Government can use monetary policies to control economic activities via banks.
When banks want to reduce their net lending position, there is an inverse relationship between deposits and loan interest rates. Meanwhile, depositors reduce their money on banks and loan interest rates increase. A monetary policy tightening induces a decrease in created liquidity (Rauch, Steffen, Hackethal and Tyrell, 2009). Liquidity creator is one of banks’ traditional roles. However, people had not been discussed about it for a long time due to a comprehensive measurement of liquidity creation until Berger and Bouwman (2005) constructed a comprehensive measurement for bank liquidity creation.
Liquidity risk and liquidity creation may occur at one time, because once liquidity creation appears, it means banks relocate their activities in balance sheet and off balance sheet. The empirical result is liquidity creation is negative to liquidity risk in market-based and bank-based financial system. Purda (2007) indicated banks are suffered higher risk in bank-based financial system than other banks in market-based system due to the financial system remains have an important influence in firms’
credit rating assignment. Banks have been considered as effective monitors to firms, because bank can renegotiate with firms. Our empirical results show there are much higher sensitive correlations in bank-based financial system than in market-financial system. More liquidity creator banks acted, less liquidity risk banks suffered in bank-based financial system.
According to the issue of the too big to fail, large banks have the advantage to do more commitment loans. It makes larger banks have more capability to possess more risky assets. This implies larger banks would have more liquidity risk. Our empirical
bank size are all positive. And there is a contagion of banking failure due to bank's commitment problem, and more commitment problem would exacerbate a liquidity shortage (Diamond and Rajan, 2005). Contagion risk would be arisen due banks’
transactions in the interbank and capital markets (Wong and Hui, 2009). Under financial crisis outbreak, there is not an obvious difference in two financial systems.
But a negative correlation exists under financial crisis outbreak. It implies when banks do more liquidity creation, banks face less pressure of insolvency. Contagion of banking failure could be prevented by doing more liquidity creation.
Liquidity risk and liquidity creation is not the same in our empirical proof.
Instead of increasing liquidity risk, doing more liquidity creation would decrease liquidity risk.
There is not an internationally recognized“Liquidity Accord”since liquidity is not absolutely determined by assets and liabilities (Fernando, 2009). For the nature of banks, they based on public information and confidence affecting the end liquidity risk degree. Banks would take appropriate degree of liquidity risk for cost considering, thus less liquidity risk is not absolute good for banks. When banks benefit from asymmetric maturities in assets and liabilities, they should avoid taking too much liquidity risk in case of insolvency.
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Table 1 Variable Description
Variables Notations Description/Calculation
Liquidity Risk LR The ratio of financing gap to total assets. Financing gap defined as a bank's loans minus core deposit and cash.
Liquidity Creation to Total Equity
LC Follow Berger and Bouwman (2009) to calculate the liquidity creation, and we divide the volume by total equity. For restrictions with Bankscope, we adjust some calculated items.
Gross Total Assets LNGTAt To measure a bank’s size, we follow Berger and Bouwman (2009) to calculate the gross total assets (total assets plus allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve), and we smooth the volume by natural log. For the restrictions from database, we calculate the GTA by total assets plus loan loss reserve.
LNGTAt-1 The bank’s size of last year.
Equity to Gross Total Assets
EGTAt The ratio of equity to gross total assets.
EGTAt-1 The equity to gross total assets ratio of last year.
Less Risky Assets LRA The ratio of risky liquid assets to gross total assets.
Risky liquid assets is sum of the liquid assets with little or no discount.
Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans
LLRGLt-1 The loan loss reserve to loans ratio of last year.
Macroeconomy GDPCt Annual percent change of GDP
GDPCt-1 GDP annual percent change of last year Official
Supervisory Power
OSP It is used to measure of legal power of the supervisory agency. The value is principal component indicator of fourteen variables.
Private Monitoring Index
PMI It is used to measures regulations that empower private monitoring of banks. Principal component indicator of nine variables.
Overall Bank Activities and Ownership Restrictiveness
BAR Indicator of bank's ability to engage in business of securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, and in real estate investment, management, and development.
Table 2 Liquidity Activities Classification with Bankscope Database Restrictions
Table 3 Classification of Financial Systems of Sample Countries
Note: All countries are sorted by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999).
Table 4
Panel Unit Root Test Results Using Unbalanced Panel DataThis table contains all the variables of Fisher test statistics. Fisher test is used to check whether one variable is stationary or not. The null hypothesis is that all all series in
OSP×GDPCt 12720 3.08E+04 0.0000
PMI×GDPCt 12720 3.08E+04 0.0000
BAR×GDPCt 12720 3.08E+04 0.0000
Notes: All variables in these regressions have been defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 5 Sargan Test Results of All Samples
Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
Note: We use LR as dependent variable, and LC as explanatory variable. Model 1 only cosists of LNGTAt, EGTAt, LRA and GDPCt control variables. And we separately add OSP×GDPCt control variable in model 2, PMI×GDPCt control variable in model 3 and BAR×GDPCt control variable in model 4. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 6 Sargan Test Results in Different Conditions
Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
Note: We use LR as dependent variable, and LC as explanatory variable. Model 1 only cosists of LNGTAt, EGTAt, LRA and GDPCt control variables. And we separately add OSP×GDPCt control variable in model 2, PMI×GDPCt control variable in model 3 and BAR×GDPCt control variable in model 4. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Market-Based Financial System Bank-Based Financial System Model Statistic D.F. P-value Model Statistic D.F. P-value
With No Financial Crisis With No Financial Crisis
(1)
8.939 3 0.0301*(1)
2.958 3 0.3981(2)
10.783 3 0.0130*(2)
3.052 3 0.3837(3)
8.128 3 0.0434*(3)
2.913 3 0.4052(4)
15.667 3 0.0013**(4)
2.937 3 0.4015With Financial Crisis Outbreak With Financial Crisis Outbreak
(1)
25.67 3 0.0000***(1)
1.598 3 0.6599(2)
25.871 3 0.0000***(2)
1.694 3 0.6383(3)
25.598 3 0.0000***(3)
1.767 3 0.6220(4)
30.173 3 0.0000***(4)
1.669 3 0.6440Table 7 Descriptive Statistics of All Samples
LNGTA
t 13.96921 1.943265 7.073389 21.74467EGTAt
9.621741 7.842396 0.000447 100GDPC
t 1.295872 1.575653 -1.81096 5.22OSP×GDPC
t 11.90485 17.52663 -23.5424 45.74921PMI×GDPC
t 8.761166 11.37983 -14.4876 31.32BAR×GDPC
t 2.903772 4.414864 -5.97615 13.01324LNGTA
t-1 13.89496 1.945326 7.197469 21.68295LLRGL
t-1 2.63229 4.340915 -1.54 100EGTA
t-1 9.646595 7.826887 0.000447 96.84032GDPC
t-1 1.321307 1.578959 -1.81096 5.22Obs
30361Notes: All variables in these regressions have been defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics in Market-Based Financial System
Market-Based Financial System
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
LR
-5.71183 31.70568 -191.792 99.9799LC
6.809581 14.17131 -672.592 596.4706LRA
33.7977 25.70861 0 259.1788LNGTA
t 13.83956 1.955941 7.073389 21.74467EGTAt
11.3807 11.34319 0.138631 100GDPC
t 1.833547 0.838142 -0.45277 5.22OSP×GDPC
t 23.2991 10.91538 -3.4331 45.74921PMI×GDPC
t 14.28857 6.468926 -3.16936 31.32BAR×GDPC
t 4.432289 2.494428 -0.81498 9.803402Obs
17279Notes: All variables in these regressions have been defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 9 Descriptive Statistics in Bank-Based Financial System with Taking Liquidity
Creation as Different VariableBank-Based Financial System and Take Liquidity Creation As Endogenous Variable
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
LR
-12.9109 33.30545 -133.848 99.38158LC
10.97489 322.2897 -85.5014 41224.39LRA
38.74642 17.70519 0 388.786LNGTA
t 14.00569 1.971925 8.875154 21.60818EGTA
t 8.497834 5.619944 0.000447 91.34595GDPC
t 0.885853 1.916553 -1.81096 5.205295OSP×GDPC
t 2.275966 16.23083 -23.5424 31.23177PMI×GDPC
t 4.304039 12.71938 -14.4876 31.23177BAR×GDPC
t 1.572604 5.175608 -5.97615 13.01324LNGTA
t-1 13.94256 1.981614 8.503508 21.68295LLRGL
t-1 3.392534 4.347244 0 76.03EGTA
t-1 8.603806 5.808842 0.000447 95.94977GDPC
t-1 0.948588 1.939252 -1.81096 5.205295Obs
16402Bank-Based Financial System s and Take Liquidity Creation As Exogenous Variable
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
LR
-12.1482 28.39889 -133.848 99.85476LC
10.61682 194.2112 -813.419 41224.39LRA
13.54222 1.739893 7.221386 21.82674LNGTA
t 7.574565 7.291206 0.000447 100.1903EGTAt
39.43165 17.74888 0 388.786GDPC
t 0.919055 1.363273 -1.81096 5.205295OSP×GDPC
t 6.804367 12.27417 -23.5424 31.23177PMI×GDPC
t 4.717914 8.710292 -14.4876 31.23177BAR×GDPC
t 1.485745 3.465381 -5.97615 13.01324Obs
45314Notes: All variables in these regressions have been defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 10 The Regression Result of All Samples
Overall the Relationship Between Liquidity Risk and Liquidity Creation
Pre. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT
? -37.419* -34.453* -33.848* -39.434**(-1.89) (-1.74) (-1.73) (-1.99)
LC
- -0.344* -0.335* -0.330** -0.345*(-1.93) (-1.94) (-1.96) (-1.9)
LNGTA
t + 4.620*** 4.403*** 4.366*** 4.791***(3.42) (3.32) (3.35) (3.5)
EGTA
t - 0.039 0.034 0.040 0.041(0.17) (0.15) (0.19) (0.18)
LRA
- -0.977*** -0.971*** -0.970*** -0.973***(-11.05) (-11.46) (-11.64) (-11.09)
GDPC
t - 1.007 -1.748 -8.124 -5.045(0.96) (-0.72) (-1.22) (-1.28)
OSP×GDPC
t - 0.283(1.04)
PMI×GDPC
t - 1.304(1.31)
BAR×GDPC
t - 2.523(1.4)
R
2 0.0242 0.025 0.0258 0.0246Obs
30361 30361 30361 30361Notes: All variables in these regressions have been defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 11 The Results In Different Financial Systems
Notes: All variables in these regressions have been defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 12 The Results of the Subsample in Market-Based Financial System
Pre. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A : Market-Based Financial System without financial crisis
CONSTANT ? -41.446*** -41.894*** -41.277*** -40.686***
Panel B : Market-Based Financial System with financial crisis
CONSTANT ? -8.764** -8.851** -9.291** -8.876**
Notes: All variables in these regressions have been defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 13 The Results of the Subsample in Bank-Based Financial System
Pre. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A : Bank-Based Financial System without financial crisis
CONSTANT ? 187.785** 185.531** 185.987** 183.494**
Panel B : Bank-Based Financial System with financial crisis
CONSTANT ? -46.818*** -46.033*** -44.255*** -47.098***
Notes: All variables in these regressions have been defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 14 The Regression Result in Different Financial Systems not during Financial
CrisisPre. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A : Market-Based Financial System without financial crisis
CONSTANT ? -41.446*** -41.894*** -41.277*** -40.686***
Panel B : Bank-Based Financial System without financial crisis
CONSTANT ? 187.785** 185.531** 185.987** 183.494**
Notes: All variables in these regressions have been defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 15 The Regression Result in Different Financial Systems during Financial
CrisisPre. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A : Market-Based Financial System with financial crisis
CONSTANT ? -8.764** -8.851** -9.291** -8.876**
Panel B : Bank-Based Financial System with financial crisis
CONSTANT ? -46.818*** -46.033*** -44.255*** -47.098***
Notes: All variables in these regressions have been defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Appendix: Survey Questions of Bank Regulation and Supervision
I. Based on Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004), the survey questions used to construct the official supervisory power:
1. Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? Yes/No
2. Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? Yes/No
3. Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? Yes/No 4. Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational
structure? Yes/No
5. Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? Yes/No
6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? Yes/No
7. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute dividends?
Yes/No
8. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute bonuses?
Yes/No
9. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute management fees? Yes/No
10. Can the supervisory agency legally declare—such that this declaration supersedes the rights of bank shareholders—that a bank is insolvent? Yes/No
11. Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to intervene—that is, suspend some or all ownership rights—a problem bank? Yes/No
Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency do the following:? Yes/No
12. Supersede shareholder rights? Yes/No 13. Remove and replace management? Yes/No 14. Remove and replace directors? Yes/No
II. Based on Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004), the survey questions used to construct the private monitoring index:
1. Whether bank directors and officials are legally liable for the accuracy of information disclosed to the public? Yes/No
2. Whether banks must publish consolidated accounts? Yes/No
3. Do banks must be audited by certified international auditors? Yes/No
4. Whether 100% of the largest 10 banks are rated by international rating agencies?
Yes/No
5. Are off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public? Yes/No
6. Whether banks must disclose their risk management procedures to the public? Yes/No 7. Whether accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enter the income statement while the
loan is still non-performing? Yes/No
8. Is subordinated debt is allowable as part of capital? Yes/No
9. Whether there is no explicit deposit insurance system and no insurance was paid the last time a bank failed? Yes/No
III. Based on Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004), the survey questions used to construct overall bank activities and ownership restrictiveness:
Bank activities restrictiveness:
1. What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in securities activities (the ability of banks to engage in the business of securities underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry)?
2. What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in insurance activities (the ability of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and selling)?
3. What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in real estate activities (the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, development, and management)?
Unrestricted = 1: full range of activities can be conducted directly in the bank.
Permitted = 2: full range of activities can be conducted, but some or all must be conducted in subsidiaries.
Restricted = 3: less than full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries.
Prohibited = 4: the activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries.
Ownership restrictiveness:
1. What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank ownership of nonfinancial firms?
Unrestricted = 1: a bank may own 100 percent of the equity in any nonfinancial firm.
Permitted = 2: a bank may own 100 percent of the equity of a nonfinancial firm, but ownership is limited based on a bank’s equity capital.
Restricted = 3: a bank can only acquire less than 100 percent of the equity in a nonfinancial firm.
Prohibited = 4: a bank may not acquire any equity investment in a nonfinancial firm.
Source: World Bank guide questions, which is available from World Bank research (Bank Regulation and Supervision) or Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004)