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92 committee, which would represent the interests of both the Rukai communities and the Forestry Bureau, would be a legal platform whereby decision-making power and legal and ethical responsibility would be shared among the parties involved.97 According to co-management expert Fikret Berkes, “rights and responsibilities always go together” (Berkes 2017). By creating a co-management committee, the Forestry Bureau and Rukai peoples would thereby create a legal forum through which to petition and appeal for change and protection of land rights when necessary. This committee would then convey these concerns and represent the interested parties to the central government. In sum, if the co-management discussions are continued and an agreement is made, then the resulting co-management committee would become the legal platform by which indigenous peoples could defend their rights to land and resources.
III. Discussion
As is evident in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, as well as sections I and II of this chapter, the cases of Taroko National Park’s co-management committee and the emerging Forestry Bureau and Rukai peoples co-management agreement have very different origins, timelines, and operations. The co-management committee in Taroko National Park was created solely because the 2005 Basic Law required it to be so (Indigenous Peoples Basic Law 2005). According to several past and present committee members and scholars, there were no other significant factors that led to the establishment of the Taroko National Park co-management committee, excepting the fact that the Park’s boundaries would encompass Taroko indigenous territories.98 The enactment of the committee was entirely carried out by the National Park Bureau, and while it consists of National Park Bureau representatives, indigenous and ecological scholars and experts, and local indigenous representatives, over the past decade the committee has served a
consultative purpose. Meanwhile, the conversations between the Forestry Bureau and the Rukai peoples regarding the establishment of a co-management agreement and committee have
surfaced for a variety of reasons. On the side of the Forestry Bureau, the government is
97 Information collected as a result of the author’s participation in the Walking Workshop 2017.
98 Interview conducted by the author with Teyra Yudaw on May 21, 2017.
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93 concerned about maintaining the integrity of the land and the forest and is hesitant to relinquish control to the Rukai peoples.99 The Rukai indigenous peoples not only argue that the ways in which the Forestry Bureau is “protecting” the forest are not the best methods, but also that they wish to regain control and access to their traditional territories and the ability to use the resources and hunt within.100 As of right now, both parties seem open to establishing a co-management agreement as a sort of compromise, not fully turning over control of the lands to the Rukai peoples, but also allowing for more access and ability to use those resources that they see as a
“living right.”101 Because the original foundations and intentions of co-management agreements tends to determine (at least partially) the likelihood of their success in protecting indigenous rights and the environment, from the start the Forestry Bureau-Rukai peoples emerging agreement seems more likely to succeed than the National Park Bureau-initiated Taroko co-management committee.
With respect to the operations of the co-management committees in each case, it is difficult to compare the two, seeing as the Forestry Bureau-Rukai agreement has yet to fully come to fruition. However, over the past decade of the Taroko National Park co-management committee’s existence, it has primarily served as an advisory and consultative agency.102 The committee convenes when the National Park Bureau determines it to be necessary, and provides suggestions regarding the management of the Park. The Park authorities can then decide
whether or not to take this advice.103 As Fikret Berkes stresses, however, “consultation is not management” (Berkes 2017). Thus, it seems that calling the Taroko National Park
co-management committee a form of co-co-management may be something of a misnomer. On the other hand, while it may be too soon to say what the Rukai co-management committee’s operations will be, it should contain representatives from both the Forestry Bureau and local Rukai communities. The committee members can then discuss and negotiate amongst
themselves to determine the best ways to protect the forest ecosystems, but more importantly the rights of the Rukai peoples, as co-management is more so about managing people than it is about managing resources (Berkes 2017). The committee could then propose solutions and
99 Information collected as a result of the author’s participation in the Walking Workshop 2017.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Interview conducted by the author with Teyra Yudaw on May 21, 2017.
103 Ibid.
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94 suggestions to the Forestry Bureau, which would have the ultimate decision-making power in whether or not to implement such. However, unlike the Taroko co-management committee, the Rukai one would meet regularly and have a set agenda for each meeting.104
In carrying out both case studies, I have interviewed local indigenous leaders and
community members and observed forums during which village concerns were voiced. Through these exchanges and forums, I have noted that the primary concerns of the Taroko indigenous peoples and the Rukai peoples are quite similar. Almost all of the aforementioned communities identified hunting, resource use, and access to traditional lands as being some of their topmost concerns. These are conflicts that have, in other co-management studies, been mitigated by the implementation of a co-management regime. However, the committee in Taroko National Park has thus far been unable to provide solutions to these conflicts due to its lack of rights and decision-making power.105 Should the Forestry Bureau engage in a co-management agreement with the Rukai peoples as discussed, these topics would become the points on the committee’s agenda (Berkes 2017). Ideally, this would allow for more successful moderation of these conflicts.
In sections I and II of this chapter, I applied the criteria for indigenous land rights that I adapted from Ortiga’s work and applied them to the co-management agreements in both my Taroko National Park case and my Forestry Bureau-Rukai indigenous peoples case. In asking six criteria-based questions about each case, I was further able to identify the strong and weak points of each agreement (or emerging agreement as in the Rukai case). Overall, it seemed that with regard to the existing co-management committee in Taroko National Park, there were far more weak points than there were strong ones. The case of the Forestry Bureau and Rukai peoples was slightly more varied, but this is largely owing to the fact that the conversation about establishing a co-management regime has only just begun. Much of my analysis has been based on the existing conditions, as well as the likely direction that the committee might take given what has already been discussed between Forestry Bureau representatives and Rukai community leaders.
Regarding the first criterion, that of land tenure regime, the Taroko National Park co-management agreement has what Ortiga would deem to be a “deficient framework” (Ortiga
104 Information collected as a result of the author’s participation in the Walking Workshop 2017.
105 Interview conducted by the author with Teyra Yudaw on May 21, 2017.
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95 2004). This is largely owing to the fact that the Taroko peoples do not have any rights to their traditional lands within the Park. While the current co-management committee consists of National Park Representatives, scholars, and local indigenous representatives, the lands
themselves are controlled and managed by the National Park authorities under the MOI, and no decision-making power or rights to land are devolved to the Taroko peoples through the
committee. The potential co-management agreement between the Forestry Bureau and the Rukai peoples, however, aims to recognize Rukai ownership of their traditional territories, while
stipulating management of such through the collaboration of both parties. At present, however, the Forestry Bureau does retain control over most of the 77 percent of forested lands that the Rukai have identified as their traditional territories, thus making it imperative that the emerging co-management committee recognize Rukai rights to these lands.
The second criterion is that of territorial recognition. Both the Taroko National Park co-management committee and the emerging Forestry Bureau-Rukai peoples co-co-management initiative seem to recognize, at least to a degree, the territories being co-managed as indigenous territories. The 2005 Basic Law states that any national park containing indigenous lands must establish a co-management mechanism (Indigenous Peoples Basic Law 2005). Therefore, one might arguably conclude that if the National Park Bureau had not recognized the Taroko
indigenous territories contained within the Park’s boundaries, it would not have been compelled to establish a co-management committee. Thus, it is apparent that the Park recognizes the historical significance of the Taroko peoples’ indigenous lands, however, it has not delegated any real decision-making power to the committee itself. This indicates that the co-management committee’s recognition of traditional territories is limited. With regard to Rukai traditional territories, the Forestry Bureau currently requires Rukai peoples to show proof of continuous use to gain access to the land and resources.106 Through the co-management initiative, however, the parties aim to smooth this process of recognition. At present, Taiwan’s Basic Law on
Indigenous Peoples provides the legal framework for recognizing indigenous territories, it is just a matter of implementing such through these co-management agreements.
The third criterion is that of natural resources rights, which, in both the Taroko National Park case and the Rukai-Forestry Bureau case has been very poorly reflected. Because of the National Park Law, which prohibits hunting and the removal of any flora and fauna from within
106 Information collected as a result of the author’s participation in the Walking Workshop 2017.
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96 Taiwan’s national parks, the Taroko peoples have no rights to natural resources located within their traditional territories. Additionally, the co-management committee has and can do little to change this at this point in time because of the committee’s consultative nature. Thus, once more, the Taroko National Park co-management committee fails to satisfy this criterion. In the Rukai case, the Forestry Bureau currently also prohibits hunting in many traditional Rukai lands.
Additionally, Rukai peoples must file a very complicated and confusing application through the District Council to gain access to non-timber forest resources and salvage timber.107 Upon implementing a co-management regime for these lands, the committee should be able to better negotiate access to these resources for the Rukai peoples as they truly view this as their “living right” (Berkes 2017). This is especially pertinent because access to these resources is also vital in continuing Rukai and Taroko cultures, a point that the government claims to make a priority.
The fourth criterion, tenure security, calls into question the ways in which indigenous title to the lands relevant to the co-management agreements is secured. In the case of Taroko National Park, despite the appearance of a co-management regime, indigenous title to the lands within the Park is non-existent. On the other hand, should the Forestry Bureau and Rukai peoples engage in the co-management agreement as discussed, they would jointly reiterate the Rukai peoples’ indigenous title to the lands defined within such. Therefore, at least in the case of the emerging co-management agreement between the Forestry Bureau and the Rukai peoples, this criterion could be satisfied.
Another of Ortiga’s characteristics that is completely absent in the case of Taroko National Park’s co-management committee is autonomy. While the committee itself exists and provides advice to the National Park Bureau, as one of the committee’s current members pointed out, the committee has no actual decision-making rights or powers.108 Thus, the Taroko peoples do not have any autonomy through this management committee. In the emerging
co-management agreement concerning Rukai lands, the co-co-management committee could serve as the bridging platform upon which Rukai peoples could exercise more autonomy over their traditional lands (Berkes 2017). While this would not grant Rukai peoples complete self-governance, it would provide a space for their voices to be heard and rights to be recognized.
107 Information collected as a result of the author’s participation in the Walking Workshop 2017.
108 Interview conducted by the author with Teyra Yudaw on May 21, 2017.
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97 Finally, the last criterion is legal recourse, referring to the legal actions available to the Taroko and Rukai indigenous peoples if their land and resource rights are violated within the co-management agreement. Once more, in the case of Taroko National Park’s co-co-management committee, Taroko peoples’ rights to their traditional territories are not locally recognized, and thus there are not legal activities available to report said violations. As of now, the best way to fight against land rights violations is to protest and petition the central government for change.
Contrarily, in the Rukai case, the co-management committee over time would become recognized as an official, legal entity. As a result, the Rukai peoples would then be able to appeal and report any rights violations to the Forestry Bureau and central government through such. Once more, the Taroko National Park co-management committee appears to be deficient in providing legal recourse to the Taroko peoples. Meanwhile the Forestry Bureau-Rukai
peoples emerging co-management initiative has the potential to become a channel through which Rukai peoples can defend their rights to land and resources.
In sum, this discussion has elucidated some of the potential benefits of establishing co-management agreements in Taiwan, butthe has also highlighted some of the major shortcomings of those in existence. As I discussed in chapter 1, section III.b., Canada has faced similar challenges in forming co-management agreements between the central government and indigenous peoples. In the following section, I will discuss the potential application of the Canadian model for co-management to present and future cases in Taiwan.
IV. Application of Canadian Co-Management Model to Taiwan
Although some may argue that Canada’s history of treaty federalism prevents it from serving as a reasonable model for Taiwan’s own indigenous-state relations, this is far from accurate. While it is true that Canadian indigenous peoples have a history of signing treaties with the Crown and the Canadian government, the similar basis of Taiwan and Canada as both being settler states with long histories of colonization and indigenous oppression serves as the foundation upon which to compare the two. Furthermore, approximately 2 percent of the total populations of Canada and Taiwan is indigenous, thus making it a pertinent matter to discuss how indigenous peoples are factored into the modern geopolitical landscape. Because Taiwan has only become a democracy over the past 30 years, it is still in the earlier stages of its
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98 development. Canada, in the meantime, has had much more time to finetune its indigenous-state relations. Although these relations are far from perfect, the co-management efforts between Canadian government agencies, like Parks Canada, and Canadian indigenous peoples, including First Nations, Inuit, and Métis, can serve as a progressive model for Taiwanese co-management.
Applying the Canadian model to Taiwanese co-management, at least in theory, is a complicated but worthwhile process. As discussed in the chapter 1, section III.d., successful Canadian co-management cases tend to incorporate the following elements: equal participation of Aboriginal and government representatives, dispute resolution mechanisms built into the co-management agreements, legally defined co-management rights, formalization of shared power, bridging organizations, and provisions for self-governance. While some of these elements might be more difficult to incorporate into Taiwanese co-management than others, all are possible over time. Many scholars, like Berkes and Pinkerton, highlight the importance of co-management as learning processes. In fact, Berkes even noted that “learning-as-participation [can lead] to broadening the scope of collaborative problem solving” (Berkes 2009). Thus, while the
immediate results may not be perfect, over time, as mutual trust and mutual respect between the government and indigenous peoples involved grows, the co-management process will become increasingly effective.
One of the key elements that has contributed to the success of co-management regimes in Canada is the concept of bridging organizations. These organizations, as discussed earlier, serve to narrow the communication gap between the government and indigenous peoples while also providing a channel through which concerns can be voiced and resolved. As the Taroko National Park co-management case indicates, one of the biggest problems in instituting
successful co-management agreements in Taiwan thus far has been the large communication gap between the government and local indigenous peoples. In the beginning discussions of a co-management agreement between the Taiwan Forestry Bureau and the Rukai indigenous peoples, one of the points that has repeatedly been stressed is the need for a co-management committee that will facilitate communication between the Bureau and the affected Rukai communities.109 Thus, given the extensive discussions thus far, this seems to indicate both parties’ awareness of the need for a bridging organization, as well as their willingness to participate in such. Applying this element in Taiwanese co-management is not nearly as far-fetched as some like to believe.
109 Information collected as a result of the author’s participation in the Walking Workshop 2017.
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99 While Taroko National Park already has a bridging organization by way of the
co-management committee, as the case study in chapter two shows, this organization is clearly lacking some key elements. These elements are also what has enabled Canadian national parks and other government entities to participate in effective co-management regimes with Canadian indigenous peoples. One of these components is equal participation of Aboriginal and
government representatives. In the case of the Taroko National Park co-management committee, there are currently eleven indigenous representatives, three representatives from the Taroko Gorge National Park Bureau, three representatives from the county government, four scholars who specialize in the National Park.110 It appears as though more than half of the committee members are indigenous; however, they are oftentimes chosen by their respective township governments, and may not always directly represent the interests of their communities.
Additionally, when it comes to actual participation in the co-management committee, the government and National Park Bureau representatives tend to have more leverage as the MOI is the entity with real decision-making power. Thus, the participation of indigenous and
government committee members is not equal after all. In implementing the Canadian model of
government committee members is not equal after all. In implementing the Canadian model of