spot after the other.13 Although Wang was saying these words concerning situation of merchants, he actually pointed out features of imperfect competition of the salt market. Imperfect competition of the salt market in Ming-Ch’ing times was manifested in the following facets:

(1) The areas of distribution were officially confined and it was not allowed to distribute beyond the boundary. There were eleven salt distribution regions in Ming-Ch’ing times (see Maps 1 and 2), namely, Liang-huai, Liang-che 兩 浙 , Ch’ang-lu長蘆, Shan-tung山東, Ho-tung河東, Shan-hsi山西, Kuang-tung廣東, Fu-chien福建, Ssu-ch’uan, Yun-nan雲南, and Liao-yang遼陽 (Sheng-ching盛京).14 The division of the salt distribution regions was mainly for prohibiting illegal salt and securing collection of salt tax. Just as Wang Shou-chi 王守基 (1852 chin-shih進士, d. 1873), who was very familiar with salt affairs, stated: “The division is depending on terrain of mountains and rivers; there must have strategic barriers for defending. It is not by accident.”15 There were not many incidents in which the areas were changed officially.16 Since the quality of salt from different region was not the same,17 the confinement of salt regions served as a barrier for competition.

(2) Salt merchants were convened by official announcements, thus, there was a limitation of entering into and existing market. After the adoption of kang-fa 綱法 (a system of organizing salt shipment) in 1617 the salt trade became hereditary.18

13

Shih-ch’ü yü-chi 石渠餘記, p. 7.

14

For the sphere of each salt region see Hsu wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao 續文獻通考, 20/2955-2959;

Ch’in-ting ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li 欽定大清會典事例 (1899 edition) , chuan 221-229. Names of

salt regions are Romanized in this paper to avoid of confusion with those of provinces. The Liao-yang salt fields in Ming times were not under official administration and the Sheng-ching salt in Ch’ing times was distributed in Feng-t’ien 奉天 and Ching-chou 錦州 prefectures.

15

Chiu-shneg yen-wu-i-lüeh 九省鹽務議略, p. 113. For modern scholars’ opinions on the salt region, see Hsu Hung, 1974, pp. 247-254; Katō Shigeshi 加藤繁, 1937, pp. 4-5; Saeki Tomi, 1956, pp.83-103; Chiang Tao-chang, 1983, pp.213-218.

16

For incidents in Ch’ing times, see Ch’in-ting ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li (1899 edition), 221/6a-b, 7a; 222/20a; 223/3a; 224/2b, 3a, 3b, 21b; 225/17a; 227/4a, 4b, 5b, 6a, 8a, 24b; 228/4a-b, 8b; 229/ 2b-3a, 5a-b, 6a, 14b.

17

The quality of slat from different regions differed and it was one reason for smuggling, see Hsu Hung, 1972a, pp. 142-154.

18

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Map 1: Salt Regions in Ming Times

Source: Wada Sei 和田清 ed., Minshi shokkashi yakuchü 明史食貨志譯註 (The Shih-huo-chih of

the Ming-shih: Translation and Notes), Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1957.

Map 2: Salt Regions in Ch’ing Tomes

Source: Saeki Tomi 佐伯富, Shindai shiosei no kenkyū 清代鹽政の研究 (The Salt Administration

under the Ch’ing Dynasty), Kyoto: The Society of Oriental Researches, Kyoto University,

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(3) The license (or certificate) for salt distribution, known as yin引, was issued by the Board of Revenue. The amount of salt per yin was officially determined. It was not allowable to separate the yin from the salt. There were regulations for shipment to be followed carefully by salt merchants.19 In some places, another kind of license known as p’iao票 was used. However, no matter it was yin or p’iao, the salt merchants must pay a price officially given. The price of yin (p’iao) was a part of cost borne by merchants and thus could be considered as a proxy of wholesale price. Moreover, in most localities, the market price of salt was set officially. Obviously, the price of salt was not determined by the market under these circumstances.

(4) For prohibiting illegal (private) salt, severe restrictions were set up by the government. For example, death penalty was a punishment for those who committed smuggling of salt.20

The phenomenon of salt smuggling during the Ming and Ch’ing periods has been studied by scholars in great details. According to estimates of Hsu Hung, in the late Ming period the volume of salt illegally sold by producers (tsao-hu 灶戶) consisted of a half of the total products and in the Ch’ing period, around the year 1800, the illegal salt occupied 40-60% of the salt market.21 Moreover, Saeki Tomi estimated that in 1821-1850 the illegal salt occupied more than one half of the market.22 Wu Cheng-ming and his collaborators estimated that prior to the Opium War there were about 800 million catties of illegal salt which accounted for one fourth of the salt market.23 So flourishing was the illegal salt that the barrier of imperfect competition market was already eroded. However, for collecting revenue from salt tax, the government had tried various methods to maintain the official slat market.

As for institutions regulating the salt market in Ming-Ch’ing times, a turning point of change was in 1617; before that year the official monopoly system and after, the merchant monopoly system was dominated. Under the former system, the main method was k’ai-chung 開中 while under the latter, it was kang-fa. In addition, a supplementary system known as p’iao-fa票法 was put into practice in both periods in some localities of Liang-che, Shan-tung, Ho-tung, and Liang-huai.24 This paper will first discuss the problem of surplus salt under the k’ai-chung system, then discuss the

19

For the style of yin see, Ta-Ming hui-tien 大明會典, 34/14a-16a; Liang-huai yen-fa-chih 兩淮鹽法志, 7/23b-25b. Items printed on yin included name of merchant, distribution location, number of yin and important rules of prohibition.

20

For prohibiting regulations and precedents, see Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/19b-34a; Ch’in-ting ta-Ch’ing

hui-tien shih-li (1899 edition), 231/1a-26b; Ch’ing-ch’ao wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao 清朝文獻通考,

chuan 28.

21

Hsu Hung, 1982, p. 543; Hsu-Hung, 1972, p.154.

22

Saeki Tomi, 1956, p. 205.

23

Wu Ch’eng-ming and Hsu Ti-hsin, 1987, p. 430.

24

In the early Ming period, a system of salt rationing, known as hu-k’ou-shih-yen-fa 戶口食鹽法, was adopted but this was gradually combined with land tax and had little to do with the salt market, for details, see Hsu Hung, 1974, pp. 221-226; Hsu Hung, 1975, pp.139-144.

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official salt market under the merchant monopoly system and finally investigate opinions on releasing control. This paper will conclude that even the illegal salt consistently occupied a part of the market, the Ming and Ch’ing governments had tried to maintain the official salt market with various methods. Thus, the monopoly system was not kept all intact and there were opinions proposed for releasing control every now and then. However, imperfect competition of the salt market in Ming-Ch’ing times had not been changed into perfect competition and this suggested that a fundamental institutional reform was not an easy task which required the society prepared to bear a great cost.

I. Problem of Surplus Salt Under K’ai-chung System

The origin of k’ai-chung in Ming times could be traced to che-chung折中 in Sung times. The similarity of these two systems was that merchants were commanded by the government to transport grain to the frontier and rewarded by certificates for distributing salt.25 A very brief definition of k’ai-chung was given by the treatise on economy in Ming-shih (Ming history) as: “To call merchants to send grain and give them salt in return is called k’ai-chung.”26 As a matter of fact, k’ai-chung was a quite complicated system.27 In respect to salt, this method required a prerequisite condition that the government controlled all product of salt.28 The government was to play a role of wholesaler and the merchant that of distributor of salt. In 1370 k’ai-chung was first adopted in Shansi province. The method was to call merchants to send 1 shih石of rice to the granary in Ta-t’ung 大同 and 1.3 shih to the granary in T’ai-yuan 太原 and receive in return one yin (200 catties) of the Huai salt. The merchants must distribute the salt at assigned localities and after finishing distribution return the used yin to the local official office. This method was for the purpose of saving transport cost and securing abundance of frontier granaries.29 In the Yung-lo 永樂 period (1403-1424) and after, the method of sending rice to interior granaries was interrupted

25

Fujii Hiroshi, 1941, pp.677-700; Tai I-hsuan 戴裔煊, 1982, pp.231-232.

26

Ming Shih 明史, 80/5a.

27

Aside for salt, k’ai-chung was also related to tea, horse, iron and other goods, see Ho Wei-ning, 1966, pp. 220-222; Hsu Hung, 1974, pp.232-235; Lee Lung-wah 李龍華, 1971, p. 371.

28

The design of the system was that the salt producers should just produce the quota assigned to them. For instance, in Fu-chien each producer was assigned to produce 450 catties per annum in early Ming, see Yen-wu-shu 鹽務署, 1914-15, Vol. 3, p. 14. This paper will not discuss the aspect of salt production, for production organization and pattern in Ming see Hsu Hung, 1975a and 1976; in Ch’ing see Hsu Hung, 1972a; for geographical variations, also see Chiang Tao-chang, 1976.

29 Modern scholars used to cite the record of Hung-wu 洪武 3/6/hsin-ssu 辛巳 in the Ming-shih-lu 明

實錄, that record was quoted exactly in Ming-shih, 80/5a. Ku Yen-wu 顧炎武 had mentioned the method adopted in Shansi and said that was “the beginning of k’ai-chung for salt”, however, he did not refer precisely that the salt given to merchants was the Huai salt, see Jih-chih-lu 日知錄, p. 247.

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and thus k’ai-chung was mainly practiced in the frontier areas.30

In accordance with the practice of k’ai-chung, there were restrictive regulations, such that merchants had to distribute salt at assigned localities, the salt should not be separated with the yin, and commitment of smuggling would be punish to death.31 Under such severe restrictions a merchant must spend his time in transporting grain to the frontier granary, receiving salt at appointed producing field and distributing salt at assigned localities. Obviously, under the condition of traditional transportation facilities the whole process would take a long time to complete. There must have a great amount of premium between the cost of transporting grain and the revenue of distributing salt so that merchants would have profit and be willing to respond to the government’s calling. In designing the system in early Ming, the government had actually considered this factor, thus the Ming-shih stated: “The regulations were not always the same; they were changed according to the need of time, the price of rice, and whether merchants would be benefited; where the distance was long and the terrain was not favorable the rate would be reduced.”32

No matter what measures were adopted by merchants to reduce their cost of transporting grain,33 a normal operation of k’ai-chung required that the number of yin given should be agreed to the amount of salt controlled by the government. Otherwise, even if merchants had obtained k’an-ho勘合 (certificate)34 at the frontier granary, he might not be able to obtain salt at the fields. As a matter of fact, in early years of k’ai-chung, merchants got a lot of profit because the cost of transporting grain was far less than the revenue of distributing salt. For example, in the Yung-lo period it was said: “The cost was one while the profit was always six or seven folds.”35 Due to merchants’ enthusiastic responses, the number of yin given was more than the amount of salt supply. There might not have enough communication of demand and supply between frontier granaries and interior administrative offices, and thus, merchants had to wait for many years before obtaining the salt.36 In 1428 the regulation of

30

For details see Fujii Hiroshi, 1941, p. 697; also see Ming-shih, 80/5a-b; for practice in the Yung-lo period, see Ming-shih, 80/6a.

31

Ming-shih, 80/5b.

32

Ming-shih, 80/5a-b. A very detailed list of grain-salt exchange rates during 1370-1482 in various regions is provided in Lee Lung-wah, 1971, pp. 376-427.

33

The merchants adopted colonization at frontier, known as shang-t’un 商 屯 (commercial colonization), to obtain cheap grain, see Wang Ch’ung-wu 王崇武, 1936, Hsu Hung, 1974, pp. 238-240; Ming-shih, 80/9a; Tieh-lu-chi 鐵廬集, pp. 534-535.

34

K’an-ho was a certificate obtained by merchants after transporting grain to frontier granaries, it should be carried to the salt fields for checking against the official records; regulations about k’an-ho were adopted in 1395, see Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/4b-5a; Hsu Hung, 1974, pp.241-242; Li Lung-ch’ien 李龍潛 had discussed differences between k’an-ho and yin-mu, see 1987, p. 616. Nevertheless, when

k’ai-chung was not in practiced, there was no use of k’an-ho and yin became a general name of the

license for salt distribution.

35

Li Lung-ch’ien, 1987, p. 625.

36

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k’ai-chung was once changed and paper money was given to merchants in compensation for their capital (known as tzu-pen-ch’ao資本鈔). In 1440, merchants who had been waiting since the Yung-lo period and their grandsons had taken their places in waiting would be given 30 ting錠of paper money for one yin of salt; those who preferred to wait would be allowed to do so. In 1483 the amount of paper money given for salts of regions other than Liang-huai was reduced.37 Since ta-Ming pao-ch’ao 大明寶鈔 (paper money of Ming) had been devalued a great deal,38 it was possible that not many merchants wanted to receive paper money.

The necessity of waiting caused the turnover of capital to slow down and merchants’ responses gradually decreased. Thus, in 1440, it was also decided that the salts of Linag-huai, Liang-che and Ch’ang-lu should be divided annually into ten portions, of which eight portions were to provide for the waiting merchants and was known as ch’ang-ku 常股 and the other two portions were to be reserved in official warehouses and known as ch’un-chi存積. The proportions of ch’ang-ku and ch’un-chi changed from time to time and were fixed at a ratio of six to four in 1526. The salt of ch’un-chi was mainly for emergent need at the frontier and its price was higher than that of ch’ang-ku, however, because it was not necessary to wait merchants competed to bid for ch’un-chi. In the beginning of Ch’eng-hua 成化 period (1465-1487) there even occurred an event of bribing the influential official to memorialize for ch’un-chi, and the Ming-shih called this was “a beginning of decay of the salt system.”39 Moreover, for solving the problem of waiting a method of transfer was adopted in 1435. At that time the Ho-tung salt had surplus while the Huai and Che salts were in short supply, therefore, the Board of Revenue decided that the Ho-tung salt should be given to the waiting merchants. Again in 1437, it was ordered that merchants waiting for the Huai salt should be given four portions of the Huai salt and the other six portions should be given with the Shan-tung salt; those who would not take this should be allowed to wait. Furthermore, the scope of transference was extended later to the salt fields of Ch’ang-lu, Shan-hsi, Fu-chien and Kuang-tung.40 In 1438, the

excessive number, see 1972, p. 82. What Terada referred to as “excessive” was probably due to the fact that there was no perfect communication between the frontier granaries and the salt offices at fields; it might also be a result of colonization which brought merchants to respond to k’ai-chung promptly; excessive issues of yin might not be a planned result.

37

Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/7b, 8b.

38

In early Ming, paper money was issued at the standard of one kuan 貫 (string) equaled to 1,000 wen 文 of cash or one tael of silver, and four kuan equaled to one tael of gold, see Ming-shih, 81/2a. As for ting, it was a unit for 50 taels of silver since the T’ang-Sung periods, in Yuan times it was also used to refer to 50 kuan of paper money, see Lien-sheng Yang, 1971, p. 43, p. 45. For the devaluation of the Ming paper money, see Line-sheng Yang, 1971, p. 67; Ch’uan Han-sheng 全漢昇, 1976, pp. 194-195.

39

Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/1b-2a; Ming-shih, 80/8a. As early as in 1394 an order was issued to prohibit officials from engaging in k’ai-chung, and many orders were issued to repeat the prohibition later, see Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/19b; Hsu wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao, 20/2958-2963.

40

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merchants were permitted to bid for both the Huai and Che salts at the same time.41 As a result of these practices, a merchant might have to obtain his salt supply from several salt fields and the distance would prevent him from going to these places all by himself, thus, during 1465-1487, there occurred a phenomenon of selling the yin to wealthy peoples around the slat producing areas. The merchants were thus divided into pien-shang邊商 (frontier merchant) and nei-shang 內商 (interior merchant). The former expertized in bidding the yin at the frontier while the latter in waiting for salt at various fields.42 This change destroyed restricted limitation of one merchant to engage both in transporting grain and distributing salt in the k’ai-chung system. During 1465-1487 there were several orders for prohibiting transaction of yin.43 On the one hand there were influential persons who engaged in ka’i-chung and on the other hand, there were differentiations between the frontier and interior merchants, thus, the yin became an instrument which could be transferred for profit. For example, during 1522-1566 the number of yin bidden by influential persons ranged from one or two thousands to several thousands. For every yin transferred the profit was 0.6 tael of silver. This not only brought about an increase of the merchant’s cost but also was harmful to the government’s revenue.44

The long waiting for obtaining salt also revealed the fact that the government was not able to control the entire salt product. In early Ming times, the government provided the salt producers with kung-pen-ch’ao工本鈔 (paper money for covering production expenses) according to the price of rice and strictly prohibited illegal selling, when diligent producers had surplus salt the field officials should purchase it with one shih of rice for one yin (200 catties) of salt.45 Due to devaluation of the paper money, however, the kung-pen-ch’ao gradually became void.46 Beyond that, the price provided by the government became lower and lower. In 1437, the official price for surplus salt was only 0.2 shih of rice or wheat per yin. In 1448, although an order of providing one shih for one yin was issued again, in 1450 and 1454 the decisions were made that for one yin of the Huai salt the price was 0.8 shih, of the Che salt, 0.6 shih, and of the Ch’ang-lu and Kuang-tung salt, 0.4 shih.47 As the

41

Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/5a-6a.

42

Hsu wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao, 20/2962-2963.

43

Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/21b-22b.

44

Li Lung-ch’ien, 1987, pp. 632-633; Huang-Ming shu-ch’ao 皇明疏鈔, pp. 3095-3096, 3101-3012; 3105.

45

Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/2b; Ming-shih, 80/7a, 8b; Hsu wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao, 20/2958, 2963. The surplus salt discussed here referred only to the surplus of producers. There was another category of surplus salt referring to the amount confiscated from merchants, in the Ch’eng-hua period this category of surplus was also allowed to be paid for not being confiscated, see Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/16b-19a.

46

Hsu Hung, 1982, p. 527.

47 See respectively in Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/34b-55a; 32/5b; 34/3a; 33/15b; also see Nakayama Hachirō,

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income of salt producers deteriorated it was unavoidable that they would sell surplus salt illegally. More important, the government was actually not able to purchase all surpluses. Thus in the beginning of the Ch’eng-hua period (1465-1487) it was decided that merchants could provide rice or wheat for the relief of poor salt producers, and in 1483 it was further decided that the waiting merchants be allowed to purchase surplus slat in order to fill up deficit amount of the official yin and the pretension of the poor relief be dropped. The Ming-shih called this “a small change in the salt system” and Nakayama Hachirō 中 山 八 郎 called this the beginning of destroying the salt monopoly system.48 In 1489, the regulation for the waiting merchants to purchase surplus salt was formally established.49

Inasmuch as merchants were allowed to purchase surplus salt legally, the government still tried various methods to control the surplus. For instance, to purchase surplus salt should be preceded by regular salt (originally, one yin of regular salt should be accompanied by one yin of surplus, it was gradually added to two, three or even six), the amount purchased should not be over 2,000 catties for one time, etc. Thus, the amount of salt actually under control by the government was two and a half folds of regular salt.50 Indeed, the amount of surplus salt was rather large; according to a memorial in 1527 by Huo T’ao霍韜 (1487-1540) in the Liang-huai region alone there were 3 million yin.51 Thus, from the mid Ming, the problem of surplus salt became very crucial for the government to maintain the official salt market.

Before continuing to discuss surplus salt, another change in k’ai-chung should be mentioned here, namely, a change from payment of grain at frontier granaries to payment of silver at salt administration offices. Although as early as in 1374 there was a precedent of commutation into silver payment and during 1465-1478 commutation was also permitted, formal regulation was announced in 1492 and more extensively practiced afterwards. At that time, the price of salt per yin was set at 0.3-0.4 tael of silver, this was about two folds of that in 1374; however, the merchants could save the trouble of transporting grain and the Treasury of the Board of Revenue accumulated more than one million taels of silver and both parties were in convenience for a short time. The commutation had changed the original ka’i-chung system and finally brought about a serious result of insufficient grain stockpiles at the frontier, but the k’ai-chung system was not all abolished.52 What were the timing and consequence of the practice of commutation?

48 Ming-shih, 80/8b-9a; Nakayama Hachirō, 1941, pp. 514-515, 523.

49 Nakayama Hachirō, 1941, pp. 517-522; Hsu Hung, 1982, p. 528; Huang-Ming shu-ch’ao, p. 3119;

Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao, 20/2963. 50 Hsu Hung, 1976, p. 405. 51 Huang-Ming shu-ch’ao, p. 3129. 52

Ming-shih, 80/9a; Hsu Hung, 1975, pp. 144-152. For details of silver rates, see Lee Lung-wah, 1971, pp.434-446.

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From the viewpoint of economic change in Ming times, commutation into silver payment in k’ai-chung during the fifteenth century was not an isolated phenomenon. As early as in 1436 land tax of some districts was commutated and the silver, known as chin-hua-yin金花銀 (“gold-patterned silver”), was collected in the emperor’s personal treasury.53 Later on, commutation of land tax became more and more widely practiced and eventually brought forth the single-whip system (i-t’ao-pien-fa 一條鞭 法).54

In the latter half of Ming dynasty, revenue and expenditure of the Board of Revenue mainly consisted of silver.55 Thus the timing of commutation into silver payment in k’ai-chung was just following a trend of adopting silver as money in the Ming economy; whether it was Yeh Ch’i 葉淇 (1426-1501) who proposed this change, it was likely to be unavoidable.56 The problem was that after commutation into silver payment, the price of slat must be adjusted and this was an important issue that should be investigated for the slat monopoly system during the late Ming period. Now, return to the problem of surplus salt. As mentioned above, in early period of 1465-1487, the salt merchants were urged to provide rice or wheat for surplus salt in the name of poor relief, there was no record about how much rice or wheat was paid for one yin of salt. It was only known that in 1488 the salt merchants were ordered to purchase surplus salt with 0.1 shih of rice or 0.15 shih of wheat for one yin of salt.57 These prices were far less than those officially provided quoted before. But the situation was changed after commutation. For the purpose of maintaining revenue from salt tax, the government regulated a higher price for surplus salt. For example, in the early Chia-ching 嘉靖 reign (1522-1566) the price of one regular yin of the Huai salt was 0.6 tael (previously only 0.35 tael) and that of the Che salt, 0.4 tael. However, for surplus salt, the price of the southern Huai salt was 0.8 tael and that of the northern Huai salt was 0.6 tael.58

The price of yin collected from merchants by the government could be considered as a proxy of wholesale price. Because the burden of silver payment became gradually heavier, the merchants were gradually exhausted and the government’s revenue was also disturbed. Thus, a reduction of price was suggested by

53

Ming-shih, 78/3b-4a; Lien-sheng Yang, 1971, p. 46; Ray Huang, 1969, pp.89-91.

54

Among scholars who had studied the single-ship system Liang Fang-chung 梁方仲 was perhaps the most eminent, see his works in 1936 and 1944. For relation between the inflow of silver and the reform of single-ship system, see Liang Fang-chung, 1939.

55

Ch’uan Han-sheng, 1972, pp.355-367; Ch’uan Han-sheng and Li Lung-wah, 1972, pp. 123-155; Hsu Hung, 1982, pp.559-560; Hsu-Hung, 1976, pp. 393-399.

56

The Ming-Ch’ing contemporaries liked to blame Yeh Ch’i for the decay of k’ai-chung and this seems not to be very fair, for example, see Ch’u Ta-wen 儲大文, “K’ai-chung yen-fa 開中鹽法” in

Huang-ch’ao ching-shih wen-pien 皇朝經世文編, 49/49a-b; Tung I-ning 董以寧, “Shang-t’un-i 商

屯議,” in ibid., 49/54a-b. Both Hsu Hung and Lee Lung-wah had discussed the role of Yeh ch’i, see Hsu Hung, 1975b, pp.155-157; Lee Lung-wah, 1971, pp. 475-480.

57

Ta-ming hui-tien, 34/9b.

58

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many officials researching for the improvement of salt system. Listed in Table 1 were the prices of yin proposed in 1535 by the Minister of the Board of Revenue, Liang Ts’ai 梁材 (1470-1540), after summarizing many officials’ opinions.

Table 1: The yin price of four salt regions, 1535

Salt region Regular salt Surplus salt

Weight (catty) Original (tael) Reduced (tael) Weight (catty) Original (tael) Reduced (tael) Liang-huai 285 0.6 0.5 265 S: 0.80 0.65 N: 0.60 0.50 Liang-che 250 0.4 0.35 200 Chia: 0.50 -- Hang: 0.45 -- Shao: 0.40 -- Wen: 0.20 -- Ch’ang-lu 205 0.2 -- 235 S: 0.30 -- N: 0.35 -- Shan-tung 205 0.15 -- 225 0.38 0.31

Source: Liang Ts’ai, “Yen-fa shih-pien shu 鹽法實邊疏 (Memorial on the salt system for securing sufficiency at the frontier),” in Sun Hsun ed., Huang-Ming shu-ch’ao, pp. 2130-3121; also see

Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/12a-b.

It can be calculated from Table 1 that in the Liang-huai region surplus salt was weighted only 93% of regular salt, while the yin price of the former was on the average 40% higher than the latter. In the Liang-che region, the weight of surplus salt was 80% of the regular salt, while the yin price was 7% higher on the average. In the Ch’ang-lu and Shan-tung regions, the weight of surplus salt was 10% higher than the regular salt, while the yin price was 50% to 150% higher. In 1535, the price reduction was mainly for the salt of Liang-huai and Shan-tung. If differences of weight were taken into account, the yin price of surplus salt after reduction in Liang-huai was still 15% higher than that of regular salt and in Shan-tung still 97% higher. In other words, the government adopted a measure of price discrimination and reduction to manage problem of surplus salt in order to maintain the official salt market and secure revenue from the salt tax.

As for whether the price of yin was rational, it may be investigated by comparing with the price of rice during Ming times. According to a study of Ch’uan Han-sheng, around the Nanking area in 1436-1500 the normal price of rice was 0.25 tael per shih and around 1535, the price of rice was 0.5-0.9 tael per shih.59 Taking the average of 0.7 shih, then, the price of rice increased about 180% between the two time points. The yin price of the southern Huai salt in 1465-1487 was 0.35 tael and in 1535 was 0.7 tael on the average, thus the increased was 100%. In other words, during about the

59

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same period from around mid-fifteenth century to 1535, the increase in the price of yin was not as great as that in the price of rice. What was more was an adoption of price reduction at that time, some effects on controlling surplus salt might be expected.

Furthermore, when calculation was done with the number of yin distributed it was clear that the tax collected from surplus salt was more than that from regular salt. The statistics derived from the same memorial by Liang Ts’ai was listed in Table 2.

Table 2: The salt tax from four salt regions, 1535

Salt region No. of yin

Regular salt (tael) Surplus salt (tael) Total (tael) Liang-huai 696,030 348,015 417,618* 765,633 Liang-che 440,000 154,000 132,000 286,000 Ch’ang-lu 135,775a 33,944* 42,090 76,034 Shan-tung 83,122b 12,468 26,599* 39,067 Total --* 548,427* 618,307 1,166,734

Source: Huang-Ming shu-ch’ao, pp. 3125-3127.

*These figures were not correctly written in the original text; here calculations were done with the number of yin and the average tax per yin. As for the total number of yin, the original text did not provide a figure; here it was not calculated as the weight of yin in regions was not the same.

a. Another 86 catties was not included. b. another 124 catties was not included.

Table 2 shows that in 1535 the salt tax collected from the surplus of four regions was already more than half (53%) of the total salt tax. These statistics demonstrated that the merchant’s purchasing of surplus salt though destroyed the rigidity of salt monopoly system, the Ming government applying measures of price discrimination and price reduction was able to prevent a loss of revenue and thus to maintain the official salt market to some extent.

Nevertheless, since the original purpose of k’ai-chung was for the security of frontier, the government in late Ming was still attempted to keep the principle of payment in kind by the merchants. For instance, in 1548 a decision was made that from the next year on all the yin bidden for k’ai-chung, no matter it was ch’ang-ku or ch’un-chi and no matter it was Liang-huai, Liang-che, Ch’ang-lu or Shan-tung, should be paid with grain or straw according to the originally fixed rates.60 It should be noted that this decision referred only to regular salt while surplus salt should still be paid in silver.61 Moreover, for the purpose of controlling silver payment of surplus salt, in 1542 the yin price of Liang-huai surplus salt was further reduced to 0.55 tael

60

Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/13a.

61

In the memorial of Liang Ts’ai it was pointed out that the surplus salt was not appropriate for

k’ai-chung at the frontier, see Huang-Ming shu-ch’ao, p. 3127. In 1542, it was decided that only the

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for the south and 0.4 tael for the north, and that of Liang-che, Ch’ang-lu and Shan-tung remained unchanged.62 In 1549, the prices of Liang-huai surplus salt were adjusted again to 0.7 tael for the south and 0.5012 tael for the north.63

If compare the revenue of surplus salt in 1535 with that in 1578, the increase was shown in Table 3. It is quite clear that for the four salt regions, the silver revenue of surplus salt all increased and the total amount increased 47% between 1535 and 1578. This indicated that the government still had considerable capability in controlling surplus salt.

Table 3: Increase in the surplus salt tax, 1535-1578

Salt region 1535 1578 Amount of increase

Liang-huai 417,618 600,000 182,382

Liang-che 132,000 140,000 8,000

Ch’ang-lu 42,090 120,000 77,910

Shan-tung 26,599 50,000 23,410

Total 618,307 910,000 291,693

Source: Table 2; Ta-Ming hui-tien, 32/3b, 14b, 21a, 25b.

In addition to the four regions discussed above, the surplus salt tax of Kuang-tung salt region was not sent to the Board of Revenue but was retained for local military expenditures. Beginning in the period of 1465-1487, offices for collecting salt tax were set up in Kuang-tung salt region at Wu-chou梧州, Shao-chou 韶州, Nan-hsiung南雄, Chao-ch’ing肇慶, and Ch’ing-yuan清遠. The merchants must pay tax at these locations for their salt supply and one yin of regular salt could be accompanied with six yin of surplus salt; the price of one regular yin was 0.05 tael and that of surplus yin was 0.1 tael. The surplus salt beyond the permitted amount could still be reported and be paid for 0.2 tael per yin. This method was put into practice for about 30-40 years before 1511 when it was decided that only 3 yin of surplus salt should be allowed for one regular yin and the extra amount should not be reported for not being confiscated. However, by a memorial of Huang Tso 黃佐 (1490-1566) the old regulations were restored and the payment for regular salt was exempted while that for surplus salt was changed to 0.15 tael per yin, and the extra amount should be paid for 0.25 tael per yin.64 This method was again changed in 1579 that the payment for all six yin of surplus salt should be 0.65 tael and for extra amount 0.2 tael per yin.65 The above regulations also showed that the yin price of surplus salt in Kuang-tung was higher than that of regular salt and the price was also reduced later

62

Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/3b-4a.

63

Ta-Ming hui-tien, 34/9b.

64

Huang-Ming shu-ch’ao, pp. 3141-3151; also see Ming-shih, 80/9b-10a.

65

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indicating that measures of price discrimination and price reduction were also adopted for maintaining competitive capacity of the official salt in the Kuang-tung region. In summation, k’ai-chung in Ming times changed from very strict to gradually loosened and following the tendency of using silver as money, the payment was also commutated. From 1489 onwards, the merchants were able to purchase surplus salt legally and the government adopted measures of price discrimination and price reduction so that by the end of the sixteenth century it was still able to control the increase of tax from surplus salt and thus prevent the official salt market from being aggressed upon completely by illegal salt. At that time, however, the k’ai-chung system was not able to function as before for the security of frontier granaries. In the beginning of the seventeenth century when the frontier was in emergent condition, the government though wanted to increase salt tax for solving fiscal crisis and yet was not able to reach its goal.66 As a result of prevailing illegal salt, the official salt was obstructed and thus a reform in 1617 was brought forth. This reform, known as kang-fa in documents, was proposed by Yuan Shih-chen 袁世振 (chin-shih in 1598), who once served as a senior secretary at the Division of Shan-tung in the Board of Revenue was very familiar with the salt affairs. The reform involved aspects of salt administration, salt producers’ organization, salt merchants’ organization and the organization for seizing smuggling.67 A short-run effect of this reform was to clear up accumulated yin in a period of thirteen years (1618-1630).68 A long-term effect was the establishment of monopoly by the kang merchants, and thus scholars called the salt system after this reform the merchant monopoly system.69

II. Official Salt Market under Merchant Monopoly

The kang-fa of the late Ming was adopted by the Ch’ing government. Since k’ai-chung was no longer in practice, the institution was somewhat simplified. Ch’eng Chün 程浚, a senior licentiate in early Ch’ing, point out:

The yin was not bidden anymore at the frontier under our dynasty and was assigned to interior merchants. There were no such names as granary certificate and surplus salt tax and all were embodied in the price of yin. There were no regulations for obtaining salt at different fields and all salts were purchased by merchants, and the affairs of salt were all in charged by

66

Hsu Hung, 1982, pp. 553-568.

67

Hsu Hung, 1977, pp. 303-311; Hsu Hung, 1972a, pp. 182-183.

68

Ch’eng Chün 程浚, “Yen-cheng yin-ke-i 鹽政因革議 (On changes in salt administration),” in

Liang-huai yen-fa-chih, 26/34a-b; also see Hsu Hung, 1977, pp. 303-311; Hsu Hung, 1972a, pp.

182-183.

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the salt administration office and the responsibility was unified.70

The above statement included four points which were just the major facets of the operation of official salt market under merchant monopoly. In short, the interior merchants paid the price of yin to the salt office and obtained the yin and then went to slat fields to purchase salt for distributing to assigned localities. Basically, the instrument for controlling official salt market was still the yin. Through regulating the weight, the number, and the price of yin, the government could control the official salt market. The interior merchants were those who had obtained the salt monopoly right; they had registered in the kang-ts’e 綱冊 (registration of the kang) and enjoyed monopolistic profit while the government in turn could control them through the registration.

In addition to kang-fa, at some localities p’iao-fa was in practice. As mentioned before, p’iao was a kind of salt license other than the yin. The p’iao-fa system was first put into practice in 1529 in the Liang-huai region; the main effect of it was to complement shortcomings of the yin and to send enough salt to hilly districts. In late Ming, p’iao-fa was also put into practice in T’ai-yuan and Fen-chou汾州 in Shansi province and in Ch’ing-chou青州, Teng-chou登州 and Lai-chou萊州 prefectures in Shantung province. Since p’iao-fa was much simpler and even very small merchants could engaged in distribution of salt, it was a quite efficient method for fighting against illegal salt in late Ming.71 In the Ch’ing period, part of Chekiang and Shantung provinces still carried on p’iao-fa. In the Liang-che salt region, there were 100,698 p’iao which accounted for 13% of the total number of yin and p’iao; in the Shan-tung salt region there were 171,740 (or 171,240) p’iao which shared 31% of the total.72 Moreover, the Yun-nan salt region had never used yin in the Ch’ing period but sometimes used p’iao;73 while the Liang-hui salt region replaced yin with p’iao in 1830 and 1850.74 In short, p’iao was a complementary instrument for the government to control official salt market.

The following discussions will be focused on operation of official salt market first from the role played by salt merchants and then from the growth and decline of official salt market.

1. The Role of Salt Merchants

70

Liang-huai yen-fa-chih, 26/35a.

71

Hsu Hung, 1977, pp. 299-303.

72

Liang-che yen-fa-chih 兩浙鹽法志, 5/1a-4b; Shan-tung yen-fa-chih 山東鹽法志, 7/6a-9a,

73

Liu Chun, 1933b, pp. 27-141.

74

Liu Chun, 1933a, pp.123-188; Hsu Hung, 1972a, pp.188-189; Wei Hsiu-mei 魏秀梅, 1985, pp. 122-154; William T. Rowe, 1984, pp. 91-94.

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As mentioned before, the salt merchants were divided into frontier and interior groups in the period of 1465-1487. By the end of Ming dynasty there appeared triple names of frontier merchant, interior merchant, and distribution merchant (shui-shang 水商) in documents. The interior merchant bought yin from the frontier merchant and the distribution merchant bought salt from the interior merchant; and there were only one-tenth among interior merchants who also engaged in distribution.75 The relations among the three tiers of merchants were succinctly observed by Ch’eng Chün as: “More fees were required with more hands of transaction.”76 What was more was that there were hoarders, known as t’un-hu囤戶, appeared in the period of 1522-1566 to specialize in buying yin at the frontier for transference and thus much abuses were created. During the Lung-ch’ing隆慶 reign (1567-1572), P’ang Shang-p’eng龐尚鵬 (ca. 1524-1581) proposed to divide the yin into three grades with different prices and thus the abuses of hoarders were curbed to some extent.77

In short, yin had become some sort of “portfolio” which could be transferred for profit. For example, in the Wang-li 萬 曆 period (1573-1619) the situation of Liang-huai was that the yin price fixed officially for the southern Huai salt was 0.85 tael and for the northern Huai salt was 0.75 tael, but the salt price paid by distribution merchants to interior merchants was about 3.2 taels, thus, interior merchants could get a windfall profit of 2.4-2.5 taels for every transaction.78 After kang-fa was put into practice, merchants who were registered in the kang-ts’e occupied ken-wo 根窩 (lit. “rooted nest”, that is, certificate permitted by the government for the monopolistic right) and thus there occurred a phenomenon of selling ken-wo. The price of ken-wo varied depending on flourishing or contracting of the assigned markets, and almost all salt regions had this phenomenon of selling ken-wo.79 Take the situation of Liang-huai for example, in 1659-1740 the prices of ken-wo increased from about 0.5-0.6 tael to 1.6-2.0 or 2.5 taels. It was only in 1740 that the price of ken-wo was fixed at 1 tael officially. At that time, about one half of the Liang-huai salt merchants did not have their own ken-wo.80 A lawsuit revealed that in 1696 the price of ken-wo for the Ch’ang-lu salt was as high as 4 teals per yin.81 These evidences of extra profit gained by the monopolistic salt merchants demonstrated the feature of imperfect competition of the salt market.

In addition to the problem of ken-wo, the operation of official salt market could

75

Hsu Hung, 1975b, pp. 159-164. Although the names of three tiers of merchant appeared first in documents of the Wan-li period (1573-1619), it was quite possible that shui-shang was in existence earlier.

76

Liang-huai yen-fa-chih, 26/34b-35a.

77

Ming-shih, 80/14a-15a; Hsu Hung, 1977, pp. 303-305; Hsu Hung, 1972a, p. 183.

78

Hsu Hung, 1975b, p. 164.

79

Chiu-sheng yen-wu-i-lüeh, pp. 43-44.

80

Pint-ti Ho, 1954, pp. 136-137; Hsu Hung, 1972a, p. 187.

81

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be understood partially from relations among salt merchants and relations between the merchant and the government. Since each salt region had special conditions, each will be discussed individually below.

Ch’ang-lu: In the beginning of the Ch’ing dynasty, because the native merchants (t’u-shang土商) and the Peking merchant (ching-shang京商) had owed salt tax year after year, a decision was made in 1660 to dismiss them and to convene the kang merchants in the next year.82 This showed that the government had power to change the merchants for distributing salt. Since Peking was in the region of Ch’ang-lu, yin was divided into ching-yin 京引 (the yin for distributed in Peking and districts of Wan-p’ing 宛平and Ta-hsing大興) and wai-yin外引 (the yin for other districts). According to the kang-ts’e recorded in the early Yung-cheng 雍正period (1723-1738), there were 101 merchants for ching-yin and 142 for wai-yin.83 The numbers of the two categories were reduced to 21 and 111 respectively in late Ch’ing.84 The number of yin bidden by each merchant was not recorded, however, those who had large amount of capital might have bid a lot of yin. For example, Yung-ch’ing-hao 永慶號 had distributed salt at 21 districts and Fan Yu-pin 范毓馪 at 20 districts before they were dismissed in 1791 and 1797 respectively.85 In the Tao-kuang 道光 period (1820-1850), distribution of salt in Yung-p’ing prefecture was changed from the hands of merchants to those of officials and 20 districts in Honan provinces were changes to the p’iao system.86 These changes indicated the decline of the salt merchant in Ch’ang-lu region.

Usually, he merchants who had bid the yin were to be in charge of distribution themselves. But in 1684 those who distributed the Peking yin agreed to establish a Ch’ang-lu-kuan 長蘆館 (Hall of Ch’ang-lu) to regulate the order of selling salt. The order to sell salt was arranged according to the order of arrival and the purpose was to rectify presumptuous abuses. However, the abuses did appear later and Ch’ang-lu-kuan was closed in 1715 by the appeal of the Peking merchants. Another method known as hsun-tan huan-chao 循單環照 (circulate pass) was proposed and adopted by the Censor to regulate the order of salt distribution in Peking.87 This incident suggested that the government had power to maintain the order of salt

82

Hsin-hsiu Ch’ang-lu yen-fa-chih 新修長蘆鹽法志, 7/3b-5a.

83

Hsin-hsiu Ch’ang-lu yen-fa-chih, 7/69a-72b; names of merchants were listed in detail.

84

Ch’ing yen-fa-chih 清鹽法志, 17/12a-15b.

85

Chiu-sheng yen-wu-i-lüeh, p. 31. According to Chi-fu t’ung-chih 畿 輔 通 志 (1884 edition), 100/4074, it was known that Yung-ch’ing-hao was operated by merchant Wang Te-i 王得宜. Fan Yu-ping was a member of Fan family from Chieh-hsiu 介休 county, Shansi; this family was famous for being served as emperor’s merchant in early Ch’ing, see Liu Ts’ui-jung 劉翠溶, 1969, pp. 98-103.

86

Ch’ing yen-fa-chih, 17/3a-b; 18/1a.

87

Hsin-hsiu Ch’ang-lu yen-fa-chih, 7/49a-50b; 15/4b-6a; Ch’in-ting ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li (1899 edition), 221/8a.

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19 market.

As for Tientsin, since it was located nearby salt fields, it was set up as a public port (kung-kung-k’oi-an公共口岸) in the Ch’ang-lu region and merchants were selected to take charge in turn. The selected merchants were originally changed once every year but in 1785 the term was extended to five years and in 1830 it was further regulated that when the five-year term was expired one should not ask for continuation in order to prevent abuses.88

Shan-tung: In the early Ch’ing period, the native merchants flourished in the Shan-tung region and there was a practice of selling salt according to the transport orders. In 1657, a memorial by Yin Ying-chieh 陰應節 (1646 chin-shih) suggested that the native merchants should be dismissed and the practice should be prohibited.89 In 1671, another memorial by Wu Sai 吳賽 suggested that the kang merchants should be responsible to pay the tax so that the retailers of kang merchants (po-shang 撥商) would not be able to occupy the assigned markets.90

The kang merchants in Shan-tung were mostly non-natives and their trade was hereditary. There were originally 14 kang and in 1728 one was added to become 15 kang which included a total number of 480 merchants.91

From records in the Yung-cheng period, the average number of yin distributed per merchant could be calculated and the result showed that it ranged from 163 yin in Hsin-hsien 莘 縣 , Shantung, and 1,386 yin in Tang-shan 碭 山 , Kiangsu. In the following five districts, the number of yin per merchant was more than one thousand: Ch’ing-p’ing清平 (1,099 yin), Ts’ao-chou曹州 (1,051 yin), P’ing-yin平陰 (1,101 yin), P’u-chou濮州 (1,227 yin), all in Shantung province and Tang-shan 碭山 in Kiangsu.92 If aggregated into the unit of prefecture (fu 府 ) and independent department (chih-li-chou直隸州), the result was listed in Table 4.

Table 4: The number of yin and merchant in the Shan-tung salt region, 1723-1735 Fu or Chih-li-chou Number of district (1) Number of yin (2) Number of merchant (3) Average yin (3)/(2) Average merchant (3)/(1) Shantung province Chi-nan fu 7 40,092 145 276 20.7 Yen-chou fu 14 106,292 248 429 17.7 Tung-ch’ang fu 14 84,287 259 325 18.5 88

Ch’in-ting ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li (1899 edition), 221/13b-14a; 222/1b.

89

Shan-tung yen-fa-chih, 11A/11a-13a.

90

Shan-tung yen-fa-chih, 11A/38a-39a.

91

Shan-tung yen-fa-chih, 7/1a; Chiu-sheng yen-wu-i-lüeh, p. 43.

92

Shan-tung yen-fa-chih, 7/9b-21a. The statistics were quoted as hsien-e 現額 (current amount), thus they were referred to as for the Yung-cheng period when the gazetteer was compiled.

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20 T’ai-an chou 2 21,042 61 345 30.5 Ts’ao-chou 5 34,347 52 661 10.4 Tung-p’ing chou 5 26,442 101 262 20.2 P’u-chou 4 15,419 25 617 6.3 Honan province Kuei-te fu 9 92,260 187 493 20.7 Kiangsu province Hsu-chou fu 6 79,788 145 550 24.2 Total 66 499,969 1,223 409 18.5

Source: Shan-tung yen-fa-chih, 7/9b-21a.

It is notable that 66 of the total 1,223 merchants were listed with their names in representing the districts, and among them 6 names appeared twice and the identified pairs of districts were not very closed spatially to each other.93 It was possible that there were other merchants who actually were in charge of distribution. Moreover, the number 1,223 was larger than 480 mentioned above. Table 4 shows that the average number of yin per merchant was 409 and the average number of merchant per district was 18.5. These evidences suggested that those who actually engaged in distribution were more than those registered in the kang-ts’e; this reflected that the salt merchants of Shan-tung were rather dispersed and each of them did not have very large capital.

In 1732, the Censor, O Li 鄂禮 (a bordered blue banner-man), proposed that for the improvement of management each merchant should distribute at least 800 yin. The merchants who already had this number of yin should be allowed to establish a registered name themselves, while those who did not should be combined with others to meet the requirement, and one who had the largest number of yin should be selected as leader to establish a registered name for taking up the responsibility.94 Thus the number of kang was reduced to 12; the names of kang and the number of merchant were listed in Table 5. From the characters such as “chin”, “fen”, and “hung” engraved in the names of kang, it could be deduced that many merchants were from Shansi province. In late Ch’ing, there were only six kang left, namely, Yung-hsing永 興, T’ung-yu, T’ung-jen同仁, Hsiang-jen祥仁, Chi-yi集義, and Heng-te恆德.95

Table 5: The Shan-tung kang merchants, 1732

Name of kang No. of merchant Name of kang No. of merchant

Yung-hsing 永興 9 Chin-hsing 晉興 32

Chin-tse 晉澤 12 Yung-ch’ang 永昌 16

T’ung-jen 同仁 32 Hung-chien 洪戩 21

93

Shan-tung yen-fa-chih, 7/9b-21a.

94

Shan-tung yen-fa-chih, 7/1a-6a; for “Ping-shang hsi-wen 併商檄文 (A proclamation for merging the merchants)” see 11B/60b-61a.

95

(21)

21

Hsiang-jen 祥仁 18 T’ung-yu 通裕 35

Ch’ing-fen 慶汾 15 Chin-kung 晉公 38

Chi-yi 集義 30 Hsiang-che 祥淛 15

Total 273

Source: Shan-tung yen-fa-chih, 7/1a-6a.

The Shan-tung kang merchants was rather small in scale, however, it seemed that the official decisions in early Ch’ing tended to avoid concentration. For example, in 1696 and 1718, a few number of merchants sent applications to require a permission for distributing newly increased number of yin and they would pay tax in advance, but in both cases the permission was not given and the increased number of yin was allotted among all merchants.96

Aside for yin, some localities in the Shan-tung region used p’iao for distributing slat and there were p’iao merchants. The p’iao merchants were not hereditary in the beginning; they entered into the business when they had enough capital and exited when they did not and most of them were natives of Shantung. In 1730, the Censor, Cheng Shan-pao鄭禪寶, memorialized that no matter being a native or not, only if one was a wealthy good merchant and had secured a guaranty could one be a p’iao merchant. At that time there were 37 p’iao merchants.97 In 1742, the p’iao was classified into three grades and the p’iao merchants were allowed to become hereditary with the assigned localities of distribution. The p’iao merchants were grouped into six kang: Hsing-hsaio興孝, Tse-yu則友, Ch’in-mu親睦, Tu-yin篤姻, Hsin-jen信任, and Chou-hsu周恤. Whenever there was a case of new entry or exit, the way of doing should follow that of the yin-wo 引窩 (i.e., ken-wo根窩).98 In this way, there was actually no difference between the yin and the p’iao merchants. Ho-tung: The salt merchants in the Ho-tung region were originally divided into two groups: residential merchant (tso-shang 坐 商 ) and transporting merchants (yun-shang運商). The residential merchants expertized in salt production and were responsible for paying the tax while the transporting merchants only in distributing the salt. It was in the Yung-cheng period that there was a change of their roles. The responsibilities of paying tax and distribution were taken by the transporting merchants, while the residential merchants were to engage in production only; their role was thus similar to that of tsao-hu in Liang-huai and Ch’ang-lu.99 The process of this change was not clear but the result was that the transporting merchants controlled

96

Shan-tung yen-fa-chih, 11A/44a-45b; 51b-53b.

97

Shan-tung yen-fa-chih, 7/21a. The traditional government used “pao 保” (security guaranty) to control merchants, see Lien-sheng Yang, 1970, pp. 188-189.

98

Chiu-sheng yen-wu-i-lüeh, pp. 44-45; Ch’in-ting ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li (1899 edition), 222/22a;

Ch’ing yen-fa –chih, 55/6a.

99

(22)

22 the Ho-tung salt.100

When the Ho-tung salt trade was still prosperous in the Ming period there were 500 merchants, but the number was reduced to only about 100 or so in late Ming.101 In 1644-1661, about one hundred more merchants were convened by the Ch’ing government.102 In 1723-1735 there were 421 residential merchants and among them 43 paid 12 ting 錠 (one ting consisted of 120 yin) of tax, 373 paid 6 ting, 2 paid less than 12 ting and 3 paid less than 6 ting.103 The number of transporting merchants was not known and after they replaced the residential merchants to pay tax, they were registered under old names of the residential merchants. According to a record in 1789, there were 425 merchants registered in Ho-tung and among them 40 paid 12 ting, 379 paid 6 ting in other categories.104 It seemed that in the eighteenth century the number of Ho-tung merchants did not change very much.

The incumbency of the Ho-tung merchants was originally set for five years. Because the wealthy households tried to avoid being convened as salt merchants and they mostly were not familiar with the salt trade, thus, in 1782 the five-year term practice was discarded. The wealthiest among the merchants who were then currently on the job was selected as chang-shang長商 (leading merchant). Moreover, locations for distribution were classified into upper, middle, and lower grades and were evenly assigned among the merchants to avoid paralyzed on one side.105

In 1792-1806 the Ho-tung salt tax was allotted to land tax and the transporting merchants were dismissed; the salt was then sold freely by the people. But this interruption was ended in 1806 and this episode need not be repeated here.106 When the old practice was restored, it was not clear how many merchants were convened, but it was known that in 1853 there were more than one hundred transporting merchants.107 In 1854 the transportation of Ho-tung salt was changed from the hand of merchant to that of official in districts of Shansi and Shensi provinces; and in Honan province to the hands of the people.108 Owing to this change to free trade in most area within the region, the Ho-tung merchants gained a profit that they had not been able to get before. However, the scale of distribution was mostly very small. There were many officials (about 100 persons) engaged in salt trade and their windfall profit from transaction of yin was the most serious problem on the Ho-tung salt

100

Wu Ch’eng-ming and Hsu Ti-hsin, 1987, pp. 795-796.

101

Ch’u-hsiu Ho-tung yen-fa-chih, 9/huan-chi 宦蹟, 11a-12a.

102

Wu Ch’eng-ming and Hsu Ti-hsin, 1987, p. 798.

103

Ch’u-hsiu Ho-tung yen-fa-chih, 3/shang-jen 商人, 2a-3b.

104

Wu Ch’eng-ming and Hsu Ti-hsin, 1987, p. 798.

105

Ch’in-ting ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li (1899 edition), 224/6b-7a.

106

Liang-huai yen-fa-chih; also see Wu Ch’eng-ming and Hsu Ti-hsin, 1987, p. 797.

107

Ch’in-ting ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li (1899 edition), 224/16a.

108

Ch’in-ting ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li (1899 edition), 224/16b; also see Chiu-sheng yen-wu-i-lüeh, pp. 99-100.

(23)

23 market.109

Liang-huai: The Liang-huai salt merchants came mostly from Shansi province and from Hui-chou徽州, Anhwei. This fact had been studied by many scholars.110 Here, aspects related to the merchant’s engagement in production of salt, accumulation of capital and way of life will be omitted and the focus will be on a few points related to distribution of salt.

The transporting merchants in Liang-huai region were divided into tsung-shang 總商 (head merchant) and san-shang散商 (“small merchants”). Those who had large capital and numerous yin were selected as tsung-shang. In 1677, the Censor, Hao Yu 郝裕, memorialized: “Twenty-four persons were selected and the san-shang were assigned under them.”111 Thus it was clear that in the beginning there were 24 head merchants. In 1725, there were 30 head merchants and among them 2-3 or 4-5 persons served as ta-tsung大總 (“merchant chief”). Since the head merchants abused their authority to collect extra fees from the small merchants, in 1830 the name of tsung-shang was abolished and changed to pan-shih-chih-shang 辦事之商 (lit., “merchants who managed the affairs”).112

As for the number of transporting merchants in Liang-huai region, there was no exact number in records. Scholars liked to quote Wang Hsi-sun 汪喜孫 (1786-1847) for the references. According to Wang, there were one hundred and several tens of san-shang for transporting the southern Huai salt and the number was reduced to 40 or 50 during the Tao-kuang period.113 Ho Ping-ti had tried to estimate the number of Linag-huai salt merchants and he believed that at the most prosperous time there were about 230 transporting merchants in the whole region.114 With this estimate the number of Liang-huai transporting merchants was smaller than 243 in Ch’ang-lu, 273 in Shan-tung, and 425 in Ho-tung. But the number of yin distributed in Liang-huai was the largest. For example, in 1800 there were 1.68 million yin and thus, on the average, each transporting merchant distributed 7,000 yin.115 During the eighteenth century, the largest transporting merchant in Lang-huai could distribute 100,000 yin annually. 116 But in the mid-nineteenth century, “those who could distribute 20,000-30,000 yin were no more than twenty.”117

109

Chiu-sheng yen-wu-i-lüeh, pp. 101-102, 108-109.

110

Terada Takanobu, 1972, pp. 251-265; Fujii Hiroshi, 1953-54, pp. 183-192; Ping-ti Ho, 1954, pp. 130-168; Thomas A. Metzger, 1972, pp. 19-27; Hsu Hung, 1972a, pp. 95-112.

111

Liang-huai yen-fa-chih, 13/8a-9b.

112

Hsu Hung, 1972a, pp. 101-102; Ch’in-ting ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li, 223/6a, 21b.

113

Hsu Hung, 1972a, p. 105; Ping-ti Ho, 1954, p. 140.

114

Ping-ti Ho, 1954, pp. 140-141.

115

Chin-ting ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li 欽定大清會典事例 (1818 edition), 178/2a-b; Chin-ting

Ta-Ch’ing hui-tien shih-li (1899 edition), 223/2a-b.

116

Ping-ti Ho, 1954, p. 150.

117

數據

Table 1: The yin price of four salt regions, 1535
Table 3: Increase in the surplus salt tax, 1535-1578
Table 4: The number of yin and merchant in the Shan-tung salt region, 1723-1735  Fu or  Chih-li-chou  Number of district  (1)  Number of yin (2)  Number of merchant (3)  Average  yin (3)/(2)  Average  merchant (3)/(1)  Shantung province  Chi-nan fu    7
Table 5: The Shan-tung kang merchants, 1732
+3

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