印尼軍事改革 (1998-2014) - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語博士學位學程 International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. 博士論文. 治. 政 Dissertation Doctoral 大. 立. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. 印尼軍事改革 (1998-2014) y. Nat. er. io. sit. Navigating The Indonesia’s Military Reform, n. a l 1998-2014 i v n Ch U engchi. Student: Broto Wardoyo (布羅托) Advisor: Dr. Sun Tsai-Wei (孫采薇). 中華民國 106 年 12 月 December 2017.

(2) 印尼軍事改革 (1998-2014) Navigating The Indonesia’s Military Reform, 1998-2014. 研究生 : 布羅托. 治. 政Broto Wardoyo Student: 大 : 孫采薇. 學. Advisor: Dr. Sun Tsai-Wei. ‧. io. sit. y. Nat. n. a. 國立政治大學. er. ‧ 國. 立指導教授. v. i l C n 亞太研究英語博士學位學程 U. hengchi 博士論文. A dissertation submitted as a partial requirement to International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies National Chengchi University. 中華民國 106 年 12 月 December 2017.

(3) Acknowledgment This dissertation would not be in its current form without assistances from various persons. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Indonesian Ministry of Research and Higher Education for providing financial assistance to my study and the writing of this dissertation. My gratitude also goes to Professor Sun Tsai-Wei who has been tirelessly encouraged with to continue writing this dissertation. Her guidance has been an important part of the writing of this dissertation. Suggestions and inputs from my committee members, Professor Hao Yang, Professor Wei Mei-Chuan, Professor Chen Pei-shiu, and Professor Shen Ming-shih, are equally important. I also owe to suggestions and inputs from Professor Ding Shu-Fan and Professor David Holm during the early writing stage as well as to the generosity of Professor Kuan Ping-Yi, the Director of International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies, for his excellent advice and assistance during my study. I would also like to thank Professor Andi Widjajanto, Professor Edy Prasetyono, Army General (Ret.) Endriartono Sutarto, and Mr. Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas for spending their time to provide me with essential information for this dissertation. My classmates at 104 batch, Ali, Rohit, Ayushman, Jerrel, Claire, Carmen, Vlada, Oscar, Dinithi, and Martin, also deserve my sincere thanks. Our discussions have been an important part of my study and my writing process. I would also like to thanks my colleagues at the Department of International Relations, University of Indonesia for allowing me to take five semesters of sabbatical leave despite the shortage of human resources at the Department. My gratitude also goes to my beloved family who endlessly support me during my study. I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Rika Wardoyo, my daughter, Zefa Wardoyo, and my son, Yoel Wardoyo. Thank you for allowing me to take two and half year of absence from the family. My mother also plays an influential part in consistently remind me to as soon as possible finish my study.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i. i n U. v.

(4) Abstract This dissertation studies military’s withdrawal from politics. It examines military reform in Indonesia which aiming at withdrawing the Indonesian armed forces, currently known as Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI, from politics following the fall of Suharto in 1998. It seeks to explain the driving force of the progress of military reform in Indonesia and asks the question of: why has the reform been progressing differently from one agenda to another? It focuses on three agendas of reform, which are: the establishment of normative democratic control over TNI, the disbandment of TNI’s business activities, and the reorganization of TNI’s territorial command structure. It argues that variation in the progress of reform in those three agendas is closely related to military interests. The relatively successful establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces has been mostly driven by the primacy of national interests within the brass, while the struggling disbandment of military’s business activities is rooted at factional/personal interests within TNI, and the complete failure in the abandonment of territorial command structure is related to strong organizational interests of TNI. This dissertation adopts a within-case comparison to answer the puzzle and focusing on Indonesia which represents the transplacement model of democratization in the third wave of democratization. Since transplacement involves coalition between reformers within the old and the new elites, it allows a process of negotiation in the transition. Hence, it creates a variation of the progress of the reform. Since this dissertation focuses on a single case studies, with three sub-cases, this dissertation is lacking of the power to generalization. However, it allows an in-depth analysis of the case using a process-tracing method. To conduct a proper process-tracing, this dissertation engages in various types of sources such as official documents, meetings’ notes, transcripts of in-depth interviews, personal communications, reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and secondary sources from newspapers’ reports. This dissertation concludes that the progress of the reform, in the case of Indonesia, varies according to the interests of the armed forces, and interaction between those interests and other variables such as the interests of civilian groups. It suggests that the organizational interests of the armed forces are the most influential variable to define the progress. Strong organizational interests would lead to a stall in the reform. The case of territorial command structure as well as, to a lesser degree, the second phase of the normative democratic control over the armed forces suggests this claim. In the absence of organizational interests, the existence of strong factional/personal interests would lead to problems in the advancement of the reform. The case of disbandment of military informal business activities supports this claim. Finally, the progress of the reform would be relatively smooth in the absence of those two interests and in the guidance of national interests.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Keywords: military reform, military’s withdrawal from politics, democratization, Indonesia, democratic control over the armed forces, military business activities, territorial command structure.. ii.

(5) Table of content Acknowledgement …………….………………………………………………. Abstract ……...………………………………………………………………… Table of content ………………………………………………………………. Table and figure ………………………………………………………………. Chapter 1. Introduction ……………………………………………………… 1.1. Historical account on Indonesia’s military reform .......................... 1.1.1. Generation of reform ....................................................................... 1.1.2. The progress of military reform in Indonesia .................................. 1.2. Research puzzle and argument .………………………………….. 1.2.1. Research question ………………………………………………… 1.2.2. Argument ............…………………………………………………. 1.3. Methodology, data source, and case selection ...………………….. 1.3.1. Methodology ......………………………………………………….. 1.3.2. Data source .………………………………………………………. 1.3.3. Case selection ……………………………………………………. 1.4. Contribution and limitation ………………………………………. 1.5. Outline of chapters ………………………………………………. Chapter 2. Explaining military’s withdrawal from politics …....………….. 2.1. Review literatures on military’s involvement in and withdrawal from politics ………………………………………………………. 2.1.1. Relationship between military’s involvement in and withdrawal from politics with military’s professionalism .....................………. 2.1.2. Indicators of military’s withdrawal from politics ...………………. 2.1.3. Identifying TNI’s involvement in and withdrawal from politics ..... 2.2. Factors influencing military’s involvement in and withdrawal from politics .……………………………………………………………. 2.2.1. Four dominant explanations on factors influencing military’s involvement in and withdrawal from politics .........………………. 2.2.2. Review of literatures on military’s withdrawal from politics in the case of Indonesia .....……………………………………………… 2.3. A typology of corporate interests of the armed forces ……....…… 2.3.1. Organizational interests of TNI ...…………………………………. 2.3.2. National interests of TNI .…………………………………………. 2.3.3. Factional/personal interests within TNI ......………………………. 2.3.3.1.Inter-services rivalry within TNI .…………………………………. 2.3.3.2.Inter-generational rivalry within TNI ..……………………………. 2.3.3.3.Inter-sectional groups rivalry within TNI .....……………………… 2.4. Conclusion ......................................................................................... 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iii. i n U. v. i ii iii-iv v 1 1 2 5 13 14 18 20 20 23 23 27 28 29 29 29 32 38 47 47 51 53 53 54 55 56 57 58 61.

(6) Chapter 3. The establishment of democratic control over TNI …………….. 3.1. The progress in the establishment of democratic control over TNI... 3.1.1. The levelling of political regulations in Indonesia ………………… 3.1.2. Applying the proposed framework to measure the degree of success in the establishment of democratic control ……………….. 3.1.2.1.Progress in the indicators of elite recruitment area ……………….. 3.1.2.2.Progress in the indicators of public policy area …………………… 3.1.2.3.Progress in the indicators of internal security area ………………... 3.1.2.4.Progress in the indicators of external defense and military organization areas …………………………………………………. 3.2. The national interests’ dominance within TNI ……………………. 3.3. Conclusion ………………………………………………………… Chapter 4. The abandonment of TNI’s business activities …………………. 4.1. TNI and their business activities ………………….……….………. 4.1.1. The evolution of TNI’s business activities ………………………... 4.1.2. TNI’s business prior to Suharto era ……………………………….. 4.1.3. TNI’s business during Suharto era ………………………………… 4.1.4. The call for abandonment of TNI’s business activities after Suharto era …………………………………………………………………. 4.2. The struggle over the taking over of TNI’s business ……………... 4.3. Conclusion ………………………………………………………… Chapter 5. The disbandment of territorial command structure …………… 5.1. The importance of komando teritorial ……………………….……. 5.1.1. The evolution of TNI’s doctrine …………………………….….…. 5.1.2. The evolution of TNI’s territorial command structure ……………. 5.2. TNI’s corporate interests at stake …………………………………. 5.3. Conclusion ………………………………………………………… Chapter 6. Conclusion ………………………………………………………… 6.1. Within-case comparison analysis ………………………………….. 6.2. Lesson learned and recommendation ………..…………………….. Bibliography …………………………………………………………………… Appendix 1. List of interviews ………………………………………...……… Appendix 2. A short history of TNI (Timeline) …………………………...…. Appendix 3. Territorial command structure of TNI ……………………...…. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iv. i n U. v. 63 63 64 70 71 74 78 82 83 91 92 93 93 98 100 103 108 113 115 115 116 121 127 133 134 134 138 143 151 153 154-5.

(7) Table and Figure Tables: Table 1.1. Timeline of military reform according to TNI ……………………... Table 1.2. Selected result of military reform in Indonesia …………………….. Table 1.3. Countries experiencing democratization during the third wave democratization ………………………………………………………… Table 3.1. Level of regulations in Indonesia’s legal system …………………… Table 3.2. Defense-related regulations ………………………………….……… Table 3.3. Relating operational-technical regulations from general principles regulations ……………………………………………………………… Table 3.4. Findings in the establishment of normative democratic control over TNI …….……………………………………………………………….. Table 4.1. Comparison of soldiers’ monthly salary in 2002 in USD …………… Table 5.1. Indonesia’s military doctrines ……………………………………….. Table 5.2. The number of Korem and Kodim ………………………………..…. Table 6.1. Mill’s method of difference in analyzing the progress of reform …… Table 6.2. Possible threats as listed in defense white papers ……………..……... 立. 政治大. 6-7 11-2 24-25 65 68 70 71 109 117 123-4 135 136. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. Figures: Figure 1.1. Categorization of reform agenda ………………………………….... Figure 1.2. Logic of argument ……………….…………………………………. Figure 1.3. Degree of democratic control over the armed forces ……………..... Figure 2.1. Spectrum of military’s role in politics ……………………………… Figure 2.2. The role of TNI in politics ………………………………………….. Figure 2.3. Four dominant schools in examining factors that influence military’s withdrawal from politics …………………………………..… Figure 3.1. Ideal type of laws arrangements (as proposed by Ahmadi) ………… Figure 3.2. Tracing for the first phase of the establishment of normative framework …………………………………….………………………… Figure 4.1. Indonesia’s defense expenditure ………………………….………… Figure 4.2. Evolution of TNI’s business …………………………………..……. Figure 4.3. Tracing for the disbandment of TNI’s business activities ………….. Figure 5.1. Structure of komando teritorial of TNI …………………………….. Figure 5.2. Evolution of TNI’s doctrine (selected main documents) …………… Figure 5.3. The gap in Indonesia’s defense budget, 2003-2011 ….…………….. Figure 5.4. The gap in Indonesian weapon systems (selected systems) ………... Figure 5.5. Tracing for the disbandment of TNI’s territorial command structure Figure 6.1. Result of legislative elections in Indonesia’s post-Suharto …………. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. v. i n U. v. 10 19 26 38 47 48 66 88 92 94 113 116 120 129 131 132 137.

(8) Chapter 1 Introduction This dissertation studies military’s withdrawal from politics. It examines military reform in Indonesia which aiming at withdrawing the Indonesian armed forces, currently known as Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI1, from politics following the fall of Suharto in 1998. It seeks to explain the driving forces of the progress of military reform in Indonesia and asks the question of: why has the reform been progressing differently from one agenda to another? It focuses on three agendas of reform, which are: the establishment of democratic control over TNI 2 , the disbandment of TNI’s. 政治大. business activities, and the reorganization of TNI’s territorial command structure. It. 立. argues that variation in the progress of reform in those three agendas is closely related. ‧ 國. 學. to military interests. The relatively successful establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces has been mostly driven by the primacy of national. ‧. interests within TNI, while the struggling disbandment of military’s business activities is rooted at factional/personal interests within TNI, and the complete failure in the. sit. y. Nat. abandonment of territorial command structure is related to strong organizational interests of TNI. This chapter intends to define the puzzle, the argument, to lay out the. io. n. al. er. methodology used in this research and to outline the organization of this dissertation.. 1.1.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Historical account on Indonesia’s military reform The aim of this part is to provide a short historical explanation on the progress of. military reform in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto until the departure of Yudhoyono from power in 2014. A short explanation on the later period under Widodo would also be given, despite the fact that this period is not the focus of this study. While the explanation given in this part will follow chronological order, it also incorporates the concept of military reform and defense transformation as well as first and second. 1. TNI has gone through several changes of name since their establishment in 1945. While the name TNI will be used in this dissertation, other names will sometimes also be given for reference. 2 The concept of democratic control over the armed forces in this dissertation is measured according to the existence of normative political regulations.. 1.

(9) generations of reform. Hence, a short introductory note on those concepts will be provided at the beginning of this part.. 1.1.1. Generation of reform The concept generation of reform suggests that military reform does not take place in one sequence. Instead, it takes place as a long process with several phases. It is basically in line with the idea of military reform as viewed by the concept civil-military relations. This concept resembles the idea of dynamics. It means that the relationship between civilian and military takes place continuously in which in some period the civilian is taking the lead and in other period the vice versa. In Indonesia, this is. 治政大 conducts in reforming the understanding proposes the idea of generation as step-by-step 立 armed forces to follow democratic governance.. commonly referred as tarik-ulur (push-and-pull). Those who disagree with this. ‧ 國. 學. Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002) introduced the concept of generation of reform to tackle the usual stall in establishing democratic control over the armed forces.. ‧. The main problem with military reform is basically laying in the second rather than the first generation in which the first generation is only focusing on “reforming core. Nat. sit. y. institutions for political control of the armed forces” while the second generation. er. io. focuses on “establishing effective structures for the democratic governance of the defense and security sectors” (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002, 32). The main. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. problem with the reform is laying at the second rather than the first generation of reform.. engchi. This division between the first and second generations of reform is relatively similar to those who argue that there are basically two phases of reform with the first focuses on structural arrangement while the second deals with the behavioral aspect of the main idea of reform—in this case democratic governance (Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008; Widjajanto, et.al, 2008). According to this understanding—which can be considered as the second school of generational reform to distinguish it from the first school above, the first phase of reform is basically an attempt to disengage the armed forces from politics while the second phase is aiming at professonalizing the armed forces. Hence, this understanding differentiates the complete reform into the phase of military reform and the phase of defense transformation.. 2.

(10) Following this logic, an identification of what constitutes the agendas of the first and second phases should be made. Following the logic developed by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002), Mietzner (2006) identified that the first generation is more focusing on “dismantling of old power structures” (p. 3). Hence, in the first generation of the reform, the activities are basically creating structural arrangements to place the armed forces under democratic control. Hence, agendas such as the subordination of the armed forces under the civilian-in-nature Ministerial oversighting is among one of the most important steps to be taken to curtail military’s autonomy. Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002) suggested that this phase should not only be limited to placing the armed forces under executive oversighting but also legislative and even judiciary oversighting. The. 治政大 institutional capacity which are the focus of the second generation. 立 The first and second generations of reform within that logic, however, fall within establishment of these structures, however, requires agendas to strengthen their. ‧ 國. 學. the agendas of the first phase according the latter school. The idea of military reform according to the second school is both covering the establishment of the structure to. ‧. ensure democratic governance over the armed forces—and defense affairs—and strengthening their capacities. The establishment and strengthening of this arrangement,. y. Nat. sit. however, should also be targeted at those who sit within this arrangement. It means that. al. er. io. the establishment and strengthening of this arrangement should be followed by the. n. establishment and strengthening of the human resources who organize and run this. Ch. i n U. v. arrangement. Simply put, the second phase according to this second school means that. engchi. there must be a change in attitude within both civilian and military to uphold the principle of democratic governing. In some cases, this attitude-making are targeted at the armed forces or defense establishment instead of civilian. One of the argument that support this approach is because military’s involvement in politics does not take place only because the opportunity to intervene but also because the desire to intervene. However, in the case of Indonesia, this attitude-making within civilian is equally important as that within the armed forces. As will further discussed in the next part, the military reform in Indonesia, especially during the early period of reform, resulted in a civil-military fusion in which groups of civilians were creating alliance with groups within the armed forces while other groups of civilian created alliance with other groups within the armed forces. The. 3.

(11) main problem lies in the intra-civilian rivalry in which some of the groups within civilian camp thought that they needed to make an alliance with military officers to strengthen their political position due to various reasons. 3 Hence, in the context of Indonesia, the second phase of reform usually refers to the establishment of the “military mind” or military professionalism. This understanding is best captured in the concept of defense transformation. The idea of defense transformation, or can be referred as military transformation, basically represents the idea of changing the nature of the soldier to be prepared for war. It is in line with Huntington’s (1957) of increasing the expertise of the soldier. Identification of what constitutes defense or military transformation can be. 治政大 constant change while it main paradoxes is the fact that military transformation requires 立 also means abandoning previous established practices and hence the desire for change challenging due to its paradoxical nature (Stulberg & Salomone, 2007). One of these. ‧ 國. 學. can be unattractive. In addition, there is another question of what should be changed. Hence, Sloan (2008) proposed various focuses of change or transformation ranging. ‧. from technological-led transformation, doctrinal-led transformation, structural-led transformation, to threat-led transformation (see also Mandeles, 2007; Stulberg &. y. Nat. sit. Salomone, 2007). The dominant key point in defense transformation is basically. al. er. io. technology, which brought scholars to invest on revolution to military affairs. Loo (in. n. Loo, 2009), however, warned that there is a stark difference between great and small. Ch. i n U. v. powers in their attitude to and conduct of transformation when technology is the key driver.. engchi. In the case of Indonesia, the concept defense transformation basically means to modernization of the armed forces. To be more precise, this modernization means to fulfill the minimum requirement of defense. In the words of Tan (2004) and Bitzinger (2010), Indonesia, as well as other Southeast Asian countries, was involved in maintenance stage of their defense capabilities instead of heading into arm race with one another. This transformation would require military officers and soldiers to focus on increasing their skills in managing violence which would—hopefully—divert their 3. One of these reasons was because support from military officers would be equal with protection to this group of civilians. In addition, the support from military officers would also provide politicians with support from general public as the figure of military officers remained important for general public, especially in rural area (Prasetyono, 2017, interview).. 4.

(12) attention from politics. Hence, the idea defense transformation in the context of Indonesia is extremely limited to modernization as a mean to diverting TNI’s attention from politics. With such an understanding, military reform in Indonesia basically can be differentiated into two different phases with two different focuses and agendas. During the early period of the reform, the main focus is on disengaging TNI from politics while in the second phase, the main focus is to professionalize TNI.. 1.1.2. The progress of military reform in Indonesia Military reform in Indonesia began in September 1998 when TNI Headquarter, then was ABRI Headquarter, adopted the “new paradigm” to redefine, reposition and re-. 治政 TNI, 1998). The term “redefinition” in this document 大 referred to a new conception of 立 military’s role in society, while the term “reposition” referred to a new position of the. actualize their role in a changing situation with the introduction of democracy (Mabes. ‧ 國. 學. armed forces within the society and the term “re-actualization” referred to adaptation of doctrines, policies, strategies and operational arrangements to follow the new defined. ‧. role. It was clearly written in this document that according to the new paradigm, TNI would conduct its new defined role by changing its position to not always leading in. y. Nat. sit. front so that the nature of their involvement in politics would be influencing instead of. al. er. io. governing in which they would adopt indirect rather than direct approach and they. n. would share their political role with other components of the society (Mabes TNI, 1998,. Ch. i n U. v. 5). Hence, those three concepts were basically nothing more than just a mere adjustment. engchi. to the way TNI involved in politics, from taking an active role within the governing bodies into playing a passive role behind the scene. Other words, the reform would be limited to TNI’s adaptation to the changing political environment while they continued their influence in politics without having involved in day-to-day matters (Haseman, 2006; Sebastian & Gindarsah in Ruland, Manea & Born, 2013). The basic premise, hence, remained the same: TNI should play a role in politics. This document, which later was adopted as official guidance for military reform in 2001, also lied out the agendas of the reform, which included: separation of the police force (Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, Polri) from military’s chain of command, liquidation of the armed forces socio-political roles, withdrawal of military representatives from both national and regional legislatures, restriction for active. 5.

(13) military officers to hold civilian bureaucratic positions, neutrality during national elections, and the changing characteristic of relationship between the armed forces and retired officer’ organizations (Mabes TNI, 1998; Mabes TNI, 2001). In addition to the abovementioned agendas, General Wiranto, then Panglima, also pointed out the need to disengage the armed forces from Golkar and to adopt new doctrine in accordance with the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces. Table 1.1 below provides a detail plan of military reform according to the new document. Table 1.1. Timeline of military reform according to TNI Taken from Mabes TNI (2001). al. n. -. Organizational structure and doctrine. -. -. Redefinition of function and structure of territorial command Internalization the new defined function and structure Selective implementation of the new defined function and structure Separation of Polri from TNI Adoption of laws related to defense affairs The making of operational regulations Finalization of new organizational structure planning The making of new doctrine Transition in military tribunal system. io. -. Ch. -. ‧. -. Nat. Territorial role. -. -. 學. -. 立. -. Long term 8-12 years Implementation of political right of soldiers Defense function of the armed forces Liquidation of TNI/Polri faction within MPR Complete noninvolvement in politics Further implementation of the defined function and structure with particular focus on the development of national potential to support defense function of the armed forces Finalization of the new structure of TNI to reflect the new doctrine Adoption of the new doctrine with the emphasis on kesemestaan (total warfare) New posture of TNI. -. Adoption of all regulations related to the new defined function and structure of territorial command Preparation for a new defined structure Organizational adaptation to the new defined structure Organizational restructuring of TNI Liquidation of social communication division Finalization of the new military tribunal system Adoption of the law on TNI. -. y. -. 政治大. sit. -. Medium term 4-7 years Liquidation of TNI/Polri faction within DPR Implementation of new paradigm. -. er. Dual function role. Short term 0-3 years Abandonment of TNI’s sociopolitical roles Abandonment of TNI’s direct involvement in governing (kekaryaan) Liquidation of sociopolitical institutions. ‧ 國. Issues. e -n g c h i -. 6. i n U. v. -. -. -.

(14) Welfare. -. Culture. -. Public accountability to TNI business lines Empowerment of cooperation Socialization of the new role of TNI Shifting to new paradigm. -. Reform in TNI business lines. -. -. Revision in military academy curriculum Formulation of a more adaptive and contextual changes of military culture. -. -. Availability of soldiers’ welfare through a transparent management system Professional soldiers that obey the law, follow civilian leadership, and loyal to the Constitution. The first step taken by TNI was the abolishment of their Political and Social Affairs Branch (Biro Sosial Politik) and the withdrawal of active military from holding positions in government and bureaucracy in 1998. In addition, in 1999, separation of. 政治大. police force from TNI has also been completed. With this separation, the armed forces began to focus on external defense and the police force dealt with maintaining internal. 立. security. The armed forces also declared their neutrality during the 1999 election and. ‧ 國. 學. officially withdrew from Golkar, which then resulted with Golkar lost the election to the Indonesian Democratic Party in Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan,. ‧. PDIP). The new government under Wahid, then elected Juwono Sudarsono as Minister of Defense, the first civilian defense minister in the last 40 years. 4 The Ministry itself. Nat. sit. y. changed its name from Ministry of Defense and Security. While this ministry was. io. er. assigned with oversighting the administration of TNI, the police force unfortunately, was not placed under the oversight of civilian ministry. It is important to mention this. n. al. i n U. v. issue since the placement of TNI under the Ministry of Defense and the independent. Ch. engchi. position of police force has been one of several sources of discontents between the brown (police) and green (TNI) corps. To further deepen the reform, the military pledged to completely disband the dual function doctrine, a task, according to TNI, completed in 2000. In exchange, the military developed a new doctrine to reflect its external defense orientation, although nominally. In the same year, the sociopolitical offices at the Department of Interior, through which TNI used to manage and oversee internal security issues, were also disbanded. In addition, a military-coordinated agency that focused on internal security 4. Since then, this post has been occupied by civilians; with two of them are former military officers. In sequence, they are: Juwono Sudarsono (since 26 July 1999), Mahfud M.D. (since 26 August 2000), Agum Gumelar (retired General, since 20 July 2001), Matori Abdul Djalil (since 9 August 2001), Juwono Sudarsono (since 21 October 2014), Purnomo Yusgiantoro (since 22 October 2009), and Ryamizard Ryacudu (retired General, since 27 October 2014).. 7.

(15) known as the Coordinating Agency for Assisting the Consolidation of National Security (Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional, Bakorstanas) was also disbanded. Bakorstanas was an instrumental tool for the armed forces to coordinate the implementation of security policies through various ministries during the previous years. One of the main tasks of this agency was to conduct special screening (penelitian khusus, litsus) to determine whether candidates for public servant positions have recorded their involvement in any activities related to the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) or descendant of those who involved in the 1965 Communist coup.5 The disbandment of those offices has significantly limit military’s ability to penetrate civilian affairs. Other attempt of reform also took place within the. 政治大. military education curriculum with the exclusion of sociopolitical courses and the introduction of humanitarian law.. 立. With regard to legal arrangements, in 2000, the parliament adopted the Law on. ‧ 國. 學. Human Rights Court (Law No.26/2000). This law allowed the examination of past human right abuses allegedly done by military officers to be conducted and to be. ‧. brought into trial. In 2002, the Law on National Defense (Law No.3/2002) was adopted by the parliament. In 2004, the Law on TNI (Law No.34/2004) was also adopted which. y. Nat. sit. further ensured control over the armed forces. In addition, the military also agreed to. al. er. io. halt their business activities with the conclusion of Presidential Order (Perpres). n. No.43/2009 during Yudhoyono presidency. Finally, the military tribunal system was. Ch. i n U. v. also put under review and ended with the transfer of military tribunal from TNI Headquarter to the Supreme Court.. engchi. The adoption and implementation of the new paradigm was not without criticisms, especially from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Indonesia. Commission for the Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Tindak Kekerasan, Kontras), a leading human right NGO in Indonesia, remarked that the new paradigm did not necessarily lead to military’s withdrawal from politics since it did not disband military’s privileges in many areas, it still considered the armed forces as important actor in politics, and it did not acknowledge that TNI’s political involvement in politics in the past was part of the problem (Kontras, 2008). 5. Litsus was also used to make decision over promotion for government employees. For a detail understanding on the practices and consequences of litsus is see Heryanto (2006).. 8.

(16) They considered the reform as cosmetic efforts to minimally change TNI’s political standing. Despite the above criticisms, it is reasonable to conclude that Indonesia’s military reform has resulted in TNI’s normative disengagement from politics and nominal noninvolvement from business activities even if the armed forces still committed to the old territorial command structure. TNI differentiates the reform agendas into four different components: dual function, territorial role, organizational structure and doctrine, welfare, and culture (Mabes TNI, 2001). A rather different categorization was given by Pacivis, a research center affiliated with University of Indonesia which played influential role in the security sector reform, which divided the. 治政大 (Wibisono, Wardoyo & structure, defense economics, and organizational agendas 立 Kasim, 2008; Widjajanto, et.al, 2008). Scholars have suggested that military reform can. reform agendas into five components: normative, substantive, oversighting, force. ‧ 國. 學. be simply divided into two different phases, in which during the first phase the reform focuses on establishing structural framework to ensure democratic control over the. ‧. armed forces and the next phase deals with the behavioral aspect of democratic control (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2001; Mietzner, 2006; Widjajanto, et.al, 2008). Most of. y. Nat. sit. the reform agendas (see figure 1.1 below) were actually dedicated to establishing. al. er. io. framework of democratic control over the military while the rest was equally spread. n. between efforts to reorganize the military and to address financial and defense posture. Ch. i n U. v. issues (Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008). During 1998-2008, 39% of reform. engchi. agendas were dedicated to the normative dimension of the reform and 13% dealt with oversighting agendas, while only 16% of reform agendas were privileged to substantive issues.6 Hence, it is understandable if the reform has yet to produce significant progress in areas other than the establishment of normative control over the armed forces. Disengaging the armed forces from politics has never been an easy process to go through. TNI noninvolvement in politics was considered as an alien concept since they 6. This categorization was first built by Pacivis, a leading research center that focused on security sector reform in Indonesia. According to them, reform agendas can be categorized into five different components. The substantive component addresses the necessity to create a new military culture that will strengthen the character of non-political and professional army. The organizational component includes the importance of imposing the democratic norms of civil-military relations into the military organizational structure. The force structure component deals with the necessity to build a future force by initiating a military transformation. And the defense economics component deals with the problem of resource allocations to defense sectors (Widjajanto, et.al, 2008).. 9.

(17) have played such an influential role during previous era. In fact, throughout the history of Indonesia, TNI and politics are simply inseparable to the extent that one scholar wrote that “the state of the Republic of Indonesia is not viable without the active involvement of the TNI in its political and security activities” (Kingsbury, 2003, 12).. Oversighting agendas 13%. Force structure agendas 3% Defense economics agendas 10%. Normative agendas 39%. 立. Organizational agendas 19%. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Substantive agendas 16%. Figure 1.1. Categorization of reform agendas. ‧. (adapted from Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008, 66-68). y. Nat. sit. With the fall of Suharto, TNI was under the pressure from pro-democratic forces. er. io. to conduct reform to disengage their involvement in politics. However, TNI’s strong. al. v i n as an important actor in political C transition in post-Suharto era, which commonly termed hengchi U as the era of Reformasi. The critical role of TNI in political transition in Indonesia can n. political position was not coming to an end despite of the fall of Suharto. They remained. clearly be seen during the last days of Suharto in power. On 18 May 1998, three days prior to his resignation, Suharto presented a Presidential Order to Panglima Wiranto to take necessary actions to secure the country (Kompas, 21 May 2016). This order provided Wiranto with three different powers: (1) to define nation-wide policies to deal with the incoming crisis, (2) to take preventive measures to ensure public safety or even to eliminate the sources of any possible threat, and (3) to command ministers and local leaders (governors and regents/mayors) in fulfilling the task of ensuring public safety. With those powers, the Order was basically an order to become the President himself. This order was similar to Supersemar. Wiranto, however, decided not to follow the. 10.

(18) same path taken by Suharto and instead supported the transition of power from Suharto to his Vice President, Habibie. Wiranto’s decision allowed TNI to escape pressures from students and NGOs to immediately return to barrack. His decision was supported by political elites which then allowed TNI to conduct internal reform. Hence, TNI has consistently argued that the Indonesia’s military reform basically was an internally-driven reform in which the armed forces had the privilege to set the agendas of the reform with very limited involvement from civilian groups in the process. Elites’ inability to put strong pressure to the armed forces and instead chose to make alliance with them indicated their inability to control the armed forces. It also indicated fragmentation within civilian. 治政 fragmentation and alliance became obvious when the大 reform took place in the later 立 period. Wibisono, Wardoyo, and Kasim (2008) argued that “civil-military fusion,” a camp with some of them leaning toward the armed forces for support. This. ‧ 國. 學. term first introduced by Finer (1962, 1988), is one of the most important characteristics of military reform in Indonesia. This civil-military fusion took place since the era of. ‧. Habibie until Yudhoyono.. While the reform had resulted remarkably well during its first phase. Table 1.2. y. Nat. sit. below suggests several achievements of the reform as of today in which most of the. al. er. io. progress takes place during the early phase of the reform. That Table shows that most of. n. the agendas of the reform was completed before to 2004 and a handful of them was completed after 2004.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Table 1.2. Selected results of military reform in Indonesia No.. Reform agenda. Year begin. Year completed. 1. “New Paradigm” document. 1998. 1998. 2. Disbandment of Socipolitical offices within the armed forces. 1998. 2005. 3. Disengagement from Golkar. 1999. 1999. 4. 1999. 2004. 5. Disbandment of officers’ involvement in non-military positions (excluding those in Ministry of Defense) Disbandment of doctrine kekaryaan. 1999. 1999. 6. Separation of Polri from TNI. 1999. 1999. 7. Reduction of members of military faction within DPR and DPRD (from 75 in DPR to 38 and for DPRD the number is deducted to only 10% of the total number of members DPRD). 1999. 1999. 11.

(19) 8. Commitment of neutrality in elections. 9. Disbandment of TNI’s sociopolitical functions. 1999. Regularly taking place 1999. 10. Revision of doctrines. 2000. 2007. 11. 2000. 2000. 2001. 2001. 2001. Not yet completed. 14. Disbandment of Bakortstanas and all of its offices in regional level Commitment of neutrality in Special Session of MPR for the impeachment of Wahid Disbandment of socipolitical-related courses from TNI’s education system and introduction of human rights related courses to TNI’s education system Redefinition and refunctionalization of koter. 2002. 2002. 15. The Law on National Defense. 1999. 2002. 16. Disbandment of military faction in MPR, DPR and DPRD. 2004. 2004. 17. 2004. 2004. 18. Transfer of authority of military tribunal from TNI headquarter to Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) The Law on TNI. 1999. 2004. 19. Disbandment of military business activities. 2004. 2010. 12 13. 立. 1999. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. In addition, the success in the progress of the reform mainly takes place in the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces. Only limited agendas that. ‧. closely correlated with defense function of TNI has been successfully adopted. Revision of doctrines, for example, had been completed in 2007. However, there are still. Nat. sit. y. disappointment to this revision since it still heavily incorporated the inward-looking nature of the TNI (Widjajanto, 2017, interview; Prasetyono, 2017, interview). Another. io. n. al. er. area in which the reform has yet to achieve significant progress is in the officers’. Ch. i n U. v. education system or curriculum. This progress, and lack of thereof, indicates that. engchi. significant efforts are required to completely disband the role of TNI in politics through both the making of political arrangement that ensuring democratic control over the armed forces and the cultivation of military professionalism. An analysis on the Indonesia’s military reform can be conducted by differentiates it into two different phases. Separation between first and second generation refers to the work of Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002) who differentiate the reform into the making of structural regulations and the changing in the behavioral aspects to follow democratic values or principles. In the case of Indonesia, Mietzner (2006) suggested the period from 1998 to 2004 with the adoption of the Law on TNI is the first phase of the reform. During this period, a number of regulations have been made to ensure that the armed forces would comply with democratic governing.. 12.

(20) Widjajanto, et.al (2008) and Wibisono, Wardoyo and Kasim (2008), on the other hand, suggested that the first phase of reform has yet finished until 2007, when the government adopted RPJP 2005-2025 which contains explanation on the Minimum Requirement Force. 7 They also suggested that the Minimum Requirement Force document basically indicates the defense transformation or defense modernization process to replace the political reform inherently in the first phase of reform. While the distinction between the first and the second phases of reform, or when the definitive period of each of these phases is, could serve as the basis for measuring the progress of the reform and the reason for it, this dissertation does not consider this separation as that important.. 學. ‧ 國. 1.2.. 治政大 Research puzzle and argument 立 In 1998, Suharto’s authoritarian rule was ended after more than 3 decades in. power. He was forced to resign his presidency following massive demonstrations by student activists and pro-democratic forces within the civil society organizations. ‧. (CSOs).8 His resignation was also due to the increasing economic pressures that stroke Indonesia following the Asian Financial Crisis since 1997 in which the crisis led to. Nat. sit. y. public dissatisfaction to the performance of Suharto’s government (Eklöf 1999, McLeod. al. er. io. 2000). Suharto was also losing support from his civilian and military loyalists who. n. decided to siding with students and pro-democracy activists and call for his resignation. Ch. i n U. v. (Mydans, 1998; Honna, 2003; Lee, 2015). The rise of opposition parties during the. engchi. latter period of his presidency also contributed to his diminishing power since these parties were basically the backbone of students and CSOs’ protests (Aspinall 2005). His resignation marked a new era in Indonesian politics which then termed as Reform era (era Reformasi) which basically was a democratization process. The reform era was not only targeted at changing the political arrangement from that of authoritarianism—also commonly referred as pseudo-democracy or hybrid regime in academic literature—to democracy but also aiming at disbanding activities that might torpedoing the drive to democratic society. Hence, apart from the reform in political institutions, the reform 7. See Chapter 6 for detail. Several works have been dedicated to assessing the factors that drove Suharto's resignation. While some of these factors will be presented in this paragraph, detail explanation is available on Forrester & May (1998) and Crouch (2010). 8. 13.

(21) was also targeted at changing the nature of Golongan Karya (Golkar)9—from a shy political party into a real political party 10 —and military’s involvement in politics— which then became the main goal of military reform in Indonesia.. 1.2.1. Research question The progress of the military reform in Indonesia since its inception in 1998 has received mix assessments. Some scholars argue that the military reform in Indonesia has been, to certain degree, successful in distancing the armed forces from politics, while others contend it. This dissertation is aiming at assessing the progress of the reform and identifying the most likely determinant that defines this progress. The most advance. 治政 forces while in the disbandment of military business 大 activities, the reform has only 立 partially successful in taking over military’s formal business activities and the worst progress is taking place in the establishment of democratic control over the armed. ‧ 國. 學. progress takes place in the abandonment of military, especially the Army, territorial command structure. Since this research seeks to explain the variation in the outcomes of. ‧. the reform from one issue to another, the main question posted in this research is: why has the reform resulted in different outcomes from one issue to another? In details, it. y. Nat. sit. also seeks to answer the following questions:. al. n. indicators to measure such a progress?. Ch. er. io. 1. How do we measure the progress military reform? What are the most sensible. i n U. v. 2. Why does the reform quite successful in creating normative framework to ensure. engchi. democratic control over the armed forces? What are the factors that enabling this success?. 9. Golkar was the main political vehicle of Suharto to win elections. It was founded as a group of professional associations instead of political party. It did not transform into political party until 1998 under the leadership of Akbar Tanjung. He adopted several reform agendas and managed to lead the party amid public’s call for disbandment and eventually gained significant number of votes in 1999 election. Under his leadership, however, Golkar suffered from split in which some senior members that were against him opted to established new political parties. None of these new parties, however, performed successfully during the 1999 election. On the transformation of Golkar during this period, see Tanjung (2007) or Tomsa (2008). 10 Since it was never referred as political party during Suharto era, Golkar was granted with various benefits including the ability to perform the so-called pembinaan sepanjang tahun (year-long coaching). This pembinaan provided Golkar with indefinite period of campaign in comparison to the other two political parties which were only allowed to do campaign in the designated period—usually few months prior to the election. In addition, it was mandatory for civil servants to be member of Golkar and those who did not chose for Golkar during the election would be punished.. 14.

(22) 3. Why does the reform relatively unsuccessful in disbanding military business activities? What are the stumbling blocks? 4. Why does the reform fail to abandon military’s territorial command structure? What are the stumbling blocks? Assessing those questions would give a clear picture of how has the military’s withdrawal from politics in Indonesia been taking place, to what extent and why. Assessing the case of military reform in Indonesia also contributes to the debate of civilmilitary relations studies in Third World countries in which Ruland, Manea and Born (in Ruland, Manea & Born, 2013) have argued that Western classical ideals of civilian control over the armed forces and military professionalism have failed to explain the. 治政 trajectory of democratic transition in post-authoritarian大 countries since the role of the 立 armed forces in that process is an important one. Third World countries’ cases. This research also contributes in understanding the. ‧ 國. 學. To understand the complexity of military reform in Indonesia, three frameworks can be applied to make sense of it. First, the reform can be framed within the concept of. ‧. transition to democracy. The Indonesian military reform would not take place if Suharto’s authoritarian rule did not collapse. Military reform is an important feature of. y. Nat. sit. transition to democracy in Indonesia especially since the role of TNI in Indonesian. al. er. io. politics during the reign of Suharto was influential. By reforming TNI, especially by. n. departing them from politics, the road to democracy shall be relatively smooth.. Ch. i n U. v. Opposition from TNI, on the other hand, could significantly recourse the transition to. engchi. different direction. Hence, within this framework, military reform in Indonesia should be considered as part of a larger socio-political reform. One of the implications to such an understanding is the need to examine relationship between military reform and other reforms, such as justice sector reform, political (institutional) reform, economic reform, etc. It means that the progress of military reform must also consider the progress in other sectors’ reform. Second, military reform in Indonesia should also be considered within a larger Security Sector Reform (SSR). Military reform in Indonesia is aiming at establishing democratic control over the armed forces instead of simply creating civilian control over the armed forces. Traditional civilian control approach focuses on how to strike a balance relationship between civilian leaderships and the armed forces. Feaver (1996),. 15.

(23) for example, identified two central yet conflicting principles in finding that balance, which are: while the military must be strong enough to protect the state from external threat, they must be ensured not to use their monopoly of violence against the state and its inhabitant. To what extent does this control should be taking place, according to democratic control school, is subject to democratic governance. The term democratic control, hence, means that the control should be guided by democratic values (Pantev, 2005). Under such values, it is crucial “to reorient and limit the military’s activities to its normative duties, and subordinate it to those democratically elected to take charge of the country’s affairs” (Akonyunlu, 2007, 13). The normative duty of the armed forces in democratic society is to defend the country from external threat and, hence, the armed. 治政 domination of certain group or groups within civilian大 camp over the armed forces, 立 which Huntington (1957) referred as subjective control. Democratic control over the forces should become a defense tool with externally-oriented task. It would prohibit. ‧ 國. 學. armed forces, hence, has a close resonance with Huntington’s ideals of objective control. An emphasis on democratic control over the armed forces is particularly. ‧. important due to several reasons. Mietzner (2004, 4) wrote that the armed forces are key factor in successful transition and hence, to minimize their role in shaping the future of. Nat. sit. y. the transition period, it is necessary to as soon as possible establish “constitutional. er. io. mechanisms that put democratically elected, civilian state institutions in charge of all aspects of governance, including the security sector.” What important is that “in some. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. cases, the establishment of civilian control by only one dominant civilian element in the. engchi. post-authoritarian transition can reinforce the very manipulability of the armed forces that the regime change aimed to removed” (Mietzner, 2004, 4). Coughlan (1998, 519) wrote that the “lack of effective mechanism of civilian control means that the political system is always hostage to the threat of military intervention or of intervention on the part of any societal group that can gain the military’s support.” Hence, she considered democratic control as an effective means of controlling the armed forces since it is not only ensuring military’s submission to democratic values but also preventing part of civilian group to solely control the armed forces for their own benefits. In addition, the word “security” in SSR should not only be associated with the armed forces per se, but also with other security agencies, such as police force and intelligence agencies. The relationship between military reform and police as well as intelligence reforms is,. 16.

(24) therefore, important. A dominant focus on certain reform, for example on military reform, would create a sense of jealousy from officers to other security agencies. Finally, one additional context should also be taken into consideration in understanding military reform in Indonesia. While it is true that the reform would not taking place without the pressures from civilian groups, the decision to initiate reform has been made internally by the armed forces. Hence, military reform in Indonesia is indeed an internally-driven project. The use of this framework has always been contested by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) since according to them acknowledging that military reform is an internally-driven project is basically giving the armed forces an empty cheque. They afraid that the armed forces would easily conclude. 治政 NGO activists believe that the reform, as of today, has 大 yet to achieve what they desire. 立 To overcome this fear, scholars who involved in military reform in Indonesia proposed. that the reform has been successful and hence no further reform need to be done, while. ‧ 國. 學. two different conceptual frameworks to understand military reform in Indonesia.11 The first concept is military reform, which is similar to the first generation of reform concept. ‧. introduced by Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster (2002), and the second concept is defense transformation, which basically closely related to Huntington’s (1957) identification of. Nat. sit. y. military professionalism.12. al. er. io. Hence, taking into consideration those three contexts, this research considers the. n. Indonesian case of military reform as an internally-driven effort by the armed forces to. Ch. i n U. v. disengage from politics during the transition to democracy. It means that the reform. engchi. should be framed from the perspective of the armed forces which, as any other political actors, their behaviors are taken according to rational calculations. The existence and. 11. A handful of scholars involved in military reform in Indonesia and gained trust from defense establishment—TNI and Ministry of Defense. Among these scholars are Kusnanto Anggoro, Edy Prasetyono, Rizal Sukma, and Andi Widjajanto who involved in the drafting of various regulations with the defense establishment and had written several—and restricted—documents for the defense establishment. 12 While various scholarly works can be found with regard to these two concepts, in the context of Indonesia, the main idea is basically distinguishing the political nature and the non-political nature of the reform. During my personal encounters with Widjajanto, Prasetyono, and Anggoro, they laid out at least two main reasons for this separation. The first reason is to prevent military officers from getting tired with critics by acknowledging that military reform has performed tremendously but at the same time—which is the second reason—the concept of military transformation would lead these officers to seriously think about their main business—defense professionalism—instead of about political role of TNI. It is, therefore, a subtle way to redirect their focus from politics.. 17.

(25) interests of other actors, however, are also worth considering since they surely have impacts to the armed forces’ behaviors.. 1.2.2. Argument This research focuses on military corporate interests. While the dominant thesis on military reform in Indonesia tends to consider the progress of the reform as the function of civil-military dynamics, this dissertation argues that the reform is basically conducted in accordance with the corporate interests of the armed forces and hence on some issues the armed forces were willingly to comply with the reform agendas while on other issues they were reluctantly complying. The concept of military interests in this. 政治大 forces , the organizational interest of the armed forces, and the factional/personal 立 interest within the armed forces. Based on that typology, this dissertation examines the dissertation is categorized into three different types: the national interest of the armed 13. ‧ 國. 學. influence of each of those types of interests to the progress of military reform in different issues/agendas.. ‧. The making of (normative) regulations to ensure democratic control over the armed forces has been the dominant focus of the military reform. It has close proximity. y. Nat. sit. with the basic idea of transition to democracy that swept Indonesia since the fall of. al. er. io. Suharto. Public call for transition to democracy has been the dominant idea since the. n. fall of Suharto. The armed forces, with relatively small room for maneuvering their. Ch. i n U. v. organizational interests, chose to comply with wider public call for democracy. Using. engchi. the concept of “reposition”, they complied to adopt reform agendas that mostly were concerned with the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces. TNI placed transition to democracy as their primary concern and agreed to adopt reform agendas which introduce sort of democratic control over themselves albeit cautiously. It is this larger national interest that led TNI to accept the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces. In the issue of military business activities, the reform has relatively less successful. The taking over of military business activities has been slow or only partially successful. While there has been progress, both in term of regulations and the While the term “national interest” can be defined rather widely, this dissertation focuses on a relatively narrower understanding of national interest from the perspective of the armed forces. It sometimes also referred as normative interest. 13. 18.

(26) actual taking over, this taking over only covers the so-called formal business activities of the armed forces. The number of TNI’s legal businesses through cooperatives (koperasi) and foundations (yayasan) was far less in comparison to their informal and illegal businesses. The armed forces showed little refusal over this taking over, but it was the case of factions/persons within the armed forces who owned interests to these businesses. These factions/persons either openly or discreetly refused the taking over as suggested in some cases examined in this dissertation. Hence, it was basically the interests of these factions/persons that led to partial success in this taking over instead of the interests of the whole establishment. Finally, the reform’s performance in the abandonment of military’s territorial. 治政大for the armed forces to fully especially the Army—has been the most important tool 立 penetrate civilian activities day-by-day in every part of the state. A change in this command structure has been completely stalled. TNI’s territorial command structure—. ‧ 國. 學. structure would significantly affect military’s ability to penetrate civilian daily life. In addition, the lack of alternatives is also the reason for TNI’s strong rejection to abandon. ‧. their current structure. In this case, organizational interests of TNI define their unwillingness to comply with reform agenda to restructure their territorial command. y. Nat. sit. structure. With such a high stake, the reform has been completely failed to create. al. n. of this dissertation can be summed up in Figure 1.2 below.. Independent variable. Military corporate interests. Ch. engchi. er. io. significant change in TNI’s territorial command structure. In short, the main argument. i n U. v. Categories of independent variable. Dependent variable. The primacy of national interests of TNI. Successful establishment of (normative) democratic control over TNI. The existence of factional/personal interests within TNI. Partial success in the disbandment of TNI's business activities. The existence of organizational interests of TNI. Failure in the abandonment of TNI territorial command structure. Figure 1.2. Logic of argument. 19.

(27) 1.3.Methodology, data source, and case selection In explaining the above argument, this dissertation employs a qualitative approach. In particular, it uses a within-case comparison method to explain the main puzzle. As suggested earlier in this chapter, this dissertation focuses on the military reform in Indonesia’s post-Suharto. Since the main aim of military reform in Indonesia is basically military’s withdrawal from politics, the main concept used in this dissertation is military’s withdrawal from politics. This part presents the methodology used in this dissertation, the data source, and the case selection.. 治政大of case study method. A case A within-case comparison falls within the family 立 study method can be defined as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical 1.3.1. Methodology. ‧ 國. 學. episode to develop or test explanations that may be generalizable for other events” (George & Bennett, 2005, 5) or as “an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively. ‧. bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena” (Gerring, 2004, 341). To fit in this definition, clear boundaries. y. Nat. sit. of historical episode or unit (bounded phenomenon) should first be clarified. The case in. er. io. this research is military’s withdrawal from politics in Indonesia's post-Suharto era. While military’s withdrawal from politics serves as substantive boundaries of this case,. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. the temporal boundaries of this research begins with the fall of Suharto in 1998 and. engchi. ends with the departure of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono from power. It does not mean, however, that the reform is no longer taking place after SBY era. The temporal boundaries of this research, therefore, cover four different presidencies, from Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie to Abdurrahman Wahid to Megawati Sukarnoputri to SBY.14 While case study method basically focuses on how to define the case instead of to analyze the case or to model causal relationship, it does not mean that case study method is lacking theory development capability. Scholars employing case study method have categorized case study method into different clusters with each serves 14. Habibie replaced Suharto after the later resigned from his post in May 1998. He was then replaced by Wahid on October 1999. Wahid was impeached by the parliament on July 2001 and then replaced by his Vice President, Megawati. She lost the presidential election—the first direct presidential election in Indonesia—from Yudhoyono who reigned from October 2004 until October 2014 after winning his second term in October 2009.. 20.

(28) different goal. Lipjhart (1971), for example, categorized case study method into atheoretical, interpretive, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-informing, and deviant case studies. Similarly, Levy (2008) differentiated case study method into few basic typologies consisted of idiographic case studies which can be either inductive or theory-guided, hypothesis generating case studies, hypothesis testing cases, and plausibility probes case studies. Rohfling (2012) identified three forms of case study based on its function to create general theory into: (1) case study that is aiming at building hypothesis, (2) a case study that is aiming at modifying hypothesis, and (3) a case study that is aiming at refining hypothesis. In short, they can be divided into a theoretical based or empirical based case study (Beach & Pedersen, 2016). George and. 治政大 by deriving observable develop logically consistent theories 立 theories and test them against empirical observations or. Bennett (2005, 5) bridged this distinction and argued that case study should “focus on empirical cases to. 學. ‧ 國. implications from. measurements to make inferences on how best to modify the tested theories.” Despite the fact that this research focuses on a single case—the case of. ‧. Indonesia’s military reform, it conducts a within-case comparison since it focuses its attention to variation of the outcomes of Indonesia’s military reform. It compares the. y. Nat. sit. relatively successful establishment of democratic control over the armed forces in the. er. io. reform to the least successful military’s withdrawal from business activities to the failure to disband military’s territorial command structure. This research, however,. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. focuses on military interests to explain the variation of the outcomes of Indonesia’s. engchi. military reform. Hence, this research basically seeks to explain the causal mechanism of single variable, military interests, in influencing another single variable, the progress of reform or withdrawal. This research focuses on TNI as the unit of analysis. It conducts an in-depth study to examine the interests of TNI in navigating military reform. It considers TNI as a solid entity with a clear line of command but at the same time it does not neglect the fact that there are contestations between factions within TNI. This research, however, does not focus on the existence of split within the brass, as conducted by various scholars in explaining the progress of military reform in Indonesia, but focuses instead on their interests, whether factional or corporate or national interests, in explaining the progress of the military reform. This research also does not assume that the decisions. 21.