As I underscored above, the superego appears to replace the function of the big Other. As the big Other declines, the public senses the real in the symbolic order, suggesting that no one is pulling the strings behind the curtain of authority. As I have discussed in my introduction, the real stands for threatening negativity that disrupts the working of the symbolic order. Thus the public start to have a sense of intolerable burden and anxiety. In order to repress and mask negativity in the symbolic order, the superego emerges to substitute and complement the big Other in the symbolic order (Žižek, Sublime 45). The superego encourages the subject to indulge itself in the unconscious working of ideology and fantasy.
The repression and exclusion of negativity work through the subject’s ideological fantasy. When the subject is first formed on entry into the language, symbolic order, and the Other17, it is pinned to a master signifier as the point de capiton or “quilting point” 18 (Lacan, Seminar III 268). The quilting point ideologically places the subject
17 For the subject, the (m)other is the first Other. The (m)other, “who feeds and nurtures, imagined to fulfill every demand and desire, is found to have desires of her own, ones which are not fulfilled by the subject” (Sheehan 14). This initial encounter with the opaqueness of the Other’s desires builds a memory that is repeated in the subject’s life. This is the meaning of Lacan’s Che vuoi? (what do you want from me?): “what does the Other want of me?” (Lacan, Ecrits 312-16). This is also a part that establishes the subject’s freedom: “In this difficult predicament, full of anxiety, when I know that the Other wants something from me, without knowing what this desire is, I am thrown back into myself, compelled to assume the risk of freely determining the coordinates of my desire” (Žižek, Fright 183).
Without knowing what the Other wants from me, the subject has the chance of freely choosing the object of its own desire.
18 The point de capiton is employed to explain the anchoring point that stops the unending flow of meaning between signifier and signified. In every chain of signification, the point de capiton is the
63
and encodes the subject’s relations in the symbolic order. When the subject is pinned to a master signifier, the moment of pinning is that of ideological interpellation. This master signifier is an influential signifier that stands for the subject for another signifier. For example, the idea of freedom justifies the wars in the Middle East.
When the concept of freedom works as the master signifier, the other signifier that derives from the master signifier can be freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, etc. All these other signifiers come from the master signifier to fill out the void in the symbolic order. As the master signifier interpellates the subject, it enables the subject to “quilt” or “pin down” “the constant sliding of the signifiers”
chain (Sublime 101), which gives the subject a meaningful goal in its life.
Through ideological interpellation, the subject is “fastened, pinned to a signifier which represents [it] for the Other, and through this pinning [it] is loaded with a symbolic mandate, [it] is given a place in the . . . network of the symbolic order relations” (Žižek, Sublime 113). The pinning down of the quilting point that gives the subject its mandate happens via a process of identification with the symbolic order (the Other), what Žižek calls the identification to cover the void in the Other. The void in the Other is the “strange traumatic element which cannot be symbolized, [or]
integrated into the symbolic order” (Sublime 133). Through pinning down, the subject is able to repress negativity and find a meaningful place in the symbolic order.
Although the subject is pinned to the master signifier, it still faces threats from the traumatic kernel of the void in the real. This traumatic kernel is the Lacanian real, which “gives rise to ever-new symbolizations by means of which one endeavors to integrate and domesticate” (Mapping 22). It explains that negativity is only
prominent signifier that serves as the organizing principle, final reference and anchoring point that unites a whole set of signifiers. The point de capiton is the signifier that “stops the otherwise endless movement of the signification” (Lacan Ecrits 303). The point de capiton, also known as the quilting point, is the point with which all analysis of discourse has to operate (Seminar III 267). Meaning is generated in the relations between signifiers through the construction of some points de capiton.
64
temporarily repressed and excluded. Negativity may return at the weakest point of the symbolic order. When negativity returns, it will appear with an evil, negative, and threatening characteristic as it is not accepted, symbolized, and legalized by the symbolic order. The non-symbolizable negativity is “nowhere directly given as a positive entity yet which nonetheless functions” (22). In global capitalism, negativity explains the negative characteristics of the illegal Mexican immigrants in the US, international refugees in Syria and protesters in the Occupy Wall Street movement. If we regard global capitalism as the symbolic order and the illegal subject as
threatening negativity, we will see that the illegal subject only appears in the weakest part in the symbolic order of global capitalism to disrupt its normal function. An example of this is the Occupy Wall Street protesters following the 2008 global financial crisis. The illegal subject has to be excluded to support law, order, and justice in global capitalism. As the threatening entity, it is regarded as useless, redundant, and disruptive in global capitalism. Its appearance is often a “problem,”
“eyesore,” and “inconvenience.” So it has to be repressed and excluded to maintain the normal working of global capitalism.
The only way the subject can identify with or approach the non-symbolizable negativity in the Other is through fantasy. This fantasy-configuration covers
threatening negativity and constructs a sense of social reality around it. In addition to fantasy, the subject can only approach the traumatic negativity via unconscious ideology. Ideology acts, to some extent, as a support for negativity qua the real, but conceals its functioning as such (Sublime 45-49). Therefore, the ideological fantasy invites the subject to identify with the objet petit a. Via ideological fantasy, the subject learns to desire and elevates the objet petit a to stand in for the lack of the master signifier of the quilting point (Lacan Ecrits 320). Žižek portrays the objet petit a as a
65
common object that “as soon as it is ‘elevated to the status of Thing (the quilting point),’ [it] starts to function as a kind of screen, an empty space on which the subject projects the fantasies that support [its] desire” (They Know Not 133). It then becomes
“the object-cause of desire” which stands in for the real (Sublime 180-97). The objet
petit a is the little piece of the real standing in for the central antagonism of the real.
The ideological operation happens through fantasy when the objet petit a steps in to fill the void as the quilting point. In the case of political dissidents in Guantanamo Bay, the subject follows the ideological fantasy and pins itself down to the American dream as the objet petit a. When it focuses on looking for the objet petit a of the American dream, the subject interprets the excluded prisoners in its own ideological fantasy: These dissidents are jailed in Guantanamo Bay prison because they have threatened the American dream. Yet, the American dream itself is the shifting objet
petit a the subject uses to repress the prisoners qua the real.
Although the subject learns how to desire through ideological fantasy, it can never satisfy its own desire and reach the objet petit a, the object-cause of its desire.
The subject realizes his desire by transposing itself into a state that postpones the full satisfaction of its desire so that it will not confront the traumatic real (Žižek, Looking
Awry 7). In the fantasy, the subject looks for the object it desires, which is the objet petit a. The constant search keeps the subject from encountering the traumatic real:
If we look at a thing straight on, i.e., matter-of-factly, disinterestedly, objectively, we see nothing but a formless spot; the object assumes clear and distinctive features only if we look at it “at an angle,” i.e., with an
“interested” view, supported, permeated, and “distorted” by desire. This describes perfectly the objet a, the object-cause of desire: an object that is, in a way, posited by desire itself . . . . (Looking Awry 12)
66
A thing will not be the objet petit a if the subject looks at it objectively. It is only a meaningless spot. But when the subject imagines the meaningless spot through ideological fantasy, the spot will start to have magical features. It will become the object and cause of the subject’s desire. The spot will become the objet petit a. The object can only become the focus of the subject’s desire when the object can fill the void in the subject’s fantasy. And it is only when an object is retroactively posited as being the goal of our desire that desire is realized in concrete form. It is in this sense that objet petit a is the object and cause of desire. In other words, the subject can never find the way to realize its desire since the objet petit a is never actually there.
The objet petit a is invoked by the subject’s fantasy and desire to fill out the void in its being. Like a mirage in the desert, the objet petit a can only come into existence when it is viewed in a distorted way. There is no tangible material behind the objet petit a, which explains why desire is a circular movement and the realization of desire is another desire.
From the discussion above, we now know ideological fantasy works to mask the traumatic real. If we put global capitalism as the master signifier, we can see how it works as the ideological fantasy to solve world poverty. It covers the void and unifies the antagonism played out in arguments over legal jurisdiction and the problems of global trade agreements. Global capitalism qua the master signifier is a fantasy which smooths over anxieties of jurisdiction by claiming that the global trade agreements and free market will lead to an inevitable prosperous global economy and worldwide equality. But protesters who criticize global trade agreements refuse to see global capitalism as the master signifier to cover the social antagonism. As they reject the ideological invitation, they reveal the master’s signifier (global capitalism) as objet
petit a, which is used to fill the void of the symbolic order (Žižek, Sublime 74). When
67
the protesters unmask the antagonism that covers the void, they expose the inconsistency of the symbolic order and are criticized by those who embrace the ideological fantasy of global capitalism.
Therefore, when the public live in ideological fantasies, they have an illusion that their life is secure and full of meaning. When they go to work or school, they believe there is a purpose in everything. They embrace their ideological fantasies
unconsciously in order to work or study hard because they can take on the ideal role given by the symbolic order. What they do not know is that their choice of life is placed under global capitalism, which will never give them true freedom. They can complain and protest about injustices of the financial system. But they will never think beyond the limit of ideological fantasies. Neither will they perceive the repressed real antagonism in the symbolic order in their ideological fantasies.
Whatever choices we make will be distorted by the ideological fantasy within the symbolic order of global capitalism. Only when the public detach themselves from the plague of ideological fantasies can they possibly have real freedom of choice. Only when the ideological fantasies disappear can we redefine the symbolic order.
Yet, before proceeding to discuss the different types of ideological fantasy, I need to relate the working of ideology. Drawing on Blaise Pascal and Louis Althusser, Žižek reveals how the public unconsciously follow ideology. In “Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses”, Althusser elucidates how ideological state apparatuses and its associated practices produce the meaningful model of capitalism for the
subject to follow. He designates a series of institutions as “ideological state
apparatuses” (ISA), which are the family, the church, the education system, and the mass media. Althusser sees that the education system has replaced the church as the dominant capitalist ISA. All these ideological state apparatuses function mainly
68
through ideology instead of coercive force. For the subject, ideology works like a process of recognition or interpellation:
To take a highly “concrete” example: we all have friends who, when they knock on our door and we ask, through the door, the question “Who’s there”, answer (since “it’s obvious”) “It’s me”. And we recognize that it is
“him”, or “her”. We open the door, and, it’s true, it really was she who was there”. (Žižek, Mapping 129-30)
The subject answers the call of ideology by unconsciously recognizing the voice like answering the door. Before the subject senses ideology, the state apparatuses insert an ideology in the mind like the memory of a friend. When the subject is interpellated by the ideological role/friend, it immediately recognizes the role/friend and opens the mind/door. In other words, before appearing, ideology has already taken up a place in the subject’s mind. The subject will even feel a sense of satisfaction when it discovers the role prepared for it as it has already anticipated the position, which fits into its prediction. Throughout the recognition or interpellation, institutions create no coercion to control the subject. On the contrary, they plant an ideal role of fantasy in the mind of the subject in advance.
In addition to the state apparatuses, ideology is embodied in material practices.
And these practices are practical actions and ideas “governed by the material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject” (Louis, ISA 169). For Althusser, the subject absorbs ideology unconsciously with different material practices in quotidian life, including speech and gestures:
The materialities of a displacement for going to mass, of kneeling down, of the gesture of the sign of the cross, or the mea culpa, of a sentence, of
69
a prayer, of an act of contrition, of a penitence, of a gaze, of a hand-shake, of an external verbal discourse or an “internal” verbal discourse (consciousness), are not one and the same materiality. (Louis, ISA 169) Althusser’s point is that the subject is formed by ideology in all these complex ways.
In ideological interpellation, the single subject internalizes the ideas through material actions and practices. The subject’s body gestures and actions in daily life already involve and insert ideology, such as when the subject goes to mass, kneels down, and does the gesture of the sign of the cross. Within these material actions and practices, the subject has been highly mediated by ideology. In the meantime, Althusser also stresses that the education system has replaced the church as the dominant capitalist ISA. Schools and universities are included in the ideological reproduction of labor power. Education creates a general ruling-class ideology that justifies and legalizes capitalism. It recreates the attitudes and manners required by major class groups within the division of labor. For Althusser, ideology educates employees to tolerate their own exploitation while educating managers and supervisors to improve the skill of ruling for the dominant class. Every class in society has been provided with ideology that commands it to fulfill its role. So upon interpellation, the subject is willing to respond to the call of ideology. After embracing its role, the subject will feel a sense of completeness in its life since it fulfills this ideal role of ideological fantasy. Yet, in global capitalism, the subject is no longer as naïve as its ancestors.
Today’s subject is the product of knowing too much (Sloterdijk 5). It is not an innocent victim of false consciousness. It knows false consciousness and
misrecognition. It “knows exactly what [it] is doing; it is just that [it] continues to do it even so” (Eagleton 4). The subject knows that products are manufactured in
sweatshops, shipped abroad and sold for many times the amount that it initially takes
70
to produce them. This new kind of attitude concerning commodity fetishism is called
“cynical consciousness” (McGowan, Dissatisfaction 122).
With cynical consciousness, the subject does not know that it is trapped in ideology. It believes that it can see through manipulation of the symbolic order. The cynical subject of commodity fetishism believes it can see directly through the symbolic order into the real. As the subject believes what it sees as the real, it is wholly taken in by the image. For the cynic of commodity fetishism, it is totally taken in by the image. In (Per)version of Love and Hate, Renata Salecl analyzes the change through a reference to Groucho Marx: “When Groucho Marx was caught in an
obvious lie, his response was: ‘Whom do you believe — my words or your eyes?’ The belief in the big Other is the belief in words, even when they contradict one’s own eyes. What we have today is therefore precisely a mistrust in mere words (that is, in the symbolic fiction). People want to see what is behind the fiction” (Salecl 151). The subject of global capitalism has the ideological fantasy that it is not duped by the symbolic order. On the contrary, the cynic believes that it has seen the image as the real behind the symbolic order. Under these circumstances, cynical thinking becomes the most effective ideology of global capitalism. To further delve into the unconscious working of ideology, I’d like to shift the discussion from Althusser to Pascal. Blaise Pascal complements Althusserian elucidation of ideological interpellation, and he explicates why the subject follows ideology like a religion. Pascal finds that the subject embraces ideological fantasy without any critical perception. In fact, the subject accepts ideology without understanding ideology. So the ideological fantasy works as a sort of belief, based not on reason or logical thinking:
Pascal’s final answer, then, is: leave rational argumentation and submit yourself simply to ideological ritual, stupefy yourself by repeating the
71
meaningless gesture, act as if you already believe, and the belief will come by itself . . . . a belief before belief: by following a custom, the subject believes without knowing it, so that the final conversion is merely a formal act by means of which we recognize what we have already believed. (Žižek, The Sublime 39-40)
Although we know very well how ideology works, we still submit ourselves unconsciously to it. We do it by acting as if we have already believed by subjecting ourselves to the machine of religious ritual. In the case of Taoist rituals, or Buddhist prayer during certain ceremonies such as funerals, we act as if there were a God and kneel down with our relatives and parents in front of the altar. By submitting
ourselves to the ideological ritual and gesture, we can unconsciously live a
meaningful life without too much burden, doubt, or anxiety. On the contrary, we will live under the pressure of facing the anxious void of the symbolic order if we
constantly question and deny the ideological fantasy. As a result, we believe without knowing what we believe because it allows life to get easier and better. We subjugate
constantly question and deny the ideological fantasy. As a result, we believe without knowing what we believe because it allows life to get easier and better. We subjugate