I. 6. - Classical realist assumptions and methodologies
I.7. Research outline
2.4. Democratic transitions and democracy promotion in Côte d’Ivoire and the Republic of Congo
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2.4.
Democratic transitions and democracy promotion in Côte d’Ivoire and the Republic of Congo.
Côte d’Ivoire
During the colonial era, Côte d’Ivoire used to be the core supplying region of cocoa and coffee for the metropole, in order to meet the increasing demand, and due to the low population density rate at the time, a policy had been conducted in order to increase the Ivorian labor and therefore increase the production of cocoa and coffee. Consequently, thousands of people from Mali and Upper Volta (the current Burkina Faso) were deported towards Côte d’Ivoire between 1933 and 1947. Additionally, frontiers were shaped by the French Empire and regions occupied by Burkinabe and Malian people become part of Côte d’Ivoire (Bovcon, 2009). After the independence in 1960, former deputy under the French colonial administration, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, also referred to as Papa (daddy) or le vieux (the dean), ruled Côte d’Ivoire from 1960 until his death in 1993. Under Houphouet-Boigny’s rule, Côte d'Ivoire's model of development was based on the colonial administration, Côte d’Ivoire specialized in the production of cocoa and coffee and counted on high rates of voluntary migration in order to have enough population to work the lands. (Bovcon, 2009).
Confronted by pressures for democratization, Houphouët-Boigny, supported by France, used the democratic process at his advantage, making political parties legal and imposing unfair electoral rules. He then organized in October 1990 presidential elections, which he won against his rival from the Ivorian Popular Front (IPF), Laurent Gbagbo. A month later, the dean’s political party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), won the majority of the seats during parliamentary election with a score between 30 and 40 percent.
In Glaser and Smith (1994) understanding, France gave the incentives to organize elections and multipartism in order to confirm the legitimacy of the French-friendly authoritarian rule.
In exchange, France would guarantee impunity for the autocrat’s future policies and measures.
After being re-elected, in an attempt to conduct deep political and economic reforms, Houphouet appointed Alassane Ouattara as prime minister, a position he held until
Houphouet-Boigny’s death in 1993. The National Assembly President, Henri Konan Bédié, succeeded the ‘dean’ in office until 1999. During the 1995 presidential elections, Bédié
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restricted eligible candidates to citizens born of two Ivorian parents, denying the political rights of a significant amount of Ivorian people and preventing possible candidates, notably Ouatarra from running for president. The politicization of ethnicity engaged by Konan Bedié resulted in Gueï’s military putsch in 1999. (Villaibre-Fernandez, 2009; Bah, 2010; Bovcon 2009; Gaulme 2001, Dozon, 2000, Losch, 2000).
General Gueï served as a transitional president during the putsch year until presidential election were to organized months later. At the occasion of the election held in 2000, Laurent Gbagbo was elected President, yet, Gueï dissolved the electoral commission and declared himself President. After days of riots confronting Guei’s personal army and Gbagbo supporters, (mostly civilians), Gueï finally stepped down, and Laurent Gbagbo became the new President.
In 2002, in an attempt to be reintegrated within the national army and to receive compensation for 2 years without salary, Gueï’s former soldiers attempted a coup which was soon stopped by government forces, yet, Gueï’s supporters soon demanded for Gbagbo’s resignation, the organization of free and fair elections and the end of discriminatory policies based on the concept of ‘Ivorianness’. The failed coup attempt soon attracted the support and sympathy of populations of the North, (mostly migrants or second generations) resulting in the First Ivorian Civil War (2002-2007).
In 2002, the war opposed Gbagbo's government military forces of the South to a Burkinabe-Ivorian rebel group, led by Guillaume Soro and his Burkinabe-Ivorian New Forces - Forces Nouvelles (FN), It has been shown that at some point in the conflict the rebels controlled 60 percent of the territory, mostly in the Northern part of the State (Pigeaud, Samba Sylla, 2018, p.100).
The rebellion notably received military and intelligence support from Burkina Faso’s government. (Smith, 2003, Bovcon, 2009). Yet, Burkina Faso’s interference was never acknowledged nor condemned by France. If France showed limited support for Gbagbo at first, notably during the 2000 crisis. (Bovcon, 2009), French authorities increasingly showed support for Northern rebels, and forced Gbagbo’s regime to negotiate during the 2004 Linas-Marcoussis accords. (Bovcon, 2009; S.Smith, 2003). After successive failed accords, both warring parties finally find common ground with the signature of the
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leader Guillaume Soro (Gaulme, 2001; Bovcon 2009). Due to the civil war and ‘technical issues’ faced by Gbagbo’s administration presidential elections, supposed to be held in 2005 were postponed six times until 2010.
At that time, Konan Bedié’s 1995 law had been erased of the Ivorian constitution by the 2003 Linas Marcoussis accords which were initiated by France (Bovon, 2009). The election
opposed Laurent Gbagbo (the incumbent) to Alassane Ouattara. Both claimed to be the legitimate president after the election results. France and the U.N. which had mobilized observers during the election recognized Ouattara as the legitimate president while, Gbagbo refused to step down, for the reason that the President of the Ivorian Electoral Commission had declared him the legitimately elected president. This dispute led in 2011, to the Second Ivorian Civil War. With the mobilization of U.N, French troops, and Ouattara sympathizers, Gbagbo was soon arrested and judged at the ICC, yet, he was acquitted of all charges of war crimes in 2019. (Maupas, January 16th, 2019; Maclean, January 15th, 2019). In the meantime, Alassane Ouattara took office.
Upon peace agreements signed on March 4th 2007, known as the Ouagadougou accords, the civil war took an end. A month later, the leader of the rebel New Forces, Guillaume Soro, replaced Henry Konan Banny who had been appointed by the international community as Prime Minister. However, due to ‘technical and financial’ issues, Gbagbo postponed the presidential election 6 times since 2005, until 2010. Contested election results led to the second Ivorian Civil War opposing Ouattara militias to the incumbent Gbagbo’s military forces. (Villaibre-Fernandez, 2009; Bah, 2010; Cogneau, Mesplé-Somps and Roubaud, 2003).
Most scholars agreed upon the fact that evidence didn’t support the hypothesis stating that the Ivorian political system crisis was the core cause of the civil war. Rather, the intense
politicization of citizenship and ethnicity, which started under Bédié at the 1995 presidential election, was one of the major causal factors of the conflict. Peace agreements instigated by the international community failed due to the international community’s lack of
understanding of issues around citizenship in the country. (Hugon, 2003; Cogneau,
Mesplé-Somps and Roubaud, 2003; Bah, 2010; Bovcon, 2009; Losch, 2000; Dozon, 2000).
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If the literature accepted these conclusions, making the politicization of citizenship and ethnicity the core explaining factors of Côte d’Ivoire’s failed democratic transition, this research is mostly interested in understanding the role external factors played in the failed democratic transition in Côte d’Ivoire in order to have a more thorough understanding. Smith (2003) argued that during the legitimacy crisis, Paris and the U.N. condemned Gbagbo exactions such as the November 2002 Monoko-Zohi massacre where hundreds of civilians were killed by Gbagbo’s army; rafts and assassinations of more than 30 dissidents in Abidjan, as well as many other well documented war crimes. In the meantime, Paris turned a blind eye on similar war crimes committed by Ouattara forces as well as obvious Burkinabe ingerence - Burkina Faso sent troops to better weaken Gbagbo forces during the conflict. The then South-African President Thabo Mbeki observed that, it was because of African countries inability to solve the Ivorian problem that France was ‘forced’ to intervene politically, diplomatically as well as militarily. (Smith, 2003).
France was mostly operating throughout international organizations and actively took part in the democratization and peace-building process within the U.N. Security Council. In
analyzing the Security Council permanent members role in democratic transitions using Côte d’Ivoire as a case study, Villalibre-Fernández (2009), concluded that in transitions from dictatorship to democracy, the U.N. Security Council promotion of democracy and
development should be considered as a global strategy and must prevent permanent members’
national interests from dominating the processes. France’s former Colonial Empire, was the engine of the council policies in the country and influenced the democratic transition of Côte d’Ivoire in many ways (agreements and implementations of policies) according selfish national interests. For this reason, the author questioned the involvement of a former colonial empire playing a critical role throughout the Security Council, no matter the effects.
(Villalibre Fernández, 2009). In addition, Chafer (2005) showed that during the 2002-2007 civil war, Gbagbo’s supporters promoted Ivorian nationalism and called for a ‘new
decolonization’ from France.
If authors have importantly pointed out the determinants of French foreign policy, French role within the Security Council, and determinant domestic factors leading to civil unrest. A deeper analysis of external factors of the Ivorian democratic transition from 1990 up to 2016
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this research attempts to understand to what extent French foreign aid and FCFA franc prior, during and after the two civil wars affected democratic practices. Was the effects positive, negative or mixed? Did they foster or appeased conflicts?
The Republic of Congo
Our second case study, Republic of Congo, also known as Congo-Brazzaville, is a former French colony. The country was shaken by 4 civil wars, in 1993, 1997, 1998-99, and 2002-03.
It has been portrayed as a perfect example of how democratic transitions can end up being human tragedies. (Bazenguissa Ganga, 1999; Englebert and Ron, 2004, p61).
The Congolese democratic transition began at the occasion of the 1991-2 National conference, which resulted in the resignation of President Sassou-Nguesso (1979-92) as well as the
acceptance of a new constitution introducing a multi-party system to the country. At the time, Prime Minister, Pascal Lissouba, had been elected President. Many of the main political players under Sassou-Nguesso remained active throughout the 1990s. As different rival parties were created, recruitment of armed troops or private militias increased. Not long after the first National conference, political rivalry opposing former president attempting to make his comeback in office, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, the mayor of Brazzaville city, Bernard Kolélas and newly elected President Pascal Lissouba led to widespread bloodshed in 1993.
(Bazenguissa Ganga, 1999).
President Lissouba's party, ‘la Mouvance Présidentielle’, and its opposition parties, agreed upon a ceasefire in January 1994. The conflict resulted in 2,000 deaths, between 100,000 and 300,000 of displaced people, and 13,000 houses destroyed. In 1997, in a context of upcoming elections, political rivalry once again led to bloodshed. Militarily backed by Angola, the Civil War ended with the victory of former President Sassou-Nguesso in October 1997.
(Bazenguissa Ganga, 1999; Yengo, 2007; Clark, 2002; French H.W., October 16th, 1997).
Former President of the Republic, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who was the most popular
candidate in terms of domestic as well as foreign support, left the country for France in 1995 until January 1997. To avoid another escalation of violence, in May 1997 political leaders agreed upon a treaty preventing each party from using military violence.
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Nevertheless, early June, the group affiliated to Sassou-Nguesso and the presidential forces resumed the conflict in Brazzaville. Between 10,000 and 15,000 people were killed (Yengo, 2007). Lissouba tried to use the 1993-94 conflict as an excuse to postpone the 1997
presidential elections. In the middle of highly popular meetings in Northern Congo, Sassou-Nguesso wasn’t willing to wait for elections as his campaign was barnstorming and was the favorite candidate. The June 5th 1997 incident was what threw oil on fire.
Two arrest warrants were issued against close collaborators of Nguesso and, Lissouba’s political police attempted to arrest them at Nguesso’s personal residence, which were
perceived as an assassination attempt by Nguesso’s supporters. However, despite the support of his then opposition, Bernard Kolélas, Lissouba’s forces lost to Sassou-Nguesso’s troops, supported by Angola in early October 1997. (Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1999; Clark, 2002; Yengo, 2007, p117).
What were the general conclusions on the failed democratic transition which led to a succession of civil wars, bloodsheds and the return of authoritarian rule? What were the conclusions on the role played by France in the failed democratic transition? Some authors argued that France played a key role in fostering the conflict (Yengo, 2017), while others tempered these conclusions emphasizing internal factors role. (Clark, 2002;
Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1999; Englebert, Ron, 2004).
Clark (2002) pointed out that France actually had no influence in the creation of the 1991 conference which started the democratic transition in Congo. This was the case for many countries in Francophone Africa, and this very fact was proof that French influence in the region was decreasing. Clark (2002) also argued that, France was actively supporting
Sassou-Nguesso, therefore had no interest in seeing him step down. (Clark, 2002; Verschave 2004).
Scholars have argued that, a couple of months after Lissouba was elected, the government recruited civilians who would work within the presidential guard, (used as a political police).
After parliamentary election and a huge loss for Lissouba, his decision to dissolve the National Assembly, to avoid cohabitation, as well as the violent repression of peaceful
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Scholars concluded that, if France supported Sassou-Nguesso regime arranging arms deals with Sassou-Nguesso as the presidential campaign was coming-up, which helped him arm his personal militia and eventually win the war. Lissouba’s own political decisions led the French government to oppose him. Finally, political figures own will to seize or remain in power was the major factor leading to bloodsheds, as a result France didn’t play the major role in Congo’s instability. (Clark, 2002; Bazenguissa Ganga, 2001).
Both Clark (2002) and Yengo (2017) have shown that French Elf company (French
governmental oil company which was the major oil company in the Francophone region - the nowadays Total company) also blocked Congolese government from receiving foreign aid from the American oil company Oxy in February 1993, an aid which would allow Lissouba to pay thousands of governmental officials and face the economic crisis.
It was perceived as a French support for Sassou and Kolélas at the time. (Clark, 2002; Yengo, 2007). Clark (2002) notably concluded that, while both French government officials and Elf operatives aimed at maintaining their influence in Congo, “Neither bears primary
responsibility for the failure of the multiparty experiment”. (Clark, 2002, p.171).
An inference which Yengo (2007) refuted by demonstrated that, Chirac (former French President at the time of the 2002 events), wanted to avoid any French sinking into another African conflict by intervening militarily after the huge fiasco in Rwanda in 1994. The stake was in maintaining control on the conflict resolution while not intervening directly. As a result, France chose a couple of African Presidents to engage in negotiations for peace accords while encouraging Angola to intervene militarily, and supporting Gabon to send weapons to Sassou-Nguesso militia. These external factors do not hold primary responsibility in Clark (2002) understanding.
Both literatures on Côte d’Ivoire and Congo were primarily interested in domestic causes of the failed democratizations and focused on French foreign policies, rather than on aid effects on democracy. Thus, due to the fact that French policies are highly focused on the promotion of self-interests, as argued by Cumming (1995), Chafer (2005), Schraeder (1995), Schraeder et al (1998), Hayter (1966). To apply a realist approach in analyzing Congo Brazzaville and Côte d’Ivoire will be best suited. Secondly, analyses of the effects of the CFA Franc on sovereignty, democratic practices, transitions as well as economic development were largely
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absent of the literature, when they might in fact be additional explaining factors of political instability. Therefore, in the following chapter identifies the goals French authorities intended to achieve by disbursing ‘democracy aid’ money in Côte d’Ivoire first and in Congo
Brazzaville, if the goals were reached or not, and the effects aid had on the democratic practices and political stability of both countries.
Chapter three: The effects of French aid on the democratic practices of Côte d’Ivoire from 1990 to 2016. Morgenthau’s (1962) theory of foreign aid applied.
3.1 -The historical context 3.1.a. Background
Côte d’Ivoire under Houphouët-Boigny’s rule (1960-1993).
Côte d’Ivoire’s first President Houphouët-Boigny, who uninterruptedly ruled the state from 1960 (the independence from the French colonial empire) until his death in 1993, had actually been elected deputy in the French parliament and was in charge of administering Côte
d’Ivoire during the colonial era from 1945. As a result, the Ivorian dean had close personal ties with successive French presidents regardless of their political affiliation, from Gaulists (conservatives) such as Charles de Gaulle himself and Jacques Foccart (the engineer of the Françafrique system), socialist political parties represented by former President Mitterrand and Neo-Gaulists political parties such as President Jacques Chirac’s RPR. (Smith, S., July 22, 1995; French, H., July 22, 1995).
Therefore, Houphouët-Boigny’s policy was in continuation with the way Côte d’Ivoire was administered during the French colonial era (I.e. Section 2.4); specializing the country in the production of cocoa and coffee by encouraging intensive migration of labor from neighboring states, notably Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo and Mali, to work the lands. Lands were
distributed to families willing to conduct agricultural activities in the field of cocoa and coffee, regardless of their ethnicity or nationality. Under Houphouët-Boigny’s rule, despite
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integrated into the economic, social and political system - it goes without saying that it was in a limited way due to the authoritarian nature of the state, but ethnic conflicts were avoided for 33 years. (Bovcon, 2009; Dozon 2000; Losch, 2000).
As a result of Houphouët-Boigny’s policy, Côte d’Ivoire is a country composed of 60 different ethnic groups and has one of the highest migration rates worldwide (Losch, 2000, Bovcon, 2009; Gaulme, 2001), with populations coming from Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Senegal, Togo. It has been estimated that migrants represented around 26% of the total Ivorian population. (Losch, 2000; Smith, 2003; Bovcon, 2009; Dozon, 2012; Gaulme, 2001, Ouazani, December 22, 2009).
Due to its economic development and political stability, 4 the state was referred to as the
“Ivorian miracle”. Therefore, due to his successful economic policy and political stability, Houphouët-Boigny was a personality respected and listened to among his African
counterparts. De facto, essential was for France to maintain good relations with such an important political influence in the continent.
The dean’s policies favored French companies over others on the domestic market, essentially for the access to cocoa and coffee. (Dozon, 2000; Bovcon 2009). The Ivorian dean also was an advocate of French policies in international institutions and encouraged in many speeches African countries (Francophone and Anglophone alike) to maintain good relations with France5. (Smith, 2004; Losch, 2000). Under the dean’s rule, Côte d’Ivoire became the foremost producer of coffee and cocoa worldwide and its first trade partner was France (Bovcon, 2009). However, Akindes F. (1996), Bovcon (2009) and Demery, Squire (1996) showed that the 1980’s and 1990’s were characterized by a striking decrease in the quality of life of Ivorian citizens and access to public services essentially due to the significant decrease of the international prices of cocoa and coffee which the country’s economy depended on, and for the reason that the Bretton Woods organizations imposed drastic economic policies
(Bovcon, 2009; Smith, 2003).
4 Côte d’Ivoire was one of the rare economically and politically stable countries in the region under Houphouët-Boigny’s rule, mainly due to its specialization in the cocoa coffee sector. For that reason, it was referred to as the “Ivorian miracle” and attracted massive migration waves from all over Africa.
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Moreover, cases of corruption involving government officials, increased popular discontent demands and demonstrations for more democratic practices, the resignation of corrupted officials, a fair redistribution the lands as well as the resources accumulated from exports of cocoa and coffee. (Ouazani, December 22, 2009). In 1990, due to such discontent as well as international pressures for democracy, Houphouët-Boigny had no choice but to introduce multipartism to Côte d’Ivoire.
In October 1990, presidential election was organized which Houphouët-Boigny won by 81, 68 percent against his rival from the Ivorian Popular Front (IPF), Laurent Gbagbo. A month later, the Dean’s political party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), won
In October 1990, presidential election was organized which Houphouët-Boigny won by 81, 68 percent against his rival from the Ivorian Popular Front (IPF), Laurent Gbagbo. A month later, the Dean’s political party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), won