According to Geophrey Harpham, the sense of the grotesque arises with the perception that something is illegitimately felt in something else. Such fusions generate the reaction described clinically by Freud, who noted that when the elements of the unconsciousness “pierce” into consciousness, we become aware of a distinct feeling of repulsion (Harpham 1982: 11). The grotesque could be defined as both the strangeness, deviation in form as well as psychological confusion that grotesqueness causes. For example, Hironymous Bosch’ paintings could be taken as one of the grotesqueries for the distorted, awkward objects, and variegated levels of the
“uncanny” sense it evokes. In Bosch, grotesqueness is characterized by technique such as disparity, enormity, exaggeration and deformity. Also, the art style known as Gothic is also highly related to the grotesque for the spookiness and darkness aroused are equally ambiguous. What is more, as Harpham argues, the definition of the grotesque depends not solely on the formal properties but it also envelopes factors of
assumptions and expectations in creating the sense of the grotesque. It is our interpretation of the form that matters. Namely, it is the social acceptance, adaptation or even pedagogy that determines the definition of the grotesque objects. As the formal configuration provides the material base for the grotesque denomination, it is also the social and cultural ambit that affects the association between particular physiological stimuli and the acquiescent recognition of something that could be called grotesque. In reverse, one may question the socio-historical progress that makes some aesthetic experience acceptable and hence legitimate art forms based on formulations, such as biological principle of agreeability, or the materially ideal according to physics or math. While one agrees that beyond the social influence human beings do have biological limits in sensory perception, what this author tries to propose is that the social aspect is very crucial in identifying agreeable/disagreeable registers of aesthetic experience in the efficacy of legitimization/exclusion operation.
Seemingly extraneous, the socio-cultural factors such as historical influence, law or even political power determines what we may regard as the most natural experience.
With this in mind, if one believes that the artistic conventions are not immobile but somewhat historically contingent, then the grotesque objects are potentially subversive and even revolutionary that they may shatter the conventional definition of good/bad and offer a more multiple aesthetic experience. Then, what is the grotesqueness in music as far as these properties are concerned?
The first focus of the grotesque in music may be on the deviation from conventions and forms. Yet for people who maintain that musical meaning is purely autonomous and that their coherent structure may bring pleasure or bear moral value, the deviation is likely to incur negative moral judgment and its inconsistent or cacophonic qualities may become the material bases for moral accusation. As the coherent, harmonic structure brings pleasure and may enhance moral sense, the negative judgment on the incoherent ones has been implied immediately yet with the same propensity as an antithesis that does not require further suggestion. The
“musically grotesque” is therefore contrary to the “musically beautiful” as proposed by Eduard Hanslick. In Hanslick’s eyes, the beauty in music consists in beautiful forms especially in melody and with a symmetrical structure. For him, why people describe certain music as fresh or melancholic is because of the quality of the music itself, not anything that is fresh or melancholic in the world beyond music. The musical beauty is reached by the unity and coherence of harmony, tonal arrangement and rhythm. The musically bad, the “pathological way” of appreciating music, is being emotionally agitated by musical sounds. The structure of the bad music thus lacks appropriate harmony and melody; it is at best just vibrations of sounds in nature but cannot be qualified as musical materials (Hanslick 1854:116-118). Hanslick
exemplifies an attitude toward music that stresses the musical work as autonomous entity detached from the extramusical world, and a structure that can be studied in an objective manner.
However, maybe it is insufficient to say that music is totally autonomous because in this sense one cannot explain why people would identify with particular piece of music whose structure or melody is rather simple (the examples would be national anthems and lullabies). Music may bear at least a minimum expressiveness that conveys imagination and emotion. Music is expressive by virtue of its capacity that elicits feelings in listeners. It also portrays or recalls expressive human behaviors within which human beings may express exuberance, anguish, anger and serenity through music.19 Certain experiences would be also be enhanced by tempo, rhythm, voice-leading or harmonic relations in musical sounds. Moreover, composers would utilize innate expressiveness of music to augment whatever the effects they intend. In this way, the preference or abhorrence of music includes our feelings and emotional reactions. Conventions and institutions may also work on the psychological level. The definition of noise, the musically beautiful or the musically grotesque engenders both the objective structure of music and one’s subjective appreciation. As a harmonic piece of music is described as euphoric, jubilant, and serene cheerful, the noisy piece would be morose, dejected, painful and repulsive.
As the perception of music is also culturally defined, a gap between the mere physiological reaction and the collective judgment on something that is believed to be indisputably bad still remained. The suture as such relates more to the social influence on the perception of individuals, as well as the degree of how much people are accustomed to the social value. In this respect, Leonard Meyer offers a detailed analysis. He argues that the meanings of music may be appropriated by the cultural forces to designate other meanings and affective experiences even they stimulate nothing but motor, physiological responses. The socio-cultural forces could bestow the musical sound with particular meanings for people to respond as collectively
19This author’s idea echoes with Peter Kivy’s argument of musical expressiveness:
That sound stimuli have an effect on a human being’s affective state is beyond question. It also beyond question that when sound is in the form of music, it possesses at least some of whatever stimulative potency it inherently has, or has acquired and what is inherent or acquired potency is, is of course a question for the psychologist of perception, among others, to answer. (51)
Please see Kivy, Peter. Sound Sentiment: An Essay on the Musical Emotions. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989.
defined other than individual interpretations. After constant deployment, the culturally defined meanings and responses would become so natural as if people would believe they were innately ingrained in the style and physical response in them. The point in Meyer is that what one believes to be unquestionably natural would still be socially constructed. As he says, when the specific pattern of music and types of pleasure are fixated, they would become a natural reaction. The physical pleasure that is aroused by the stylistic formation further strengthens one’s belief that the musical conventions are natural instead of the efforts to excavate the historical factors. The process of stylistic development is filled with changes and conflicts that vie for the final regulation among various experiments. Conventions and norms are then not taken as innately acceptive but historically contingent, which includes constant cognitive and affective readjustment of subjects. Meyer (1956) argues:
The argument is that any kind of music will serve as a group or society provided the music is stylistically distinguishable from all others; there is noting internal to music, in other words, which predisposes it impart one kind of significance above all others. In contrast, it is also possible to argue that the internal qualities of a musical style are of themselves significant. This is not necessarily to assume that the significance of music is located in some form of “asocial”, “ultimate”
reality, however. It can be asserted that because people create music, they reproduce in the basic qualities of their music the basic qualities of their own thought process. If it is accepted that people’s thought process are socially mediated, then it could be said that the basic qualities of different styles of music are likewise socially mediated and so socially significant. (12)
Concerning the stylistic development, he also writes that:
Styles and style systems are not permanent, fixed, and rigid. Within cultures which do not impose strong social sanctions upon art, changes in style have been the rule rather than the exception. One style gradually replaces another, attains its own particular fruition, declines and is replaced by another style. The process is gradual and, since not all aspects of the system are necessarily changed, it is often impossible to mark off the historical limits of a style. We must be content to point out its ultimate fruition and its general limits. This has also been the case, though less frequently, with the style system. (64)
In this way, Metal (especially Black and Death Metal) would be the most plausible candidate to deserve the name of the musically grotesque, because the disparity and deformity in painting find the expressive equivalents in the enormous volume and unconventional progression of tempo in Heavy Metal. By the use of tritone, Metal
also evokes the spooky feeling and sense of horror in listeners’ minds. Nevertheless, what remains critical is how people receive the stylistic deviation and grotesque objects. Besides individual preference, the larger social context is more crucial in defining the grotesque stimuli. This then raises the issue of musical meanings, emotional designation, and contemporary definition of good and bad that remains crucial in the discussion of deviance formation.