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4.2 The Emergence of the Taiwanese Identity
The origins of the conflict across the Taiwan Straits can be traced back to the Chinese Civil War between the Communists led by Mao Zedong, and the Nationalists (KMT) led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. After the KMT were defeated by the Communist PLA troops in 1949, Chiang and his remaining soldiers and KMT officials fled the 100 miles across the Straits to seek refuge in Taiwan. Chiang originally planned to use Taiwan as a stepping stone back to recapturing the Mainland, but by the time Mao Zedong had declared the People’s Republic of China on October 1st 1949, two China’s had effectively already been created: the People’s Republic of China with its headquarters in Beijing, and the Republic of China which was governed in Taipei. Both sides openly advocated the unification of Taiwan with China, but there remained obvious disagreements about who should govern this ‘one China’. The ROC’s policy of ‘liberating’ the mainland through military means was matched by rhetoric in Beijing which called for Taiwan ‘to be liberated at all costs’.
However, political developments in Taiwan in the 1980s signalled a new era in cross-strait relations, and the threatening rhetoric used by both sides eventually faded. The most important development that occurred was the process of democratization in Taiwan, whereby opposition parties were formed and elections held. Changes in the international system in the 1980’s also paved the way for a rise in nationalism in China which was motivated primarily by ending China’s ‘century of humiliation’ (Oksenberg, 1986). Democratization in Taiwan also unleashed a wave of Taiwanese nationalism, and the formation of the Taiwanese national identity which has been a key factor in the
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Chinese nationalism, and Taiwanese democratization, increasingly made for a ‘rocky period’ in cross-Strait relations, culminating with the test firing of missiles by China off of the coast of Kaohsiung in 1996 (Wang, 2004). The following part of this literature review will link the globalization process to the democratization of Taiwan, analysing the impact it has had on the security relations across the Taiwan Straits.The decision to move forward with Taiwan’s democratization in the 1980’s ultimately belonged to the KMT leader Chiang kuo. Up until the 1980’s, Chiang Ching-kuo had maintained that ‘the restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland’
remained the ROC’s ‘sacred mission’ (Rigger, 2011: 31). However, changes at the domestic and international level led Chiang Ching-kuo to realize that a return to the mainland was a distant, if not impossible dream, and that the future of his regime rested on the wellbeing of people in Taiwan. Chiang Ching-kuo realized that a democratic system would benefit the KMT, and that failure to liberalize the system could potentially result in violent conflict (Wachman, 1994). Taiwan’s continued isolation from the political arena, especially in the aftermath of its expulsion from the United Nations Security Council also contributed to Chiang Ching-kuo’s efforts to democratize Taiwan in that it led Taiwan to secure its foreign relations by building a free and prosperous nation that would seek reunification on its own terms. The democratization of Taiwan can be seen as the most important development in cross-strait relations since the 1980’s. Effectively, Taiwan had emerged as a de facto independent state. At the same time, it had given a legitimate political voice to a significant proportion of the population who did not want unification with the China mainland (Yahuda, 2011).
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Early attempts to establish a system of political liberalization in Taiwan had been suppressed and opposition to the government was quashed, with dissidents either exiled or imprisoned. However, whilst political activities languished, Taiwan’s economy was booming. Although after the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1949, inflation recorded 3000%, during the 1950s and 60s the KMT succeeded in bringing inflation down steadily year on year (Copper, 2003). Soon after, Taiwan had developed into a highly successful export based economy, and from 1960-1980 GDP grew at an annual rate of 9% (Chu, 2004). As a result, by the 1970s Taiwan had become a ‘newly industrialized country’, or ‘NIC’. Further developments were also taking place behind the scenes. Taiwanese businessmen were granted permission to travel to the China mainland in order to expand economic links with the PRC, the eastern coastal cities of Fuzhou and Xiamen in particular profited from a large amount of Taiwanese investment. Indirect trade diverted via Hong Kong also thrived and began to rise rapidly. Between 1979 and 1985, total trade between the two rose from 77 million USD to 1.1 billion USD, more than twelve times in nominal terms (Hu, 2005).
After Taiwan Martial Law was lifted in 1987, the ROC completed two complementary transitions; one to a relatively wealthy, industrialized economy (as explained above), and the other to a liberal-style democracy. As a consequence of these transitions, a third dynamic emerged (which is of key importance to this thesis); the consolidation of a national Taiwanese identity (Blundell, 2012). This has led successive ROC leaders – even those considered ‘pro-China’ to pursue localized domestic legitimization at the expense of ‘One China’. Here we can see the direct impact the globalization process,
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and in particular, economic globalization has had on the cross-Strait relationship. The KMT’s decision in the late 1950s and early 1960s to foster economic development based on a strategy of export-led growth resulted two decades later in the emergence of a middle class that began to push for a more open political system. In short, it has been suggested by scholars such as Stockton (2002) that sustained economic and political development continued to push Taiwan away from the Chinese acculturation preferred by the PRC.
Increasingly we can see how changing economic as well as political dynamics across the Taiwan Strait were the catalyst for change in national identity in Taiwan. Increased economic prosperity also helped establish a new, well-educated middle class who called for more political participation and civil liberties (Rigger, 2011). By the mid 1980’s, the middle class had expanded to include roughly one third of the entire adult population (Tsang and Tien, 1999). As well as this, the KMT regime embarked on a number of important reforms to strengthen the KMT’s ruling positions abroad and at home. High ranking political posts had previously been filled predominantly by mainlanders who came to Taiwan after 1949 but only made 15% of the overall population (Wang, 2004). However, the KMT soon came to realize that its mainlander based power structure had become untenable and stepped up efforts to co-opt young, talented Taiwanese into the leadership ranks. As a result, the %age of Taiwanese in the KMT Central Standing Committee increased from 14 % in 1973, to 52 % in 1988 (Tien, 1996). The formation of opposition parties in Taiwan after the lifting of martial law in 1987 also allowed for a radical transformation of Taiwanese domestic politics. As political liberalization proceeded, a number of opposition parties emerged, and by 1996 there were 82 recorded political parties in operation (Wang, 2004). Additionally, legal
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and institutional reform followed, and society rapidly became liberalized. The process of political liberalization in Taiwan was completed in 1996 with the island’s first ever presidential election which was won by KMT candidate Lee Teng-hui.
The democratization and political liberalization of the ROC was down to a number of factors. The domestics factors, as already discussed include the growth of the economy and the subsequent emergence of a middle class eager to have a role in the political process. International factors also play a part. Changes to the international environment of the 1970’s and 1980's made Taipei realize that it was not just enough to be an anti-Communist government (Wunderlich, 2003). Expulsion from the United Nations Security Council in 1971 was a significant turning point for the ROC regime, forcing Chiang Ching-kuo to confront the regimes' legitimacy crisis head on. The final push for democratization came in 1978 when the United States severed ties with the ROC, normalizing ties with the People’s Republic of China in Beijing. Thus, democratization became of increasing self-interest to the ROC in order to remain viable as an independent political entity (Hu, 2005). Developing a freer and more prosperous Taiwan was the only viable means to secure Taiwan’s foreign relations in light of China’s efforts to isolate it. In any event, the election of the first non KMT president Chen Shui-bian in 2000 was a crucial milestone in the democratization process, and reflected Taiwan’s rapid evolution away from an authoritarian, one party system towards the thriving, open democracy we see today.
Whilst the penetration of Taiwanese society by international economic, political and social forces was a major factor in the democratization of the ROC, political
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globalization process also helped in catalysing the issue of national identity in Taiwan.Historical and global factors were also at work in forming the first notion of Taiwanese identity. However, it can be suggested that neither historical roots nor system-level changes alone can directly alter group identity (Rigger, 1997). The effects of these historical and global forces on people’s political consciousness can only be realized through the actions of the state (Chu, 2004). Essentially, national identities are not automatically ingrained in the individual; rather they are politically contracted sentiments that are susceptible to manipulation, especially under the intensive mobilization of political regimes at times of regime transition. Thus, we must look at the formation of the Taiwanese identity in context of recent cross-Strait developments as well as its historical background.
It is possible to point to the brief period of Japanese colonial rule from 1895-1945 as planting the first seeds of Taiwanese identity. The Japanese had a major effect, most notably through the imposition of the Japanese language and education system which were imposed on Taiwan during the colonial period (Rigger, 1997). As well as this, whilst modern Chinese nationalism was being shaped by events such as the Xinhai Revolution or the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, all of these critical moments for Chinese nationalism happened when Taiwanese were thinking of themselves as subjects of the Japanese Emperor. Missing this forging of modern Chinese nationalism subsequently gave rise to the development of a Taiwanese consciousness, separate from that of the China mainland. In addition, we should also not overlook the harassment of Taiwan by the PRC, and the poisonous effects Beijing’s continued attempts to isolate Taiwan had, and continue to have on the emergence of the
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Taiwanese identity. Behaving as a bully towards Taiwan only facilitates angering more Taiwanese, and making them contemptuous and resentful of the PRC (Myers and Zhang, 2006).
The forming of opposition political parties and Taiwanese presidential elections has also played an important role in launching the widespread nationalism seen in Taiwan today. One such example was the formation of the main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. Although the newly formed DPP didn’t advocate an independent Taiwan, they did demand that the party ‘would allow Taiwan’s people to determine the future of Taiwan and develop diplomatic ties with other nations’
(Chao et al, 2002: 9). Thus, the DPP stopped short at calling Taiwan a sovereign state separate from the mainland, but it did set a clear agenda for future DPP leaders such as Chen Shui-bian and most recently, Tsai Ying-wen to follow. Similarly, Lee Teng-hui’s tenure in office also dramatically altered the security relations of the Taiwan Straits. In keeping with the Taiwanization policy of the political ranks, Lee, who was Taiwanese, was chosen to succeed Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988. Although relations between the ROC and the PRC continued to improve in terms of trade and economic exchanges, President Lee seemed determined to reverse the decline of Taiwan’s national sovereignty status announcing that the ROC regime would pursue a ‘pragmatic foreign policy’ to ‘protect the sovereignty of our nation’ (Myers and Zhang, 2006: 32).
Furious at Lee’s repeated efforts to win foreign support, and already disappointed that Lee had not signed a number of cross-Strait agreements, Beijing became increasingly impatient and responded by conducting a series of missile tests off the coast of Taiwan’s
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Taiwan and deeply angered the Lee administration. However, despite Beijing’s hard-line approach, Lee continued to assert that the PRC regime must respect the fact that Taiwan and the Mainland have been governed by ‘two sovereign political entities’ since 1949 and that a display of respect was necessary in negotiating the possibility of unification (Zhang and Myers, 2006: 33). Essentially, Lee was moving Taiwan further out of the China orbit, and as a result the number of those who identified themselves as Taiwanese and not Chinese started to increase (Copper, 2003). In keeping with his foreign policy approach, in June 1995 Lee made a controversial visit to the United States to deliver a speech at Cornell University. Incensed by his speech, Beijing’s leaders now identified Lee as a separatist and a traitor. Another series of missile launches aimed close to two of Taiwan’s major ports followed, as well as a number of military exercises clearly intended to intimidate Taiwan in the run up to the 1996 presidential election (Fook and Zheng, 2007).The constant harassment of Taiwan by the PRC, and the firing of missiles close to the Taiwanese mainland only served to reinforce the emergence of a separate Taiwanese identity. Beijing’s continued claims that it solely represented all of ‘one China’ also motivated some Taiwanese to justify their building of an independent nation state (Lin, 2011). Although the Taiwanese identity started to gain in momentum in the late 1990s, a poll conducted in 1987 had revealed that only 8.8 % of the population identified themselves as Taiwanese (Zhang and Myers, 2006: 52). In the 1990s, when the forces of globalization started to become more apparent, and Taiwanese nationalism was becomingly stoked by the actions of the PRC, Taiwanese identity became increasingly mainstream. By November 1995, a few months after the PRC’s firing of missiles off
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the coast of Taiwan, the %age of those in Taiwan identifying themselves as purely
‘Taiwanese’ had risen to 31 %, and in November 1999 it had reached 36.2 % (Zhang and Myers, 2006: 53).
The rise of the Taiwanese identity also continued during the Chen Shui-bian presidency.
During his two terms in office Chen often spoke of there being two sovereign states on either side of the Taiwan Strait (Copper, 2003: 213). His refusal to accept the 'One Country-Two Systems' formula as proposed by Beijing, his repudiation of the 1992 Consensus - much like president Tsai - and his initial proposal to settle Taiwan’s unification by referendum also implied a departure from the ‘One-China Principle’
which had previously dominated cross strait dialogue. Increasingly, his emphasis on Taiwan as a separate entity from China seemed to signal a new stage in the identity building process of the island, and less than a year into his administration he was quoted as saying ‘we will never be caught in the framework and trap of One China’ (Chao et al, 2002). Chen was essentially devaluing Taiwan as a Chinese society, and by the turn of the century, it was clear that a decisive shift in ethnic identity had taken place. Whilst in the past Taipei seemed to be opposed only to the communist government on the mainland, opposition to China itself and not just the Communist Party had also developed, further strengthening the emergence of a Taiwanese national identity separate from that of the PRC.
Increasingly, we can see the conflict between China and Taiwan as two nationalisms on a collision course. This nationalism further complicates cross-Strait relations. The period in history which the Chinese refer to as the ‘century of humiliation’ has served
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as the basis for which modern Chinese nationalism is based on, and the Chinese have still not completely removed the psychological scars associated with that part of its history. The legacy of a ‘victim mentality’ is still discernible in China today (Dent, 2007: 84). Indeed, Beijing’s leaders still often use the century of humiliation as a political tool to drum up support for the government (Callahan, 2004). However, modern Chinese nationalism arose from China's new-found sense of confidence and pride, as a result of its rapid socio-economic transformation in the years since the opening up policy (Fook and Zheng, 2007). Now that China is once again perceived as a strong nation, it can again concentrate on building a China in which all Chinese people are united in one nation. This sovereignty bound nationalism explains Chinese policy in other areas it considers to be ‘separatist’ regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet. However, as things stand, Taiwan, the ‘renegade province’, is not part of this one China nation and that poses a problem to the PRC.
The smallest hint of a threat to China’s unification as understood by Beijing sets off the most intense reaction. This is because of the inordinate value ascribed by China to its integrity, and to the Communist Party’s continued tenure in office. Liu Ji, former Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences writes that:
“The unification of China is a matter beyond dispute and bargaining. Anyone with a little knowledge of Chinese culture knows that unification has been an essential tradition and the basis for natural establishment throughout Chinese history. Chinese history is a history of fighting disunity and reinforcing unity. Any person or political group that maintains Chinese unification and territorial integrity wins the people's support and the appreciation of historians. Any person or political group that tries to
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generation to generation” (Liu, 2004: 249).Others agree with this analysis, stating that ‘China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division’ (Chen, 2003). Indeed, Taiwan is no exception. China cannot allow Taiwan to move towards independence. If Taiwan did declare independence, it would seriously undermine the legitimacy of the Communist party to rule, possibly resulting in the breakup of the Chinese state (Copper, 2003).
Taiwan’s increasingly prominent national identity often puts it at loggerheads with China. Communism in China has lost its appeal and thus, ensuring prolonged periods of economic prosperity and safeguarding sovereign territory have become the two pillars supporting the PRC’s legitimacy (Dent, 2007). Nationalism seems to have filled the void left behind Maoist-Leninism as the legitimizing ideology of the regime. From the Mao era onwards, China has treated the Taiwan issue as unfinished business. The return of Macau and Hong Kong to China also put added emphasis on Beijing to incorporate Taiwan into the PRC (Wang, 2004). Quite simply, Taiwan’s de jure independence cannot be tolerated especially under the leadership of the independence leaning President Tsai. Such a rigid view of sovereignty conflicts directly with the rapid emergence of the Taiwanese identity, which in recent years, has seen more and more Taiwanese residents identifying themselves as purely ‘Taiwanese’. In a recent poll conducted by National Chengchi University’s Election Center, 55.8 % of residents identified themselves as ‘Taiwanese’, whilst those saying that they were ‘Chinese’
reads just 3.5 % (National Chengchi University, 2017). What is evident is that over time, the two sides seemed to have developed a different outlook and understanding of
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cross-strait relations. More detailed statistics on the changes of Taiwanese/Chinese
cross-strait relations. More detailed statistics on the changes of Taiwanese/Chinese