Sunshine Laws and Anticorruption

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i

Contributors

CHAN, Hou-sheng

（詹火生）

Convener, Social Security Division, National Policy Foundation

CHANG, Hung-hao

（張宏浩）

Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, National Taiwan University

CHAO, Li-yun

（趙麗雲）

Legislator

Fellow, Education and Culture Division, National Policy Foundation

CHAO, Yi

（趙怡）

CHAO, Yung-mau

（趙永茂）

Dean, College of Social Sciences, National Taiwan University

CHEN, Chao-cheng

（陳朝政）

Assistant Professor , Center for General Education, Kaohsiung Medical University Adjunct Research Fallow, Interior Affairs Division, National Policy Foundation

CHOU, Yujen

（周育仁）

Professor, Department of Public Administration and Policy, National Taipei University

CHU, Hsin-min

（朱新民）

Professor, Department of Diplomacy, National Chenchi University Adviser, Interior Affairs Division, National Policy Foundation

CHU, Jui-ting

（褚瑞婷）

Senior Research Fellow, Education and Culture Division, National Policy Foundation

HAN, Pao-teh

（漢寶德）

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vi

Ph.D., Department of International Education, University of Oxford

HSIEH, Yu-cheng

（謝宇程）

Assistant Research Fellow, Interior Affairs Division, National Policy Foundation

HSU, Chen-min

（許振明）

President, Taiwan Academy of Banking and Finance

Professor, Department of Economics, National Taiwan University

HUANG, J. Chao-meng

（黃朝盟）

Professor, Department of Public Administration and Policy, National Taipei University

HUNG, Chien-chao

（洪健昭）

Fellow, National Security Division, National Policy Foundation

KAO, Yuang-kuang

（高永光）

Professor and Director, Taiwan Studies Center, National Chengchi University

KO, Wei-shin

（葛維新）

Fellow, National Security Division, National Policy Foundation Former Vice Minister, Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission

KU, Yeun-wen

（古允文）

Professor and Department Head, Department of Social Work, National Taiwan University

KUNG, Wen-chi

（孔文吉）

Legislator

Adviser, Interior Affairs Division, National Policy Foundation

LEE, Cheng-hsiu

（李正修）

Assistant Research Fellow, National Security Division, National Policy Foundation

LEE, Chien-sing

（李建興）

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vii

LEE, Chun-ta

（李俊達）

Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Public Administration and Policy, National Taipei University

LEE, Lawrence L.

（李禮仲）

Commissioner, Fair Trade Commission, Executive Yuan

Associate Professor, Department of Finance and Economic Law, Asia University S.J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School

LEE, Jack Yun-jie

（李允傑）

Adviser, Monetary and Public Finance Policies Division, National Policy Foundation Professor, Department of Public Administration, National Open University

LI, John Chien-chung

（李建中）

Chairman, CECI Engineering Consultants, Inc., Taiwan

LIAO, Chih-feng

（廖志峰）

Associate Research Fellow, Taiwan Academy of Banking and Finance

LIN, Chu-chia

（林祖嘉）

Convener, Economy and Technology Division, National Policy Foundation Professor, Department of Economics, National Chengchi University

LING, Shiang-nung

（林享能）

Fellow, Economy and Technology Division, National Policy Foundation

LIU, Helen Yi-ling

（劉奕伶）

Assistant Research Fellow, National Security Division, National Policy Foundation

LIU, Kung-chung

（劉孔中）

Adviser, Constitution and Law Division, National Policy Foundation

LU, Chia-li

（魯嘉麗）

Deputy Project Manager, CECI Engineering Consultants, Inc., Taiwan

SHIH, Kuang-hsun

（施光訓）

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TAN, Ching-yu

（譚瑾瑜）

Associate Research Fellow, Economy and Technology Division, National Policy Foundation

TSENG, Hui-chin

（曾慧青）

Assistant Research Fellow, Education and Culture Division, National Policy Foundation

WANG, Chun-yuan

（王俊元）

Assistant professor, Center for General Education, National Chiao Tung University

WANG, Eric C.

（王釗洪）

Professor, Department of Economics, National Chung Cheng University

Adjunct Research Fallow, Economy and Technology Division, National Policy Foundation

WU, Shiao-chi

（吳肖琪）

Professor, Institute of Health and Welfare Policy, National Yang-Ming University President, Taiwan Long-Term Care Professional Association

WU, Jung-hua

（吳榮華）

Adviser, Sustainable Development Division, National Policy Foundation

WU, Ming-yen

（吳銘彥）

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Preface

Typhoon Morakot sideswiped Taiwan on August 8, 2009, leaving in its wake

hundreds of people buried alive in landslides and a third of the island under

floodwa-ters, a few yards deep in many low-lying areas. It is Taiwan’s worst flood disaster in

history. And it occurred while Taiwan was hard pressed for coping with the global

economic crisis, often referred to the financial tsunami. On the other hand, voters

went to the polls to elect the new magistrates and mayors in altogether 17 counties

and cities across the country.

In the momentous local elections, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party

attained a great gain. It narrowed the gap in voter support against the ruling

Kuomin-tang. But the political map of Taiwan was little changed. That has made it next to

im-possible to predict how the upcoming mayoralty elections in five special

municipali-ties at the end of 2010 and the presidential election in 2012.

This new political development is thoroughly analyzed in the Focus and

Inte-rior Affairs sections of this issue of Taiwan Development Perspectives. Similarly

well-researched papers deal with the triangular relationship among Taipei,

Washing-ton and Beijing, Japan’s foreign relations under Premier Yukio Hatoyama, the

pros-pects for relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and the contributions

the Taiwan Relations Act has done over the past three decades. One paper refutes

Taiwan’s Finlandization and points out a possible historical trend.

Also reviewed are Taiwan’s judicial reform and social policy after the

finan-cial tsunami. Post-Morakot reconstruction and land resources planning are examined,

while the revision of the Referendum Act and strategic planning Taiwan’s bureaucracy

and the performance of the Seventh Legislative Yuan are treated in the Government

section.

A thorough examination of an economic cooperation framework agreement,

which the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations across the

Taiwan Strait are expected to conclude before the end of the first half of 2010, is

pre-sented in the Economy section. The section on Finance features Taiwan’s monetary

and financial polices in the aftermath of the economic crisis, local governance and

fiscal sustainability, an evaluation of the reverse mortgage scheme, and performance

of Taiwan’s transportation system.

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cussed in the Sustainable Development section. The section on Sports, Media and

Culture that follows is highlighted by an analysis of budget allocations for sports

af-fairs in Taiwan, a review of the film and TV industry policy adjustment on both sides

of the strait, and aesthetics of living emphasized in everyday life of the people on the

island.

Taiwan’s sustainable society policy in a new welfare era and long-term care

policy and practice are features of the Social Security section of this new volume of

the annual publication of the National Policy Foundation.

The Foundation hopes its annual report for 2009, which examines and

analyz-es major developments in Taiwan, will shed light on how the country should chart its

course of action in the foreseeable future. Its publication, the seventh effort on the part

of the Foundation, is timely, for Taiwan has just weathered the global financial crisis,

looking forward to a better era of prosperity that may be ushered in by the signing of

the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement with the People’s Republic of

China.

All contributors to Taiwan Development Perspectives 2010, are leading

re-searchers in their respective fields of study. Special thanks are due to CHAN,

Hou-sheng; CHANG, Hung-hao; CHAO, Li-yun; CHAO, Yi; CHAO, Yung-mau;

CHEN, Chao-cheng; CHOU, Yujen; CHU, Hsin-min; CHU, Jui-ting; HAN, Pao-teh;

HSIEH, Ming-jui; HSIEH, Pei-tseng; HSIEH, Yu-cheng; HSU, Chen-min; HUANG, J.

Chao-meng; HUNG, Chien-chao; KAO, Yuang-kuang; KO, Wei-shin; KU, Yeun-wen;

KUNG, Wen-chi; LEE, Cheng-hsiu; LEE, Chien-sing; LEE, Chun-ta; LEE, Lawrence

L.; LEE, Jack Yun-jie; LI, John Chien-chung; LIAO, Chih-feng; LIN, Chu-chia; LING,

Shiang-nung; LIU, Helen Yi-ling; LIU, Kung-chung; LU, Chia-li; SHIH, Kuang-hsun;

SWEI, Duh-ching; TAN, Ching-yu; TSENG, Hui-chin; WANG, Chun-yuan; WANG,

Eric C.; WU, Shiao-chi; WU, Jung-hua; WU, Ming-yen; and research fellows on the

Policy Committees of Local Self-Governance of the National Policy Foundation.

TSAI, Cheng-wen, Ph.D.

President, National Policy Foundation

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Overview

The year of 2009 saw the upcoming of a global economic recovery and a free

trade zone in Asia. Taiwan’s economy is expected to grow by 4.72 percent in 2010, a

year of recovery. Moreover, Taiwan has moved up to twelfth place from seventeenth

in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index 2009-2010. In

particular, Taiwan is eighth highest in the world in the field of innovation. On the

other hand, Taiwan was removed from the Special 301 Watch List of the United

States, and became a signatory to the Government Procurement Agreement of the

World Trade Organization. Relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were

greatly improved. It is essential that Taiwan continues to work harder to embrace the

East Asian and Chinese markets. In addition, the conclusion of an economic

cooperation framework agreement has been placed on the agenda of an upcoming

meeting between the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations

across the Taiwan Strait in the first half of 2010.

Against these backgrounds, this issue of Taiwan Development Perspectives

would provide a comprehensive review of the problems that have arisen in the past

year. Specifically, it reviews several of the most widely discussed topics in the Focus

section. Chao Yung-mau presents an in-depth analysis of the impact of the magistracy

and mayoralty elections of 2009 on Taiwan’s party politics. Hung Chien-chao

discusses the issue of future cross-strait relationship. Lee Cheng-hsiu analyzes the

triangular relationship among Taipei, Washington and Beijing during the first year of

President Barrack Obama’s administration. Liu Kung-chung examines the progress of

the judicial reform in 2009, while Eric C. Wang makes a study on the economic

aspects of a BOT transportation project of Taiwan’s high speed railroad system. These

are followed by an analysis of financial supervisory reform in response to the

financial tsunami by Lawrence L. Lee and a treatise on the post-Morakot

reconstruction and land resources planning by John Chien-chung Li and Lu Chia-li.

Lee Chien-sing makes a feasibility study on promotion of 12-year compulsory

education and Chan Hou-sheng examines Taiwan’s social policy in response to the

financial tsunami.

There are four treatises in the Interior Affairs section. They include a review of

party politics in Taiwan by Chen Chao-cheng, demarcation of administrative districts

by the Policy Committee of Local-Self-Governance of the National Policy

Foundation, sunshine laws and anticorruption by Cu Hsin-min and Hsieh Yu-cheng,

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municipalities and regional governance. Swei Duh-ching examines the amendment of

the Referendum Act. Huang Chao-meng, Wang Chun-yuan and Lee Chun-ta treat

strategic planning in Taiwan’s bureaucracy. Chou Yujen studies the effectiveness of

the Seventh Legislative Yuan.

The National Security and Diplomacy section features Japan’s foreign

relations under Hatoyama – the complicated ties among Tokyo, Beijing and

Washington – by Hung Chien-chao and the prospects for cross-strait relations in 2010

by Helen Yi-ling Liu. Wu Ming-yen assesses the contribution of the Taiwan Relations

Act to peace during the past three decades and Ko Wei-shin reviews the Chinese

language education in overseas Chinese communities.

The Economy section provides a description of the current status of the

Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement by Lin Chu-chia and Tan Ching-yu.

The agreement is scheduled to be signed by the end of June 2010.

Hsu Chen-min and Liao Chih-feng discuss the financial tsunami and monetary

policies in the Finance section. Jack Yun-jie Lee investigates the case of Taiwan’s

local governance and fiscal sustainability. Hsieh Ming-jui and Hsieh Pei-tseng

evaluate the scheme of reverse mortgage. Besides, Shih Kuang-hsun attempts to find

out the performance and reconstruction policy of transportation systems.

Three authors contribute to the two sections that follow. Chang Hung-hao

raises a question of what we can learn from the impacts of the economic crisis on

farm households in Taiwan. Lin Shiang-nung discusses the promotion of cross-strait

agricultural cooperation in the ASEAN and Pan-Pearl River region in the Agriculture

and Fisheries section. In the section of Sustainable Development, Wu Jung-hua

analyzes the energy policy in Taiwan.

The Sports, Media and Culture section includes an analysis of Taiwan’s sports

budget by Chao Li-yun and Tseng Hui-chin. Chao Yi and Chu Jui-ting describe the

film and TV industry policy adjustment on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and Han

Pao-teh discusses aesthetics of living in Taiwan.

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describes the sustainable social policy in a new welfare era and Wu Shiao-chi

analyzes the long-term care policy and practice in Taiwan.

It is hoped that this volume will give readers insights into how Taiwan’s

politics and society evolved in 2009. What happened in Taiwan, an economy that is

among the largest in Asia and a maturing democracy, may have practical implications

for countries around the world.

CHU, Yung-peng

Distinguished Professor of Economics and Director

National Central University

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Impact of Magistracy and Mayoralty Elections on Taiwan’s Politics 1

Impact of Magistracy and Mayoralty Elections

on Taiwan’s Politics

CHAO, Yung-mau

Abstract

Altogether 17 counties and cities across the Republic of China on Taiwan elected their magistrates and mayors in December in 2009. No elections took place in the counties of Taipei, Kaohsiung, Taichung and Tainan and the cities of Taichung and Tainan. As Presi-dent Ma Ying-jeou now doubles as chairman of the Kuomintang, he was responsible for the outcome of the 17 elections. So is his Democratic Progressive Party opposite number, Tsai Ing-wen. The outcome of the elections has an impact on the two major elections in the fu-ture. Eligible voters will go to the polls to elect the mayors of the five special municipali-ties in 2010 and their new president in 2012.

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1. Pre-election Political Map

There are 23 counties and cities in the Republic of China on Taiwan. The two special municipalities of Taipei and Kaohsiung are not included. Sixteen of them were ruled by the Kuomintang. They were Keelung City, Taipei County, Taoyuan County, Yilan County, Hsinchu County, Hsinchu City, Miaoli County in northern Taiwan; Taichung County, Taichung City, Changhua County and Nanto County in central Taiwan; Hualien County and Taitung County on eastern Taiwan; and the two offshore island counties of Penhu and Lienchiang (on Matsu). The offshore island county of Kinmen was under control of the Kuomintang’s ally, the New Party. The Democratic Progressive Party con-trolled six, including Yunlin County, Chiayi County, Tainan County, Tainan City, Kaohsiung County and Pingtung County. Most of the cities and counties ruled by the opposition party are located in southern Taiwan.

Before 2004, southern Taiwan was painted “green” and northern Taiwan “blue” in the political map. Green is the party color of the opposition and blue that of the ruling Kuomintang and its ally. However, the magistracy and mayoralty elections of 2005 and subse-quent legislative and presidential elections of 2008 changed the “Blue North/Green South” political land-scape. The Kuomintang made inroads into the South by crossing the Dado River, which separates the counties of Taichung and Changhua. The Chuoshui River, which separates the counties of Changhua and Yunlin, became

the new line of division.

A survey conducted by Global Views in June of 2009 gave 13 magistrates and mayors high approval ratings. Nine of them hold Kuomintang membership. They included Lin Chen-tse (Hsinchu City), Eric Chu (Taoyuan County), Jason Hu (Taichung City), Liu Chen-hung (Miaoli County), Cheng Yung-ching (Hsin-chu County), Huang Min-hui (Chiayi City), Chuo Po-yuan (Changhua County), Wang Chien-fah (Penghu County), and Chen Hsieh-shen (Lienchiang County). The remaining four were local chief executives of the Democratic Progressive Party. They were Yang Chiu-hsing (Kaohsiung County), Chen Ming-wen (Chiayi County), Hsu Tien-Tsai (Tainan City), and Tsao Chi-hung (Pingtung County). Five of the 13 mayors and magistrates had yet to complete their first term. The remaining eight were completing two terms and were forbidden to seek a third term. Both the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party had to field new nominees for the eight offices in the 2009 elections. (See Chart 1.)

There were two magistrates who were given poor approval ratings. Both of them, Kuang Li-jen (Taitung County) and Chou His-wei (Taipei County), are both members of the Kuomintang. Since Taipei County will be made a special municipality under direct control of the Executive Yuan, the Kuomintang did not have to name a candidate for the 2009 election.

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Chart 1: Political Map before Mayoralty and Magistracy Elections in 2009

Legend: The magistrate of Taitung County, Wu Jun-Lih, was suspended from duties because of corruption. A by-election was held on Apr. 1st, 2006, and then Kuang Li-Jen nominated by the KMT was elected. The magistrate of Lienchiang County, Chen Hsueh-sheng was a People First Party member. He joined the KMT later. So the number in the above chart has been slightly modified: the KMT controls 16; the PFP controls none; there is no independent; and the DPP and the New Party retain one each.

Sources：Unted Daily News Web http://issue.udn.com/2005vote/sta/vphoto12.htm Reference Date：Dec. 15th, 2009

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Table 1: County Magistrates and City Mayors in 2005

Where Name Party Membership Status

Keelung City Chang

Tung-Rong KMT To be reelected.

Taipei County Chou Hsi-wei KMT To be reelected.

To be made a special municipality in 2010. Yilan County Lu Kuo-hua KMT To be Reelected

Taoyuan County Eric Chu KMT Two consecutive terms Hsinchu County Cheng

Yun-ching KMT Two consecutive terms

Hsinchu City Lin Cheng-tse KMT Two consecutive terms Miaoli County Liu Cheng-hung KMT To be reelected. Taichung County Huang

Chung-shen KMT

Two consecutive terms

To be merged to make a special municipality in 2010. Taichung City Jason Hu KMT Two consecutive terms

To be merged to make a special municipality in 2010 Changhwa

Coun-ty Chuo Po-yan KMT To be reelected

Nanto County Lee Chao-ching KMT To be reelected. Yunlin County Su Chih-fen DPP To be reelected. Chiayi County Chen Ming-wen DPP Two consecutive terms

Chiayi City Huang Min-hui KMT To be reelected. Tainan County Su Huen-chih DPP Two consecutive terms

To be merged to make a special municipality in 2010 Tainan City Hsu Tien-tsai DPP

Two consecutive terms

To be merged to make a secial mupromoted to be a city of direct jurisdiction by Central Government, another election will be held in 2010

Kaohsiung Coun-ty

Yang

Chiou-Hsin DPP

Two consecutive terms Will be promoted to be a city of direct jurisdiction by Central Government, another elec-tion will be held in 2010

Pingdong County Tsao Chi-Hung DPP Renew his term of office。（Sure to be nominated） Hualien County Hsieh

Sheng-Shan KMT Two consecutive terms。 Taidong County Kuang Li-Jen KMT Failed in the primary election

Penhu County Wang Chien-Fah KMT Renew his term of office（sure to be nominated） Jingmen County Lee Ju-Fung NP Two consecutive terms

Lienchiang

County Chen Xue-Shen KMT

Two consecutive terms（The original party membership is PFP）

Annotations: For Taipei County, Taichung County, Taichung City, Tainan City, Tainan County, and Kaohsiung County, since the application of city promotion has been approved by Executive Yuan, the country ma-gistrate and city mayoral elections will be suspended and another election will be held in 2010, along with the city mayoral election in those cities of direct jurisdiction by Central Government.

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2. Outcome of the Magistracy and

Mayo-ralty Elections in 2009

Eligible voters in the Republic of China on Taiwan went to the polls on December 5, 2009 to elect 17 ma-gistrates and mayors. The Kuomintang won 12 counties and cities and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party four. One independent was elected. There was little change on the political landscape. Numerically, the Kuomintang won. But the opposition party won the key county of Yilan, ousting the incumbent Kuomin-tang magistrate running for reelection. In other words, the two major parties fought to a “tie.”

Turnout was low. It was only63.34 percent, down by 2.88 percent from the previous magistracy and mayoralty elections in 2005. The rate was particularly low in the counties and cities that are the power bases

of the Kuomintang and its two allies, the People First Party and the New Party.

Voters turned out in numbers lower than the aver-age in Keelung City, Taoyuan County, Changhua County, Yunlin County, Chiayi City, Penghu County, and Kinmen County. (See Table 2.) The opposition party won Yunlin, but the Kuomintang retained the re-maining six. All six Kuomintang candidates won the elections by a margin smaller than in 2005. The margin was 181,014 votes in Taoyuan County in 2005 and only 49,559 in 2009. In the county of Changhua, it was 99,841 in 2005 and 71,444; in Penghu, 12,664 and 595; and in Chiayi City, 12,664 and 8,694. Apparently, more Kuomintang supporters stayed away from the polls.

Table 2: Turnout of Voters in the Magistracy and Mayoralty Elections in 2009

Areas Population Eligible voters Votes Turnout in 2009 Turnout in 2005 Change

Total 9346529 7051039 4466403 63.34% 66.22% -2.88% Taiwan Province 9244037 6970833 4421831 63.43% 66.23% -2.80% Yilan County 461345 351858 248706 70.68% 70.25% 0.43% Taoyuan County 1974758 1437190 772180 53.73% 61.77% -8.04% Hsinchu County 509453 369480 256770 69.49% 71.12% -1.63% Miaoli County 561315 425837 290780 68.28% 69.45% -1.17% Changhua County 1311971 991741 650169 65.56% 71.16% -5.60% Nanto County 530769 408006 276424 67.75% 70.48% -2.73% Yunlin County 722831 560207 361941 64.61% 69.73% -5.12% Chiayi County 547267 428673 322764 75.29% 71.64% 3.65% Pingdung County 882575 682475 464677 68.09% 70.68% -2.59% Taitung County 232290 178139 110226 61.88% 60.51% 1.37% Hualien County 340910 261214 155357 59.47% 61.6% -2.13% Penghu County 95751 75033 47516 63.33% 72.16% -8.83% Keelung City 388542 299960 159092 53.04% 64.05% -11.01% Hsinchu City 410399 298439 169588 56.83% 59.6% -2.77% Chiayi City 273861 202581 135641 66.96% 70.77% -3.81% Fujian Province 102492 80206 44572 55.57% 62.54% -6.97% Kingmen County 92602 72509 39011 53.8% 62.78% -8.98% Lienchiang County 9890 7697 5561 72.25% 60.99% 11.26%

Sources: Central Election Commission http://210.69.23.140/cec/cechead.asp/ Date: Dec. 15, 2009

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A total of 47.88 percent of the votes were cast for the Kuomintang in the 2009 magistracy and mayoralty elections, against 45.32 percent for the opposition party. The gap narrowed. In the county of Yunlin, for instance, the opposition candidate outpolled her Kuomintang

rival by 108,126 votes in 2009, up by 58,567 from the 49,559 in 2005. In Pingtung, the Kuomintang candidate was outpolled by 20,272 in 2005 and 85,018 in 2009. In the county of Yilan, the incumbent Kuomintang ma-gistrate was outpolled by 20,925 votes. (See Table 3.)

Table 3: Voter Support in the 2009 Magistracy and Mayoralty Elections

Areas KMT DPP Difference in votes won Difference in voter support rate (%) Votes won Voter sup-port rate (%) Votes won Voter sup-port rate (%) Total 2094518 47.8754 1982914 45.3245 111604 2.55﹪ Taiwan Province 2074845 47.9050 1982914 45.7824 91931 2.12﹪ Yilan County 112469 45.7446 133394 54.2554 -20925 -8.51﹪ Taoyuan County 396237 52.2243 346678 45.6924 49559 6.53﹪ Hsinchu County 97151 38.4872 77126 30.5541 20025 7.93﹪ Miaoli County 181256 63.7915 95469 33.5995 85787 30.19﹪ Changhua County 348341 54.8880 276897 43.6306 71444 11.26﹪ Nanto County 136951 50.8701 107023 39.7534 29928 11.12﹪ Yunlin County 121832 34.6320 229958 65.3680 -108126 -30.74﹪ Chiayi County 128973 40.6682 177333 55.9172 -48360 -15.25﹪ Pingtung County 185384 40.6735 270402 59.3265 -85018 -18.65﹪ Taitung County 56354 52.5906 50802 47.4094 5552 5.18﹪ Hualien County 38603 25.4419 －－－－ Penghu County 22664 49.3662 22069 48.0701 595 1.30﹪ Keelung City 86001 55.1059 65673 42.0805 20328 13.03﹪ Hsinchu City 92667 55.6348 68822 41.3189 23845 14.32﹪ Chiayi City 69962 52.1984 61268 45.7118 8694 6.49﹪ Kinmen County 19673 44.9545 －－－－ Lienchiang County 14269 37.2753 －－－－ Yilan County 5404 98.5772 －－－－

Note：Differences are arrived at by deducting the numbers of votes won and voter support rates of the Democratic Progressive Party from those of the Kuomintang. The former’s gains are preceded by the minus sign. Sources: Central Election Commission http://210.69.23.140/cec/cechead.asp/

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Table 4: Comparison of Voter Supports in 2005 and 2009

Unit: (%)

Areas Pan Blue Pan Green

2005 2009 +/- 2005 2009 +/1 Yilan County 51.39 45.74 －11.93 47.75 54.26 6.51 Taoyuan County 60.84 52.22 －8.62 38.32 45.69 7.37 Hsinchu County 67.09 38.49 －28.60 32.91 30.55 －2.36 Miaoli County 47.91 63.79 15.88 29.86 33.60 3.74 Changhua County 55.46 54.89 －0.57 40.52 43.63 3.11 Nanto County 45.32 50.87 5.55 30.33 39.75 9.42 Yunlin County 44.48 34.63 －9.85 53.37 65.37 12.00 Chiayi County 37.31 40.67 3.36 62.69 55.92 －6.77 Pingdon County 41.86 40.67 －1.19 46.19 59.33 13.14 Taidong County 0.00 52.59 52.59 0.00 47.41 47.41 Hualien County 67.25 25.44 41.81 19.86 0.00 －19.86 Penghu County 50.69 49.37 －1.32 48.16 48.07 －0.09 Keelung City 67.04 55.11 11.93 32.96 42.08 9.12 Hsinchu City 69.27 55.63 13.64 30.73 41.32 10.59 Chiayi City 54.63 52.20 －2.43 45.37 45.71 0.34 Kinmen County 54.28 37.28 －17.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Lienchiang County 52.90 98.58 45.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 Notes：

1. Changes are arrived at by deducting the voter supports for the Kuomintang and the Democratic in 2005 from those in 2009.

2. Pan Blue comprises the Kuomintang and the People First Party. Pan Green comprises the Democratic Progressive Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union.

Sources: Central Election Commission

http://mag.udn.com/mag/vote2009/storypage.jsp?f_MAIN_ID=431&f_SUB_ID=4401&f_ART_ID=224989 http://210.69.23.140/cec/cechead.asp/

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Chart 2: Political Map in 2009.

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3. Impact on the Kuomintang

President Ma Ying-jeou doubled as chairman of the Kuomintang in October 2009. He was responsible for the party’s win or loss in the December 5 magistra-cy and mayoralty elections. He campaigned vigorously for Kuomintang candidates in such counties as Yilan, Hsinchu, Chiayi and Pingtung. The vigorous cam-paigning did not bring about expected results.

The president did not rally Kuomintang supporters behind its candidates. But those who supported the Kuomintang in 2005 did not vote for Democratic Pro-gressive Party candidates. One reason for the low sup-port for the Kuomintang is that many voters did not return to their registered places of abode to vote. (No absentee vote is allowed.) Another is that many sup-porters thought Kuomintang candidates would win and stayed away from the polls. Still another is that suppor-ters were dissatisfied with the performance of the Ku-omintang administration. Last but not least, a few local factions of the party did not support its nominees.

President Ma insists that his party keep its clean image. He persisted, even if his insistence would split the party. One example suffices. The Kuomintang re-fused to nominate Fu Kun-chi, a lawmaker convicted of insider trading who was a local faction leader in Hua-lien County. Fu bolted the Kuomintang to run for magi-strate of Hualien as an independent and won. The loss in Hualien, however, is expected to have a favorable impact on his party reform.

The Kuomintang administration failed to produce a good track record in one and a half years after the party came to power. The financial tsunami hit the world three months after President Ma was inaugurated. The administration had a hard time coping with the swine flu pandemic, American beef imports and the rescue and relief in the aftermath of Taiwan’s worst flood disaster in history triggered by Typhoon Morakot on August 8, 2009. The lackluster performance of the government caused Kuomintang supporters and sway voters to stay away the polls.

4. Impact on the Democratic Progressive

Party

The voter support for the Kuomintang fell from the unprecedented height at the time of the legislative and presidential elections of 2008 to a new low toward the end of 2009. That means the Democratic Progres-sive Party was clawing back to power. It consolidated its power base in the counties of Yunlin, Chiayi, and Pingtung in addition to regaining control of Yilan County. Tsai Ing-wen strengthened her leadership as chairperson of the opposition party.

On the other hand, the opposition party is emerg-ing out of the shadow of former President Chen Shui-bian, who has been convicted of forgery, corrup-tion and graft, and money laundering.

Tsai owes her stronger leadership position to the powerful support of the party’s largest New Tide fac-tion. The faction will be more powerful after the 2009 elections – so much so that other factions, that of for-mer Premier Frank Hsieh in particular, will be margina-lized. Hsieh, who ran unsuccessfully for president in 2008, will have no chance to bear the party’s standard in 2012. Tsai has increased the odds for a try at chal-lenging President Ma, who will seek a second term.

The party’s success in regaining the control of Yi-lan greatly boosted its morale. Political activists call Yilan Taiwan’s holy land of democracy. The strong power base of the party, the county was under its unin-terrupted rule for 24 years before Lu Guo-hua of the Kuomintang was elected magistrate in 2005. Despite President Ma’s vigorous campaigning for its incumbent magistrate, Lin Tsung-hsien was elected for the opposi-tion party’s comeback to power in the county to signal its political ascendancy.

The opposition party also further consolidated its power base in southern Taiwan. Its candidates in the three counties of Yunlin, Chiayi and Pingtung farther outdistanced their Kuomintang rivals in 2009 than in 2005. If the domino effect endures, the party will win

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the mayoralty elections in the two special municipali-ties of Kaohsiung and Tainan towards the end of 2010.

5. Impact on Taiwan Politics

The magistracy and mayoralty elections of 2009 were considered a warm-up for the 2012 presidential race. The outcome did not favor either of the two major political parties in the presidential election. But it con-firmed and perhaps accentuated the “Blue North/Green South” political landscape in Taiwan.

The Kuomintang tried in vain to take over control of a number of southern Taiwan counties, including Chiayi and Pingtung. The Democratic Progressive Party failed to win the counties of Nantou and Taitung. As the political map remains almost unchanged, the Kuomin-tang is expected to win the three special municipalities of Taipei, New North City and Taichung in northern and central Taiwan, while the opposition party will re-tain the other two special municipalities of Kaohsiung and Tainan in the south in the 2010 elections.

The morale of the opposition party has been so greatly boosted that it will more vehemently challenge the Kuomintang administration by resorting to the checks-and-balances function of its small but strongly determined minority in the Legislative Yuan, where the ruling party controls a two-thirds majority. In particular, the minority in the legislature will strongly oppose any government policies to further improve relations be-tween the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

President Ma’s party reform suffered a setback in the 2009 elections owing mainly to the tongue-in-cheek support of discontented local factions. The president, who doubles as Kuomintang chairman, is determined to carry on the reform. The success of the reform affects his chance of reelection as president in 2012. If success comes in less than two years, he will be reelected with little difficulty.

The Kuomintang won 12 counties and cities by preventing a split in the party that would seriously di-lute its voter support. It lost the county of Hualien,

thanks to the full support of its local faction for Fu Kun-chi who bolted the party to run for magistrate as an independent. Both the Kuomintang and the opposi-tion party have to prevent a split in order to win the mayoralty elections in the five special municipalities towards the end of 2010. In addition, they must field candidates with a very clean image.

6. Conclusion

The magistracy and mayoralty elections of 2009 are variously labeled as a warm-up for the presidential election in 2012, a mid-term examination for President Ma Ying-jeou, a qualifying test for Democratic Pro-gressive Party chairperson Tsai Ying-wen, and a duel between two DPP presidential hopefuls. The outcome did not clearly indicate which of the two parties may win the presidential race. Taiwan’s political map re-mains little changed, although the opposition party has finally emerged out of the shadow of former President Chen Shui-bian and narrowed the gap with the Kuo-mintang in voter support. The KuoKuo-mintang will be do-minant in north and central Taiwan, likely to win the three special municipalities of Taipei, New North City and Taichung when voters go to the polls towards the end of 2010. Similarly, the opposition party will retain control of the two special municipalities of Kaohsiung and Tainan in the south. However, both Kaohsiung and Tainan may be taken back to the Kuomintang’s fold, if the administration improves its track record and the ruling party fields clean and unanimously supported candidates.

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Taiwan Is No Finland 11

Taiwan Is No Finland

Chinese Reunification Is a Historical Inevitability

HUNG, Chien-chao

Abstract

Finlandization is the influence that one powerful country may have on the policies of a smaller neighboring country. Taipei’s rejection of entry visa applications by Uighur inde-pendence leader Rebiya Kadeer and President Ma Ying-jeou’s refusal to meet the Dalai Lama are cited by Portland State University Professor Bruce Gilley as examples showing Taiwan is being Finlandized. In an article published in a February 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs, Professor Gilley also writes Taiwan’s Finlandization is in the interest of the United States.

The truth is that Taiwan is no Finland. It may be in a dire situation like Finland dur-ing the Cold War era. But the People’s Republic China is incapable of invaddur-ing Taiwan just as the Soviets did by rolling their tanks to occupy Helsinki. Taiwan is not helpless like Fin-land, either. The United States is duty-bound to arm and equip Taiwan’s defense force to safeguard its security.

On the other hand, the People’s Republic is not ready to take over Taiwan by force. In fact, what Beijing wants is a peaceful unification. And Chinese reunification is a histori-cal inevitability.

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Taiwan was separated from China at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Chiang Kai-shek lost the war and moved his Kuomintang government from Nanjing to Taipei, raising the status of Taiwan from province to that of sovereign state in the process. Mao Zedong wished to unleash his People’s Liberation Ar-my to wash Taiwan with blood but his attempt to take the island province back to China’s communist fold was effectively thwarted by the outbreak of the Korean War in May 1950. President Harry S. Truman, who had written off the Republic of China as a bad bargain and all but invited Mao’s People’s Republic of China to take over the island by force, made an about-face de-marche, proclaiming the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait which was enforced by the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Taiwan has since remained an independent, sovereign state, albeit it is so recognized by 23 countries, all of them small and inconsequential.

There were armed clashes between Taiwan and China after Chiang had set up his rule over the island, the Pescadores and the two small archipelagos of moy and Matsu. A small Chinese army invaded Que-moy on October 25, 1949. The invasion was repulsed. On September 3, 1954 China’s shore batteries started bombarding Quemoy and Matsu. It was a prelude to the Quemoy crisis triggered by an artillery duel that began on August 23, 1958. Two members of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group were killed along with hundreds of Chiang’s officers and men and civilians in the armed conflict that lasted until December 15. Dur-ing what is commonly known as the Battles of the Tai-wan Strait, the air forces and navies of the two bellige-rents also saw action, with Taiwan winning in all air and sea encounters. A truce has since been in place, save a brief hostile confrontation when Chiang ordered an assault on a small Chinese-held island to ascertain chances of his foolhardily ambitious counterattack to restore Kuomintang rule over China. He had to give up his dream of recovering the China he lost after the as-sault had ended in a fiasco.

Relations between Taiwan and China remained

hostile for five decades after these armed encounters, with both sides beefing up their military force. The United States provided Taiwan with military assistance under a mutual defense treaty of 1954. Assistance was given in the form of transfer of weapons and equipment needed for defense of Taiwan, the Pescadores, Quemoy and Matsu, to which the United States was committed. The balance of military power across the strait began to tip in China’s favor after President Jimmy Carter cut off diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979. The mutual de-fense treaty was abrogated, though the Taiwan Rela-tions Act, forced on the Carter administration by the U.S. Congress, requires American sales of “such de-fense articles and dede-fense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a suffi-cient self-defense capability.” That stand was mod-erated later with a communiqué U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig ushered in on August 17, 1982. It promises a termination of American arms sales to Tai-wan. Despite the promises, the United States has con-tinued to sell defensive weapons and equipment, in-cluding missiles, fighter-interceptors and destroyers.

When China started test-firing surface-to-surface missiles in waters close to major seaports in Taiwan and followed it up with a series of war games to intimidate the electorate ready to vote in President Lee Teng-hui in 1996, President Bill Clinton, concerned about the Chi-nese military threat, sent two aircraft carrier groups to show American support. It was not exactly a military confrontation between the United States and the People’s Republic, but Beijing backed off. Lee was reelected, garnering 54 percent of the vote.

Lee tried to end hostile relations between Taiwan and China. He terminated Taiwan’s state of emergency on May 1, 1991, formally disowning Chiang’s claim to represent China, which had been under the control of the “hitherto rebel” communist regime since 1949. It was an unequivocal recognition of the People’s Repub-lic as a separate, independent sovereign state. A consti-tutional amendment limits the area under control of the Republic of China to Taiwan, the Pescadores, the

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off-Taiwan Is No Finland 13

shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and a few islets in the Pacific and the South China Sea. A National cation Council was set up in 1990. The National Unifi-cation Guidelines were adopted in 1991 as the highest directives governing Taiwan’s policy vis-à-vis Beijing, the ultimate goal being to create a democratic, free, and equitably prosperous China. A consensus between Tai-wan and China was reached in 1992 under which they both acknowledge there is but one China, whose con-notations can be orally and individually expressed. The consensus of 1992 paved the way for a brief détente across the strait.

The détente came to an abrupt end after Lee was succeeded by President Chen Shui-bian in 2000. He had the National Unification Council “cease to func-tion” and the National Unification Guidelines “cease to apply” in defiance of the American warning against his going back on the pledges he made on inauguration. He refused to accept the consensus of 1992. Nor did he try to resume the dialogue between Taipei and Beijing disrupted towards the end of 1999 after Lee proclaimed his doctrine of “special state to state relationship” be-tween Taiwan and China. Chen continued to pursue his policy of “creeping independence” for Taiwan and his brinksmanship provoked China into adopting an an-ti-secession law codifying an automatic invasion of the island. China also deployed an increasingly large num-ber of cruise missiles all targeting Taiwan, which it vows to take back to its fold by force, if necessary. The strait was turned into a flashpoint of the world.

Tensions eased between Taiwan and China after Ma Ying-jeou took over from President Chen in 2008. Direct flights across the strait were resumed almost six decades after Taiwan and China had been separated. So did direct maritime shipping. Chinese tourists were allowed to visit Taiwan. A dozen agreements were signed to further improve cross-strait relations. Ma also had a diplomatic truce set in place, whereby Taiwan and China stopped competing against each other for diplo-matic allies. A new détente began.

Ma has to make political compromises to continue

the détente. He denied Uighur independence leader Rebiya Kadeer her entry to Taiwan to attend the show-ing of a documentary of her life at a Kaohsiung film festival. He muted criticism of Beijing in comments he made on the Tiananmen Square massacre on its twen-tieth anniversary. He refused to meet China’s democra-cy activists he had met before his election as president. He is trying to sign an economic cooperation frame-work agreement with China, which is opposed by the Democratic Progressive Party as a sellout of Taiwan. All this has bred the suspicion that Ma is Finlandizing Taiwan.

Finlandization of Taiwan?

Finlandization is the influence that one powerful country may have on the policies of a smaller neigh-boring country. It is generally considered to be pejora-tive, originating in West German political debate of the late 1960s and 1970s. As the term was used in Germany and other NATO countries, it meant the process of turning into a country which, although maintaining na-tional sovereignty, in foreign policies resolves not to challenge a more power neighbor.

According to Professor Bruce Gilley at Portland State University’s Mark O. Hatfield School of Gov-ernment and the author of The Right to Rule: How

States Win and Lose Legitimacy,” the term that derives

its name from Finland’s 1948 agreement with the So-viet Union under which Helsinki agreed not to join al-liances challenging Moscow or serve as a base for any country challenging Soviet interests. In return, the Kremlin agreed to uphold Finnish autonomy and re-spect Finland’s democratic system. Therefore, from 1956 to 1981, under the leadership of Urho Kekkonen, Finland pursued a policy of strategic appeasement and neutrality on U.S.-Soviet issues and limited domestic criticism of the Soviet Union. Gilley also cited Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen’s “adaptive politics” to discriminate the Finnish regime and a client, or “puppet,” state. Unlike a puppet regime, a Finlandized state calculates that its long-term interests are best served by making strategic concessions to a superpower

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next door. These concessions are motivated chiefly by geographic proximity, psychological threats from the superpower, and cultural affinities between the two sides. Being so close, the superpower needs only to issue vague threats, rather than display actual military muscle, to change its weaker neighbor’s policies, while the small power perceives itself as engaging in an “ac-tive and principled neutrality,” rather than a cowering acquiescence, a distinction that is critical to rationaliz-ing these policy changes domestically. Gilley concludes that Finlandization will take Taiwan out of the strategic orbit of the United States and recommends that Wash-ington confront and adapt to this historic change.

Taiwan today is in dire straits like Finland in the Cold War era. It has a giant neighbor who is fast be-coming a superpower of the world, though not on a par with the Soviet Union Helsinki had to deal with. That emerging superpower, the People’s Republic of China, is a belligerent neighbor who has never renounced the use of force of arms to recover what is referred to as the “renegade province.” Taiwan, ceded to Japan in 1895, was restored to China as a province at the end of the Second World War in 1945. Beijing claims it as the province that strayed away from its fold with Chiang Kai-shek at its head at the end of 1949. Taiwan is ostra-cized internationally. Only a little more than a score of the countries of the world maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It was ousted by the United Nations in 1971. No representation in any U.N. organizations is possible. Participation in international activities is possible only under the almost unintelligible name of “Chinese Taipei.” Yet Taiwan has to rely ever more heavily on China for trade and economic growth, par-ticularly during the worldwide crisis touched off by the U.S. financial meltdown. Taiwan needs American sup-port to defend itself against a possible invasion from across the strait and to obtain a Lebensraum in the world community. But a new nationalism nursed by a long separation from China has made the people of Taiwan intolerant of their country being treated like an American client state, as evidenced by the beef war across the Pacific. A Protocol of Bovine Spongiform

Encephalopathy-Related Measures for the Importation of Beef and Beef Products for Human Consumption from the Territory of the Authorities Represented by the American Institute in Taiwan was signed between Tai-wan and the United States on October 22, 2009. The United States, according to the protocol, wants to ex-port to Taiwan American beef and beef products that may cause mad cow disease by a one-in-billions chance. The people of Taiwan believe their government has been bullied into concluding an unequal agreement. An irate Legislative Yuan amended a food sanitation act to effectively ban ground beef and offal imports. Angered, though mistakenly, that their country is treated as a ba-nana republic, the people are calling for a referendum to revoke the agreement signed in good faith and de-mand a renegotiation, making Taiwan an irresponsible trading partner and member of the international com-munity. Moreover, the unsavory incident is likely to hamper Taiwan’s efforts to sign free trade arrangements with its trading partners, including not just the United States but all members of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) that created, together with China, a large free trade zone in Asia. Japan and South Korea are expected to join the ASEAN-plus-One in a year or so. Taiwan is excluded from the emerging colossal trade bloc. If barred, Taiwan will be economically mar-ginalized. Its economic survival will be threatened.

A parallel drawn between Taiwan and Finland goes no farther. Geographically, Taiwan is not as close to China as Finland is to Russia. There is a strait at least 100 miles wide that separates the island and the main-land of China. Soviet tanks could easily run over Hel-sinki, while it takes an amphibious operation on the scale of Operation Overlord General Dwight D. Eisen-hower commanded to defeat Nazi Germany. The People’s Liberation Army is still incapable of mounting such a large-scale attack on Taiwan. It may resort to a decapitation assault, coupled with the landing of a fast deployment force, but the people determined to defend their democratic homeland will not surrender, even without American help, militarily or morally. The fact is that Taiwan has a credible defense force which is

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well armed and equipped by the Americans to deter a Chinese military venture. Simply put, Taiwan is not afraid of an invasion from a distant China just as Fin-land feared in confrontation with its much closer neighbor Soviet Union.

The fear of invasion from Russia compelled Fin-land to sign an Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in April 1948. Finland started Finlandization by pledging to resist armed attacks by “Germany or its allies” against Finland, or against the Soviet Union through Finland, and, if necessary, ask for Soviet military aid to do so. At the same time, Finland pledged to adopt a policy of neutrality during the Cold War. As a result, it did not participate in the Marshall Plan, and took neutral posi-tions on Soviet overseas initiatives. By keeping very cool relations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to Western military powers in general, Finland could fend off Soviet preludes for affiliation to the Warsaw Pact. Finlandization, in short, was to keep the Soviets at an arm’s length. As far as perceptions of the policy within Finland go, Finlandization has been explained as the art of bowing to the East without mooning the West.

In the later years of the Cold War, the Soviets forced the Finnish editors of mass media to exercise self-control and self-censorship and adopt a pro-Soviet attitude. Most of the elite of media and politics shifted their attitudes to match the values that the Soviets were thought to favor and approve, developing into a self-imposed Finlandization that often is argued to have exceeded Soviet expectations. Government functiona-ries, politicians and journalists accepted the practice that, if they cared about their careers, they did not talk about injustices such as Soviet political repressions. On the other hand, Finlandization led to many human rights violations in Finland. Freedom of speech was limited. Public libraries removed books deemed an-ti-Soviet, while bookstores were given a list of cen-sored publications. Anti-Russian movies were banned. Finnish authorities denied political asylum to Russian

dissidents. All these Finnish servilities took place for Finland was without any credible assistance from the West to resist the Soviet Union.

Taiwan Is Different

No similar human rights violations have ever been committed in Taiwan over the past six decades. Viola-tions occurred from time to time in Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek, who afraid of Chinese communist infiltration, tried to have political dissidence stamped out during what has come to be known as “white ter-ror.” His successors continued by and large the same policy. President Chen Shui-bian was even hostile. President Ma Ying-jeou, the Hong Kong-born son of a Kuomintang apparatchik, is cautious not to provoke China by refusing to criticize the People’s Republic. But he is not obsequiously Finlandizing Taiwan.

Paradoxically, Chiang’s hostility against Beijing helped foster Taiwan’s independence movement, re-sumed following the bloody February 28 Incident of the 1947 and his subsequent land reform, which laid the foundation for Taiwan’s economic takeoff but wiped out the island’s small landlord middle class. Moreover, Chiang offered fantastic rewards in pure gold for any defector who was dissatisfied with Mao Zedong’s communist rule over China. Dozens of them, including a few diplomats, got asylum.

Taiwan fears no invasion from China. Unlike Fin-land, which was invaded by the Russians, Taiwan is not without help. Aside from the United States, which sup-plies the needed armaments, Japan is ready to help Taiwan, though not militarily in the strictest sense of that word, because the friendly island state makes its lifeline sea lanes safe and is one of its top trading part-ners. Besides, its pride as Taiwan’s former colonial master and the camaraderie with the island’s older gen-eration who went through World War II as Japanese subjects oblige Japan to extend a helping hand to its former colony in need. That is the relationship Japan does not have with its other colony Korea, a kingdom before it was annexed by the land of the rising sun in

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1915. The beef war across the Pacific did not stop the United States from continuing to sell Black Hawk heli-copters and Patriot III ground-to-air missiles to Taiwan despite Beijing’s strong opposition. There is no need whatsoever for Taiwan to be as obsequious to China as a helpless Finland was to the mighty Soviet Union.

One fundamental difference stands out between Taiwan and Finland. Finnish is a Finno-Ugaric lan-guage, not Slavic. Finns, who account for more than 90 percent of Finland’s population, are not Slavs like Rus-sians, whereas almost all the residents on Taiwan save a few Austronesian minorities are ethnically and cultu-rally Chinese, like most of the 1.3 billion people in China. They are the Han of the Chinese nation the First Emperor of the Qin Dynasty unified as an empire in 221 B.C. The Han Chinese are a very cohesive nation in China that has been an empire for more than 22 cen-turies. An empire is an extended territory usually com-prising a group of nations, states, or peoples under the control or domination of a single sovereign power. The territory of the Chinese empire has expanded or shrun-ken, while the Han Chinese witnessed their house di-vided against itself from time to time. But history tells us they were always united again in the end. They might be dominated by non-Han rulers like the Mon-gols and the Manchu but managed to overthrow them, and in most cases, assimilated their former masters.

Deng Xiaoping, the supreme leader who started the People’s Republic on its rise as an economic power, promised “no Chinese would fight Chinese” as the guiding principle for settling the question of Taiwan. The Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe it, the reason being the Han Chinese are against fratri-cidal war. Of course, countless wars occurred in which Chinese killed Chinese, but those were wars between the rebels and their rulers. Chiang Kai-shek vowed to fight the communist Chinese rebels to regain the main-land of China he lost. He issued a general mobilization decree to suppress the rebellion of Mao Zedong and his communist followers. President Lee Teng-hui ended Chiang’s Period of National Mobilization for

Suppres-sion of Communist Rebellion in 1991, giving up offi-cially and formally Taiwan’s claim to represent the whole of China to extend an olive branch to Beijing.

As tensions mounted across the strait while Presi-dent Chen Shui-bian continued his brinksmanship Chi-na policy, Beijing adopted an anti-secession law in 2005, codifying an automatic invasion of the island if Taipei declares independence or takes moves toward de jure independence. The threatening legislation, however, is carefully couched on iffy conditions that the Chinese on Taiwan would turn rebels or would-be rebels. So long as they are no rebels, the Chinese on the mainland are not going to fight their brethren on the island of Taiwan. That is why almost all the people on Taiwan, including hardcore independence activists, believe the People’s Liberation Army would not launch an all-out attack across the strait. That belief, as a matter of fact, had encouraged President Chen to keep on playing his China-baiting game.

Koxinga ousted the Dutch from Taiwan to claim the island for China in 1662. Like Chiang Kai-shek, the loyal Ming general wanted to recover the mainland for his Han Chinese emperor. His son, Zheng Jing, launched a counterattack on the mainland under Man-chu rule in 1674 and had to withdraw his expeditionary army six years later. Zheng Jing’s son surrendered Tai-wan to China in 1682. The war between China and Taiwan was fought by Chinese against Chinese. Those on the mainland sided with the Manchu to crush the rebel Chinese on the island. The rebels on Taiwan were an extremely proud lot. They took pride in representing traditional Han China. They did not have the slightest doubt that they were perpetuators of Chi-nas heritage and held defectors to the Manchu in utmost contempt. They believed what they were doing was in keeping with China’s Confucian tradition. These figh-ters had almost all died out by the time Taiwan was surrendered. A new generation of Han Chinese, born and brought up on the mainland under Manchu Qing rule, came to accept the Kangxi emperor of the Manchu Qing dynasty as their son of heaven. While Taiwan was

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being Sinicized, another form of Sinicization or rather the Chinese legitimation of alien Manchu rule was completed on the mainland. Kangxi annexed Taiwan in 1683 as part of China where his Manchu subjects would be totally assimilated by the Han Chinese in the following two centuries.

Unification

Taiwan, unified with China in 1683, was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. Taiwan declared independence on May 23, 1895. Two days later, Tang Jingsong was inaugurated as president of Asia’s first republic that proclaimed “eternal alle-giance” to the Great Qing Empire. A brief war of inde-pendence was fought against Japan before the Japanese could establish full control over Taiwan.

There were at least two armed uprisings on Taiwan during the 50 years of Japanese colonial rule, both aimed at reunification with China. One was led by Lo Fuxing, who joined the Tungmenhui or United League founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The United League was renamed the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party that top-pled the Manchu dynasty in the 1911 Chinese Revolu-tion. Lo’s revolution in Taiwan was unsuccessful. A total of 535 revolutionaries were arrested, including Lo himself who was executed. The other was master-minded by a former policeman, who proclaimed a Great Ming Charity State in June 1915. Yu Qingfang, the leader, was a frequent visitor to China and was inspired by the Kuomintang’s revolution to restore Han Chinese Ming rule on Taiwan. Altogether 1,957 revolutionaries were tried for sedition, 866 of them sentenced to death.

The Taiwan Communist Party, inaugurated in Shanghai in 1928, had a platform advocating indepen-dence. The Chinese Communist Party fully endorsed Taiwan’s independence from Japan, while the Kuomin-tang helped form a Taiwan youth league to take the island back to the Chinese fold. Lin Xientang, one of the wealthiest men in Taiwan in the early twentieth century, formed the Bunka Kyokai (Cultural Associa-tion) in 1921, which spawned a de facto independence

movement in the name of Taiwan Self-Rule League. Again, the movement aimed at unification with China.

The movement stopped aiming at unification after the bloody February 28 Incident of 1947. Untold thou-sands of innocent people were massacred by govern-ment troops sent from the mainland of China to sup-press spontaneous riots against Kuomintang rule less than two years after Taiwan was restored to the Repub-lic of China at the end of the Second World War.

The people of Taiwan rejoiced in returning to the Chinese fold after the war. Most of them were alienated after the indiscriminate slaughter. Subjugated by the suppression, they began to consider possibilities of gaining independence for their homeland. The inde-pendence movement gained momentum after Chiang Kai-shek’s successful land reform in Taiwan in 1953. Tennant farmers were made owners of the land they tilled under Chiang’s land reform program, which paved the way for rapid economic development in Tai-wan. Most of the small landlords were bitterly es-tranged because they believed the government robbed them of their land. They turned anti-government, sup-porting independence for Taiwan.

But everyone on Taiwan knows full well indepen-dence is impossible. The People’s Republic, much more powerful than Qing China was to Taiwan in the late seventeenth century, is irresistible. Meanwhile, Taiwan has to rely ever more heavily on China for economic survival. On the other hand, most of the people on Tai-wan believe they belong to the same Chinese nation. They are convinced blood is thicker than water. They know China will become one again sooner or later, al-beit it may take a couple of decades or longer. Unifica-tion is a historical inevitability.

It is Chiang Kai-shek who helped create a new na-tionalism in Taiwan. He made Taiwan a nation-state named the Republic of China. He indoctrinated the people on Taiwan against the Chinese on the mainland to believe they are defenders of traditional Chinese culture. As Taiwan wrought the economic miracle of

Sunshine Laws and Anticorruption

CONTENTS

Preface

Overview

ix

xi

Focus

Impact of Magistracy and Mayoralty Elections on Taiwan’s Politics

1

Taiwan Is No Finland

Chinese Reunification Is a Historical Inevitability

11

Triangular Relationship among Taipei, Washington and Beijing:

The First Year of the Ma and Obama Administrations

21

Progress and Review of the Judicial Reform in 2009

33

Economic Aspects of a BOT Transportation Project: Case of THSR

Network

41

Global Financial Supervisory Reform after the Financial Tsunami

65

Post-Morakot Reconstruction and Land Resources Planning

75

A Feasibility Study on Promotion of 12-Year Compulsory

Education

99

Taiwan’s Social Policy in Response to the Financial Tsunami

105

Interior Affairs

A Review of Party Politics of Taiwan in 2009

117

Demarcation of Administrative Districts in Taiwan

127

Reconstruction of Homes for Indigenous Peoples

135

Government

Special Municipalities and Regional Governance

139

Amending the Referendum Act

143

Strategic Planning in Taiwan’s Bureaucracy

151

Effectiveness of the Seventh Legislative Yuan in Taiwan

157

National Security and Diplomacy

Foreign Relations of Japan under Hatoyama

Tokyo’s Complicated Ties with Washington and Beijing

165

Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations in 2010

173

Three Decades after How the Taiwan Relations Act

Has Contributed to Peace

179

Chinese Language Education in Overseas Chinese Communities

185

Economy

Current Status of Taiwan’s Economic Cooperation Framework

Agreement with China

191

Finance

Taiwan’s Monetary and Financial Policies in Post-Financial

Tsunami Era

197

Local Governance and Fiscal Sustainability:

The Case of Taiwan

213

An Evaluation of Reverse Mortgage Scheme

225

Performance of Taiwan’s Transportation Systems

233

Agriculture and Fisheries

What Can We Learn from the Impacts of the Economic Crisis

on Farm Households in Taiwan?

241

Promotion of Cross-Strait Agricultural Cooperation in the

ASEAN and Pan-Pearl River Region

251

Sustainable Development

Energy Policy in Taiwan: Historical Developments, Current