This study has shown that the use of rhetorical logos to create equivalence between types characterizes TD and CoP in the sense that dialectical logos is rendered incapable of generating combinations.
Accompanying the inversion of the logos is a series of contrapuntal relationships symptomatic of the problematic complex. Cicero and Boethius have approached the possibilities of unions and oppositions, though the image of a male Roman orator perpetually wins through. Here, in this concluding
section, this study wishes to propose a contrapuntal relationship between writing and speech in these two texts.
The contrapuntal relationship between writing and speech is a problem for the reason that it invokes concurrently the problematized connection between philosophy and rhetoric. The devotion to philosophy, it appears, constitutes a tradition that always exerts itself in spare time. For instance, the author of RaH begins with the claim that “My private affairs keep me so busy that I can hardly find enough leisure to devote to study, and the little that is vouchsafed to me I have usually preferred to spend on philosophy” (1.1.1).
Cicero, as well, professes that “if in the active business I have been of service to my countrymen, I may also, if I can, be of service to them in my leisure”
(TD 1.3.5). He is of course referring to the philosophical studies carried out between M and A. As for Boethius, when he accuses Madame Fortune of fickleness, he moans that he suffers ill-treatment even though he has applied in public affairs “what I had learned in sequestered leisure” (CoP 1.4.7).
These examples constitute what Lerer calls “the tradition of otium”—referring to
the leisure granted the intellectual nobleman for the pursuit of the life of the mind. The harried official, beset by daily dilemmas but longing for the refuge of books, becomes a trope in Latin writing from Cicero through the sixth century. (21) And, even though CoP has been composed in imprisonment, its philosophical message still connects to the tradition of “otium.” For, Lady Philosophy reminds Boethius that “This very locality, which you label your place of banishment, is the hearth and home of people who dwell here” (CoP 2.4.17).
This house-arrest evokes not so much torment and torture as ease and comfort and relates leisure and philosophy. A certain contrapuntal nexus emerges therefore between public and private, naturally returning one to the nexus between rhetoric and philosophy, and further, to that between speech and writing. Cicero is obviously most productive of philosophical writings when he leaves the public scene and especially after the death of his daughter. As for Boethius, once Lady Philosophy reminds him that the power of ill fortune cannot possibly lead to the omission of the enjoyment of human achievements such as the day when his two sons are appointed twin consuls and he gives an encomium to King Theoderic, winning “high praise for your originality of
thought and your power of utterance” (CoP 2.3.8). This clearly serves as a distinct foil to Boethius’ later “devoiced” philosophical pursuit. In brief, the Roman tradition of “otium” is a trope not only for pestered officials seeking relief from public affairs but also, particularly in the cases of Cicero and Boethius, for time to spend in philosophy and writing. The reasons why Cicero and Boethius turn to philosophy and writing are not difficult to surmise.
Both are, in a sense, forced to them owing to political disempowerment. In lamenting over the neglect of philosophy, Cicero also implies that there are but few opportunities for him to practice his oratory in the Roman forum. In a letter to his friend Varro, Cicero suggests to him:
To you I have the same advice to offer as to myself. Let us avoid men’s eyes, even if we cannot easily escape their tongues.
The jubilant victors [Caesar and his company] regard us as among the defeated, whereas those who are sorry for the defeat of our friends feel aggrieved that we are still among the living.
(Letters to Friends 2.177) This letter suffices to explain that the ill-disposed political climate compels Cicero to seek solitude lest his opponents plot against him one way or another.
Boethius’ case is more desperate: in order to save Albinus, he is charged with treason and sentenced to death.
The recourse to philosophy seems then not just an attempt to console themselves but a criticism of the wicked and the unjust political players. So, the initial disjunctive move to philosophy is conjunctive in nature, and the use of rhetorical logos is the very medium to project that concern onto the public area. More fundamentally, this logos is conveyed in the written form. For Boethius, “I have committed the sequence of events, and the truth about them, to paper for later scrutiny, so that they cannot be hidden from posterity” (CoP 1.4.25). As for Cicero, the procession of dialogues is intended, as the structure of TD suggests, to address Brutus in a written format in which the exchanges between M and A are recorded. A written text, therefore, arises to override a spoken text for both authors, once more at variance with the Socratic drive to type—since firstly, there is little dialogism involved, and secondly, a written text is far more removed from the eidos than from the spoken logos.
So far as Cicero is concerned, however, his writing in leisure is not that ineffective. His political aspiration—teaching virtue to save Rome from
depravity—comes to a head by way of Brutus. He assassinates Caesar, and very symbolically, his first utterance to the crowd after the murder should be a cry of “Cicero” (Butler 104). It is as if the name of Cicero suffices to explain everything, and in Shane Butler’s words, “Brutus’ gesture not only blends deed with text but also, eerily, blood with ink” (111). Among others, the dedication of TD to Brutus turns out to be an action that has been largely achieved by oral rhetoric. Thence, however, philosophy and dialectic remain exclusively outside the Roman forum; they are merely strategic uses for rhetoric to re/dress itself before reverting to the public. “Penning oratory” then appears an apt footnote for the philosophical dialogues such as TD and CoP.
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