Armed forces that are mentioned and/or detailed in their state’s Constitution, for the most part, spent between 1% to 1.5% with the exeeding exceptions of Ecuador and Colombia, which spent $2797million and $13054million respectedly, which have over 2.5% each, according to the SIPRI database (2014) as demonstrated in Figure 3.4 . In comparison to these countries, armed forces with limited or no constitutionaly defined role all have different spendings, ranging from 0.7% to 2%, being Uruguay the second largest with 1.7% of its GDP valued in $915 million, and Chile with 2% of its GDP with a value of approximately $5149 million.
Figure 3.4 Constitutional Role % of GDP
Source: SIPRI, 2015
States in Latin America have been keen to change the power status of the armed forces, particularly in the last 20 years, having focused on the need to maintain governance for the
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
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civilian and keep social order. This change has allowed civil society to have a more receptive participation in the political spectrum, and to be able move forward from dictatorships and authoritarian military regimes. However, as mentioned constantly in this research, the military and their governance weren’t the only problematic regimes throughout Latin American history, civilian governments have also been authoritarian, as power has been mostly designated to elites. In this cases, the environment created by a governing state is subject to civil society accountability, and the perception of legitimacy from not only civil society but also the other branches of the state.
States that struggle the most with legitimacy can be defined from a couple of O’Donnell’s (1978, 6) characteristics of bureaucratic-authoritarian states, which are “political exclusion, in that it aims at closing channels of political access to the popular sector and its allies so as to deactivate them politically, not by means of repression but also through the imposition of vertical controls by the state on such organizations” and “de-politication, in the sense that it pretends to reduce social and political issues to technical problems to be resolved by means of interactions among the higher echelons of the mentioned organizations.” Being this the case, civil society is often left with little participation and much more limited resources, if any. By limiting civil society, authoritarian regimes aim to limit the possibility of being overthrown, and these regimes also have more direct control of resources. However, even if civil society is directly excluded, it changes when the other branches of the state act according to the Constitution and defend the rights and duties, specifically in constitutions that straightforwardly give the armed forces the task to do so.
Even though the Constitutions limit the armed forces to be in governing power, it enhances them in most of the cases to act as a guardian of such constitutions, and therefore turns the attention to civilian governing and its legitimacy. While it is true that in many of the cases concerning Latin America, it is elites that have and remain in power of civilian control,
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some have met their faith in terms of legitimacy, and had to go through the removal of power, carried on through its armed forces.
Considering the change of role for the armed forces after the transition to stabilizing democracies and civilian control over the states, and the changes in constitutions according to the “at the moment” necessities, the challenges that the military now faced where related to maintaining internal order and support the State. For the most part; armed forces were left to deal with violence issues in their countries and the protection of civil society against it, and the still on-going issues of this kind are drug war, gangs, guerrillas, violent demonstrations, etc.
Violence is one of the most recurrent factors in many of the countries of Latin America, particularly in countries dealing with gangs and drugs, such as Honduras, Mexico and Venezuela. It can be said that with the importance of the armed forces has been predominant to that of the police, and have by far a bigger impact on civil society for the majority of the states. Table 3.1 illustrates that most of the countries in the Latin American region, civil society has better trust in its armed forces with over 50% in favor except in Argentina where it is only 36.3% of civil society trusting its armed forces. The table also shows elites considering and separating them from the rest of civil society in each state. In El Salvador, Chile and Uruguay, the citizens have more trust in their police than in the armed forces, for the rest of the Latin American countries with armed forces, citizens have better trust in their armed forces than in the police. This table helps to understand the comparison between the armed forces and police in a state, regarding its citizens and legislators, and perhaps based on institutional trust it can be understood the contemporaneous importance of the armed forces in Latin America.
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Table 3.1 Institutional Trust 2011
Armed Forces Police
Civil Society Elites Civil Society Elites
Argentina 36.3 47.9 32.1 44.8
Bolivia 54.9 54.3 40.2 34.4
Brazil 68.4 78.3 48.5 41.4
Chile 65.2 59.6 67.2 65.2
Colombia 65.6 62.5 55.8 60.3
Costa Rica 47.8 55.0
Dominican Republic 68.1 60.6 46.6 29.4
Ecuador 56.9 56.6 37.6 38.8
El Salvador 56.5 62.5 58.6 48.6
Guatemala 52.9 40.2 40.3 25.4
Honduras 51.9 51.5 44.0 39.9
Mexico 70.8 76.2 43.6 27.2
Nicaragua 61.5 68.1 53.8 70.0
Panama 48.5 63.7
Paraguay 41.5 57.9 29.2 28.7
Peru 52.1 47.2 38.8 39.6
Uruguay 54.4 52.5 54.9 47.1
Source: PNUD 2011
Elites in power use the armed forces to help resolve issues the governing regimes have difficulty solving; such as the violence from gangs and drug wars, or to also resolve or act upon government institutions that are risking democracy. This in a nutshell the relevance of the military in Latin America. The armed forces remain an important tool for the states, and also for civil society.
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3.3 Civil-Military Relations and Civil Society in Honduras
As previously mentioned, the relations between the military and the civilians in Honduras have been of great importance to the country’s development. The first military junta coup d’etat took place from 1956 to 57, marking what would turn into a habit for the Armed Forces, overthrowing civilian governments and installing themselves in power. However, during the early XX century, military men could also be elected president, such was the case of Vicente Carrasco in 1924. During this period of history in Honduras, the military could be elected for public administration, and could also overthrow governments with coup d’etat, and is commonly known as the time of the militarized state.
Figure 3.5 Tiburcio Carias Andino
Source: Congressman “Tony” Hernandez www.tonyhernandeza.com
After the aforementioned elected president, the next important event in chronological order is the presidency of Tiburcio Carias Andino in 1933, as illustrated in figure 3.5. He became president through constitutional elections, and although representing the National
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Party (“Partido Nacional” in Spanish), he was also known for being an army General, reason for which he is criticized as an army man in power. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that he was both a politician and an army man, characteristics that strategically combined together enabled him to remain in power for sixteen years, what has been the longest dictatorship in Honduras. During his time in power, he focused on improving the Army, and without a doubt with his presidency title and highest military rank of General, he had a strong influence over the armed forces. Although during his sixteen years in power he made a lot of improvements for the development of the country; specially in terms of economy as he has been the only president that has paid off the Foreign Debt, the focus for this paper will remain in the relationship between the military man in control and the subordinate civilians.
From a top-down perspective, Tiburcio Carias had absolute control of the State, and made the armed forces one of his strongest tools, both nationally and internationally. Control was applied mostly by force, and from a bottom-up point of view, repression was the strongest characteristics for civil society during this period.
Repression was his strongest tactic, and any group that had an opposing view of his command was banned. He declared the “Communist” political party as illegal, and many political leaders of other parties left the country in asylum. Not only where political parties a victim, but also newspapers, journalists, opposing groups and others were censured or directly repressed, incarcerated, tortured and even disappeared. He negotiated with his political party through Congress to remain in power until 1949, as his attempt to change the constitution regarding reelection and presidential term failed. The discontent with his regime was so large that there were two separate attempts to kill him. During the efforts to change the Constitution on his favor, civil society had mass demonstrations in the hopes of preventing his power last any longer, however the force of repression was stronger and the dominion of the state belonged to the National Party which he represented.
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Elections were held after his term expired in 1949, and civilians had governing power until 1956, when the first military junta took over for a year. From 1963 to 1971 army General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano through a coup d’etat had his first time as a president, and then a second term from 1972 to 1975 through another coup d’etat. He was then ousted by the military, by General Juan Melgar who ruled until 1978. Melgar’s presidency was also terminated by a military coup d’etat which was formed by a military junta until 1982. The last president before the change of Constitution in 1982 was General Policarpo Paz, who was part of the previous military junta.
The consistency of presidential terms, as well as the legitimacy of governing power was not a strong factor for Honduras until 1982. Being able to govern, be elected or oust a ruling government, the military was often in complete control of the state which not only represented an on-going threat for civil governments, but also for civil society who often faced the repression of force used by and during military governing. The last years before the constitutional change were completely governed by the military, excluding the civilians from power opportunities. The need to de-militarize the State was another justification for changing the Constitution, and as a general result, achieving a stable democracy.
However, regardless of the many military governments, the State still acknowledge the armed forces as necessary, contrary to the example of Costa Rica which completely eliminated them. The armed forces with the change of Constitution in 1982 went through a change of reducing its power and transforming them into subordinates of the State, obedient to the roles described in the Constitution. The State of Honduras started its democratic transition process by having the government be fully civilian-controlled, and the armed forces subject to being an institution of the state. Presidential elections have been constant and respected every four years, unlike any other time in the history of Honduras, with the exception of 2009, which will be further detailed shortly.
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During this new period of change, the armed forces have proven to be professional in knowing their expectancies and limitations, and have served to maintain internal order to the point where they have gained the respect and appreciation of civil society. The most heated action taken by the armed forces during this new period for Honduras has to be the 2009 political crisis events. As guardians of the nation, the armed forces received and executed the order to take former president Manuel Zelaya out of the country on the 28th of June of that year.
This matter in terms of legitimacy of a government, being part of the state environment previously discussed, has as a result the need for military intervention or action. The removal of President Zelaya was caused by his attempt to implement the Fourth Ballot, going against specific articles of the Constitution that directly forbid these kinds of actions. The actors in charge of the decision were the National Congress, Supreme Court of Justice and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, dictated that the actions being taken by former president Zelaya violated the Constitution therefore being illegal and he was accused for treason and abuse of power, and the only viable resolution was to take him out of the country, through the armed forces. As the Constitution indicates, the armed forces being obedient and non-deliberative, were in no problem to execute the actions of taking Zelaya out of the country in defense of the nation.
This has been a debate since its occurrence, as some people see it as a military coup, whereas others see it as a constitutional coup, being based on the interpretation of the law. The coup and the military intervention were the most arguable factors that divided civil society during and after 2009. Having two different stand points on what happened, and as a result, it led to some groups of civil society to organize into political parties, which will be explored in the next chapter.
Throughout these events, and because civil society was strongly divided, the armed forces also had the duty to maintain the internal order, specially during public demonstration.
The “Resistencia” often, if not always, demonstrated violently, in hopes to provoke the armed
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forces and condemn them through the international press that were currently in the country.
Figure 3.6 illustrates some of the violent ways in which the “Resistencia” carried on their manifestations. Honduras went through a rough following months, trying to simmer down the strong feelings against the coup, and planning the elections to be held on time, proving that democratic elections were still in the agenda and that the removal of president Zelaya was because of his unconstitutional actions, instead of the perpetuation of power of the interim president.
The role of the armed forces became more notorious, as their presence was in the streets, trying to maintain the order. In addition, the armed forces were also responsible for citizen security during the election day, as well as the transportation of the ballots to the counting center, task which they are in charge of during every election, since they are an apolitical institution, they can be trusted with the handling of the ballots. Since civil society was divided into two strong positions, from a bottom-up perspective, it can be considered that the side of the “Resistencia” felt repressed by the armed forces, whereas on the other hand those in favor of the coup felt secured by it. This period in Honduras represents the most controversial
Figure 3.6 “Resistencia” Demonstration
Source: Local newspaper www.tiempo.hn and www.honduprensa.wordpress.com
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military intervention since its democratic paths, however, the armed forces have kept playing an important and crucial role for internal order.
With the new presidency of Porfirio Lobo, months after the coup, the state focused on the reconciliation between the people, as well as with the international community. Civil society had the chance to form into political parties, with the same ideals of opposition with which they manifested during and after 2009. The role of the armed forces to help maintain order was successful, keeping the nation from turning into a civil war, which was much feared.
Although already explained, from the changes that carried on from 1982 and forward, for the Armed Forces placed them under the control of a civilian Minister of Defense, and under the expectancy of helping maintain internal order. Another important change during this time was the removal of the Police from the Armed Forces. The police today represent one of the major problems in Honduras, for not being a stable institution and also representing major corruption cases, participation in drug related crimes, homicide, etc., therefore not trustworthy of the people. Honduras has major security problems not only because of gangs, but because it is used as a bridge to traffic drugs from South America to North America, causing weak institutions such as the Police to work with drug traffickers to make extra money. This makes it even more difficult for the State to prevent or stop the drug on wars, when locally there are high ranking police officers that participate in it instead of being against it. Major scandals are coming to light, and various intents of police depuration are the topic of negotiation in Congress at the moment. Therefore, with a weak police institution, the state has no other choice than to count on its armed forces for almost all matters of security in addition to defense.
The Armed Forces in Honduras play a very important role in the State’s measures for internal control. Even though the institution’s power got reduced to specific tasks since 1982, the dependency on the armed forces is still strong, and it represents the trustworthy tool of security in the State. In terms of enhancing the military professionalism for a better controlled
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and efficient armed forces, the State has focused much more on the institution since the events of 2009, perhaps counting for political influence of the armed forces and the government. The need to improve the armed forces for providing the security the police lacks, and carrying on related operations, was much necessary, remarkably after the Armed Forces proved to be trustworthy with high tension matters such as the coup and its follow up events (demonstrations, elections, etc.). This explains the budget the State of Honduras designates to its army, as shown in the last section of this chapter, emphasizing on the combat against drugs and gangs. In addition, since 2012 the state designates a percentage of tax directly for population security known as the “Security Rate”, which is divided between the Police, Armed Forces, Supreme Court, Direction of National Investigation as well as a few more institutions of the public administration for specific projects. Figure 3.7 illustrates the increases in the military expenditure in Honduras, showing a progressive increase after 2009 from 1.07% to 1.63% in 2014.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
PERCENT
YEAR
% of GDP
% of GDP
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A poll carried out on 2013 by CID Gallup demonstrated that civil society in Honduras has 84% of little or no trust in the Police, this being the highest percentage of distrust in Central America. Security remains the biggest problem in Honduras, having to deal with all the problems mentioned earlier and being followed by economy, with over half of the population living in poverty. This creates the need for people to find ways to make money, and in doing so many people turn to drug trafficking and gangs.
The need for the State to take action in maintaining internal control where the Police lacks more than it offers, led to the creation of the Military Police of Public Order (PMOP for its words in Spanish) in 2013, as part of the Armed Forces, but specifically in service of the people, which have been patrolling on the most dangerous places in the two major cities of the
The need for the State to take action in maintaining internal control where the Police lacks more than it offers, led to the creation of the Military Police of Public Order (PMOP for its words in Spanish) in 2013, as part of the Armed Forces, but specifically in service of the people, which have been patrolling on the most dangerous places in the two major cities of the