In order to further put Deng Xiaoping's Taiwan policies into practice, China drew up the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005. The legal explanation of the draft Anti-Secession Law clearly explains that "The thoughts of the three genera-tions of Chinese central collective leadership, particularly those of Comrade Deng Xiaoping and Comrade Jiang Zemin, on resolving the Taiwan question and the principles and policies adopted by China's central authorities have provided clear guidance and a policy basis for this legislation,"3showing that Beijing had been planning to draft this law for quite some time. Beijing was not forced by Taiwan independence secessionist forces to draft this law, as the legal explana-tion and even some people in Taiwan criticize.
It should come as no surprise that the ten Articles of the Anti-Secession Law
(3) steps and arrangements for peaceful national reunification (4) the political status of the Taiwan authorities
(5) the Taiwan region's room of international operation that is com pati -ble with its status
(6) other matters concerning the achievement of peaceful national reunifica tion
Amongst these six topics, there is not one that does not seek to pull Taiwan under the umbrella of the PRC's rule and force Taiwan to recognize the Central People's Government as its ruling government. In particular, "the political status of the Taiwan authorities" and "the Taiwan region's room of international opera-tion that is compatible with its status" must be approved by the Central People's Government before they can be afforded to Taiwan. Taiwan must give up its sov-ereign status and the ROC in order to attain a high level of political autonomy under the one country, two systems formula, similar to that of Hong Kong. The Anti-Secession Law completely eliminates the possibility of negotiations on an equal footing; it only allows for negotiations in which Taiwan surrenders to the PRC. If these negotiations are to be truly equitable, both sides should negotiate not only "the political status of the Taiwan authorities," but also "the political sta-tus of the Beijing authorities" and "the mainland region's room of international operation that is compatible with its status." Only by discussing these two issues will "cross-strait consultations on equal footing" have any real meaning.
With regard to mid-to-low-level political topics, the Anti-Secession Law con-tains several measures for developing cross-strait relations, including:
(1) to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges across the Straits for greater mutual understanding and mutual trust
(2) to encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and cooperation, realize direct links of trade, mail and air and shipping services, and bring about closer economic ties between the two sides of the Straits to their mutual benefit
along.4
If we take a closer look at the content of this law, we can see that Articles 3-5 clearly express three main points: to support the one China principle, to solve the Taiwan problem, and to achieve national reunification. We could say that the CCP has now clearly articulated its strategic goals for Taiwan in the text of a legal document. In order to achieve these strategic goals for Taiwan, the CCP has a two-handed strategy, which is made up of a hard strategy (non-peaceful means for reunification) and a soft strategy (peaceful reunification). For the hard strate-gy, the Anti-Secession Law lists three points of no return for using non-peaceful means to force unification with Taiwan: " ...in the event that the 'Taiwan indepen-dence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted...." If the State Council and the CMC determine that Taiwan has crossed any of these points, "the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity."
As part of its soft strategy, Beijing has outlined topics for peaceful cross-strait negotiations in the Anti-Secession Law, and it has divided these into high-level and mid-to-low-high-level political topics. With regard to high-high-level political topics, Article 7 of the Anti-Secession Law states that "The state stands for the achieve-ment of peaceful reunification through consultations and negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits." But what is "peaceful reuni-fication?" In this case, it means that Taiwan must voluntarily accept unification with the PRC as a precondition for peace, and that Taiwan must accept this pre-condition in order to have "consultations and negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits." In what way does this constitute consultations on an equal footing? We can see that the Anti-Secession Law con-tains six topics for cross-strait negotiations:
(1) officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides (2) mapping out the development of cross-Straits relations
under one roof," and the "two Germanies" model, to the EU model.
(2) Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China, and the state shall never allow Taiwan to secede from China. Due to complex historical factors from the Chinese Civil War in the twentieth c e n t u r y, the territory of Taiwan has not been reclaimed. However, the PRC replaced the ROC in 1949, and so it inherited the territory that the ROC claimed in 1945, just as the ROC inherited the territory of the Qing Dynasty in 1912. Throughout China's history, this was the process of dynastic change, and in principle, it is natural for the new government to inherit the property of the previous government. For this reason, there is no way that Taiwan can be independent from the PRC. If the twenty-three million people on Taiwan are unwilling to accept the rule of the Central People's Government of Beijing and become its obedient citi-zens, should the PRC treat Taiwan as the Japanese did when they colo-nized it, allowing a two-year buffer period for dissidents to leave? The PRC has not made a concrete decision, but it allows the issue to be dis-cussed.
(3) Taiwan is merely a region; the PRC does not accept the fact that there is a separate political entity on each side of the Strait. Although Article 2 of the Anti-Secession Law states that "Both the mainland and Ta i w a n belong to one China," this "one China" can only be interpreted as the PRC. Under this precondition, the "mainland" and "Taiwan" are merely geographical terms; they do not refer to political entities. Both places are the sacred territory of the PRC, and the PRC does not accept the objec-tive fact that there is a permanent political separation across the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, according to Article 7, cross-strait negotiations can only touch on "the political status of the Taiwan authorities." If the PRC could accept the political separation across the Taiwan Strait, cross-strait negotiations would have to touch on the political status of the "Beijing authorities" and the "Taiwan authorities," or their collective status. The ROC should not have to solicit Beijing's approval and recognize Beijing as the central government in order to discuss the political status of the (3) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits exchanges in education,
science, technology, culture, health and sports, and work together to carry forward the proud Chinese cultural traditions
(4) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits cooperation in combating crimes
(5) to encourage and facilitate other activities that are conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and stronger cross-Straits relations
These items pertain primarily to cross-strait trade and economics, as well as social and cultural exchange. Beijing can initiate some of them by itself, but oth-ers require the authority of both sides to create mechanisms of collective man-agement (such as direct cross-strait flights). Measures in the latter category are only possible with authorization from the governments or government-authorized civil organizations on both sides of the Strait.
We can argue that the content of these items for negotiation are the codifi-cation of the May 17 Statement and Hu's four points. It is through these items, h o w e v e r, that the Anti-Secession Law has created such a strict framework for negotiations. The structure of this framework is built around several pillars on which Beijing refuses to yield an inch, all of which revolve around the one China principle:
(1) Through the discourse on the Chinese Civil Wa r, the PRC denies the existence of the ROC. The only "China" is the PRC (ie - there is no future-tense interpretation here), and there is no room for the co-exis-tence and co-prosperity of the ROC and the PRC. Under Beijing's one China principle, Beijing not only refuses to recognize the ROC interna-tionally and in cross-strait interactions, but of all the hypothetical models for future cross-strait integration, besides the one country, two systems model, Beijing adamantly opposes any model that allows the ROC and the PRC to co-exist and co-prosper. The PRC rejects models ranging from the confederation model, the commonwealth model, "one China
In summary, Beijing uses the Anti-Secession Law of the NPC to not only violate principles of peace in international law, harm Taiwan's democratic devel-opment, and disrupt the status quo and future prospects for cross-strait relations, but also to copy half of the existing war laws of the US. The government and the people of Taiwan, as well as the rest of the international community, collectively condemn this behavior. Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and relevant scholars and experts have issued stern statements and criticisms,5as described below:
1.Violating the Spirit of International Law
1.1 Violating the principles of popular sovereignty and determina-tion: According to the theory of popular sovereignty and the principle of self-determination, which is explained in the Charter of the United Nations (UN), the sovereignty of the ROC belongs to the twenty-three million people of Ta i w a n . Furthermore, according to the essential qualifications of statehood and foreign diplomacy set forth in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, it is difficult to deny the ROC's status as a sovereign, independent c o u n t r y. US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld currently affirms that Taiwan is a sovereign nation, and it must make its own decision whether or not to purchase arms from the US to defend its national security.6The Anti-Secession Law is a domestic law that was created unilaterally by the PRC. The people of Taiwan are not citizens of the PRC, but the legal explanation of the draft Anti-Secession Law proclaims that "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China." The law itself proclaims that "Taiwan is part of China," and it calls on the people of Taiwan to "[accomplish] the great task of reunifying the motherland." It stipulates that it will use non-peaceful means to achieve reunification in three situations, clearly violating the principle of self-determination and the sovereignty of the ROC.
1.2 Violating the principle of peace: The Charter of the UN emphasizes maintaining world peace and security and not resorting to force to solve disputes.
In 1984, the UN General Assembly passed the Declaration of the Right of Peoples to Peace, affirming that peace is the sacred right of all people. It also Taiwan authorities. If it does so, there is nothing to discuss.
(4) Taiwan must accept peaceful national reunification in order for the moth-erland to instate the one country, two systems model in Taiwan that has already been instated in Hong Kong. How flexible is one country, two systems? Whether or not Beijing would instate "one country, three sys-tems" or "one country, N syssys-tems" merely depends on whether or not Taiwan's performance can persuade Beijing to show "mercy." If the moth-erland is not reunified peacefully, and instead uses non-peaceful means to take back Taiwan, Beijing's style of governance over Taiwan will depend entirely on Beijing's disposition.
Under this strict framework, how much room does Taiwan have for negotia-tions? Beijing holds all the power to initiate negotiations, and it has adopted a policy of "leniency for cooperation, punishment for resistance" towards Taiwan in order to divide Taiwanese society. It applies differential treatment to entice differ-ent political parties and political actors in Taiwan to engage in negotiations with Beijing. Beijing grants more favorable terms to those who are more cooperative.
The result is that different political forces in Taiwan are jumping on the Beijing bandwagon, struggling for Beijing's favor, taking credit for achievements that are not their own, and attacking their political opponents. In this way, they can prove to Beijing that they are the ones with whom Beijing should negotiate, and at the same time they can criticize their opponents for having a lower status in Beijing's eyes and being unable to engage in negotiations. Furthermore, they can attack the government's reputation and denounce those in power as incompetent. Even in low-level political matters, unless the Taiwanese can accept the abovemen-tioned strict framework for negotiations, Beijing will absolutely not allow the Taiwanese government or authorized civil society organizations to engage in negotiations. Instead, Beijing divides Taiwanese society and allows those various political parties and political actors that are willing to cooperate to engage in negotiations. It then turns around and pressures the government into making all kinds of concessions, threatening that, otherwise, it will disregard the fate of the Taiwanese people.
change to the future of Taiwan." This is the greatest consensus among Taiwan's society about national sovereignty and Taiwan's future, and it is the greatest com-mon denominator between the ruling and opposition parties. According to a pub-lic opinion survey conducted by the Institute for National Popub-licy Research after China drew up the Anti-Secession Law, 93.4 percent of Taiwanese people sur-veyed opposed the non-peaceful means that the Anti-Secession Law describes for solving the sovereignty dispute between Taiwan and China.8 On March 4, 2005, members of the Legislative Yuan from both the ruling and opposition par-ties passed a resolution calling on Beijing to think carefully before taking any dangerous actions. Some believe that the NPC does not even represent the peo-ple of the PRC, because members of the NPC are chosen through indirect elec-tions. Such a method is not the same as direct elections by the people, which are inherent in a regular democratic country, calling into question just how represen-tative of the population the NPC is. Among the 2,896 members of the NPC who voted on this law, not a single one was elected by the twenty-three million people of Taiwan. As this law is in no way based on the will of the Taiwanese people, it should have no effect on Taiwan or the Taiwanese people.
3. Disrupting the Cross-Strait Status Quo and Prospects for the Future 3.1 Distorting the nature of cross-strait issues: The legal explanation of the draft Anti-Secession Law proclaims that "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China." Article 2 of that law states that "Taiwan is a part of China." Article 3 states that "The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China's civil war of the late 1940s." Through these statements, the PRC attempts to present the theory that the PRC replaced the ROC after the CCP defeated the KMT in the Chinese Civil War in the twentieth century, and therefore the PRC has the right to inherit Taiwan as part of the territory that it inherited from the ROC. This theory is a blatant distortion of history and the present reality, and these statements are preposterous. It is Taiwan's duty to spread the word to the rest of the world that there is no Taiwan problem. The only problem is that the PRC wants to assimilate Taiwan but has been unable to do so. If we look back into history, we will see that it is true that the CCP defeated the KMT, but that does not mean that the ROC was eliminated. The ROC still has people, sover-required that all member states refrain from the threat or use of force, and that
they respect the principle of resolving disputes through peaceful means, as stipu-lated by the UN Charter.7The Anti-Secession Law, unilaterally drafted by China, is a domestic law. Taiwan is not under China's jurisdiction, and this law should not extend to Taiwan. However, this law clearly puts forth the use of non-peaceful measures against Taiwan, flagrantly violating the principle of peace in the UN Charter and the Declaration of the Right of Peoples to Peace.
2. Harming Taiwan's Democratic Development
The establishment of this law not only denies democratic values, but also violates the will of the Taiwanese people. This law not only denies the universal value of democracy; it also violates mainstream public opinion in Taiwan.
2.1 Denying democratic values: The greatest difference between Taiwan and China is that Taiwan is committed to democracy and human rights, whereas China is not. China is still a one-party, authoritarian state, its people deprived of their rights and liberties, and the international community continues to condemn China's human rights record. Over the past fifty years, Taiwan's political system has turned into a diverse democracy through a successful transfer of power, and its people enjoy full political and civil liberties, can amend their constitution, directly elect their head of state, and choose those who represent their will to sit in the national legislature. They also have the right to assemble and form civil society organizations, and freedom of speech and of the press. Taiwan thorough-ly safeguards these basic human rights. The Anti-Secession Law maliciousthorough-ly dis-torts Taiwan's deepening democracy into Taiwan independence secessionist forces and authorizes the authoritarian Chinese State Council and CMC to use non-peaceful means to unify with Taiwan. This is slander against the universal values of freedom, democracy, and human rights, and furthermore, it represents a step backward for human civilization.
2.2 Violating the will of the Taiwanese people: President Chen and the DPP administration assert that "The Republic of China is a sovereign and inde-pendent country, the sovereignty of this country is vested in the 23 million people of Taiwan, and only these 23 million people have the right to decide on any