V. Comparison and Discussion
V.I Comparison
dealing with contracts are ranked very
high compared to rest of the world.
starting a business and dealing with contracts are ranked very low.
Risk of Detection and Punishment
Since the implementation of the
‘National Integrity Building Plan’
(2008) almost thrice the amount of officials convicted and around three thirds are found guilty.
Low-level officials have higher risk of detection; risk for high level officials depends on political relationship towards the leadership.
Cultural Factors Guanxi and gift-giving culture Guanxi and gift-giving culture Political Will to Tackle
the Problem of Corruption
Ma Ying-jeou’s reputation and National Integrity Building Plan’s implementation and results indicate a strong will in tackling corruption.
No genuine political will to tackle the problem of corruption.
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is the broadest and most exhaustive of its kind up to date;
however no commitment to long-term institutional reform.
V.I Comparison Patterns of anti-corruption
Earlier in the text I hypothesized that both countries would have the same pattern of anti-corruption legislation and non-independent ACAs. This hypothesis turned out to be wrong. Taiwan correctly fits this pattern. However, upon closer analysis the PRC does not fit the same pattern, or any other of Quah’s patterns of anti-corruption. The PRC has non-independent ACAs just like Taiwan. Yet, the PRC has two sets of anti-corruption regulations that officials abide by, the law and the rules of party discipline, of which party discipline often takes precedence. In Taiwan all officials are judged by the law.
This is an important point regarding the relationship between corruption and political regime type.
With two sets of regulations, the punishment of corruption becomes political instead of legal in the
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71 higher levels of politics. Because the CDIC answers to the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest level of CCP leadership remains isolated from any real danger of getting caught.
This is different in democratic Taiwan where ex-president Chen Shui-bian was tried and convicted of corruption on the basis of the same rules that all citizens of Taiwan abide by.
Having a separate set of party discipline regulations is another cause of corruption in itself, because it creates an uneven playing field as party members and non-party members are treated differently by the law. When these differences occur, opportunities for corruption arise.
Party discipline inspection could exist in Taiwan, but it would never be able to take precedence over the legal framework in terms of anti-corruption. In a democracy like Taiwan a politician that does not follow the law would not be able to stay in power for long. Therefore we can conclude that this is a point where political regime type creates a difference in corruption trends.
Civil servant salaries
I hypothesized that in both countries civil servant salaries were previously very low, but have increased to a level high enough to suppress need-driven corruption. In both Taiwan and the PRC civil servant salaries have been at a very low point in the past, thus being a cause of need-driven corruption. However, the wages have become more competitive in both countries. In Taiwan, due to economic growth, significant benefits in comparison to private sector jobs, and wage stability during economic downswings, wages have become attractive to a satisfactory level. In the PRC, civil servant wages have been raised by reforms during 1997-2002 and are currently at a level significantly above the GDP per capita.
In both democratic Taiwan and authoritarian PRC governments have realized the importance of having competitive wages for civil servants and have managed to root out need-driven petty corruption by lower level officials who depended on corruption to make a living.
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72 This cause of corruption has manifested itself and has been dealt with in similar ways in both
Taiwan and the PRC. It is an economic cause of corruption that appears in poor countries. For both democracies and authoritarian governments economic growth and the raising of government salaries are a remedy to this cause of corruption. Therefore this is not an indication of a difference between corruption trends in democracies and authoritarian countries.
Red tape and opportunities for corruption
I hypothesized that red tape and opportunities for corruption would be influenced by administrative reforms through the years in both countries. These reforms would create more rigid systems of administration and a more transparent bureaucracy, thus reducing opportunities for lower-level petty corruption and giving more opportunities for higher level corruption due to the ability to manipulate more complex administrative loopholes.
After analysis it seems that my hypothesis is half right. Both countries have seen reforms lowering opportunities and incentives for low level officials. Therefore we can conclude that over the years petty corruption has decreased. However, opportunities for grand corruption by higher officials are developing very differently in both countries and here the difference between democratic and authoritarian political regimes stands out.
In Taiwan, 2008 was the year that Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election, running on an anti-corruption platform. The following year he initiated the ‘National Integrity Building Plan’, a
comprehensive plan to make government more efficient and more transparent. Additionally, under his leadership the Agency Against Corruption was established. It is not as good as replacing all ACAs with a single independent agency, but it increases efficiency due to the involvement of government ethics committees and district procuratorate. The efficacy of these reforms show from Taiwan’s high ranking in the World Bank’s Doing Business index since 2009. These reforms are results
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73 of democracy. The previous president, Chen Shui-bian was corrupt and the people demanded reform. Ma Ying-jeou had to genuinely appeal to this popular sentiment in order to get elected. The results are that he enacted reforms that make it more difficult for any officials, including the higher ups, to get away with acts of corruption.
In the PRC, Xi Jinping started an anti-corruption campaign that has resulted in the arrest of many officials of low and high levels. However, there are no indications that he is willing to make any administrative reforms making high-level party members’ dealings more transparent. The highest levels of the CCP remain a black box and there seems to be no incentive for them to change this due to the CCP’s monopoly on power. This is another fundamental difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes in terms of the causes and curbs of corruption.
Risk of detection and punishment of corruption
My hypothesis about the risk of detection and punishment of corruption factor was similar to the previous one. In both countries risk of detection becomes progressively higher for lower level officials over time due to administrative reforms and at the same time the risk of detection and punishment has become lower for higher level officials as they make the rules.
Similar to the previous section, the analysis indicates that I was only half correct in my hypothesis.
As shown with court data of both countries, the risk has become progressively higher for lower level officials in both countries. The data indicates that these trends correspond with administrative reforms. Again I was wrong about higher level grand corruption. There is evidence for a surge in higher level grand corruption in the PRC. The highest levels of the CCP make the rules and are thus not in danger of being detected. Furthermore, risk of detection as a high level official is of a political nature. In the context of Xi Jinping’s current anti-corruption crackdown, the risk of capture is higher if you politically oppose the leadership.
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74 In Taiwan judicial data shows an increase from around a 25% chance of being found guilty in
corruption cases during 1991-2002 to chance of around 75% of being found guilty after the implementation of the ‘National Integrity Building Plan’ in 2008. This is evidence that the risk of detection is becoming higher for all levels of government.
The analysis of this factor further indicates that the trends in corruption of democratic and
authoritarian nations are similar regarding low level corruption, but very different in terms of high-level, grand corruption.
Cultural factors
I hypothesized that the cultural factors causing corruption are similar in Taiwan and the PRC, since both have a strong traditional Chinese cultural history. As discussed before, the influence of guanxi and gift-giving culture promotes the manifestation of corruption. Culture is hard to change from the top down, regardless of the political regime. There is no evidence of these cultures changing in the short or long term in both countries. Therefore this serves as a control variable, making Taiwan and the PRC more easily comparable.
Political will to tackle the problem of corruption
I expected that political will to tackle corruption would play a similar role in both countries as the countries’ political elites are both split into younger, progressive, and western-educated factions and the conservative old-guard of party elites. The younger ones have less vested interests and a more progressive attitude and would thus display a stronger political will to tackle the problem.
Currently both countries are ruled by relatively young politicians with western education backgrounds. However, the analysis indicates that my hypothesis was incorrect. There is a large difference in political will between both countries’ leaderships. Taiwan’s ruling elite shows far more
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75 genuine will to tackle the problem of corruption with its ‘National Integrity Building Plan’ reforms, than Xi Jinping’s administration does with its anti-corruption campaign. As we have shown before, Taiwan’s current policies show genuine improvements in the country’s government infrastructure to warrant lasting results in terms of anti-corruption. As for the PRC, there is no indication that the current anti-corruption campaign is anything more than a method for Xi Jinping to consolidate his power. As long as he does not address the issues of party discipline preceding over the rule of law when it comes to the trial of party members or establishing the CDIC as a truly independent ACA, then there is no indication of genuine will to tackle corruption.