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(1)

Chapter 7-Equilibrium Analysis

( I ) Demand Shock:G↑ (政府提振內需)

 Crusoe world analysis

c , y

l 0

G

1 E

F

*( )

y 總產量

n*

c*

G

D

生產可能線整個下移 G

w E

( )

=MPL E

( )

=MPL D

( )

>MPL F

( )

=w F

( )

G↑by G∆ ⇒ IE(income effect)

* * * * *

cn ↑ ⇒ yw =MPL

(2)

w

n

(

( ) ( )

)

s ,

n w d T

+

(

( ),( ),( )

)

nd w A k

+

+

w*

n*

Excess supply , s

IE n ↑

S F E

w

y w*

Excess demand E

( )

( ) ( ), * yd w a G

+ + +

(

( ),( ),( )

)

ys w A k

+ +

*

*

y c G

= +

G

cd G

< ∆

A

 Demand and supply analysis

Labor market Good market

(1) Direct impact( at the original w ) *

G↑ ⇒ n → , d y → (因這兩項只跟 w, A, k 有關) s y ↑ by dG

(2) Income effect( at the original w ) * G↑ ⇒ T ↑ by G∆ ⇒IE,c ↓ d n ↑ s

cd < ∆ :因為G cd +wld = +w (dT) ∆cd + ∆ = −∆ = −∆ w ld T G ∴ ∆cd < ∆ G

由圖可知當 w 不變情況下 labor market 有 excess supply,good market 有 excess demand,因此 w 會改變直到兩市場均衡。

(3) Wage effect

labor market 有 excess supply ⇒ w ↓

對個人來說有 SE(替代效果):c ↓ d n ↑ 由 S 點移至 F 點 s 對廠商來說n ↑ d y ↑ s

Net equilibrium at point F:w ↓ * n ↑ * y ↑ * c ↓ *

G↑ ⇒T ↑⇒IE c: dns ↑ G↑ ⇒ w↓⇒SE c: dns

只看n 無法看出到底式上升還下降,但因平衡時s ns =nd,且n 線 d 不動,所以由 w ↓ 可知n 一定上升,因此d n ↑ 。 *

(4) Business cycle implications

Pro-cyclical(正向循環):Corr( x, GDP)>0 GDP= 產量 = y

(3)

y

n ( , )

AF k n

Couter-cyclical(負向循環):Corr( x, GDP)<0

由前面推導可知改 G∆ ,Corr( c, y)<0、Corr( w, y)<0、Corr( n, y)>0,

但此結果與實際數據不合,原因是因為除 G∆ 外還有其他效果。

( II ) Supply Shock:A↑

 Crusoe world analysis

生產可能線向上移動 MPL↑

c , y

l 0

G

1 F

E

*( )

y 總產量

n*

c*

D

A↑ ⇒ IE:c ↑ , d n ↓ (D → F) s

MPL↑,SE:c ↑ , d n ↑ (E → D) s

Net equilibrium:w*=MPL* ↑ , c ↑ , * y*↑(∵y* =c*+G), n*? 證明w 上升:*

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

w F =MPL F >MPL D =MRS D >MRS E =MPL E =w E

(4)

w

n

(

( ) ( )

)

s ,

n w d T

+

(

( ),( ),( )

)

nd w A k

+

+

w*

n*

Excess demand E

w

y w*

Excess supply E

*

*

y c G

= +

( )

( ) ( ), * yd w a G

+ + +

(

( ),( ),( )

)

ys w A k

+

+

 Demand and supply analysis

Labor market Good market

(1) Direct impact( at the original w ) * A↑ ⇒ y ↑ , s n ↑ d

(2) Income effect( at the original w ) * ∆ = ∆ − ∆d ys w nd y=AF(k,n)

(

,

) (

,

)

s d

n MPL

y F k n A AF k n n

∆ = ∆ + ∆ 偏微分

(

,

)

n

(

,

)

d

(

,

)

d F k n AAF k n wn F k n A

∆ = ∆ + − ∆ = ∆

 

∴∆ ↑ IE:d c ↑ , d n ↓ s

(3) Wage effect w ↑

Example:

u c l

( )

, =lnc+lnl y= Anα 0<α < 1

Assume G=qy 0< < q 1 y c G= + c=

(

1q y

)

Equilibrium condition: l

c

MRS u w MPL

=u = =

(

1

)

c= −q y

(

1

)

1 1

c c q y y

l = n= n =MPL=α n

− − (解是 A, K, G 的函數)

(5)

w

n ns

nd

w*

n*

E A

w

y

w* A E

*

*

y c G

= +

( )

( )

cd τ G

+

ys

*

( )

0,1

n 1

q α

= α ∈

+ − 此時n 和 A 無關,因為 IE 和 SE 抵銷。 * y* =An*α

*

*

*

w y α n

= c* =y*G

( III ) Wage Income Tax↑

 Demand and supply analysis

Given budget constrain G T= +τwn

G→, τ↑ ⇒ T↓ no IE only SE ⇒c ↓ d n ↓ s

Market clearing conditions

( )

( ) ( )

(

( )

)

, , ,

d s

c w τ G y w A k

+ + =

( )

( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )

, , ,

d s

n w A k n w τ

+ + +

 

 =

 

Labor market Good market

Net equilibrium:τ↑ ⇒ w ↑ * n ↓ * y ↓ * c ↓ *

(6)

 複數均衡

假設政府所收 tax revenue Rwn lnR=lnτ +lnn w fix 所以不考慮

ln ln

ln 1 ln

R n

τ = + τ

τ 0% 10% 50% 60%

(1-τ)w w 0.9w 0.5w 0.4w

change 下降 10% 下降 20%

做出 R 對τ關係圖如下

R

τ 1

τ

h

τ

l

0

R

τ=0:沒課稅所以 R=0

τ=1:所賺的錢全課稅,沒有人要工作,R=0 若要收 tax revenue= R 有τl和τh兩種選擇

Example:

( )

, ln ln

u c l = c+ l y=nα 0<α < G=0 c G y1 + = ⇒ c= y

(

1

) (

1

)

1

l c

u c y

MRS MPL

u n τ α τ n

= = = − = −

( )

( )

* 1 *

1 1

n α τ n

α τ τ

= − ⇒ ↑⇒ ↓

+ −

( ) ( )

( )

1

1 1

R wn y n

n

α τ α

τ τ τ α ατ

α τ

 − 

 

= =   =  + − 

(7)

(出自毛老師書) 有兩個平衡點:a, b 為高稅率、c, d 為低稅率

( IV ) 消費券(Consumption Voucher)

 均衡式子分析

Consumer:

( )

maxu c+v l, c c v= + (total consumption) st c= −

(

1 τ

)

wn+

(

dT

)

l+ = n 1

FOC:

( )

( ) ( )

,

, 1

,

l l c

c

u c l

MRS w

u c l τ

=  = −

 ───①

Firms:

( )

max d= f nwn

FOC:MPL= f '

( )

n =w───

Goods market equilibrium:

Walra’s law 使 labor market 自動平衡

( )

c= + = =c v y f n ─── Government Constrain(G=0):

v= +T τwn───④

(8)

給定v τ 政府決定後,T 自動固定,若 v ↑ 對其他變數影響

{

c n y T w, , , ,

}

其中

{

c n y, ,

}

都和v無關,因為①②③式中沒有v

 圖形分析

Labor market Good market

v ↑直接效果

y w*

*

*

y c G

= +

d d

c =c +v

ys

w

替代效果

課稅T ↑效果

w*

w 替代效果

課稅T ↑效果

n ns

nd

n*

因為要發消費券要課稅,所以 v ↑T ↑⇒cd ↓ , n ↑ s

但此時勞動市場 w↑,商品市場 w↓,不可能達到平衡,所以若要

達到平衡,則所有效果必須抵銷,使c 及d n 回到原處。 s

Net equilibrium: v ↑ c , d n , * y , * w 都不變。 *

(9)

Chapter 8-Consumption and Saving

( I ) The Model Economy (Endowment economy)



取自毛慶生老師課本 Ch8 Model 中包含:

(1) 2 agents:consumers & government

(2) 2 competitive market:goods & credit (bond) market

Assumption:

(1) 所有人都為全知 (2) 只存活 2 期

(3) 沒有廠商,所有商品都是天上掉下來的

(10)

( II ) Fisher two period models

 Budget constrain

(1) 定義變數

b

0

b

1

b

2

Period 1 Period 2

1 1 1

a = yT a

2

= y

2

T

2

c

1

c

2

Endowment product:y 、1 y (天上掉下來的) 2 Lump-sum tax:T 、1 T 2

Disposable income:a 、1 a 2 Consumption:c 、1 c 2

b :Initial bond holding at t=1 (原始擁有的債券,一出生就決定,0

自己不可以決定) b >0 ⇒ assent (lender) 0

b <0 ⇒ liberty (borrower) 0

b :Bond holding at the end of t=1 1

(2) Budget constrain

t=1 t=1 t=1 t=1

1

(1 )

0 1 1

a + + r b = c + b

1 (1 ) 0

a + +r b :Source of found

1 1

c + :Use of found b rb :利息 0

Saving:S1 =

(

a1+rb0

)

c1 =b1b0 (Disposable income which is not consume)

(11)

t=

t=

t=

t=2 2 2 2

2

(1 )

1 2 2

a + + r b = c + b

2 2 2

1 1

c b a

b r

+ −

= + 代入 t=1 時的式子可得終身預算限制式

Life time budget constrain Life time budget constrain Life time budget constrain Life time budget constrain

( )

2 2 2

1 1 1 0

1 1 1

c b a

c a r b

r r r

 

+ + = + + +

+ +  + 

( )

2

1 1 0

1

a a r b x

r

 

+ + + =

 + 

  :終身財富

終身預算中有除以(1+r)的可以想成第 2 期折算回第 1 期時的價 格,因第 1 期不消費而拿來儲蓄,第二期會多(1+r),所以折算回來 時要除以(1+r)。

t=1 t=2

1 → 1+r

1

1 r+ ← 1

(3) Reason of b =0 2

b >0 ⇒ leave bequest after death ⇒ not optimal 2

b <0 ⇒ in debt after death (大家都想要2 b = −∞ ) ⇒ market won’t 2 allow it ⇒ not feasible

∴optimal b = 0 2

 圖形

Assume b2 =b0 = 0

Life time budget constrain: 1 2 1 2

1 1

c a

c a x

r r

+ = + =

+ +

Ex:

A:

(

a a1, 2

) (

= 0,105

)

r=5% x=100 B:

(

a a1, 2

) (

= 100, 0

)

r=5% x=100

(12)

c 2

c1 borrowing ( )

11 a +r

1 x a a2

( ) ( )

1 1 2 1

a +r +a = +r x

lending Slope = 1+r

(1 2 )

a +r

Ex:lending rate < borrow rate c 2

c1 borrowing

a1

a2

lending

Ex:卡奴(不能再借了) c 2

c1 borrowing

a1

a2

lending

(13)

 Preference

U c c

(

1, 2

)

=u c

( )

1u c

( )

2 1

0 1

β 1

< = ρ <

+

(1) U c c1

(

1, 2

)

>0,U2

(

c c1, 2

)

>0,U11

(

c c1, 2

)

<0,U22

(

c c1, 2

)

<0 (2) Prefer diversity

( )

( )

( ) ( )

1 1 2 1

1,2

2 1 2 2

, '

, '

u c c u c

MRS =u c c =βu c ↓ as c ↑ 1 (3) c &1 c are normal goods 2

(4) U is time separable or time additively⇒ MU of c is independent of MU 1

of c and vice versa 2

(5) U is time preference:β < 表示在 t=2 消費時的效用較低 1

( )

( )

12 1 2

' 1

1 ( )

'

MRS u c when c c

u c ρ

β β

= = = + =

c 2

c1 c1=c

c2 =c

45 line0

slope= +1 ρ

無異曲線

 Decision problem

Given

{

a a r1, 2,

}

{ }

( ) ( )

1 2 1

1 2

, ,

max

c c b

u c + β u c

St: c1+b1=a1 (b = ) ───0 0 ①

c2 =a2 + +

(

1 r b

)

1 (b = ) ───2 0 ② Or st: 1 2 1 2

1 1

c a

c a

r r

+ = +

+ + 決定關鍵為b 1

(14)

FOC:

When a fix 1 ∆ =b1 1⇒ ∆ = ⇒ ∆ = +c1 1 c2

(

1 r

)

Marginal cost of saving in current utility:u c'

( )

1

Marginal gain of saving in current utility:βu c'

( )(

2 1+r

) ( )

1

( )(

2

)

' ' 1

u cu c +r ───③

( ) ( )

1

1,2

2

' 1

'

MRS u c r

βu c

= = +

由上面①②③可解

{

c c b1, 2, 1

} c

2

c

1

c

1

c

2

( ) 1 MRS E = + r

e

a

1

a

2

E

B(lending) A(borrowing)

( ) 1 MRS B < + r ( ) 1

MRS A > + r

無論初始稟賦在 A 還是 B,最終選擇都在 E 點,只是b 正負號不同而已。 1

初始在 A:b <0 1 初始在 B:b >0 1

(15)

 Shocks

(1) r fix,a ↑,1 a fix (temporary increase in income) 2 a ↑1 ⇒ ↑ Wealth effect(WE):x c1d ↑,c2d ↑,S1 =b1

S1 =b1↑ 是因為希望各期消費都可以上升(consumption smoothing)

c

2

c

1

c

1

c

2

e

a

1

a

2

F

f c

1

∆ ∆ = ∆ b

1

S

1

因為 r 不變,所以斜率不變。

S1 =a1c1 ∆ = ∆ − ∆ > S1 a1 c1 0 ( 1 2 1

1

c c x a

r

∆ + ∆ = ∆ = ∆

∵ + ⇒ ∆a1 > ∆c1 )

(2) r fix,a fix,1 a ↑ (temporary increase in income) 2 a ↑2 ⇒ ↑ Wealth effect(WE):x c1d ↑,c2d ↑,S1=b1

(3) r fix,a ↑,1 a ↑ (permanent increase in income) 2 a ↑,1 a ↑2 ⇒ ↑ Wealth effect(WE):x c1d ↑,c2d ↑ ∆ 要看哪個上升較多,如果上升量差不多S1 ∆ 不大 S1

MPC ( marginal propensity to consume) MPS ( marginal propensity to save)

1

1

MPC c a

= ∆

1 1 1

1 1

S a c 1

MPS MPC

a a

∆ ∆ − ∆

= = = −

∆ ∆

(16)

temporary increase in income:

MPC is relatively small,MPS is relatively large because of consumption smoothing

permanent increase in income:

MPC ≈ 1 MPS ≈ 0

(4) Simple Keyne’s consumption function ct = +a byt 0< < b 1

b is constant which is independent of temporarily or permanently increase of income.

但台灣實際 saving rate

1993 t

t t

S y

1990

2009 25%

30%

可見上述模型錯誤。

(5) r↑,a fix,1 a fix 2

r↑ ⇒ opportunity cost of c ↑1c1↓ ,c ↑ ,2 S ↑ 1 Intertemporal substitution effect (ISE) (跨期替代效果) 下圖平衡點由 E→E’

考慮是否有財富效果:

1 2 1 2

1 1

c a

c a x

r r

+ = + =

+ + :r ↑ ⇒ x ↓

分三種情況考慮

(17)

a. Lender

c

2

c

1

c

1

c

2

slope = + 1 r

e

a

1

a

2

E

x F

E’

1 ' slope = + r

1 1 1 0

S =a c >

WE:(E’→F) c ↑ ,1 c ↑ ,2 S ↓ 1

On net:c1?,c ↑ ,2 S1?

b. Borrower

c

2

c

1

c

1

c

2

slope = + 1 r e

a

1

a

2

E

x F

E’

1 ' slope = + r

1 1 1 0

S =a c >

ISE:r↑⇒c1↓ ,c ↑ ,2 S ↑ (E→E’) 1

WE:r↑⇒c1↓ ,c ↓ ,2 S ↑ (E’→F) 1

On net:c ↓ ,1 c2?,S ↑ 1

(18)

c. Representative consumer

c

2

c

1

1 1

a = c

2 2

a = c e=E

E’

1 0

S =

只有 ISE(E→E’)

d. Example

u c

( )

=lnc u c'

( )

1

= c

FOC:u c'

( )

1u c'

( )(

2 1+r

)

BC: 1 2 1 2

1 1

c a

c a x

r r

+ = + =

+ + 求c c S 1, 2, 1 FOC:c2

(

1+r c

)

1

1 1 1 2

1 2 1

a

c x a

r ρ

β ρ

 +  

= + = +  + +  1 β 1

= ρ +

( ) ( )

1 2

2

1 1

1 2

r a a

c β r x

β ρ

+ +

= + =

+ +

1 1 1 1 1 2

2 1 1

a a

S a c

r ρ

ρ ρ

 

= − = ++  + − + 

Temporary increase in income:∆ = ,a1 1 ∆a2 = 0 1 1

1

1 2 MPC c

a

ρ ρ

∆ +

= =

∆ + , 1 1

MPS 2

= ρ +

Permanent increase in income:∆ = ,a1 1 ∆a2 = 1 1 1

1

2 1

2 1 1

c r

MPC a r

ρ ρ

 

∆ +  + 

= ∆ = +  + ≈ ,MPS ≈ 1 0

(19)

If r= ρ MPC = ,1 1 MPS = 1 0

由 FOC: 2

( )

1

ln c ln ln 1 ln

r r

c β β

 

= + + ≈ +

 

  rby 1% 2

1

c c

⇒ ↑ by 1%

跨期替代彈性:

( )

2 1

ln ln 1 d c

c

d r

 

 

  +

c

2

c

1

A

B

1

1

slope = + r

2 2 1

1 ( )

slope = + r r > r

2 1 B

slope c c

 

=  

 

2 1 A

slope c c

 

=  

 

若無異曲線圖形為以下

則 r ↑ 時 2

1

ln c c

 

 

 不變

(20)

Chapter 9-Dynamic family (Infinite life)

( I ) Budget Constrain t=1,2,3…

 Preferences

( )

( ) ( ) ( )

( )

1 2

2

1 2 3

1 1

,

0 1

t t t

U c c

u c u c u c

u c

β β

β β

=

= + + +

=

< <





 Lifetime budget constrain

(1) Variables

t 1

b

b

t

b

t+1

Period t Period t+1

t t t

a = yT a

t+1

= y

t+1

T

t+1

c

t

c

t+1

bt1:Initial bond holding at time t b :End bond holding at time t t

(2) Lifetime budget constrain ct+bt =at + +

(

1 rt1

)

bt1t St =

(

at +r bt1 t1

)

ct =btbt1t

Let rt =r ∀ , t b = ,Consider the equations from t=1 to t=T< ∞ 0 0

1 1 1

2 2 2 1

1

1:

2 : (1 )

:

T T T

(1 )

T

t c b a

t c b a r b

t T c b a r b

= + =

= + = + +

= + = + +

 

用 t=1 和 t=2 式子來消去b 可得1 1 2 2 1 2

1 1 1

c b a

c a

r r r

+ + = +

+ + +

(21)

用上式和 t=3 來消去b 可得 2

( ) ( ) ( )

3 3 3

2 2

1 2 2 1 2

1 1 1 1 1

c b a

c a

c a

r r r r r

+ + + = + +

+ + + + + 重複上述過程可得

( )

1

( )

1

( )

1

1

1 1

1

1

T T

t T t

t T t

t t

c b a

r

r

r

= =

+ =

+ + +

∑ ∑

期時上式右邊

( ) ( )

3 2

1 2

1 1

a a

a r r

+ + +

+ + 就是各期稟賦折算到今天的

價值總和。

Assume:

(

1

)

1 0

T T

b r + =

b >T 0⇒ not optimal b <T 0⇒ not feasible ∴bT = 0

T→ ∞

( )

1

( )

1

1

1

1

1

t t

t t

t t

c a

x

r r

= =

= =

+ +

∑ ∑

( II ) Decision Problem

 Conditions

Given

{

at = ytT rt, t

}

t=1

{ } 1

( )

, 1

max

t t

t c b t

t

β u c

=

St ct+bt =at + +

(

1 rt1

)

bt1t b = 0 0

(22)

 FOC

For any time t consider the trade off between c and t ct1 holding other fixed

t 1

b

b

t

t 1

b

+

Period t Period t+1

c

t

c

t+1

a

t

a

t+1

fixed

( )

( )

1 1

1 1 1

1 1

t t t t t

t t t t t

c b a r b

c b a r b

+ + +

+ = + +

+ = + +

1 1 1 1

t t t t t

c b S c+ r

∆ = − ⇒ ∆ = ∆ = ⇒ ∆ = + Marginal cost of saving at t:u c'

( )

t

Marginal gain of saving at t:βu c'

(

t+1

)(

1+rt

)

FOC:u c'

( )

tu c'

( )(

t+1 1+rt

)

t

( )

1

(

2

)(

1

)

' t ' t 1 t

u c+u c+ +r+

( )

2

(

2

) ( )(

1

)

' t ' t 1 t 1 t

u cu c+  +r +r+

Marginal gain:若今天存一塊,明天不花,後天才花,則到後天會有

(

1+rt

)(

1+rt+1

)

乘上 MU 後在折算回今天,就是上是右方。

1

(1 )

t t

b r

+

= +

t t+1

t

1

∆ = − c

1

0

c

t+

∆ =

t+2

2

(1 )(1

1

)

t

t t

b

r r

+

+

= + +

In general:u c'

( )

tju c'

( )

t+j

(

1+rt

)(

1+rt+1

)



(

1+rt+ −j 1

)

j=1, 2,

( ) ( )

,

( )(

1

) (

1

)

' 1 1 1

'

t

t t j t t t j

j t j

u c MRS r r r

β u c+ = + = + + +  + + −

(23)

 Discuss

上面說今天存一塊,明天不花,後天才花。但若改成明天花一些,

後天在花一些,會不會又什麼不一樣?

Plane1:∆ = − 全留到 t+2 ct 1

Plane2:∆ = − ct 1 ∆ct+1 = ,rtbt+1= ,1 ∆ct+2 = +1 rt+1 每期都花一些

FOC:

Plane1:u c'

( )

t2u c'

(

t+2

) (

 1+rt

)(

1+rt+1

)

 Plane2:u c'

( )

tu c'

( )

t+1 rt2u c'

(

t+2

)(

1+rt+1

)

Pf:兩者一樣

( )

1

(

2

)(

1

)

' t ' t 1 t

u c+u c+ +r+

Plane2:u c'

( )

tu c'

( )

t+1 rt2u c'

(

t+2

)(

1+rt+1

)

2u c'

(

t+2

)(

1+rt+1

)

rt2u c'

(

t+2

)(

1+rt+1

)

2u c'

(

t+2

) (

1+rt

)(

1+rt+1

)

 = Plane1

意義:不論如何分配資源的效果都一樣,因為終身效用已經極大化。

 Summary

ISE:

(1) r ↑ known at time t tc ctd, td+1,ctd+2,ctd+j

r ↑ 表示儲蓄有利tctd ↓,ctd+1↑,ctd+2 ↑,ctd+j

(2) rt+j ↑ known at time t ⇒c ctd, td+1,ctd+2,ctd+j

只要今天知道,今天行為就會改,不用等到 t=t+j

1 2 1 1

, , , , ,

d d d d d d

t t t t j t j t j

c c+ c+ c+ − c+ c+ +

⇒ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑

(3) rt1↑ suddenly:分 lender & borrower 考慮 (和 Ch8 同)

(24)

c 2

c1 c1=c

c2=c

45 line0

1 slope= +r

1 slope= +ρ r=ρ

WE:

(1) a ↑ temporarily:t c ↑ for all t td S ↑ td

(2) a ↑ permanently:t c ↑ for all t td S → td Summary:

1 1

( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

, , ; , ,

d d

t t t t t

c c r r

+

a a

+

− − + +

 

=  

 

 

ISE WE

1 1 2

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

, , ; , , ,

d d

t t t t t t

S c r r

+

a a

+

a

+

+ + +

 

=  

 

 

ISE WE

( III ) Optimal Consumption Profile (Assume

rt =rt

)

 Relation of r &ρ ( )

( ) ( )

1

' 1

' 1 1

t t

u c r

r t

u c β

+ ρ

= + = + ∀

+ ,r ρ為外生 (1) r =ρ

u c'

( )

t =u c'

( )

t+1t ct = constant tc

用 FOC + lifetime budget constrain 可以解所有變數 所以用 lifetime budget constrain 解 c

( )

1

( )

2

1

1 1 1

1 1

1 1

t t t

c r

x c c

r r

r r

=

  +

= =  + + + =

+  + + 



1 c r x

∴ = r +

(25)

(2) r >ρ

u c'

( )

t >u c'

( )

t+1t

ct <ct+1 ∀ (邊際效用遞減) t

c

2

c

1

45 line

0

r > ρ r = ρ

r > ρ

slope = + 1 r

(3) r <ρ

u c'

( )

t <u c'

( )

t+1t

ct >ct+1 ∀ (邊際效用遞減) t

c

2

c

1

45 line

0

r < ρ

r=

ρ

r<

ρ

slope = + 1 r

(26)

r

t

t r = ρ

1 10 20

c

t

t 1

c r x

= r +

10 21

c

t

t r > ρ

r = ρ

r < ρ

假設終身所得相同,則上方 3 條線積分面積相同。

(4) Example 1

t=1~9:r =ρ 所以各期消費相等但較少 ct = < c c t=10~20:r >ρ ct <ct+1

t=21~ ∞ :r =ρ 所以各期消費相等但較多 ct =c'> c 因不考慮財富效果,所以右圖兩條線積分面積=終身財富=x 若考慮財富效果,右圖圖形形狀不變,只是上下移動而已。

(5) Example 2

u c

( )

=lnc

( )

( )

1 1

' 1

' 1

t t

t t

u c r c

u c ρ c

+ +

= + = +

消費成長率=lnct+1−lnct =ln 1

(

+r

)

−ln 1

(

)

≈ −r ρ

(27)

( IV ) Permanent Income Hypothesis (Milton Friedman)

 Review

{ } 1

( )

, 1

max

t t

t c b t

t

β u c

=

St ct+bt =at + +

(

1 rt1

)

bt1t b = 0 0 Or 1

(

1

)

1 1

(

1

)

1 (1 ) 0 1

t t

t t

t t

c a

r b x

r r

= =

= + + =

+ +

∑ ∑

if rt = r

x :Lifetime wealth at t=1 1

 Milton Friedman

P T

t t t

y = y +y

y :Observed (actual) income at time t t P

y :Permanent income ex:工作所得 t T

y :transitory income ex:中獎 t P

y 和t y 是無法分別觀測到的,Milton 認為消費只和tT y 有關,和tP y 無Tt 關。

P

t t

cy φ=some constant (close to one)

t 1990

y

t P

y

t

c

t

P

y

t T

y

t

(28)

因為消費只和y 有關,所以tP y 都被儲蓄,tT y 有正有負都被儲蓄tT

⇒ consumption smoothing

Define:A person’s permanent income from a perspective of time t is an imputed or imaginary constant flow of income from t on, of which the discounted sum equals the person’s lifetime wealth at time t.

 2 period case (

b =0 0

)

2

1 1

1 x a a

= + r

+ let y =permanent income

1 1

y y x

+ r =

+ 1 1

2

y r x

r +

 

=  + 

2

1 1

1 x a a

= + r

+ 代入 1 1 1 2

2 2

y r a a

r r

+

   

= +  + +  真實所得的加權平均

c

2

c

1

1

y = y

P

a

2

45 line

0

slope = + 1 r B

2

y = y

P

A

a

1

1T

0 y >

2

0

y <

T

每一期 y 相同 ⇒ 在450線上 1 1

y y x

+ r =

+ ⇒ 在預算限制線上

所以可知所求在兩線交點

FOC:u c'

( )

1u c'

( )(

2 1+r1

)

1

β 1

= ρ

+ if r= ρ

1 2

c =c = y ∴ = φ 1

參考文獻

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