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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusion
The US Taiwan policy of ambiguity apparently has carried over to the results of this thesis. When both sets of data were compared one supported Taiwan as a vital interest, while the other did not. Additionally, neither set had a clear “winner”. In the literature review analysis, Taiwan’s value barley scored higher that the costs of conflict. In the summary of questionnaire results, the combined expert opinion was that the costs of conflict slightly outweighed Taiwan’s value. The thesis might not have been able to definitively answer the question of whether Taiwan is a vital US interest, but it did provide greater insight into the objectives of this paper.
The objectives as previously stated were to provide American leaders with a
framework to make more informed decisions about Taiwan and to extend the academic base of knowledge. This has clearly been done by first showing that Taiwan as a separate entity should be considered as having moderate to high value for the US. At this value level the US should continue to nourish Taiwan and find innovative ways to harness its value. Second, the results have shown that Taiwan’s current status would be quite costly to maintain if China decided it was time to reunite by force. Realizing this, the US should continue its policy of deterrence so China is not tempted to reach the point of conflict.
At this point the question might be raised: Doesn’t US leadership already know that Taiwan is valuable when independent and a that a war with China would be costly? The answer is most likely yes. But another thing learned from the thesis is that the ultimate choice will not be an easy one. This has been demonstrated by the similar scores for both value and cost/risk factors. The key here is that the President and security advisors are charged with making the fundamental judgment on Taiwan. Leadership needs to know the
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pros and cons (values and risks) and where do they fall on his/her personal list of priorities.
The results of this thesis can help lead the way on setting those priorities. For the value side balance of power and democracy in Taiwan scored highest. If President George W. Bush were in office, his doctrine stating that fostering democracy is high value coupled with his strong support for nurturing and spreading democracy could well push Taiwan toward being a vital interest.
Another example could emanate from the cost/risk factors, in which two of the highest factors were economic costs and the cost of defeat. Currently the US faces both recovery from a recession and almost a decade of having troops in the Middle East. If both interest factors and current events are combined, President Obama might well decide that deepening the recession and deploying troops yet again might not be in the nation’s interest.
Therefore Taiwan would not be vital interest.
For Taiwan and China, the factor results could also be useful. The scores can provide a roadmap to focus on policy that could best influence the US and serve their interests. It would be in Taiwan’s best interests to work toward raising its value and reducing risk factors.
Three policy recommendations would be: increasing the capabilities of the Taiwanese defense force to keep up with China’s rapid military modernization, continuing to grow investment and trade ties with the US, and maintaining its commitment to a strong vibrant democracy that young democracies want to emulate and older ones respect.
From the opposite perspective and goal of incorporating Taiwan into China, the PRC’s objective should be to undermine Taiwan’s value factors, while increasing risks for the US. Again another three policy recommendations follows. One, continue to build on the enormous economic connections the US and China has formed. Work toward becoming a more viable US strategic partner making Beijing indispensible on the world stage. Finally,
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most important, continue to improve upon the PLA’s capabilities therefore making it to costly for the US militarily intervene.
In the end, although not conclusive on whether Taiwan is of vital interest to the US, this thesis found defense of Taiwan to be both a valuable and risky proposition for the US.
Unfortunately, as China grows stronger and more assertive the risk will only heighten, potentially reducing Taiwan’s claim as a US vital interest. It is hoped that the relative rankings can provide focused direction for US leaders and interesting new opportunities for scholarly research.
Recommendations
Unfortunately this study was not conclusive, but it did provide insights in how to improve the use of Nuechterlein’s national vital interest factors in future research.
First, one of the major problems in both the initial analysis and then the summary of the questionnaire was that there was no clear separation. Taiwan could be an issue where the values and costs are really just that close. Originally in his work, Nuechterlein suggested using a scale of three. A scale of four was chosen for this study to provide a little more differentiation, but mainly to avoid the easy middle answer which could possible skew the data. Therefore, in order to provide more definitive results in any study using Nuechterlein’s factors, it is suggested that the scale be expanded.
A second suggestion to achieve more distinct results would be to weigh the factors.
At the outset this was deliberately not considered in order to keep the process and data simple in this initial analysis attempt. The benefit of weighing would put more emphasis on the areas which, simply put, matter more. For example, as President of the United States, would the risk of international opposition or economic costs weigh more on your mind? A
suggested way to achieve the weights would be to have the experts answer an additional
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question ranking each set of factors. The list could then be used as a basis to assign weights to an analysis of the vital interest factors.
Third, although the initial analysis was in depth and very useful into understanding the topic it is suggested future studies focus on an expanded questionnaire process. In addition to weighing the answers, more questions for each factor could be asked,
explanations for answers could be required and more experts could be used. This would greatly expand the dataset providing more reliable and specific answers. It would most likely also raise new questions.
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APPENDIX QUESTIONNAIRE
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Questions:
1. What level of physical danger does the location of the conflict pose to the US?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
2. How much of a threat does China’s aggressive action toward Taiwan pose to the US?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
3. What would be the level of negative economic consequences for the US if it decided not to oppose China?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
4. When making the choice to intervene in a China/Taiwan conflict, how important is it to the US that Taiwan is a fellow democracy?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
5. How much influence does the Taiwan Lobby have on the US government?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
6. To what extent will an annexation of Taiwan by China impact the regional balance of power?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
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7. How important is standing by Taiwan to US prestige in the world community?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
8. What is the likelihood that key US allies will support US military engagement in Taiwan?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
9. What would the level of negative impact be to the US economy and financial system if it entered the conflict?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
10. What will be the level of US casualties in a conflict with China?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
11. What is the likelihood that an initial conflict over Taiwan will expand to the greater region?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
12. What are the expected economic costs for the US of an armed conflict over Taiwan?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
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13. If the conflict ends in stalemate or defeat, what will the political costs be to the US?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
14. What is the probability of US public opposition to the US military engaging China over Taiwan?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
15. What is the probability of international opposition to US engagement?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
16. What is the probability of Congressional support in such a scenario?
Low Low‐Medium Medium‐High High
Comment:
Additional Comments:
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