一、參加會議經過
此次會議舉行兩天，一場主題演講，由 Holenstein 主講，其餘共計 25 篇論文，美國 學者 3 位，澳洲 1 位，愛爾蘭 1 位，日本 4 位，韓國 4 位，香港 4 位，中國大陸 5 位，台灣學者 3 位 (吳俊業、游淙祺與本人)。由於議程緊縮為兩日，故會議分兩個 場地舉行。第二天會議結束討論是否這兩年一度的東亞現象學會議繼續舉辦，以及 是否要籌組圓桌論壇參加 2013 年於希臘舉行的第 23 屆世界哲學會議 。經表決將於 2014 年於香港繼續舉行第 6 屆東亞現象學會議。
二、與會心得
此次會議主題為現象學與自然主義，與會學者分別從不同角度提出論文，有涉及專 家者，有涉及主題者。由於會議緊縮為兩天，分成兩個場地舉行，會議的效果有些 不足。台灣學者相較之下人數較少，歷年來未見有新秀加入，這是台灣現象學學術 界的隱憂。相反的，中、日、韓等地皆有不少青年學者與會，台灣學者要有所警惕。
三、發表論文全文或摘要
計畫編號 NSC 99-2410-H-004 -043 -MY3 計畫名稱 海德格「型態符指」方法的探源 出國人員
姓名 汪文聖 服務機構
及職稱 國立政治大學哲學系 會議時間
2012 年 9 月 22 日至 2012 年 9 月 23 日
會議地點 北京大學哲學系
會議名稱
(中文) 第五届東亞現象學圈國際會議：現象學與自然主義 (英文) The 5th Phenomenology for East-Asian Circle Conference:
Phenomenology and Naturalism 發表題目
(中文) 論海德格晚期對自然主義的超克： 〈藝術作品起源〉作為引線 (英文) On Heidegger's Overcoming the Naturalism in His later Work:
"The Origin of the Work of Art" as a Clue
On Heidegger’s Overcoming the Naturalism in His Later Work:
“The Origin of the Work of Art” as a Clue
Wen-Sheng Wang, National Chengchi University, Taiwan
1. Introduction.
In this article, I will first assert that Heidegger, in Being and Time (BT), defines what phenomenon and phenomenology are to ensure that readers understand how Heidegger, in his earlier period, directly and indirectly establishes his phenomenology. Next, I will explain what Heidegger means in BT by the meaning of
“Nature,” and I will provide a possible explanation of naturalism regarding his analysis of equipment. The overcoming of naturalism will be ascribed to one of the important tasks of his phenomenology. Under the presupposition of his earlier thinking, how and what Heidegger turns to in his later works, namely through poetic language to realize his phenomenology, which is considered to be an indirect way, is the main point of this article. Via such perspective, how Heidegger overcomes the naturalism (and what it is) in his later period will be clarified. I will discuss this in accordance with the essay, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” which can be seen as a connection between Heidegger’s earlier and later thoughts.
2. The role of “indication” of “appearance” pointed out in Being and Time.
In BT, when Heidegger compares the notion of phenomenon with other notions -- semblance (Schein), appearance (Erscheining), and mere appearance (bloße Erscheinung) -- he seems to more positively evaluate the notion of phenomenon insofar as the notion of phenomenology, at least literarily, consists of the two notions: phenomenon and logos. However, in this context Heidegger actually wants to point out two ways, namely the direct and indirect, to establish his phenomenology. I will argue that the notion of appearance is slowly more important than that of phenomenon for establishing and developing his phenomenology up to his later philosophy, if it could be also called phenomenology. Naturally, a careful reader might notice that Heidegger uses “phenomena (Phänomene)” as a comprehensive notion that includes the four notions:
phenomenon, semblance, appearance, and mere appearance. These notions will be clarified further in this article.
First, Heidegger differentiates appearance from phenomenon as follows: “Appearance, as appearance ‘of something’, does not mean showing-itself; it means rather the announcing-itself by [von] something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself.”1 On the contrary,
“phenomenon” is “that which shows itself in itself” (das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende), or the manifest (das Offenbare).2 Phenomenon of something means that something shows itself directly as phenomenon, without mediating another appearance. Appearance of something means something shows itself indirectly by mediating its appearance; in other words, appearance “indicates”3 something as phenomenon itself.
In Heidegger’s differentiation, phenomenon and semblance are in a group; appearance and mere appearance
1 Heidegger, Martin. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. 1979, S. 29; Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie &
Edward Robinson, New York: Harper & Row, 1962, p. 52.
2 Sein und Zeit. S. 31; Being and Time. p. 54.
3 Sein und Zeit. S. 29; Being and Time. p. 52.
are in another group. Indeed, the Greek word phainomenon means not only the “that which shows itself in itself,”, but also “it [can] show itself as something which it is not” (es [kann] sich zeigen als etwas, was es nicht ist.). Why can it show itself as what it is not? For it makes a pretention of showing itself – being a phenomenon. In this sense, Heidegger says: “The primordial signification (of the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification [of the semblance] is founded.” Furthermore, and he designates the former also as positive signification of phainomenon, which is in difference from semblance as the privative modification of phenomenon.4
On the contrary, appearance, which does not mean showing-itself, implies a signification of “not”; however, it has not to do with the privative “not.” Although the original phenomenon is not included in appearance as its foundation, Heidegger states that the notion of phenomenon is presupposed (vorausgestzt); “appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself of something,” and is the “‘wherein’ in which something
‘appears,’”, or announces itself.5 However, this phenomenon is not on the same level of announcing-itself, which must be rely on something that does show itself. The important point is that Heidegger says that this appearance “indicates (anzeigen)” something that really does not show itself. Other than a semblance that can directly manifest its privative phenomenon, appearance just indicates the phenomenon that is on the higher level, and always cannot directly show itself in the announcing-itself of appearance. So Therefore, I argue that semblance and appearance could let the original phenomenon be shown, respectively, in a direct or indirect way.
For Heidegger, however, not every appearance can indicate the original phenomenon; in some cases, it can just merely indicate the non-manifest (das Nichtoffenbare). Such appearance is called “mere appearance.”
What it indicates remains always within the realm of non-manifest. For instance, the Kantian term of appearance is such a mere appearance, because the “thing in itself” (Ding an sich) always remains concealed behind the appearance.6 Naturally, the Kantian notion of “thing in itself” is not the Heideggerian notion of the original phenomenon, because the “thing in itself” cannot show itself, but the Heideggerian original phenomenon can show itself in itself. Mere appearance is not a semblance, which, however, can manifest its privative phenomenon; mere appearance is neither an appearance, which is capable of indicating the original phenomenon. How can my illumination of those notions be applied to my further consideration of Heidegger’s reflection on the notion of Nature in BT?
3. The reflection of the notion of Nature in BT.
It is well-known that Heidegger in BT analyzes equipment as something ready-to-hand (Zuhandenes), and characterizes the peculiarity (das Eigentümliche) of what is proximally ready-to-hand as to withdraw (zurückziehen) in its readiness-to-hand, in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.7
Nature is for Heidegger a kind of being ready-to-hand. So, Nature authentically shows itself to us in a
‘withdrawal’ way. In this regard, Heidegger’s concerns about whether Nature is contrarily discovered and defined in its pure present-at-hand: “The Nature which ‘stirs and strives,’ which assails us and enthralls us as landscape, remains hidden.” He also accuses natural scientists of discovering Nature in its present-at-hand:
4 Sein und Zeit. S. 28-29; Being and Time. p. 51.
5 Sein und Zeit. S. 29-30; Being and Time. p. 53.
6 Sein und Zeit. S. 30; Being and Time. pp. 53-54.
7 Sein und Zeit. S. 69; Being and Time. pp. 98-99.
“The botanist’s plants are not the flowers of the hedgerow; the ‘source,’ which the geographer establishes for a river is not the ‘springhead in the dale.’”8
It is to be noticed that Heidegger in his analysis of equipment traces this back to Nature: not only equipment or a tool for production, but also the produced work is encountered in our ‘concernful dealing.’ They both are ready-to-hand and subjected to the assignment-context of means-end or “in-order-to” relationship. Hence, according to Heidegger’s analysis, a work can imply an assignment to “materials”; for instance, a shoe depends on leather, and leather is produced from hides, which are taken from animals; parts of animals are raised by someone else, parts of them are not; nevertheless, hides still produce themselves even when animals have been raised by others -- the same as steel, iron, metal, mineral, wood, which produce some other tools and the work. They do not need to be produced by others, because they produce themselves. Accordingly, Heidegger says: “So in the environment certain entities become accessible which are always ready-to-hand, but which, in themselves, do not need to be produced.” Therefore, along with the used tools and the work, Nature is discovered, in the characteristic of the self-production.9
Nature is characterized as its self-production. In the later work: “The Question Concerning Technology,”
Heidegger depicts Nature (physis) as “the arising of something from out of itself,” and praises Nature as
“poiésis [bringing-forth/ Her-vor-bringen] in the highest sense.”10 In the case Nature produces itself or arises from out of itself, Nature implies in itself the power to produce itself or arise from itself. But natural power is usually understood by us from the perspective of how human beings can exploit the nature resource for the human beings’ sake. In this regard, Heidegger claims that modern technology lies in human beings’
challenging (Herausfordern) Nature -- in a process of unlocking, transforming, storing, distribution, and switching about.11 However, already in BT, Heidegger warns us: “‘Nature’ is not to be understood (…) as natural power. The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails.’”12
In sum, Heidegger traces from equipment back to Nature. Although the Being of both Nature and equipment is depicted as readiness-to-hand, Nature originally is not equipment. According to Heidegger’s illustration of Nature, “withdrawal” as the peculiarity of the ready-to-hand is transferred to Nature, but the phenomenon of Nature cannot be exhausted by that. The self-production of Nature shows that Nature is not derived from being as equipmental beings, but rather, shares the name of Greek “physis.” Such meaning of Nature is already given in BT.13
4. Does Nature show us as phenomenon or appearance?
How can Nature be thematizied as the self-production phenomenologically? It is a very challenging question.
In BT, Nature obviously is intelligible on the basis of fundamental ontology in terms of Dasein. So according to Heidegger’s statement, Nature is understood as a “limiting case of the Being of possible entities
8 Sein und Zeit. S. 70; Being and Time. p. 100.
9 Sein und Zeit. S. 69-70; Being and Time. pp. 99-100.
10 Heidegger. “The Question Concerning Technology,” in: Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: Harper, 1977, pp. 283-317; cited from p. 293.
11 Ibid., pp. 296-298.
12 Sein und Zeit. S. 70; Being and Time. p. 100.
13 To this point, I am not of the same opinion as Haar, Michel in The Song of the Earth (Translated by Reginald Lilly, Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 10-11) asserts.
within-the-world,” and Dasein can discover entities as Nature, even the phenomenon of “Nature” in romanticism, only in some definite mode of its own Being-in-the-world.14 The question is, as Dreyfus asks:
Can the Being of Nature “be made intelligible only in terms of Dasein’s mode of being, and not vice versa?”15 Dreyfus cites a sentence from §17 of BT and interprets it as a way of Nature: Nature of primitive people.16
Perhaps even availability [readiness-to-hand] and equipment have nothing to contribute as ontological clues in interpreting the primitive world; and certainly the ontology of thinghood does even less.17
However, I prefer to interpret it as a threshold for us to understand Heidegger’s direct way of establishing his phenomenology.
In this paragraph with the title, “Reference and Signs (Verweisung und Zeichen),” Heidegger interprets the primitive world with signs in order to show that a working out of the “‘formal’ idea of the worldhood” is on edge. According to his analysis, signs are used as equipment, but they should be characterized as more than equipment. Signs could be characterized in their reference to the whole world, but the reference of a sign is always after our “familiarity with the world” (Vertrautheit mit Welt).18 “Familiarity with the world” means that no equipment plays an intermediary role to connect us and the world. “Familiarity with the world” shows a direct, intimate relationship between me and the world. When Heidegger illustrates the use of signs in primitive Dasein, as in fetishism and magic, he says, “The way of using them [signs] always remains completely within a Being-in-the-world, which is ‘immediate’,”19 and “for primitive man, the sign coincides with that which is indicated.”20 This coinciding means that the role of a sign as equipment, namely as an intermediate, has disappeared.
As Dasein, namely “Being-in-the-world,” we are in our “concernful dealings” (besorgendem Umgang),21 insofar as we orient our lives either to the totality of involvements (Bewandtnisganzheit), which remain in the context of relation of means -end or serviceability22, or to the worldhood (Weltlichkeit) as the towards-which (Wozu) of the totality of involvements.23 Accordingly, signs indicate us not only in relation to the totality of involvements, based on serviceability of equipment ready-to-hand, but also to the worldhood as towards-which of the totality of involvements, based on our familiarity with the world. Heidegger’s interpretation of the primitive world shows that our working out of the worldhood is based upon being aware of living not merely in the relation of means-end with other beings within the world, but rather for the sake of Being itself24. In this case, Dasein (like primitive Dasein) immediately orients itself to the world, without signs as an intermediate.
My previous emphasis on the distinction between the original phenomenon and appearance regarding
14 Sein und Zeit. S. 65; Being and Time. p. 94.
15 Dreyfus, Hubert L. Being-in-the-World. A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time. Division I. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991, p. 109.
24 Heidegger discusses it in §18 of Being and Time. He shows that we should live in the world for the sake of our Dasein self, and also for the sake of the worldhood as the towards-which of the totality of involvements. The worldhood is for Heidegger the end goal of our lives, but how we disclose it and reach it belong to the following part of Being and Time.
Heidegger’s establishment of his phenomenology in direct and indirect ways may assist us in comprehending what purpose and signification Heidegger’s mention of the Nature of primitive people implies. As discussed above, Heidegger aims to work out the worldhood, which is formulated by Heidegger also as “phenomenon of world.”25 The phenomenon of world shows itself in itself for Dasein, without the mediating of equipment and signs as appearances of the world.26
If the world announces itself by something which does not show itself, the world appears to us. The appearance indicates something that does not and cannot really show itself; this “something” must be the original phenomenon of the world. When equipment and signs indicate us in relation to the totality of involvements, the indication or reference might be authentic or inauthentic. In the inauthentic case, the world just merely appears to us. In BT, the direct way is dominant over the indirect way; in other words, the indirect way is subjected to the direct way. In Heidegger’s later thoughts, the indirect way is dominant. For instance,
“The Origin of the Work of Art” (OWA) shows how equipment could indirectly manifest the phenomenon of world, insofar as equipment must be preserved in its equipmental Being, which is disclosed by an artwork in function as a symbol. In this paper, I will especially point out the poetic language as an indirect way to indicate the phenomenon of the world. Further, under the perspective that the world is finally subjected to Nature characterized as the self-production in a special sense, we can thoroughly examine how the naturalism is overcome. OWA will be the object of my research.
5. What does “The Origin of the Work of Art” show us?
In OWA, Heidegger discusses some important theses:
1) Artwork is more than a thing that is made; what is brought together with the thing that is made brings about the artwork as a symbol.27
2) In Western philosophy “there are three modes of defining thingness to conceive of the thing as a bearer of traits, as the unity of a manifold of sensations, and as formed matter.” It is to be emphasized that the thingness of the thing is difficult to express, and in the tradition, the matter-form structure determines not only the Being of equipment, but also the nonequipmental beings – things and artworks, and even God Himself.28
3) “The equipmental quality of equipment consists in its usefulness.” “The equipmental Being of equipment in truth (is) reliability;” “the artwork let[s] us know what [equipment is] in truth.”29
4) “The origin of the artwork is art (…), [but] art is actual in the artwork.” The work must be accessible “on its own for itself alone.” The Greek temple-work, for instance, “standing there, opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on the earth, which itself only thus emerges as native ground.”30
5) “The setting up of world and the setting forth of earth are two essential features in the work-being of the work.” The relation between world and earth is in “strife.” The truth in the sense of “the Greek word aletheia, the unconcealment of beings” means: “the clearing in which beings stand is in itself at the same time concealment,” just like world and earth always “enter into the strife of clearing and concealing.”31
6) The artwork is bearer of the happening of truth, which is related to the creative process of the work. Both art and craft are in Greece techne, which means aletheia, revealing or bringing forth of beings. However, “this happens in the midst of being that surges upward, growing of its own accord, physis.”32
25 Sein und Zeit. S. 86; Being and Time. p. 119.
26 Scheffczyk, Adelhard (“Vom Zeichen des Wesens zum Wesen des Zeichens: Husserls und Heideggers semiotische Philosophie,”
in Zeitschrift für Semiotik, Bd 10, Heft 3 [1988], S. 229-259; S. 254) also emphasizes the direct and indirect two ways of
7) Originally, “to create is to let something emerge as a thing that has been brought forth. The work’s becoming as a work is a way in which truth becomes and happens.” In the strife, “the open region is won within which everything stands and from which everything withholds itself that shows itself and withdraws itself as a being.” The happening of truth is historical in different ways: in establishing artwork, in political states, sacrifice, and thinking.33
8) Work is created when truth is fixed in place in the figure (Gestalt). However, the createdness of the work is part of the created work. So rather than a creator or artist of the work, we need a preserver of is, who is “capable of responding to the truth of happening in the work,” and is “for and with on another” “standing within the openness of beings that happens in the work.”34
9) We know equipmental and thingly character indirectly through the artwork. The art itself, hidden in nature becomes manifest also only through the work.35
10) The essence of art is poetry, which is understood in a wider sense as “clearing projection” and cannot be “thought in terms of the power of imagination.” However, poetry in the narrower sense as a linguistic work “has a privileges position in the domain of the arts.”36
11) Accordingly, the concept of language must be comprehended authentically. Language first “names beings” and
“brings beings into the open” “to word and to appearance.” It “nominates beings to their Being from out of their Being.”
Poetry is saying of world and earth, and of the gods. Actual language is just the happening of this saying. “In such saying, the concepts of a historical people’s essence (…) are performed for that people.”37
Poetry is saying of world and earth, and of the gods. Actual language is just the happening of this saying. “In such saying, the concepts of a historical people’s essence (…) are performed for that people.”37