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CHAPTER 5. Conclusion
Blum’s paper only discussed about the equilibrium areas of different regimes of the cartel games, but we made some extensions. In this paper, we used a game-theoretical model to analyze the equilibriums of two firms’ strategies in a cartel.
And the amount of fine payment is the key factor to affect two firms’ equilibrium.
Different countries would have different p , which means the probability of a confession being processed by the antitrust authority. And that is issue what we are focus on.
The actions of firms being a cartel would be allowed if it is good for the whole society. That is to say, the antitrust authorities will not interfere too much to forbid cartels all the time. However in Taiwan, antitrust authorities will not permit a cartel absolutely if firms do not make applications in advance. The conclusion is that cartels are easier to appear in America (or Europe) than in Taiwan. Hence, how to enact the antitrust laws becomes a very important issue to the cartel office.
This paper is surely to provide a point of view for antitrust authorities to set the policies of leniency programs. And it may arouse more people to study about this issue in the future and then the antitrust authorities would control the actions of cartels more effectively. Maybe in the future, we can make a extension that leniency reduction is a proportion of fine payment, which means wsf , s[0,1] . To see what would happen in this kind of situation.
‧ these three games and the situation. As they take the probability of a confession being processed by the antitrust authority, p , into consideration, we think there are something that we can modify and make an improvement. The way that Blum put the probability into the formulae is too simple.
According to the conditions, we will portray the three kinds of game. We set the conditions of the figures under ac and a(1p)z . B1 A1 is forming the
‧ prisoners’ dilemma game. And the equilibrium area of prisoners’ dilemma game must fulfill B1 A1 , D1 C1, and A1 D1. 2 is the equilibrium area of chicken game,
Figure 4. Different regimes of the cartel game
0 w
f
L2
L1
Figure 4 Different regimes of the cartel game
e ( ,z z a c )
L3
1
2
3
‧ Whistle-blowing Programs on Cartels,”International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, 1241-1266.
Bigoni, M., S. Fridolfsson, C. Coq, and G. Spagnolo (2012). “Fines, Leniency, and Rewards in Antitrust,” Journal of Economics, 43, 368–390.
Blum, U., N. Steinat and M. Veltins (2008). “On the Rationale of Leniency Programs:
A Game-theoretical Analysis,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 25, 209-229.
Brisset, K., and L. Thomas (2004). “Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 17, 5-19.
Chavda, A. and M. Jegers (2007). “The Effects of Leniency Programs and Fines on Cartel Stability,” Metroeconomica, 58, 231-243.
Ellis, C., and W. Wilson (2003). “Cartels, Price-fixing, and Corporate Leniency Policy:
What Doesn’t Kill Us Makes Us Stronger. Manuscript, University of Oregon.
Hinloopen, H. (2003). “An Economic Analysis of Leniency Programs in Antitrust
Spagnolo, G., “Divide et Impera (2004). “Optimal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels (and Organized Crime),” FEEM working paper, Milano.
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立 政 治 大 學
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Na tiona
l Ch engchi University
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不同國家的反托拉斯法對於 卡特爾行為的影響
國立政治大學財政學研究所碩士班 研究生:陳宜卲
指導教授:王智賢
論文提要:
反托拉斯法在近期以來已受到越來越多的關注與重視，而為了全球經濟的穩 定與公平，近年來有越來越多的國家採用反托拉斯法裡面的寬恕政策來控制企業 壟斷的行為。本文利用賽局理論的模型來分析在不同國家的反托拉斯法之下會產 生的均衡對應為何，並且我們以 Blum et al. (2008) 的模型加以修改來分析在不同 寬恕政策的機制之下，對於廠商們壟斷行為的可能影響。我們研究發現，對於壟 斷行為的罰款金額大小會影響壟斷行為的存在與否，而各個國家對於壟斷行為的 合法性認定也會是一個非常重要的因素，我們研究得出的結果是，當一個國家的 主管機關要求廠商一定要事先提出壟斷行為(卡特爾聯盟)申請，才能夠使聯合行 為合法的時候，廠商們會傾向決定不要採取聯合壟斷的行為。
關鍵詞: 反托拉斯、卡特爾、寬恕政策、貝氏 Nash 均衡