Conclusions - 董監事質押與銀行信用風險及績效之關係-以本土上市櫃商業銀行為例

The fundamental question addressed in this study is whether the attitude of the board of directors toward risk will affect the bank risk and performance. The population of our research is domestic commercial banks. The examination period is from 4^th quarter 1999 to 4^th quarter 2007. Since OLS estimators could be inconsistent and meaningless if there were heterogeneity across individuals. To control for individual heterogeneity, the quantitative analysis of the panel data regression model was conducted. The empirical results support the claim that the collateralized shares may have contributed to a lower return due to a higher risk. Those results are also in line with previous researches (Chiou et al., 2002; Kao and Chiou, 2002). Because we adopt quarterly data in our study, another important issue is that if performance on different month were anomaly. We examine performance measures and risk measures for the first quarter to forth quarter. This analysis indicates that performance and risk measures engaging in the seasonal effect results similar to the full samples, and suggests that our inference in not biased by the seasonal anomaly. Such findings underscore the importance of enforcing relatively regulations and may provide policy implication for the regulators in the later monitoring requirement.

Although our study has yielded findings that have empirical implications, there are limitations in this study. The first shortcoming in the current study is that we can only get listed bank information about the collateralized shares. The second limitation is insiders’ discretion to report the number. We can not ensure that the ratios we adopt are all proper numbers without manipulating by banks’ insider. Furthermore, we adopt the criteria when judging examination periods and samples, it is hard to prevent our empirical results from the nonselection bias.

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Table 1: List of financial institutions (end of September 2007)

Table 1 shows the list of financial institutions (end of September 2007). The first column indicates bank name. The second and the third column indicate that if banks were listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange or the OTC during our examination periods, respectively. The forth column shows SIC code if banks were listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange or the OTC during our examination periods. There are 40 Domestic Banks listed in Table 1, 26 banks listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange and l banks listed in OTC market.

The Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank ×

Taipei Fubon Commercial Bank Co., Ltd. ○ 2830 4^th 1999 to 4^th 2007

China Development Industrial Bank Inc. ○ 2804 ×

Industrial Bank of Taiwan ×

Source: Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Table 2: Samples and observations

Table 2 shows samples and observations in our study. The examination periods in our study are from 4^th quarter 1999 to 4^th quarter 2007. The criteria we adopt when judging examination periods are (a) whether equity is negative, (b) whether the bank be takeover by FSC. We got rid of the same year and the last year when banks emerge the situations we listed above. Finally, we got an unbalanced penal data in our study.

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total

2801 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2802 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2803 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2806 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2807 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2809 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2811 1 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 21

2812 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2815 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2826 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2830 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2831 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 25

2834 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2836 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2837 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2838 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2839 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2840 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2843 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2844 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2845 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2847 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2849 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

2893 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 4 11

5810 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 25

5817 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 33

5854 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 32

Total 25 104 104 104 104 104 103 96 96 840

Table 3: Variable definitions

Variable Definition

ROA (before depreciation) operating income (before depreciation) divided by total assets ROE (before depreciation) operating income (before depreciation) divided by equity

RARROA risk adjusted return on assets (moving average of three-year ROA divided by three-year standard deviation of ROA)

RARROE risk adjusted return on equity (moving average of three-year ROE divided by three-year standard deviation of ROE)

NPLR nonperforming loan ratio (nonperforming loans divided by total loans) ROASTV three years standard deviation of ROA

ROESTV three years standard deviation of ROE HDR director shareholdings divided by total shares

CLR shares collateralized divided bydirector shareholdings

EA equity to assets ratio

SIZE logarithm of total assets (unit: thousand)

Table 4: Variance inflation factor

Table 4 indicates the direction and relationship between independent variables. In this study we introduce Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) as a measure of collinearity. The result of the VIF revealed that independent variables are chiefly showed not to be significantly related (VIF< 10) except for variable HDR. However, this relationship, while significant, is moderate in strength.

Yit=αi+β1 HDRit+β2HDR²it+β3EAit+β4SIZEit+εit

Variable VIF 1/VIF

HDR 44.98 .0222

HDR² 40.34 .0247

EA 1.10 .9092 SIZE 1.89 .5288 Mean VIF: 22.08

Yit=αi+β1 HDRit+β2HDR²it+β3 CLRit+β4HDRit*CLRit+β5HDR²it*CLRit+β6EAit+β7SIZEit+εit

Variable VIF 1/VIF

HDR 49.53 .0202

HDR² 43.64 .0229

CLR 4.59 .2120

HDR*CLR 19.67 .0508

HDR²*CLR 14.04 .0712

EA 1.14 .8737 SIZE 1.92 .5196 Mean VIF: 19.24

Variable definitions

HDR =director shareholdings divided by total shares

CLR =shares collateralized divided bydirector shareholdings

EA =equity to assets ratio

SIZE =logarithm of total assets (unit: thousand)

Table 5: Pearson correlation

HDR CLR EA SIZE

HDR 1

CLR -.4561 1

EA -.1963 .2870 1

SIZE .5789 -.4382 -.3127 1 Variable definitions

HDR =director shareholdings divided by total shares

CLR =shares collateralized divided bydirector shareholdings

EA =equity to assets ratio

SIZE =logarithm of total assets (unit: thousand)

Table 6: Descriptive statistics

Variable Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Cases ROA .0024 .0057 -2.2396 10.9226 -.0311 .0124 840 ROE .0007 .1742 -6.0592 46.1036 -1.5866 .1417 840 RARROA 1.0255 1.0198 -.1109 1.8216 -1.3613 3.3491 821 RARROE .9214 1.0557 .0891 1.6848 -1.3193 3.0558 831 NPLR .0454 .0437 2.6360 11.7697 .0000 .3025 836 ROASTV .0057 .0050 2.5716 13.1811 .0005 .0382 822 ROESTV .1493 .4191 6.8361 53.3077 .0080 3.6987 832 HDR .4526 .3894 .5129 1.5153 .0007 1.0000 828 CLR .1090 .2026 2.2048 7.7776 .0000 .9826 825 EA .0651 .0193 .6093 6.0001 .0068 .1739 839 SIZE 8.6197 .3883 .0627 2.2161 7.6111 9.3937 839

*HDR=1 shows that the bank belongs to holding company totally, such as First Bank.

Variable definitions

ROA (before depreciation) =operating income (before depreciation) divided by total assets ROE (before depreciation) =operating income (before depreciation) divided by equity RARROA =risk adjusted return on assets

RARROE =risk adjusted return on equity

NPLR =nonperforming loan ratio

ROASTV =three years standard deviation of ROA ROESTV =three years standard deviation of ROE HDR =director shareholdings divided by total shares

CLR =shares collateralized divided bydirector shareholdings

EA =equity to assets ratio

SIZE =logarithm of total assets (unit: thousand)

Table 7: The relationship between holding, the proxy of return and risk

To distinguish if holding were a consequential factor in banking industry. The relationship between holding and dependent variables has been examined at the first stage. The model we use for the test is:

Y

= α

+ β

HDR

+ β

HDR

²it

+ β

EA

+ β

SIZE

+ ε

.

The empirical results reflected in Table 7 indicate that variable HDR is the prime cause of performance and risk in banking industry.

Variable ROA

*Significant at .1 level;**Significant at .05 level;***Significant at .01 level

Variable definitions

RARROE =risk adjusted return on equity

NPLR =nonperforming loan ratio

ROASTV =three years standard deviation of ROA ROESTV =three years standard deviation of ROE HDR =director shareholdings divided by total shares

CLR =shares collateralized divided bydirector shareholdings

EA =equity to assets ratio

SIZE =logarithm of total assets (unit: thousand)

Table 8: The relationship between the collateralized shares, the proxy of return and risk

To discriminate the influence of the collateralized shares, variable CLR was added.

The model we use for the test is:

Y

= α

+ β

HDR

+ β

HDR

²it

+ β

CLR

+ β

HDR

*CLR

+ β

HDR

²it

*CLR

+ β

EA

+ β

SIZE

+ ε

.

The results in our study support the claim that the higher the proportion of collateralized shares, the poorer the operating performance. Furthermore, the results indicate that the proportion of collateralized shares is not statistically significant related to nonperforming loans.

*Significant at .1 level;**Significant at .05 level;***Significant at .01 level

Variable definitions

RARROE =risk adjusted return on equity

NPLR =nonperforming loan ratio

ROASTV =three years standard deviation of ROA

ROESTV =three years standard deviation of ROE HDR =director shareholdings divided by total shares

CLR =shares collateralized divided bydirector shareholdings

EA =equity to assets ratio

SIZE =logarithm of total assets (unit: thousand)

Table 9: The variation in the relationship between the collateralized shares, the proxy of return and risk

To contribute to our growing understanding of nature and influence of the collateralized shares, we redefined the variable CLR as a dummy variable Dit to observe the variation in the relationship between the collateralized shares, the proxy of return and risk. Let other variables hold constant. The model we use for the test is:

Y

= α

+ β

HDR

+ β

HDR

²it

+ β

D

+ β

HDR

* D

+ β

HDR

²it

* D

+ β

EA

+ β

SIZE

+ ε

it.

Those results are also in line with previous researches (Chiou et al., 2002; Kao and Chiou, 2002) that the financial leverage approaches such as collateralized shares significant affect the attitude toward credit risk of the management and performance, more proportion of collateralized shares is observably not good to banks.

CLR Variable ROA ROE RARROA RORROE NPLR

HDR .0382 .8428 28.1177 2.6741 .2559

HDR² -.0584 -1.2470 -36.4098 3.3946 .1150

CLR -.1542 2.0866 -6.9578 -5.7676 .4246

0 - Median HDR*CLR 1.5873 -19.7424 9.9659 4.8299 -4.3389^**

(median=.1788) HDR²*CLR -1.9471 29.9646 -11.4514 -2.8148 3.5921^* EA .1872^*** 3.2874^*** 18.8571^* 20.4902^*** .0409

*Significant at .1 level;**Significant at .05 level;***Significant at .01 level

** The model we adopted is the fixed effect model, we have detected all criteria

Variable definitions

RARROE =risk adjusted return on equity

NPLR =nonperforming loan ratio

CLR =shares collateralized divided bydirector shareholdings

Table 10: Robustness of performance and risk results - seasonal effect (separate samples)

Because we adopt quarterly data in our study, another important issue is that if performance on different month were anomaly. We examine performance measures and risk measures for the first quarter to forth quarter. We then rerun the equation 11 and report empirical results in Table 10. This analysis indicates that performance and risk measures engaging in the seasonal effect results similar to the full samples, and suggests that our inference in not biased by the seasonal anomaly.

Q1 Q2

Variable RARROA RARROE NPLR Variable RARROA RARROE NPLR

HDR 1.0864 .5688 .1864^*** HDR .4968 .2368 .2144^***

HDR² -1.9451^* -1.4392 -.1526^*** HDR² -1.1211 -.8336 -.1712^***

CLR -.7623 -1.1436 .0754 CLR -.2048 -.0633 .0817

HDR*CLR 18.8554 20.3447 -.6730 HDR*CLR 48.9881^* -49.6781^* -.1827 HDR²*CLR -136.6860 -151.7740 .8709 HDR²*CLR -291.723^*** 283.1600^** -3.5661 EA 18.8763^*** 23.0759^*** -.1764 EA 18.7877^*** 22.0985^*** -.0037 SIZE .8767 .4089 -.0922^*** SIZE .0471 -.4965 -.0962^***

Cases 196 196 198 Cases 198 198 199

Q3 Q4

Variable RARROA RARROE NPLR Variable RARROA RARROE NPLR

HDR .7235 .0503 .2068^*** HDR 2.1602 1.0032 .1536^***

HDR² -1.3084 -.6098 -.1646^*** HDR² -2.6142^** -1.4680^* -.1282^***

CLR -1.9796^*** -2.1416^*** .1052^*** CLR -1.5318^** -1.5487^** .1342^***

HDR*CLR 10.5699^* 8.9210^* -1.0598^*** HDR*CLR 5.5857 2.8880 -1.2526^***

HDR²*CLR -9.5258 -7.9517 .8982^** HDR²*CLR -4.2130 -1.3313 1.0966^***

EA 18.2821^*** 20.5296^*** -.3089^** EA 21.4149^*** 21.9154^*** -.1393 SIZE -.3398 -.7488 -.0749^*** SIZE -.1028 -1.0226^** -.0867^***

Cases 198 198 199 Cases 224 224 226

*Significant at .1 level;**Significant at .05 level;***Significant at .01 level

Variable definitions

RARROA =risk adjusted return on assets RARROE =risk adjusted return on equity

NPLR =nonperforming loan ratio

HDR =director shareholdings divided by total shares

CLR =shares collateralized divided bydirector shareholdings

EA =equity to assets ratio

SIZE =logarithm of total assets (unit: thousand)

Table 11: Robustness of performance and risk results - seasonal effect (setting dummy variables)

To mitigate seasonal difference concern, we introduce new variables to discriminate if it exists. The model we adopt is:

Y

= α

+ β

HDR

+ β

HDR

²it

+ β

D

+ β

HDR

* D

+ β

HDR

²it

* D

+ β

EA

+ β

SIZE

+ β

Q

2it

+ β

Q

3it

+ β

Q

4it

+ ε

where

Q

3 and

Q

4 are dummy variables. We consider the first quarter to be the reference group and detect if significant difference exist among them. This analysis also indicates that performance and risk measures engaging in the seasonal effect results similar to the full samples, and suggests that our inference in not biased by the seasonal anomaly.

Variable Q2 Q3 Q4

RARROA

(p-value) -.0041

(.9358) .1013

(.8269) .0499

(.3144) RARROE

(p-value) -.0341

(.4962) -.0551

(.1973) -.0515

(.2828) NPLR

(p-value) -.0020

(.2891) -.0012

(.4329) -.0037

(.4332)

Variable definitions

Q2 =Q2 is 1 if data were belong to the second quarter and 0 for otherwise Q3 =Q3 is 1 if data were belong to the third quarter and 0 for otherwise Q4 =Q4 is 1 if data were belong to the forth quarter and 0 for otherwise RARROA =risk adjusted return on assets

RARROE =risk adjusted return on equity

NPLR =nonperforming loan ratio

-0.01

ROA (before depreciation) =operating income (before depreciation) divided by total assets ROE (before depreciation) =operating income (before depreciation) divided by equity

Figure 1: Performance trend (ROA, ROE)

RARROA =mean return on assets divided by ROA standard deviation RARROE =mean return on equity divided by ROE standard deviation

Figure 2: Performance trend (RARROA, RARROE)

280128022803

Code Assets(log) Code Assets(log) Code Assets(log)

2801 9.0959 2834 8.9896 2847 8.4107

Figure 3 illustrates differences between bank assets and the unit of assets is thousand.

The examination periods are from 4^th quarter 1999 to 4^th quarter 2007. To prevent results from the price inflation effect, all of observations are divided by CPI Index of the same year. The results indicate that bank size is around 10 to 100 billions.

Appendix A: Bank Translated Name

The Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank 上海商業儲蓄銀行

Taipei Fubon Commercial Bank Co., Ltd. 台北富邦商業銀行 2830

Cathay United Bank 國泰世華商業銀行 2826

The Export-Import Bank of ROC 中國輸出入銀行

Bank of Kaohsiung 高雄銀行 2836

Mega International Commercial Bank 兆豐國際商業銀行 2806

Agricultural Bank of Taiwan 全國農業金庫

China Development Industrial Bank Inc. 中華開發工業銀行 2804

Industrial Bank of Taiwan 臺灣工業銀行

Standard Chartered Bank (Taiwan) Limited 渣打國際商業銀行 2807

Taichung Commercial Bank 台中商業銀行 2812

Far Eastern International Bank 遠東國際商業銀行 2845

Yuanta Commercial Bank 元大商業銀行 2843

Bank SinoPac Company Limited 永豐商業銀行 2839

E. Sun Commercial Bank 玉山商業銀行 2840

Cosmos Bank, Taiwan 萬泰商業銀行 2837

Bowa Bank 寶華商業銀行 5810

Taishin International Bank 台新國際商業銀行 2844

Ta Chong Bank Ltd. 大眾商業銀行 2847

Jih Sun International Bank 日盛國際商業銀行 5817

EnTie Commercial Bank 安泰商業銀行 2849

Chinatrust Commercial Bank 中國信託商業銀行 2815

Chinfon Commercial Bank 慶豐商業銀行

Taiwan Business Bank 臺灣中小企業銀行 2834

Appendix B: Variable Descriptive Statistic by Quarter

Variable: ROA

Year Month Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Cases 1999 12 0.0036 0.0058 -2.3844 7.7790 -0.0153 0.0100 25 2000 3 0.0034 0.0058 -2.5736 8.6487 -0.0153 0.0093 26 2000 6 0.0034 0.0061 -2.5793 8.6853 -0.0167 0.0097 26 2000 9 0.0034 0.0066 -2.5876 8.7518 -0.0188 0.0100 26 2000 12 0.0028 0.0073 -2.5902 8.7688 -0.0213 0.0101 26 2001 3 0.0023 0.0071 -2.5962 8.8041 -0.0217 0.0091 26 2001 6 0.0021 0.0079 -2.6851 9.2725 -0.0258 0.0094 26 2001 9 0.0022 0.0074 -2.5331 8.5397 -0.0219 0.0094 26 2001 12 0.0023 0.0065 -2.7156 10.9917 -0.0239 0.0093 26 2002 3 0.0028 0.0052 -3.3956 15.9283 -0.0205 0.0084 26 2002 6 0.0022 0.0058 -3.3918 15.9562 -0.0234 0.0089 26 2002 9 0.0015 0.0066 -3.2047 14.8815 -0.0276 0.0097 26 2002 12 0.0005 0.0074 -2.8838 13.2591 -0.0311 0.0105 26 2003 3 0.0005 0.0066 -2.5025 11.3755 -0.0263 0.0101 26 2003 6 0.0006 0.0065 -2.3860 10.8792 -0.0257 0.0106 26 2003 9 0.0008 0.0064 -2.0544 9.3430 -0.0239 0.0112 26 2003 12 0.0010 0.0060 -1.6142 7.2871 -0.0207 0.0110 26 2004 3 0.0010 0.0055 -1.2114 5.5248 -0.0172 0.0102 26 2004 6 0.0012 0.0056 -1.0066 4.8434 -0.0163 0.0107 26 2004 9 0.0016 0.0055 -0.5965 3.5880 -0.0138 0.0113 26 2004 12 0.0019 0.0053 -0.0999 2.5660 -0.0102 0.0119 26 2005 3 0.0023 0.0047 0.1919 2.2434 -0.0060 0.0112 25 2005 6 0.0026 0.0047 0.1635 2.2490 -0.0053 0.0117 26 2005 9 0.0032 0.0045 0.2449 2.3934 -0.0046 0.0124 26 2005 12 0.0035 0.0043 0.0800 2.3535 -0.0052 0.0114 26 2006 3 0.0044 0.0038 0.2112 2.2437 -0.0030 0.0115 24 2006 6 0.0040 0.0040 0.0965 2.2724 -0.0036 0.0110 24 2006 9 0.0033 0.0042 -0.3022 2.8384 -0.0072 0.0102 24 2006 12 0.0021 0.0046 -0.8580 3.8533 -0.0113 0.0092 24 2007 3 0.0041 0.0038 0.2523 2.3065 -0.0030 0.0115 23 2007 6 0.0040 0.0040 0.0974 2.1527 -0.0036 0.0110 24 2007 9 0.0033 0.0042 -0.2688 2.6739 -0.0072 0.0102 24 2007 12 0.0022 0.0047 -0.7908 3.5162 -0.0113 0.0092 25

Variable: ROE

Year Month Mean Std.Dev. ^Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Cases 1999 12 0.0265 0.1307 -4.0045 18.4513 -0.5727 0.1100 25 2000 3 0.0218 0.1368 -4.2134 19.9960 -0.6250 0.1012 26 2000 6 0.0228 0.1366 -4.1836 19.7996 -0.6214 0.1024 26 2000 9 0.0225 0.1359 -4.1376 19.4944 -0.6157 0.1018 26 2000 12 0.0150 0.1457 -4.1101 19.3072 -0.6676 0.0984 26 2001 3 0.0096 0.1363 -4.1084 19.2893 -0.6289 0.0842 26 2001 6 0.0095 0.1357 -4.0463 18.8692 -0.6223 0.0867 26 2001 9 0.0280 0.0527 -1.8776 6.2693 -0.1421 0.0878 26 2001 12 0.0269 0.0517 -2.2525 9.3947 -0.1732 0.0873 26 2002 3 0.0297 0.0461 -2.4545 11.1642 -0.1576 0.0891 26 2002 6 0.0171 0.0638 -2.9818 13.5416 -0.2556 0.0879 26 2002 9 -0.0092 0.1412 -3.9345 18.4898 -0.6636 0.0953 26 2002 12 -0.0613 0.3172 -4.4214 21.3845 -1.5866 0.1030 26 2003 3 -0.0601 0.3034 -4.4024 21.2635 -1.5167 0.0983 26 2003 6 -0.0561 0.2957 -4.3857 21.1655 -1.4740 0.1027 26 2003 9 -0.0525 0.2858 -4.3183 20.7494 -1.4161 0.1074 26 2003 12 -0.0490 0.2735 -4.2423 20.2741 -1.3464 0.1059 26 2004 3 -0.0473 0.2664 -4.2175 20.1173 -1.3086 0.1000 26 2004 6 -0.0438 0.2630 -4.1835 19.9234 -1.2857 0.1063 26 2004 9 -0.0388 0.2565 -4.1243 19.5807 -1.2451 0.1141 26 2004 12 -0.0342 0.2479 -4.0388 19.0902 -1.1922 0.1219 26 2005 3 0.0119 0.0744 -0.6589 2.5714 -0.1566 0.1164 25 2005 6 0.0166 0.0747 -0.6571 2.4957 -0.1433 0.1212 26 2005 9 0.0276 0.0670 -0.6187 2.8362 -0.1282 0.1296 26 2005 12 0.0324 0.0652 -0.8156 3.2830 -0.1357 0.1261 26 2006 3 0.0530 0.0525 -0.2609 2.3333 -0.0573 0.1417 24 2006 6 0.0306 0.1136 -3.1867 13.9610 -0.4493 0.1337 24 2006 9 0.0173 0.1253 -3.3170 14.6369 -0.5188 0.1228 24 2006 12 -0.0061 0.1439 -3.1969 13.8579 -0.6130 0.1131 24 2007 3 0.0455 0.0495 -0.1323 2.5227 -0.0573 0.1417 23 2007 6 0.0263 0.1122 -3.2130 14.1641 -0.4493 0.1337 24 2007 9 0.0142 0.1237 -3.3907 15.0361 -0.5188 0.1228 24 2007 12 -0.0081 0.1406 -3.2677 14.3718 -0.6130 0.1084 25

Variable: RARROA

Year Month Mean Std.Dev. ^Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Cases 1999 12 1.6150 0.9644 -1.2314 3.0676 -0.8327 2.4206 24 2000 3 1.5269 0.8606 -1.2784 3.3842 -0.8320 2.2861 25 2000 6 1.5678 0.8953 -1.2405 3.3727 -0.8894 2.4411 25 2000 9 1.6193 0.9399 -1.2577 3.4237 -0.9860 2.4979 25 2000 12 1.6413 1.1088 -0.8509 2.5022 -1.1547 2.8215 25 2001 3 1.4114 0.9796 -0.9160 2.6150 -1.0964 2.3986 25 2001 6 1.4050 0.9986 -0.9272 2.8070 -1.2276 2.4684 25 2001 9 1.4390 1.0445 -0.9134 2.7713 -1.3038 2.5284 25 2001 12 1.4801 1.1649 -0.6058 2.3027 -1.3613 3.1787 25 2002 3 1.3006 0.9848 -0.5723 2.4013 -1.1772 2.4826 25 2002 6 1.0237 1.0671 0.1410 1.9196 -1.2153 2.6347 26 2002 9 0.9762 1.1310 0.1912 1.6998 -1.1406 2.7372 26 2002 12 0.6423 1.0595 0.5881 2.0365 -1.0977 2.7708 26 2003 3 0.5807 0.9725 0.6147 1.9897 -0.8894 2.3951 26 2003 6 0.6117 0.9955 0.6230 2.0256 -0.8505 2.5490 26 2003 9 0.6339 1.0127 0.6052 2.0117 -0.7453 2.5946 26 2003 12 0.6764 1.0416 0.4455 1.8715 -0.8807 2.5777 26 2004 3 0.6461 1.0088 0.3381 1.7313 -1.0105 2.2839 26 2004 6 0.6819 1.0573 0.3108 1.8177 -1.1978 2.3939 26 2004 9 0.7137 1.0758 0.2753 1.8710 -1.2898 2.4892 26 2004 12 0.7117 1.0853 0.2655 1.8320 -1.2898 2.4230 26 2005 3 0.7165 0.9634 0.1585 1.7648 -1.0433 2.2945 25 2005 6 0.8405 1.1043 0.3805 2.2239 -1.0563 3.3491 26 2005 9 0.8974 1.0755 0.1939 2.0457 -1.1677 3.0549 26 2005 12 1.0844 0.9450 -0.3472 2.0478 -0.8173 2.5574 26 2006 3 1.2477 0.7577 -0.7954 2.2246 -0.2657 2.1222 24 2006 6 1.0336 0.7264 -0.4587 1.9275 -0.2610 2.0113 24 2006 9 0.8390 0.7775 0.0182 1.6988 -0.4060 2.1077 24 2006 12 0.6912 0.8548 0.2991 1.7517 -0.5297 2.1765 24 2007 3 1.2308 0.7531 -0.8253 2.3340 -0.2657 2.1222 21 2007 6 1.0282 0.7167 -0.5378 2.0329 -0.2610 2.0113 22 2007 9 0.8079 0.7737 0.0065 1.6811 -0.4060 2.1077 22 2007 12 0.6392 0.7947 0.2928 1.9211 -0.5297 2.1391 22

Variable: RARROE

Year Month Mean Std.Dev. ^Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Cases 1999 12 1.5547 0.9999 -1.0518 2.7123 -0.8111 2.5569 25 2000 3 1.4699 0.9200 -1.1785 2.9612 -0.8054 2.3005 26 2000 6 1.5690 1.0090 -1.0320 2.7314 -0.8668 2.6253 26 2000 9 1.5523 1.0347 -0.9847 2.6845 -0.9715 2.6020 26 2000 12 1.3588 1.0555 -0.6807 2.2174 -1.0866 2.5811 26 2001 3 1.4113 1.0912 -0.7507 2.0692 -1.0383 2.6247 26 2001 6 1.4253 1.1400 -0.6810 2.1302 -1.1899 2.6865 26 2001 9 1.3998 1.1450 -0.6682 2.2279 -1.3193 2.6910 26 2001 12 1.2860 1.1297 -0.4623 1.9374 -1.2394 2.7006 26 2002 3 1.2921 0.9947 -0.5935 2.2059 -1.0832 2.4031 26 2002 6 1.0381 1.1645 0.3057 1.5041 -0.7143 2.9435 26 2002 9 0.9065 1.1892 0.4892 1.6449 -0.4499 3.0558 26 2002 12 0.4921 1.0542 1.0260 2.6132 -0.4833 2.9141 26 2003 3 0.4939 1.0088 0.7913 2.0181 -0.5393 2.4623 26 2003 6 0.5387 1.0621 0.8279 2.1419 -0.6626 2.6005 26 2003 9 0.5388 1.0529 0.7790 2.1726 -0.8223 2.6361 26 2003 12 0.5177 1.0321 0.6927 2.2299 -1.0565 2.6026 26 2004 3 0.5435 1.0200 0.4564 1.8446 -1.1321 2.2971 26 2004 6 0.6055 1.1070 0.5064 1.9950 -1.2758 2.5622 26 2004 9 0.6314 1.1152 0.5052 2.0507 -1.3035 2.5719 26 2004 12 0.6001 1.0512 0.5266 2.0185 -1.1524 2.5337 26 2005 3 0.5958 0.9531 0.3632 1.8924 -1.0476 2.2512 25 2005 6 0.6455 1.0097 0.5089 2.1518 -1.0711 2.6489 26 2005 9 0.7082 1.0203 0.4884 2.2273 -1.1531 2.6929 26 2005 12 0.6677 0.9467 0.4284 2.4323 -1.1859 2.6426 26 2006 3 1.1094 0.8153 -0.4787 1.7043 -0.3018 2.2401 24 2006 6 0.9250 0.7912 -0.1705 1.5413 -0.2943 2.0038 24 2006 9 0.7223 0.8030 0.2117 1.5955 -0.3345 1.9982 24 2006 12 0.5269 0.8082 0.5145 1.8829 -0.3950 1.9996 24 2007 3 1.0841 0.8095 -0.4686 1.7505 -0.3018 2.2401 21 2007 6 0.9134 0.7759 -0.2241 1.5877 -0.2943 1.9739 22 2007 9 0.6887 0.7826 0.1845 1.6053 -0.3345 1.9959 22 2007 12 0.5041 0.7694 0.4489 1.8856 -0.3950 1.9872 22

Variable: NPLR

Year Month Mean Std.Dev. ^Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Cases 1999 12 0.0548 0.0334 1.1145 3.5315 0.0118 0.1472 24 2000 3 0.0547 0.0357 1.2439 3.7773 0.0116 0.1543 26 2000 6 0.0554 0.0427 1.9145 6.4163 0.0113 0.1986 26 2000 9 0.0591 0.0468 2.1380 7.6357 0.0112 0.2261 26 2000 12 0.0546 0.0421 2.1224 7.7973 0.0119 0.2070 26 2001 3 0.0595 0.0463 2.2283 8.3599 0.0128 0.2310 26 2001 6 0.0642 0.0548 2.7791 11.6374 0.0176 0.2891 26 2001 9 0.0700 0.0543 2.5364 10.4259 0.0183 0.2865 26 2001 12 0.0730 0.0565 2.6931 11.2294 0.0203 0.3025 26 2002 3 0.0780 0.0558 2.4166 9.9392 0.0210 0.2975 26 2002 6 0.0725 0.0501 2.0738 7.9451 0.0204 0.2575 26 2002 9 0.0671 0.0445 1.5660 5.1824 0.0209 0.2113 26 2002 12 0.0596 0.0516 2.2141 7.8751 0.0138 0.2475 26 2003 3 0.0601 0.0527 2.0028 6.3556 0.0136 0.2300 26 2003 6 0.0577 0.0540 1.9805 6.1157 0.0135 0.2295 26 2003 9 0.0583 0.0532 1.9181 6.0848 0.0134 0.2302 26 2003 12 0.0493 0.0478 2.1856 8.0373 0.0082 0.2263 26 2004 3 0.0483 0.0474 1.9722 6.6677 0.0057 0.2122 26 2004 6 0.0446 0.0465 2.2027 7.8328 0.0049 0.2144 26 2004 9 0.0437 0.0462 2.2524 7.8310 0.0046 0.2109 26 2004 12 0.0356 0.0391 2.9288 12.0698 0.0074 0.1972 26 2005 3 0.0339 0.0365 3.1605 13.6114 0.0076 0.1885 25 2005 6 0.0261 0.0156 1.2287 4.9104 0.0073 0.0759 26 2005 9 0.0307 0.0177 0.7392 2.9917 0.0068 0.0737 26 2005 12 0.0223 0.0130 1.6715 6.0739 0.0040 0.0651 26 2006 3 0.0188 0.0067 0.2138 2.1988 0.0062 0.0314 24 2006 6 0.0166 0.0074 0.2955 3.8798 0.0000 0.0362 24 2006 9 0.0185 0.0086 0.8862 4.8874 0.0000 0.0423 24 2006 12 0.0175 0.0086 1.6328 5.5436 0.0072 0.0436 24 2007 3 0.0207 0.0098 1.1601 3.6896 0.0082 0.0470 23 2007 6 0.0192 0.0094 1.8314 5.9697 0.0088 0.0474 23 2007 9 0.0192 0.0100 2.1972 7.9675 0.0083 0.0544 23 2007 12 0.0154 0.0063 1.9007 8.0944 0.0072 0.0385 24

Variable: HDR

Year Month Mean Std.Dev. ^Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Cases 1999 12 0.2059 0.1495 0.6762 1.8302 0.0501 0.4889 24

2000 3 0.2001 0.1498 0.7206 1.8976 0.0507 0.4889 25

2000 6 0.2015 0.1489 0.7027 1.9056 0.0507 0.4889 25 2000 9 0.2019 0.1482 0.7024 1.9053 0.0507 0.4889 25 2000 12 0.2101 0.1687 0.9108 2.3994 0.0507 0.6111 25 2001 3 0.2095 0.1685 0.9163 2.4114 0.0507 0.6110 25 2001 6 0.2131 0.1714 0.8685 2.2517 0.0375 0.6110 25 2001 9 0.2142 0.1708 0.8811 2.2655 0.0500 0.6124 25 2001 12 0.2376 0.2297 1.6992 5.6294 0.0500 1.0000 25 2002 3 0.3080 0.3072 1.2877 3.4143 0.0500 1.0000 25 2002 6 0.4155 0.3712 0.6646 1.8210 0.0313 1.0000 25 2002 9 0.4495 0.3829 0.5092 1.5913 0.0025 1.0000 25 2002 12 0.5215 0.4158 0.1384 1.1928 0.0025 1.0000 26 2003 3 0.5440 0.4252 0.0293 1.1304 0.0007 1.0000 26 2003 6 0.5461 0.4228 0.0329 1.1272 0.0116 1.0000 26 2003 9 0.5461 0.4229 0.0329 1.1271 0.0116 1.0000 26 2003 12 0.5404 0.4276 0.0431 1.1145 0.0228 1.0000 26 2004 3 0.5404 0.4269 0.0488 1.1128 0.0386 1.0000 26 2004 6 0.5404 0.4267 0.0503 1.1111 0.0386 1.0000 26 2004 9 0.5370 0.4267 0.0748 1.1125 0.0386 1.0000 26 2004 12 0.5364 0.4268 0.0790 1.1103 0.0386 1.0000 26 2005 3 0.5558 0.4237 0.0107 1.1021 0.0594 1.0000 25 2005 6 0.5395 0.4187 0.1156 1.1238 0.0357 1.0000 26 2005 9 0.5374 0.4187 0.1330 1.1230 0.0376 1.0000 26 2005 12 0.5305 0.4219 0.1705 1.1005 0.0555 1.0000 26 2006 3 0.5691 0.4163 0.0323 1.0668 0.0604 1.0000 24 2006 6 0.5749 0.4111 0.0223 1.0847 0.0604 1.0000 24 2006 9 0.5758 0.4099 0.0256 1.0807 0.0789 1.0000 24 2006 12 0.6060 0.4081 -0.1155 1.0819 0.0951 1.0000 24 2007 3 0.6258 0.4109 -0.2186 1.1169 0.0604 1.0000 23 2007 6 0.6097 0.4102 -0.1422 1.1078 0.0604 1.0000 24 2007 9 0.6072 0.4138 -0.1552 1.1290 0.0193 1.0000 24 2007 12 0.6817 0.4045 -0.5355 1.3869 0.0193 1.0000 25

Variable: CLR

Year Month Mean Std.Dev. ^Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Cases 1999 12 0.1620 0.2649 1.7037 5.0105 0.0000 0.9826 24 2000 3 0.1862 0.2859 1.4090 3.7095 0.0000 0.9697 25 2000 6 0.1616 0.2554 1.8104 5.6167 0.0000 0.9697 25 2000 9 0.1648 0.2468 1.7497 5.6401 0.0000 0.9697 25 2000 12 0.1930 0.2599 1.4669 4.6451 0.0000 0.9697 25 2001 3 0.1942 0.2657 1.4853 4.5622 0.0000 0.9697 25 2001 6 0.1758 0.2411 1.6529 5.6366 0.0000 0.9692 25 2001 9 0.1746 0.2383 1.6066 5.6073 0.0000 0.9678 25 2001 12 0.1908 0.2577 1.3891 4.3145 0.0000 0.9678 25 2002 3 0.1647 0.2560 1.6211 4.9566 0.0000 0.9678 25 2002 6 0.1080 0.2196 2.4257 8.7981 0.0000 0.9356 25 2002 9 0.0915 0.1838 1.9463 5.5558 0.0000 0.6725 25 2002 12 0.0861 0.1764 2.2459 7.0210 0.0000 0.6725 26 2003 3 0.0561 0.1291 2.6418 9.5620 0.0000 0.5548 26 2003 6 0.0611 0.1335 2.4542 8.4418 0.0000 0.5548 26 2003 9 0.0862 0.1893 2.2457 6.9718 0.0000 0.7359 26 2003 12 0.0950 0.2005 2.1288 6.6206 0.0000 0.7822 26 2004 3 0.0950 0.2004 2.1291 6.6233 0.0000 0.7822 26 2004 6 0.0901 0.1843 1.8886 5.2062 0.0000 0.6518 26 2004 9 0.0874 0.1769 1.8290 4.8927 0.0000 0.6027 26 2004 12 0.0912 0.1922 2.1047 6.4255 0.0000 0.7379 26 2005 3 0.0872 0.1800 2.1694 7.1110 0.0000 0.7228 25 2005 6 0.0849 0.1677 2.1587 7.3334 0.0000 0.6903 26 2005 9 0.1047 0.1929 1.9841 5.9848 0.0000 0.6765 26 2005 12 0.0981 0.1763 1.8537 5.5854 0.0000 0.6620 26 2006 3 0.0648 0.1305 2.1794 7.2514 0.0000 0.5247 24 2006 6 0.0618 0.1288 2.3152 7.8522 0.0000 0.5247 24 2006 9 0.0578 0.1248 2.5350 9.0488 0.0000 0.5245 24 2006 12 0.0404 0.0914 2.4807 8.3831 0.0000 0.3695 24 2007 3 0.0567 0.1345 2.3209 7.5416 0.0000 0.5247 22 2007 6 0.0561 0.1316 2.3876 7.9219 0.0000 0.5247 23 2007 9 0.0807 0.1791 2.2441 6.8268 0.0000 0.6611 23 2007 12 0.0788 0.2108 3.3158 13.7891 0.0000 0.9745 25

Variable: EA

Year Month Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Cases 1999 12 0.0813 0.0246 1.8869 9.0689 0.0343 0.1739 25 2000 3 0.0830 0.0215 2.4714 10.5522 0.0606 0.1681 25 2000 6 0.0826 0.0233 1.4328 7.1895 0.0357 0.1652 26 2000 9 0.0834 0.0219 0.9866 5.5732 0.0369 0.1546 26 2000 12 0.0786 0.0196 0.6234 4.8643 0.0327 0.1377 26 2001 3 0.0786 0.0189 0.4444 3.9783 0.0357 0.1306 26 2001 6 0.0767 0.0170 -0.0914 2.9497 0.0362 0.1140 26 2001 9 0.0755 0.0173 -0.3174 2.8256 0.0321 0.1081 26 2001 12 0.0725 0.0158 -0.6867 2.8899 0.0320 0.0921 26 2002 3 0.0724 0.0155 -0.6257 2.7858 0.0336 0.0931 26 2002 6 0.0650 0.0172 -0.2032 2.0460 0.0310 0.0933 26 2002 9 0.0640 0.0199 -0.4881 2.7437 0.0148 0.0973 26 2002 12 0.0597 0.0196 -0.5153 3.2164 0.0068 0.0941 26 2003 3 0.0616 0.0191 -0.3532 2.6106 0.0151 0.0947 26 2003 6 0.0611 0.0194 -0.2901 2.6097 0.0142 0.0954 26 2003 9 0.0609 0.0200 -0.1490 2.1448 0.0194 0.0977 26 2003 12 0.0596 0.0159 -0.4082 2.0414 0.0269 0.0819 26 2004 3 0.0598 0.0150 -0.2936 2.0450 0.0304 0.0809 26 2004 6 0.0602 0.0149 -0.2374 1.9067 0.0304 0.0808 26 2004 9 0.0616 0.0156 -0.1973 1.8914 0.0305 0.0837 26 2004 12 0.0599 0.0148 -0.3082 1.9566 0.0299 0.0803 26 2005 3 0.0626 0.0158 -0.4074 2.0704 0.0314 0.0851 25 2005 6 0.0602 0.0136 -0.3179 2.1666 0.0320 0.0804 26 2005 9 0.0614 0.0125 -0.1351 2.3950 0.0326 0.0823 26 2005 12 0.0585 0.0122 -0.5964 3.2844 0.0275 0.0798 26 2006 3 0.0602 0.0136 -0.2074 2.6602 0.0300 0.0865 24 2006 6 0.0561 0.0166 -0.9355 4.0165 0.0083 0.0843 24 2006 9 0.0553 0.0129 -0.2593 2.5262 0.0285 0.0802 24 2006 12 0.0522 0.0124 0.4595 2.7536 0.0321 0.0828 24 2007 3 0.0602 0.0136 -0.2074 2.6602 0.0300 0.0865 24 2007 6 0.0561 0.0166 -0.9355 4.0165 0.0083 0.0843 24 2007 9 0.0553 0.0129 -0.2593 2.5262 0.0285 0.0802 24 2007 12 0.0522 0.0124 0.4595 2.7536 0.0321 0.0828 24

Variable: SIZE

Year Month Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Cases 1999 12 8.4632 0.3784 0.3423 2.4416 7.6375 9.1846 25 2000 3 8.4650 0.3547 0.2118 2.4645 7.6554 9.0681 25 2000 6 8.4902 0.3798 0.2389 2.4233 7.6370 9.2158 26 2000 9 8.4909 0.3789 0.2337 2.3915 7.6419 9.2099 26 2000 12 8.5004 0.3902 0.2032 2.3659 7.6208 9.2269 26 2001 3 8.5066 0.3834 0.1975 2.3503 7.6430 9.2157 26 2001 6 8.5149 0.3858 0.1901 2.3446 7.6443 9.2201 26 2001 9 8.5217 0.3903 0.2007 2.3655 7.6443 9.2569 26 2001 12 8.5282 0.3912 0.1688 2.3467 7.6432 9.2540 26 2002 3 8.5369 0.3942 0.1111 2.3036 7.6415 9.2544 26 2002 6 8.5380 0.4003 0.0673 2.3525 7.6111 9.2631 26 2002 9 8.5340 0.3989 0.0746 2.3714 7.6124 9.2654 26 2002 12 8.5458 0.3971 0.0876 2.3494 7.6354 9.2725 26 2003 3 8.5525 0.3943 0.1016 2.2896 7.6641 9.2778 26 2003 6 8.5631 0.3953 0.1011 2.2742 7.6756 9.2857 26 2003 9 8.5748 0.3964 0.1169 2.2015 7.7032 9.2960 26 2003 12 8.5976 0.4000 0.0931 2.1284 7.7247 9.3058 26 2004 3 8.6236 0.4006 0.0277 2.1135 7.7384 9.3122 26 2004 6 8.6334 0.3999 -0.0076 2.0586 7.7527 9.3091 26 2004 9 8.6370 0.3962 -0.0052 2.0599 7.7680 9.3084 26 2004 12 8.6495 0.3915 -0.0255 2.1586 7.7739 9.3178 26 2005 3 8.6998 0.3535 0.2294 1.5496 8.1770 9.3099 25 2005 6 8.6959 0.3512 0.2478 1.5697 8.1794 9.3029 26 2005 9 8.7019 0.3514 0.2381 1.5643 8.1754 9.3000 26 2005 12 8.7209 0.3505 0.2058 1.5742 8.1989 9.3068 26 2006 3 8.7751 0.3513 -0.0175 1.5416 8.1874 9.2913 24 2006 6 8.7809 0.3593 0.0375 1.5841 8.1781 9.3937 24 2006 9 8.7896 0.3579 0.0408 1.5616 8.1810 9.3845 24 2006 12 8.7973 0.3554 0.0386 1.5682 8.1841 9.3924 24 2007 3 8.7751 0.3513 -0.0175 1.5416 8.1874 9.2913 24 2007 6 8.7809 0.3593 0.0375 1.5841 8.1781 9.3937 24 2007 9 8.7896 0.3579 0.0408 1.5616 8.1810 9.3845 24 2007 12 8.7973 0.3554 0.0386 1.5682 8.1841 9.3924 24

Appendix C: Variable Descriptive Statistic during Examination Periods

Appendix C lists the characteristic marks of banks in detail. The examination periods are from 4^th quarter 1999 to 4^th quarter 2007. In general, ownership concentration is a common phenomenon. There are 15 banks which block shareholder ownership over 50%. However, 6 banks which the proportion of share collateralized are 0 and 10 banks which the proportion of share collateralized are over 10%, It argued that collateralized shares as a leverage approach is not widespread in banking industry.

Code: 2801

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA -0.0008 0.0036 0.5971 1.5852 -0.0052 0.0051 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0008 0.0049 -0.3204 1.4453 -0.0068 0.0070 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0013 0.0038 -0.1726 1.3094 -0.0041 0.0059 33

Code: 2806

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0057 0.0009 -0.1832 1.6275 0.0041 0.0070 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0014 0.0009 0.2127 1.8914 -0.0004 0.0027 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA -0.0005 0.0025 0.2739 1.7459 -0.0035 0.0046 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0094 0.0016 -0.2655 2.0502 0.0061 0.0119 32

Code: 2826

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0063 0.0035 -0.4373 1.3987 0.0007 0.0101 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0059 0.0007 0.4427 2.2683 0.0047 0.0074 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0010 0.0022 0.7019 1.9028 -0.0012 0.0049 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0024 0.0010 -1.2480 4.5125 -0.0010 0.0034 33

Code: 2837

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0040 0.0025 -1.1904 4.5539 -0.0031 0.0071 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0035 0.0013 0.5016 2.1507 0.0016 0.0063 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0068 0.0007 -0.0745 1.6781 0.0058 0.0078 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0078 0.0021 0.3666 1.7623 0.0046 0.0115 33

Code: 2843

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0015 0.0028 0.0569 1.6648 -0.0025 0.0062 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0083 0.0019 0.4888 1.9824 0.0055 0.0124 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0056 0.0024 0.2758 2.3407 0.0012 0.0103 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0010 0.0020 -0.1133 1.5831 -0.0025 0.0040 33

Code: 2849

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0026 0.0017 0.2467 3.1842 -0.0011 0.0062 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0001 0.0041 -1.5107 4.6286 -0.0113 0.0045 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA -0.0039 0.0093 -1.2048 2.7179 -0.0258 0.0042 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0029 0.0014 0.0275 1.8693 0.0004 0.0054 33

Code: 2811

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0014 0.0009 0.2127 1.8914 -0.0004 0.0027 33

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0032 0.0012 0.3029 1.8318 0.0013 0.0054 25

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA 0.0019 0.0024 -0.3958 1.7753 -0.0019 0.0049 11

Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Cases ROA -0.0018 0.0020 -0.1487 1.5149 -0.0048 0.0008 25

在文檔中董監事質押與銀行信用風險及績效之關係-以本土上市櫃商業銀行為例 (頁 31-66)