第五章 結論與建議
第三節 後續建議
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第三節 後續建議
針對本研究探討之議題，後續研究者可朝下列其他方向深入探討:
1. 在研究變數上可以加入借款條件之差異，本研究認為可以加入借款是否有擔 保品，借款利率為浮動或是固定，借款是否為聯合貸款等變數來做更周全的 討論。
2. 依據國外之文獻指出，銀行往來家數會與銀行市場的集中程度及公開舉債市 場的發達程度有關聯，因此，本研究認為後續可針對不同國家之銀行體系及 舉債市場之成熟度來探討銀行往來家數的影響。
3. 在解釋變數的部分可以加入銀行內部持有(inside holding)的變數探討，由 於銀行的內部持有會影響企業之借款條件與績效表現，故建議後續研究可以 將此變數加入討論。
4. 除了銀行往來家數，本研究認為尚可加入企業變更往來銀行對企業績效之影 響，Von Thadden(1992)提出 Information Lock-in Problem，指的是單一往 來銀行會利用資訊上的優勢來創造不利於企業之借款條件，例如提高融資利 率、提高擔保品價值等，因此企業可能會藉由變更銀行來獲得較好的借款條 件，但若變更往來銀行的頻率變高，可能隱含企業之體質較差，造成逆選擇 等問題，建議後續研究者能對此有更深入的研究。
5. 本研究主要為對企業經營績效之探討，對於企業之投資面較少著墨，根據 Houston and James(2001)、Diamond(1993)的研究，若企業主要使用銀行貸 款來做為內部資金需求之融通，銀行會對企業之投資計畫進行介入，可能導 致企業投資效率不彰的問題，建議後續研究者可以將投資面的影響加入，使 得研究更加完整。
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