In this dissertation, I attempt to plan a transport policy through economical modeling.
Our first model is that the public and private firm who could choice the flexible routing types under differentiates subsidies. Our second model is that the public and private firm whose routing type of difference is fixed under differentiates subsidies. Our third model is that the public and private firms whose routing types are compatibility under differential subsidies. The final model is that our fiscal resources will be distributed through optimal control theory.
As a result of analyzing models through Hotelling model, game theory and optimal control theory, I obtain some results with respect to subsidies and routing types. Firstly, the government acquires more efficiency of Fu-Kang transport through subsidy rate is arranged. Secondly, the government is able to make more ranges of subsidy so that the response of the riders’ demand. Thirdly, the public and the private firms need to be compatibility because lower market share with respect to Fu-Kang bus transport of disabled persons. Finally, the subsidy rate can be disturbed through riding time because riders are used to riding the buses in a peak hour.
The purpose of this dissertation I attempt to establish competitive spatial model through game theory and optimal control to analysis and discuss between subsidy differentiation and routing choices. Finally, I provide a competitive strategy of a paratransit transport policy to complement the lack of social welfare policy with respect to finance.
In the past, the government always has a rough distribution for fiscal finance with respect to social welfare so that they don’t consider whether subsidies are exceeded or deficiency. I found out the improvement methods that including competitive model, game theory and optimal control theory to solve this problem so that I toward a direction of establishing paratransit transport policy and give a suggestion to the government.
Furthermore, I must face the problems of the senior citizens and that of the fewer babies born in next ten years so that the resources of transport service need to be refined.
Our paratransit transport policy need to be respectful in overall transport policy because it would be associated with long-term health care planning, Fu-Kang bus transport of disabled persons and bus transport of remote districts in rural areas in the future.
Moreover, the public and private firms will know how to operate the social welfare business in the future if the government has established the precisely paratransit policy with respect to social welfare through our researched model.
The contribution of this dissertation is to suggest a paratransit guidance through models so that precisely establish subsidy policies; furthermore, provide a guidance to the public and the private transport firm and they know how to determine their operation goal.
I establish a new subsidy mode that is service configuration subsidy through above-mentioned models. This subsidy mode might be an immature concept for paratransit;
however, paratransit could have a new definition for public transportation. The subsidy mechanism provides disabled persons for various medical transport services; furthermore, the most important concept is that the carpool could be connected with subsidy mechanism.
DRTS, as I know, is a flexible transport service method. I emphasis the service configuration services along with subsidy rate. The more manifold configuration services are used, the more subsidies are obtained.
Our contributions were appeared in this study. I established a milestone with respect to Fu-kang bus transport service and a new subsidy mechanism. I hope our efforts toward the settlement of Fu-kang bus transport service in the future.
Our further research is based on this paper, that is, I consider the relationship between transportation of the subsidy differentiation with respect to disabled persons on the medical health care system in Taiwan and location of the public or the private medical care organization.
Aging population society is coming in Taiwan. I must consider more transport modes with respect to senior citizens and disabled persons. Furthermore, the trend towards fewer children is obvious twenty years later. A birthrate affects the capacity for physical labor;
moreover, manpower may be insufficient. Therefore, service configurations with respect to carpool need to be promoted in the future.
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Appendix A
Table 7
The fare table of shuttle bus with respect to mild or moderate cognitive elderly impairment (Taipei City Government Department of Social Welfare authorized)
type Calculated fare by shuttle bus meter
35 37.5 40 42.5 45 47.5 50
Each type is calculated by following fare table
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 3 3 4 4 4 4 5
C 10 11 12 12 13 14 15
type Calculated fare by shuttle bus meter
52.5 55 57.5 60 62.5 65 67.5
Each type is calculated by following fare table
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 5 5 5 6 6 6 6
C 15 16 17 18 18 19 20
type Calculated fare by shuttle bus meter
70 72.5 75 77.5 80 82.5 85
Each type is calculated by following fare table
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 7 7 7 7 8 8 8
C 21 21 22 23 24 24 25
type Calculated fare by shuttle bus meter
87.5 90 92.5 95
Each type is calculated by following fare table
A 0 0 0 0
B 8 9 9 9
C 26 27 27 28
type Calculated fare by shuttle bus meter
97.5 100 102.5 105 107.5 110 112.5
Each type is calculated by following fare table
A 2 5 7 10 12 15 17
B 12 14 17 19 22 24 27
C 31 33 36 38 41 43 46
Table 6 (to be continued)
type Calculated fare by shuttle bus meter
115 117.5 120 122.5 125 127.5 130
Each type is calculated by following fare table
A 20 22 25 27 30 32 35
B 29 32 34 37 39 42 44
C 48 51 53 56 58 61 63
type Calculated fare by shuttle bus meter
132.5 135 137.5 140 142.5 145 147.5
Each type is calculated by following fare table
A 37 40 42 45 47 50 52
B 47 49 52 54 57 59 62
C 66 68 71 73 76 78 81
type Calculated fare by shuttle bus meter
150 152.5 155 157.5 160 162.5 165
Each type is calculated by following fare table
A 55 57 60 62 65 67 70
B 64 67 69 72 74 77 79
C 83 86 88 91 93 96 98
type Calculated fare by shuttle bus meter
167.5 170 172.5 175 177.5 180 182.5
Each type is calculated by following fare table
A 72 75 77 80 82 85 87
B 82 84 87 89 92 94 97
C 101 103 106 108 111 113 116
type Calculated fare by shuttle bus meter
185 187.5 190 192.5 195 197.5 200
Each type is calculated by following fare table
A 90 92 95 97 100 102 105
B 99 102 104 107 109 112 114
C 118 121 123 126 128 131 133
type Calculated fare by shuttle bus meter
202.5 205 207.5 210 212.5 215 217.5
Each type is calculated by following fare table
A 107 110 112 115 117 120 122
B 117 119 122 124 127 129 132
C 136 138 141 143 146 148 151