出席國際學術會議心得報告 - 現象學倫理學--- 從優納斯、漢娜鄂蘭、海德格向胡塞爾回(III)

計畫編號 NSC 95-2411-H-004-005 (2006/08/01 ~ 2007/07/31)

計畫名稱現象學倫理學 – 從優納斯、漢娜鄂蘭、海德格向胡塞爾回溯(3/3)

出國人員姓名

服務機關及職稱汪文聖 (國立政治大學哲學系教授) 會議時間地點 2006 年 9 月 22-25 日，於日本東京

會議名稱 2^nd International Conference of “Phenomenology for East-Asian Circle”

發表論文題目 Phenomenological Experience as Aesthetic Experience – On the free Exchangeability between transcendental and natural Attitude

一、參加會議經過

本次會議係第二屆東亞圈現象學國際會議，該會議每兩年在東亞國家輪流舉辦，本屆由日本東京大學舉辦，主題為：「經驗是什麼？知覺、科學與生活世界」(What is experience? – Perception, Science and Life-World)。在四天裡共有 15 個 Sections，31 篇論文發表。與會人士中國大陸學者有四位，台灣學者有四位，香港學者有五位，韓國學者有五位，日本學者有八位，另外來自歐美及澳洲的五位學者。會議論文涵蓋的哲學家有胡塞爾、海德格、列維納斯、梅洛龐蒂、黑格爾、維根斯坦等，並呈現了與科學哲學、心靈或神經哲學、醫療照顧等跨學科的現象學課題，並有與儒學及佛學比較的討論出現。

會議的安排與第一屆於香港中文大學舉辦的類似，參與學者以圓桌會議的方式，進行內部的討論為主，周遭參與的外賓並不多。因而討論的內容有其深度並頗，並不以拼裝門面的好大喜功為尚。

東京大學提供住宿於舊有奧林匹克運動員宿舍，會議亦在該選手村旁舉行。其慷慨支付學者出席費，與會人士的交通費用，與午餐皆由此支付。日方宴請招待晚餐，會議中有半日遊的安排，包括東京大學校園的巡覽。

事務會議 (Business meeting) 中決定第三屆於 2009 年在韓國首爾大學舉行 (因 2008 年首爾舉辦世界哲學會議)，第四屆於 2011 年在中國大陸舉行，第五屆則於 2013 年在台灣舉行。

因為主辦人 Jyunichi Murata (村田純一) 研究領域為現象學與科學理論間的關係，其建立了神經科學與現象學關係的研究學圈，故有不少日本學者提出有關的論文。

其他國家學者的論文則多呈現多元性，較單純就哲學理論為主題。

二、與會心得

東亞圈現象學國際會議係由全球 OPO (Organization of Phenomenological Organizations) 的負責單位：「現象學進階研究中心」(Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology) 與東亞現象學者合作創立，藉此會議的確可讓東方與西方的現象學學者得到交流與砌磋的機會。經過幾次參與，也深覺國內的現象學水準並不差，前提是必須對現象學文獻文本閱讀精細，才能更去確實掌握其深義；惟國內現象學界對東方哲學的詮釋並未如中國大陸之蓬勃，這是尚待加強之處；國內現象學者也多未對英美分析與神經科學有所涉獵，

更何談彼此的合作研究，這已見於日本及中國大陸學界。意台灣現象學界也必須早日成立現象學學會成為 OPO 的會員，才能以更適合的名份主辦東亞圈現象學國際會議及參與 OPO 的國性交流會議。

本人的論文如下：

Phenomenological Experience as Aesthetic Experience - On the free exchangeability between transcendental and natural attitude

WANG, Wen-Sheng (National Chengchi University, Taiwan)

1. Introduction - should we be afraid of the notion “transcendental”?

Many philosophers, maybe including some phenomenologists, are not very confident of the notion of “transcendental” in Husserl’s phenomenology, even if they think Husserl’s phenomenology has contributed to the “transcendental” in another sense, as Kant’s transcendental philosophy did. In what sense the two great philosophers differently understand the

“transcendental” needs reconsideration. For Husserl himself the “transcendental turn” seems to be influenced by Natorp. His transcendental phenomenology also seems to have already left his descriptive phenomenology, which must be based upon our lived experience (Erlebnis). Does this mean that transcendental phenomenology is neither descriptive nor based on our experience? Does it further mean that Husserl’s “transcendental turn” shows us, as Kant did, some principles a priori, which on the one hand are transcendent of our experience, and, on the other hand, can be applied to our experience? If it were that, in what sense would Husserl be distinguished from Kant in regard to their conceptions of “transcendental”?

I think some philosophers are afraid of the notion “transcendental” because they connect its meaning with idealism. Idealism is just to be avoided by those scholars who seriously take our experience into consideration. Certainly, Kant’s great contribution is through his “transcendental turn” to explicate the condition of the possibility of our knowledge, praxis and taste in our reasonable subjectivity. So he himself calls his philosophy “transcendental idealism”; however, he also calls it “empirical realism.” Why? Does Kant want, with such an assertion, to combine idealism and realism, or, in other words, to compensate the gap between the idealistic subject and the realistic object?

We see this compensation in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where he highlights sensibility and understanding both as the necessary conditions of the possibility of our knowledge. We see also this compensation in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, where he brings freedom and nature together.

Freedom and nature here are no longer mutually exclusive (“Introduction” I - III). In the Second Part of Critique of Judgment they are together because moral freedom acquires its objective reality in nature through our belief in God. Therefore freedom, God, and the human immortal soul become the three ultimate goals (Endzwecke) of nature (§ 88).

But I am interested rather in the First Part of Critique of Judgment, where freedom and nature are brought together in regard to the condition of the possibility of our taste. The discussion of the objectivity of our aesthetic taste, namely of our feeling about beautiful, natural and artificial things, is the theme. The word “aesthetic” has a double meaning: regarding beauty on the one hand and the subjective sense and feeling on the other hand (§§ 6-9). The reason why the discussion about the objectivity of our subjective sensibility is connected with the discussion of the objectivity of our

own experience of beauty will be explained later. What I now want to point out is the connection between subject and object is very similar to what Husserl shows us in his phenomenology.

It is with good reason that we think of Kant’s philosophy as “transcendental idealism” and at the same time as “empirical realism,” aiming to reach what Husserl in his phenomenology has done, namely to “dissolve all philosophical contrasts between rationalism and empiricism, relativism and absolutism, psychologism and anti-psychologism” (Hua IX 299-300). Kant has in his Critique reached this point before. Some of his expressions-- e.g. “reflective judgment”, “purposiveness without purpose”-- can even help us understand what Husserl wants to do.

“Transcendental” in Husserl’s phenomenology is rightly connected with “empirical”, just as

“idealism” or “rationalism” is connected with “empiricism”. Therefore we need not be afraid of the notion of “transcendental” by Husserl, because we will not escape our sensible experience when we stay in the transcendental attitude. Regarding Kant’s discussion in Critique of Judgment, as already mentioned, we call the phenomenological experience an aesthetic experience. In corresponding to the assertion of Kant that his philosophy is both “transcendental idealism” and “empirical realism”, we formulate the problem in Husserl’s phenomenology as the free exchangeability between transcendental and natural attitude.

My purpose in this paper is: 1) to show Husserl’s phenomenological experience as aesthetic; it indicates some similarity between Husserl’s phenomenology and Kant’s transcendental philosophy, especially in regard to his Critique of Judgment, and 2) to explain the free exchangeability between transcendental and natural attitude in Husserl’s phenomenology, which can dissolve the philosophical contrasts between idealism and realism more profoundly than Kant’s philosophy did.

2. What are the transcendental experience and the pure ego in Husserl’s phenomenology?

In his Logical Investigations (Hua XIX/1 A 328f.), Husserl differentiates between “the appearance of thing” (die Dingerscheinung) and the “appearing thing” (das erscheinende Ding). He calls the former “lived experience” (Erlebnis), and says: “The appearances themselves do not appear, they are lively experienced”(Die Erscheinungen sebst erscheinen nicht, sie werden erlebt) (A 330). Further, we read a sharper formulation: “Between the lively experienced […] content and the lived experience itself there is no difference” (A 330).

Indeed, in this time Husserl sees the lived experience as “real” (reell). The lived experience “is not itself what is intentionally present ‘in’ it” ([ist] nicht selbst das, was „in“ ihm intentional gegenwärtig ist) (A 329). That means the lived experience belongs to the side of the subjective act, not to the side of the intentional object. The intentional act itself is no more an intentional object.

We see clearly in paragraph 10 of the V. Logical Investigation “Descriptive characteristic of the acts as ‘intentional’ lived experience” (B 366). But when we notice only the side of the appearance of thing (or the intentional act, the lived experience), we see only on this side the appearance and the appearing are identical. About this I want to highlight two points.

First, the immediate function of the intentionality, which Heidegger in Prolegomena to

Therein we see Heidegger’s critique of Husserl. On the contrary, the lively experienced content just as the lived experience itself is immediately shown in our consciousness, but they are not the intentional object. The intentional object cannot be shown immediately in our consciousness.

However, later I will note that Husserl’s conception of the intentionality is changed.

Second, the transcendental experience itself belongs to the empirical level. I think that the transcendental level is taken into account within the empirical due to the theme of consciousness.

In Logical Investigations, the consciousness of experiences is first a phenomenological ego in the empirical or psychological sense. Even Husserl talks about the phenomenologically reduced ego, but this is just meant as the purely mental ego (das rein psychische Ich) from which the ego-body is separated (B 353). So the phenomenological consciousness or ego is the “relational focus”

(Beziehungspunkt) (B 352), namely it is related to all experiences, or in other words: “it is simply identical with their [experiences’] own interconnected unity” (es ist einfach mit ihrer eigenen Verknüpfungseinheit identisch) (B 353). It is “a unified sum total of content” (eine einheitliche Inhaltsgesamtheit) (B 354). We must have in mind that within the lived experience the three terms

“consciousness,” “experience,” and “content” have only one sense, to which naturally the phenomenological ego belongs, too (B 354).

Up to this point, this was what Husserl called the first consciousness. The second consciousness is “inner consciousness” or “inner perception” (B 354f). It is adequate, for “the object in it is itself actually present, and in the strictest sense present” (der Gegenstand in ihr selbst wirklich und in strengstem Sinn “leibhaftig” gegenwärtig) (B 355). The second consciousness is narrow in comparison with the first. The narrow consciousness is in the Second Edition not a simply empirical ego, but results from the reduction of the empirical ego to “its content as can be grasped by the pure phenomenologist” (seinen rein phänomenologisch faßbaren Gehalt) (B 357). It is what is adequately perceived. It is the kernel that makes possible and provides a ground for the evidence of the judgment “I am” and other unnumbered judgments of the “I perceive this or that.”

This kernel is the “pure ego” (B 357).

It is well known that Husserl in the First Edition of Logical Investigations rejects the pure ego, because he wants to avoids the “metaphysics of ego” (Ichmetaphysik) (B 361, note 1), and he thinks that the pure ego, which at least is for Natorp not the object of all thinking and knowing, should be metaphysical. In the Second Edition, Husserl accepts the pure ego, certainly for the reason that just the pure ego in the transcendental attitude can guarantee the objective knowledge. But he does not really accept Natorp’s pure ego, because Husserl’s pure ego is not only the object of thinking, which is common to Kant’s pure ego, but also can be given in the lived experience, which for Kant only happens in the empirical ego (Düsing: Selbsbewußtseinsmodell, S. 28-31). However, is the question still not cleared by Husserl, as Düsing says: “How can these empirical determinations of the ego combine with the pure or transcendental ego?” (ibid. S. 31). To respond to this question is my theme in this paper.

I find that Husserl’s first consciousness, which we saw above as the empirical, and the second consciousness, the pure ego, both mean the “relational focus” (B 359), to which all contents of

consciousness are related. It is also well known that in the First edition the phenomenological ego is

“conscious unity” (Bewußtseinseinheit) and “‘bundle’ of experiences” (‘Bündel’ der Erlebnisse) (A 356). They are related to the empirical ego. In the Second Edition, Husserl also speaks of them, but in both the pure and empirical version (B 376-377). However, what does this unity or bundle mean?

Is it not inconsistent with ego as the relational focus?

Husserl has explained how the experience can be extended from the narrow consciousness (the pure ego) to the broad consciousness (the empirical ego) (B 358-359). It is owing to the temporality of the experience (Erlebiniszeit). But is the pure ego itself the flux of the consciousness, namely as a unity (Düsing, S. 31)? Or is the pure ego only characterized with the potentiality of temporality of the experience, namely as a focus? The question of how the determinations of the empirical ego are combined with the pure ego can be cleared when the two sides of the pure ego, unity and focus, can be taken together in a favorable relationship.

In Husserl’s later work Cartesian Meditations, the identity of the “I am” as “absolute indubitable in transcendental self-experience” corresponds to the relational focus, and “a universal apodictically experienceable structure of the Ego” that “extends through all the particular data of actual and possible self-experience, even though they are not absolutely indubitable in respect of single details” (Hua I 67) agrees with the conscious unity. They compose “the infinite field of transcendental experience” (ibid. 69), and our phenomenological task is just to lay it open.

Now, for us it is important to know that the transcendental experience aims to assure not only the conscious unity, which naturally includes the relational focus in a factual sense, but also to assure the potentiality of the conscious unity, namely the condition of the possibility of it. This potentiality is implicated in what Husserl expresses as the relational focus, which does not still show itself factually as a point within the whole conscious unity. If we only take the factual conscious unity into account, we forget its origin. We can empirically describe this conscious unity, including the relational focus, so far as we need only to assert the empirical phenomenological ego as a bundle of the temporal experiences or the relational focus. However, if we want to describe how the conscious unity is emerged from the origin, disregarding whether the description could refer to the last origin of the conscious unity or not, the transcendental experience is necessary.

Regarding the transcendental experience, Husserl speaks of the transcendental or pure ego in the two aspects already mentioned.

3. How can we seek the relational focus as the origin of the conscious unity regarding the two aspects of the pure ego?

The descriptive phenomenology aims to describe the essence of things themselves, but how can this aim be attained? The description must be based on our lived experience. By what is a thorough lived experience characterized, so that a thing shows itself as its essence for that experience? We know that the transcendental reflection plays an important role, but how can we explain that, to a certain extent of consciousness after the reflection, the thing shows us just as itself?

We know also that this is owing to our release from all prejudices of the thing, but the reason needs

I have emphasized the pure ego as the relational focus within the conscious unity. On this side of the ego and the act there is no difference between consciousness, experience, and content. Still, ego and act must be directed at an object. So in Logical Investigations Husserl proposes the third consciousness as “intentional experiences” (B 346); with it the meanings of the consciousness is more or less complete.

Now to the question of how we can describe the essence of the thing itself-- in other words, how the thing can show itself in our intentional consciousness. We must take into account Husserl’s discussion about the quality and the matter (Materie) of an intentional act.

With Husserl’s words, in short, “our distinction posited two sides in every act: its quality, which stamped it as, e.g., presentation or judgment, and its matter, that lent it direction to an object, which made a presentation, e.g., present this object and no other” (B 414). Husserl remarks with the

在文檔中現象學倫理學--- 從優納斯、漢娜鄂蘭、海德格向胡塞爾回(III) (頁 32-45)