Chapter 6 Analysis
6.5 Summery
The initiator can select the number of the intermediate nodes in the path and the value of the error tolerant factor to control tradeoffs between churn resilience, anonymity and overhead.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
Our routing protocol, AFATOR, provides anonymity against adversaries without proxies. We use layered encryption and random intermediaries to achieve anonymity.
We also achieve unlinkability between initiator and responder without being identify from adversaries. Every node in the path knows only the previous hop and the next hop. It is easy to recover the routing path without request re-transmission. By using Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption (Fuzzy IBE) [4], a user can decrypt a cipher-text encrypted with other's public key if and only if the two users are within a certain distance. Thus, any node can easily take over message forwarding if its neighbor node fails. At last, AFATOR uses smallest key storage and leaks less information about the responder.
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