1st-stage regression: Dependent variables
lnVegat lnDeltat
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2nd-stage regression: Dependent variables
Total_riskt Syst_riskt Idio_riskt Z-scoret
lnAsset t-1 0.000460 0.000551*
0.0506** 0.0728***
-0.000416 -0.000280
-0.0912** -0.0830**
(0.99) (1.93) (2.42) (4.34) (-0.94) (-1.14) (-2.11) (-2.41)
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Intercept 0.00572 0.0105***
0.586** 0.698***
Observations 622 622
622 622
本表係檢驗 71 家樣本銀行之 CEO 風險承受性薪酬對股票報酬波動度及銀行風險之迴歸結果，根據 Coles, Daniel, and Naveen（2006）及 DeYoung, Peng, Yan（2013），
兩階段迴歸模型可設立為
財富變動之總額（Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006），lnDelta為Delta之自然對數，Delta定義為股價變動1%時，薪酬財富變動之總額（Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006），Vested opts/Cashcomp 為價內的既得股票選擇權之價值占現金薪酬之比率，其他銀行相關控制變數整理於附錄1的表 中。根據All-in-spread drawn、lnVega、 lnDelta及M/B ratio等四個主要變數進行刪除極端值，將超過上下1%的樣本刪除，最後的樣本共包含71家銀行。固定效果 估計之係數未呈現於本表中，標準誤經過異質性（heteroskedasticity）及個別銀行的群聚性調整。括弧中為T值，*、**、***分別代表10%、5%及1%之雙尾T檢定
之顯著性。
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表 1 敘述性統計－非銀行業
Panel A: Loan Attributes
Variables Unit N Mean Std P5 P25 Median P75 P95
Loan Conditions
All-in spread drawn Basis points 12,415 133.697 109.563 20.000 45.000 100.000 200.000 350.000 All-in spread undrawn Basis points 8,809 23.280 19.577 5.000 10.000 15.000 35.000 50.000 Loan amount Million 12,415 573.291 1,090.830 40.000 140.780 300.000 625.000 1,940.000
Maturity Months 12,104 44.850 24.757 12.000 20.000 52.000 60.000 84.000
Collateral Y=1; N=0 7,584 0.525 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
# of lenders Number 12,415 11.690 10.124 1.000 5.000 9.000 16.000 29.000
# of lead banks Number 12,415 1.749 1.474 1.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 3.000
Lead bank shares Percent 12,390 53.877 35.285 7.480 19.355 50.000 100.000 100.000
Covenants Y=1; N=0 12,415 0.577 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
# of covenants Number 12,415 1.238 1.282 0.000 0.000 1.000 2.000 4.000
Loan Type
1: 364-Day Facility Y=1; N=0 12,415 0.186 0.389 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
2: Revolver/Line < 1 Year Y=1; N=0 12,415 0.021 0.144 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3: Revolver/Line >= 1 Year Y=1; N=0 12,415 0.540 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
4: Term loan Y=1; N=0 12,415 0.086 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
5: Others Y=1; N=0 12,415 0.167 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Loan Purpose
1: Corp. purposes Y=1; N=0 12,415 0.353 0.478 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
2: CP backup Y=1; N=0 12,415 0.136 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
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CEO Specific Characters
CEO's age Number 11,978 55.466 6.680 44.000 51.000 56.000 60.000 66.000
CEO tenure Number 11,857 6.229 6.242 0.000 2.000 4.000 8.000 19.000
lnCEO tenure Natural log 12,415 1.578 0.881 0.000 1.099 1.609 2.197 2.996
Sub-sample after 2006
Inside debt $'000 3,159 6,929.690 12,422.280 0.000 179.302 2,455.420 8,811.810 26,975.560 Inside equity $'000 3,192 49,855.320 104,009.910 1,912.810 9,251.110 20,182.600 46,018.320 195,432.870
CEO debt / equity Number 3,159 0.391 0.955 0.000 0.009 0.118 0.412 1.574
RLEV Number 3,143 3.833 38.196 0.000 0.024 0.340 1.246 6.135
RLEV_PEN Number 3,140 1.823 14.987 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.615 3.648
RLEV_ODC Number 3,139 2.014 33.263 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.393 2.799
High RLEV Y=1; N=0 3,143 0.312 0.463 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Panel C: Firm Control Variables
Variables Unit N Mean Std P5 P25 Median P75 P95
lnAsset Natural log 12,415 8.045 1.466 5.715 6.952 7.963 9.180 10.440
Market capitalization Natural log 12,415 7.837 1.533 5.409 6.749 7.778 8.881 10.430
M/B Number 12,415 2.934 2.318 0.863 1.528 2.267 3.480 7.415
Equity ratio Number 12,415 0.384 0.158 0.149 0.268 0.373 0.487 0.669
ROA Number 12,415 0.043 0.054 -0.044 0.020 0.043 0.072 0.127
ROE Number 12,415 0.112 0.179 -0.163 0.062 0.121 0.181 0.339
Leverage Number 12,415 0.296 0.148 0.057 0.191 0.292 0.390 0.561
Tangibility Number 12,415 0.355 0.221 0.064 0.173 0.306 0.523 0.770
Tobins'Q Number 12,415 1.694 0.841 0.955 1.170 1.445 1.935 3.215
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Panel A: Year if sample firms with and without bank loans in this year Year lnVega lnDelta
risk Syst_risk Idio_risk 1992 2.943 4.097 0.016 . . . . 0.017 1.003 0.016
Panel B: Year if sample firms have bank loans in this year Year lnVega lnDelta
risk Syst_risk Idio_risk 1992 3.598 5.064 0.270 . . . . 0.021 1.006 0.020
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Panel C: Year if sample firms do not have bank loans in this year Year lnVega lnDelta
risk Syst_risk Idio_risk 1992 2.943 4.097 0.016 . . . . 0.017 1.003 0.016 Panel D: Difference between year with and without bank loans
Year lnVega lnDelta
risk Syst_risk Idio_risk 1992 0.654 0.966 0.255 . . . . 0.004 0.003 0.004 1993 0.654 0.873 0.272 . . . . 0.001 0.123 0.001 1994 0.794 1.031 0.454 . . . . 0.000 -0.026 0.000 1995 0.475 0.943 0.615 . . . . 0.003 0.024 0.002 1996 0.589 1.194 0.564 . . . . 0.001 0.038 0.000
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2003 0.678 0.892 0.310 . . . . -0.008 -0.112 -0.007 2004 0.540 0.991 0.170 . . . . -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 2005 0.439 0.824 0.750 . . . . -0.003 -0.089 -0.003 2006 0.448 1.836 0.307 -2.207 -17.318 -14.053 -3.333 -0.000 -0.029 -0.001 2007 0.144 -0.147 -0.469 0.259 -1.246 -0.310 -0.936 0.020 0.108 0.011 2008 0.655 0.783 0.159 -1.124 -2.389 -2.421 0.032 -0.005 0.129 -0.002 2009 0.450 0.552 0.239 -0.056 -1.851 -1.680 -0.171 -0.012 -0.097 -0.010 2010 0.076 0.056 -0.029 -0.038 -5.533 -2.327 -3.206 -0.000 -0.005 -0.000 本表為 1,560 家借款公司在 1992 年至 2010 年的樣本期間內，CEO 薪酬及股票報酬波動風險之歷年平均 值，Panel A 為所有樣本期間；Panel B 為有銀行聯貸的年度；Panel C 為沒有銀行聯貸的年度；Panel D 為有銀行聯貸及沒有銀行聯貸年度之差。CEO 薪酬資料及聯貸資料分別來自 Execucomp 資料庫及 Dealscan 資料庫，CEO 的 Vega、Delta 及內部權益的資料來自 Core, Daniel, and Naveen（2006）及 Daniel, Li, and Naveen（2013）所提供的資料，樣本為美國的借款公司，並刪除金融業的公司，而樣本期間為 1992 年至 2010 年。財務會計資料來自 Execucomp 資料庫及 Compusta 北美版資料庫，公司的股價報酬 來自 CRSP 資料庫。除了聯貸總額及財務條件限制個數外，根據所有連續性自變數刪除離群值，將超過 上下 1%的樣本刪除。最後的樣本共包含 1,560 家公司、9,086 筆個別借款、6,905 筆借款合約，以及 12,415 筆個別借款銀行樣本，CEO debt / equity、RLEV、RLEV_PEN 及 RLEV_ODC 之數值因為 SEC 揭露規範 改變的關係，Execucomp 資料庫僅在 2006 年以後才有提供，詳細的變數定義整理於附錄 1 的表中。
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（differences in mean test）之結果。共將樣本期間分為5個時期，Period 1為1992年至1999年；Period 2為2000年至2005年，2006年SEC對於高階經理人薪酬揭露制 度改變前；Period 3為2006年至2007年，為2006年SEC對於高階經理人薪酬揭露制度變更後，以及美國金融海嘯爆發前；Period 4為2008年至2009年，為金融海嘯 期間；Period 5為2010年，亦即金融海嘯過後。CEO薪酬資料及聯貸資料分別來自Execucomp資料庫及Dealscan資料庫，CEO的Vega、Delta及內部權益的資料來自
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Core, Daniel, and Naveen（2006）及Daniel, Li, and Naveen（2013）所提供的資料，樣本為美國的借款公司，並刪除金融業的公司，而樣本期間為1992年至2010年。
財務會計資料來自Execucomp資料庫及Compusta北美版資料庫，公司的股價報酬來自CRSP資料庫。除了聯貸總額及財務條件限制個數外，根據所有連續性自變數 刪除離群值，將超過上下1%的樣本刪除。最後的樣本共包含1,560家公司、9,086筆個別借款、6,905筆借款合約，以及12,415筆個別借款銀行樣本，詳細的變數定
義整理於附錄1的表中。括弧中為T值，*、**、***分別代表10%、5%及1%之雙尾T檢定之顯著性。
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表 4 CEO 薪酬與股票報酬風險之關係
Total_riskt Syst_riskt Idio_riskt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
lnVegat-1 -0.000557*** -0.00385 -0.000533***
(-4.16) (-1.18) (-4.11)
lnDeltat-1 0.00000172 0.00875*** -0.0000935
(0.02) (2.97) (-1.20)
Vegat-1/1,000 -0.000194 -0.0720*** 0.000339
(-0.34) (-2.61) (0.78)
Delta / Totalcompt-1 2.16E-07 3.49E-06 1.64E-07
(1.49) (0.59) (1.14)
ln (Vested opts/
Cashcomp) t-1 0.000110 0.00403 0.00000164
(1.52) (1.45) (0.02)
RLEV t-1 -1.32E-06 -0.0182 0.00031
(-0.01) (-0.48) (0.31)
lnCashcomp t-1 0.0000537 0.0000431 0.00116 0.0126* -0.00294 -0.0000140 -0.0000730 -0.000339
(0.34) (0.27) (0.19) (1.89) (-0.22) (-0.09) (-0.45) (-0.93)
lnAsset t-1 -0.00228*** -0.00260*** -0.00266*** -0.00312*** -0.0000978 0.00687 0.00296 -0.0137* -0.00244*** -0.00281*** -0.00284*** -0.00310***
(-16.44) (-19.69) (-23.28) (-16.92) (-0.02) (1.13) (0.57) (-1.80) (-18.22) (-21.99) (-25.43) (-14.74)
M/B t-1 0.000756** 0.000662 0.000387 0.00123 -0.0443* -0.0285 -0.0431* 0.158 -0.000674 -0.000897 -0.00106 -0.0017
(1.97) (1.64) (0.83) (0.14) (-1.74) (-1.51) (-1.70) (0.54) (-1.28) (-1.58) (-1.47) (-0.22)
Equity ratio t-1 -0.00332** -0.00347*** -0.00398*** -0.0123*** 0.0987* 0.112** 0.0973* -0.193** -0.00477*** -0.00486*** -0.00528*** -0.0119***
(-2.48) (-2.58) (-2.95) (-4.73) (1.88) (2.13) (1.86) (-2.22) (-3.74) (-3.83) (-4.14) (-4.69)
ROA t-1 -0.0362*** -0.0410*** -0.0379*** -0.0520*** -0.579*** -0.603*** -0.561*** -0.440*** -0.0349*** -0.0406*** -0.0368*** -0.0501***
(-14.34) (-17.51) (-14.58) (-10.45) (-7.58) (-7.17) (-7.56) (-3.62) (-13.57) (-16.80) (-13.86) (-9.92)
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Tangibility t-1 -0.000829 -0.000755 -0.000561 0.00473*** 0.0393 0.0222 0.0388 0.120** -0.000957 -0.000832 -0.000705 0.00331**
(-0.96) (-0.87) (-0.66) (2.88) (1.17) (0.66) (1.16) (2.27) (-1.17) (-1.02) (-0.88) (2.13)
Leverage t-1 0.000135 -0.000570 -0.0000882 -0.00156 0.0146 0.0186 0.0143 -0.186* 0.000408 -0.000178 0.000333 0.000146
(0.09) (-0.37) (-0.06) (-0.49) (0.24) (0.30) (0.23) (-1.84) (0.28) (-0.12) (0.23) (0.05)
Intercept 0.0385*** 0.0401*** 0.0408*** 0.0507*** 0.649*** 0.536*** 0.682*** 1.102*** 0.0409*** 0.0429*** 0.0424*** 0.0508***
(22.02) (22.12) (26.83) (18.96) (9.01) (6.86) (10.36) (8.87) (23.80) (24.13) (28.41) (15.98)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,775 15,517 16,742 3,361 15,775 15,517 16,742 3,356 15,775 15,517 16,742 3,356
R-squared 0.494 0.501 0.495 0.559 0.112 0.117 0.114 0.225 0.463 0.467 0.460 0.467
Adj. R-squared 0.493 0.500 0.494 0.556 0.110 0.115 0.112 0.220 0.462 0.465 0.459 0.464 本表係檢驗1,560家借款公司之CEO風險承受性薪酬對股票報酬波動度及銀行風險之迴歸結果，模型1至4之應變數為股票報酬的總風險，模型5至8之應變數為系統 性風險，模型9至12之應變數為非系統性風險。Toal_risk定義為一年的股票日報酬的自然對數的標準差；Syst_risk為系統性風險，使用一年期股票日報酬估計 Fama-French三因子模型之beta係數；Idio_risk為非系統性風險，係使用一年期股票日報酬，Fama-French三因子模型之殘差的標準差。lnVega為Vega之自然對數，
Vega定義為股票報酬的標準差變動0.01時，薪酬財富變動之總額（Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006），lnDelta為Delta之自然對數，Delta定義為 股價變動1%時，薪酬財富變動之總額（Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006），Vested opts/Cashcomp為價內的既得股票選擇權之價值占現金薪酬之 比率，RLEV為CEO的相對負債權益比，定義為CEO薪酬的負債權益比對公司的負債比率（Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu, 2011; Anantharaman, Fang,
and Gong, 2013），其他公司相關控制變數整理於附錄1的表中。除了聯貸總額及財務條件限制個數外，根據所有連續性自變數刪除離群值，將超過上下1%的樣本
刪除。最後的樣本共包含1,560家公司。固定效果估計之係數未呈現於本表中，標準誤經過異質性（heteroskedasticity）及個別公司的群聚性調整，RLEV及M/B的 係數乘上1,000呈現。括弧中為T值，*、**、***分別代表10%、5%及1%之雙尾T檢定之顯著性。
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Small ( < 25% percentile) Middle ( < 75% percentile) Large ( >= 75% percentile) (Large - Small)
N Mean Std. N Mean Std. N Mean Std. Mean t-statistics
CEO risk-taking incentives - Subsample after 2006
CEO debt / equity 552 0.29 1.02 1,732 0.39 1.03 875 0.46 0.74 0.17 (3.39 ) ***
RLEV 542 5.77 50.44 1,726 2.86 37.41 875 4.56 30.05 -1.21 (-0.51 )
RLEV_PEN 539 2.87 25.06 1,726 0.95 4.09 875 2.90 19.59 0.03 (0.03 )
RLEV_ODC 538 2.94 43.39 1,726 1.91 37.00 875 1.66 10.63 -1.28 (-0.67 )
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本表為1,560家借款公司之公司規模與（1）聯貸條件；（2）股票日報酬之波動；（3）CEO風險性薪酬，三者間之平均值間差異檢定之結果。CEO薪酬資料及聯貸 資料分別來自Execucomp資料庫及Dealscan資料庫，CEO的Vega、Delta及內部權益的資料來自Core, Daniel, and Naveen（2006）及Daniel, Li, and Naveen（2013）所 提供的資料，樣本為美國的借款公司，並刪除金融業的公司，而樣本期間為1992年至2010年。財務會計資料來自Execucomp資料庫及Compusta北美版資料庫，公 司的股價報酬來自CRSP資料庫。除了聯貸總額及財務條件限制個數外，根據所有連續性自變數刪除離群值，將超過上下1%的樣本刪除。最後的樣本共包含1,560 家公司、9,086筆個別借款、6,905筆借款合約，以及12,415筆個別借款銀行樣本，詳細的變數定義整理於附錄1的表中。括弧中為T值，*、**、***分別代表10%、
5%及1%之雙尾T檢定之顯著性。
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ln (Vested opts/ Cashcomp) -1.352
(-1.53)
ln (Inside equity) -2.027
(-1.64)
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(11.76) (12.21) (11.70) (12.43) (12.51) (6.33) (5.94)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,924 11,924 11,924 11,924 11,924 3,114 3,114
R-squared 0.575 0.573 0.576 0.572 0.572 0.684 0.684
Adj. R-squared 0.574 0.571 0.574 0.570 0.570 0.680 0.680
本表為檢驗 CEO 風險性薪酬對聯貸利率加碼的迴歸結果。CEO 薪酬資料及聯貸資料分別來自 Execucomp 資料庫及 Dealscan 資料庫，CEO 的 Vega、Delta 及內部權益的資料來自 Core, Daniel, and Naveen（2006）及 Daniel, Li, and Naveen（2013）所提供的資料，樣本為美國的借款公司，並刪除 金融業的公司，而樣本期間為 1992 年至 2010 年。財務會計資料來自 Execucomp 資料庫及 Compusta 北美版資料庫，公司的股價報酬來自 CRSP 資料庫。除了聯貸總額及財務條件限制個數外，根據所 有連續性自變數刪除極端值，將超過上下 1%的樣本刪除。最後的樣本共包含 1,560 家公司、9,086 筆個別借款、6,905 筆借款合約，以及 12,415 筆個別借款銀行樣本。lnVega 為 Vega 之自然對數，
Vega 定義為股票報酬的標準差變動 0.01 時，薪酬財富變動之總額（Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006），lnDelta 為 Delta 之自然對數，Delta 定義為股價變動 1%時，薪酬財富變動之總 額（Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006），Vested opts/Cashcomp 為價內的既得股票 選擇權之價值占現金薪酬之比率，詳細的變數定義整理於附錄 1 的表中。固定效果估計之係數未呈 現於本表中，標準誤經過異質性（heteroskedasticity）及個別銀行的群聚性調整。括弧中為 T 值，*、
**、***分別代表 10%、5%及 1%之雙尾 T 檢定之顯著性。
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ln_vega 0.00345 -0.00686 0.000814
(0.17) (-0.31) (0.03)
ln_delta 0.0225 0.0253 0.0120
(1.13) (1.14) (0.35)
ln (Vested opts/ Cashcomp) 0.0132
(0.94)
ln (Inside equity) 0.0278
(1.48)
RLEV 0.000517 0.000524
(0.93) (0.94)
ln (Cashcomp) -0.000125 -0.0117 -0.00955 0.00192 -0.0148 0.125 0.120
(-0.00) (-0.26) (-0.21) (0.04) (-0.33) (1.61) (1.51)
CEO's age -0.00476 -0.00489 -0.00497 -0.00473 -0.00492 -0.00491 -0.00495
(-1.40) (-1.45) (-1.46) (-1.40) (-1.46) (-0.89) (-0.90)
lnCEOtenure 0.00195 -0.00589 -0.00574 -0.00197 -0.00837 0.0264 0.0190
(0.08) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.08) (-0.34) (0.59) (0.37) Altman Z t-1 -0.000120 -0.000148 -0.000147 -0.000132 -0.000161 0.000131 0.000101
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Intercept 1.147** 1.217** 1.195** 1.161** 1.111** 2.816*** 2.863***
(2.39) (2.50) (2.47) (2.39) (2.31) (3.55) (3.66)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,924 11,924 11,924 11,924 11,924 3,114 3,114
R-squared 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.293 0.293
Adj. R-squared 0.349 0.349 0.349 0.349 0.350 0.285 0.284
本表為檢驗 CEO 風險性薪酬對財務限制條件個數的迴歸結果。CEO 薪酬資料及聯貸資料分別來自 Execucomp 資料庫及 Dealscan 資料庫，CEO 的 Vega、Delta 及內部權益的資料來自 Core, Daniel, and Naveen（2006）及 Daniel, Li, and Naveen（2013）所提供的資料，樣本為美國的借款公司，並刪除金 融業的公司，而樣本期間為 1992 年至 2010 年。財務會計資料來自 Execucomp 資料庫及 Compusta 北 美版資料庫，公司的股價報酬來自 CRSP 資料庫。除了聯貸總額及財務條件限制個數外，根據所有連 續性自變數刪除極端值，將超過上下 1%的樣本刪除。最後的樣本共包含 1,560 家公司、9,086 筆個別 借款、6,905 筆借款合約，以及 12,415 筆個別借款銀行樣本。lnVega 為 Vega 之自然對數，Vega 定義 為股票報酬的標準差變動 0.01 時，薪酬財富變動之總額（Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006），lnDelta 為 Delta 之自然對數，Delta 定義為股價變動 1%時，薪酬財富變動之總額（Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006），Vested opts/Cashcomp 為價內的既得股票選擇權之價值占現金 薪酬之比率，詳細的變數定義整理於附錄 1 的表中。固定效果估計之係數未呈現於本表中，標準誤經 過異質性（heteroskedasticity）及個別銀行的群聚性調整。括弧中為 T 值，*、**、***分別代表 10%、
5%及 1%之雙尾 T 檢定之顯著性。
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Panel B: CEO Compensations
Variables Unit N Mean Std P5 P25 Median P75 P95
CEO Compensation Structure
Vega $'000 584 513.481 479.299 22.102 106.017 385.696 820.030 1,415.140
lnVega Natural log 597 5.481 1.587 2.355 4.532 5.870 6.690 7.255
Vega / 1000 Number 584 0.513 0.479 0.022 0.106 0.386 0.820 1.415
Vega / Cashcomp Number 575 0.200 0.656 0.005 0.031 0.083 0.201 0.626
Delta $'000 519 2,527.090 3,192.860 81.986 451.862 2,147.960 3,381.140 7,251.040
lnDelta Natural log 597 6.207 2.739 0.000 5.240 7.402 8.007 8.852
Delta / Totalcomp Number 519 0.215 0.673 0.025 0.063 0.102 0.160 0.446
Delta / Cashcomp Number 510 1.127 3.892 0.071 0.164 0.310 0.561 3.741
Inside equity $'000 519 216,495.250 310,438.900 5,950.110 37,307.240 160,902.090 277,054.070 642,362.090 ln (Inside equity) Natural log 597 10.010 4.114 0.000 9.626 11.722 12.474 13.294 ln (Totalcomp) Natural log 597 9.520 1.162 7.261 8.665 9.957 10.325 10.702
ln (Salary) Natural log 597 6.509 1.005 5.303 6.399 6.654 6.909 7.317
ln (Bonus) Natural log 597 6.507 3.527 0.000 5.930 7.873 8.913 9.745
ln (Cashcomp) Natural log 588 8.188 1.114 6.430 7.194 8.236 9.034 9.760 Cashcomp / Totalcomp Number 597 0.371 0.242 0.019 0.157 0.369 0.505 0.869 Vested opts/ Cashcomp Number 588 8.290 15.305 0.000 0.684 2.802 7.355 28.572 Vested opts/Totalcomp Number 597 4.250 31.013 0.000 0.160 0.808 2.240 8.899 ln (Vested opts/ Cashcomp) Natural log 597 1.102 1.460 -1.191 0.000 1.030 1.976 3.352 ln (Vested opts/Totalcomp) Natural log 597 0.063 1.390 -2.277 -0.598 0.000 0.807 2.186 Restricted stock / Cashcomp Number 588 9.739 22.992 0.000 0.485 2.837 6.662 56.288 Restricted stock / Totalcomp Number 597 1.234 1.614 0.000 0.146 0.807 1.818 4.220 Totalcomp $'000 597 22,858.600 24,043.630 1,423.760 5,795.710 21,093.090 30,496.170 44,456.240
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CEO Specific Characters
CEO's age Number 569 59.450 6.123 49.000 56.000 59.000 63.000 71.000
CEO tenure Number 536 6.024 4.605 0.000 2.000 5.000 8.000 15.000
lnCEO tenure Natural log 597 1.526 0.886 0.000 0.693 1.609 2.197 2.773
Sub-sample after 2006
Inside debt $'000 104 20,730.110 28,900.010 0.000 360.665 1,944.840 44,370.410 83,022.330 Inside equity $'000 90 197,639.680 368,494.670 3,478.370 15,155.360 132,194.180 251,243.670 642,362.090 CEO debt / equity Number 90 0.309 0.642 0.000 0.004 0.135 0.316 1.024
Panel C: Firm Control Variables
Variables Unit N Mean Std P5 P25 Median P75 P95
lnAsset Natural log 597 11.861 1.797 8.556 10.854 12.131 13.334 14.117
Market capitalization Natural log 597 9.806 1.656 6.790 8.695 9.925 11.009 12.411
M/B Number 597 2.456 1.548 1.081 1.595 2.070 2.493 6.891
Equity ratio Number 597 0.072 0.059 0.032 0.041 0.069 0.083 0.114
ROA Number 597 0.012 0.011 0.004 0.006 0.011 0.014 0.024
ROE Number 597 0.182 0.100 0.086 0.138 0.162 0.193 0.309
Z-score Natural log 597 3.640 1.046 2.126 3.111 3.750 4.255 5.063 本表提供銀行業樣本的敘述性統計結果，Panel A 為聯貸相關變數，包括聯貸條件、聯貸結構、聯貸類型，以及聯貸的借款目的等；Panel B 為 CEO 薪
Z-score Natural log 597 3.640 1.046 2.126 3.111 3.750 4.255 5.063 本表提供銀行業樣本的敘述性統計結果，Panel A 為聯貸相關變數，包括聯貸條件、聯貸結構、聯貸類型，以及聯貸的借款目的等；Panel B 為 CEO 薪