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5. Conclusion
The very paradoxical result of this thesis is that China has a governance problem but it does not really matters. The final question should not be whether or not China has a governance problem. The question should be: how serious is the problem? In this thesis, I have examined different aspects of governance to analyze the problem of China‟s governance from different angles and I got different answers.
The problem is serious
While China‟s governance problems are serious, they may simply be one piece of the puzzle of China‟s economic miracle. In the short run, governance deficits have boosted China‟s GDP. But governance deficits have a price, and in the case of coal-fired power plants, the costs can only be estimated but are certainly immense. Low environmental protection standards are made worse by the incapacity to implement regulations at the local level. People and the environment suffer from a steady deluge of pollution. The bill for this pollution will be paid later. Even if the governance system were „fixed‟, the legacy of China‟s weak governance in the beginning of the 21st century will be felt for a long time.
The problem is not so serious
But why bad governance in China is not the logical and appropriate conclusion?
Firstly, governance indicators show that in recent years, China has at best been able to hold its position compared with other countries, but the general tendency is downwards.
Secondly, governance reforms are one part of the ongoing reforms in China and cannot be evaluated in isolation. The problem is how we evaluate a reform process in terms of governance. Governance indicators are an obvious choice.
Thirdly, if we factor out normative questions and analyze the outcomes such the results of governance processes in the electricity market, our evaluation may be much more positive.
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It doesn‟t matter
Let us reformulate the question. Does China‟s governance problem matter? The example of the problems with coal-fired power plants shows that by ignoring central-government policies and processes China was able to supply its regions with plenty of new and cheap energy. China was able to raise its production and achieved one of its priority goals of rapid economic development. With more efficiently functioning good governance the supply of energy might have stagnated, which could have resulted in power blackouts and less foreign investment. In that sense the problems does not matter because the primary goal of improving the economic growth at almost any cost has not yet changed. There are good grounds for pessimism about China‟s future.
Policy adjustments to the fast changes in China are too slow and harm many aspects related to China‟s future. But there are also good grounds to be optimistic about China‟s future. The dynamism found at the local-level attests to a degree of independence from the central level. That may prove very helpful to solve problems at the local level. Problems can quickly be adjusted according to the local needs. For instance, Shanghai citizens' protests over the potential health hazards, noise, and loss of property value resulting of the proposed Shanghai-Hangzhou Maglev train line succeeded in bringing about a suspension of the project in 2009. Even without a national electromagnetic policy and formal participation structures for the local people, solutions are possible.
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How can the questions posed at the beginning of the thesis be answered?
Firstly, governance theories may help to interpret governance indicators. This may be a paradoxical answer because governance indicators are based on governance theories. However, the variety of governance theories should make us cautious about the results of governance indicators. China‟s decline in the WGI‟s corruption indicator is not an absolute value. For instance, it does not include significant policy changes and their implications. A stricter corruption policy may lead to a lower value in such indicators, by causing a greater awareness among the people.
Secondly, China‟s governance problems have many roots. The case of energy policies and the failure to implement them is an example of the problems. On the one hand, local governments simply ignore the policies and they are insufficiently evaluated on the basis of achievements. On the other hand, governance entails costs and someone has to pay for them. Without funding and supervision from the central government, it is unlikely that the problems will disappear quickly.
Thirdly, governance reforms are a part of virtually every reform. The limits of governance reforms can be seen in their costs in the short run.
Finally, a governance approach is, in my opinion, very fruitful for discussing China‟s future. Paradoxically, this thesis supports both approaches.
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5.1. The limits of governance theories in China
The governance approach helps us analyze the development of China and facilitates a structured evaluation of general and specific issues. Nevertheless, we should be aware of the limits of applying governance theories to China. In my view, governance theories applied to analyze China have weaknesses in that they over emphasize democratic values and that governance normally turns attention to the status-quo and does not evaluate long-term planning and development visions. China may have its strengths in both. Neither governance theories nor most literature on China‟s development take due account of the China-specific concept of supraplanning (謀略 – móulüè).362 Western democracies plan normally during legislative periods. China has no such limitations and has a tradition of supraplanning that combines a vision with strategic development over 10, 50 and even 100 years. Statements by the Chinese leadership that China will be a democratic country by 2050 are seen by many Westerners as an excuse on the part of China‟s elite for being undemocratic now and for their lack of commitment to democratic development. But we ought to be wary of ignoring the Chinese government‟s long-term development vision. China remains a communist country. In my opinion, the impact of that simple fact is greatly underestimated. The party leadership‟s program to achieve rapid growth and development by any means necessary is not because the Communist Party is convinced that capitalist methods are superior to a centrally planned socialist economy, but is a result of the principal contradiction with which China has to struggle. Since 1978, this principal contradiction has been the official doctrine of the Communist Party. Its commitment to undertake massive efforts to modernize China‟s agriculture, industry, national defense system, economy and science has deep roots in communist doctrine. Studies on Sino-Marxism (馬列 – măliè)363 should be taken much more into account. This communist dialectic may explain why we have a gap between the poor results of policy formulation and implementation and the relative good evaluation of their outcome. In that sense, when it comes to governance in China, we have to think about governance in China with communist characteristics.
362 Harro von Senger, Moulüe - Supraplanung. Unerkannte Denkhorizonte aus dem Reich der Mitte (Supraplanning: Non-Perceived Dimensions of Thinking in the People’s Republic of China) (München:
Carl Hanser Verlag, 2008).
363 Ibid.
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