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Chapter 2:
The Thucydidean Tradition
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discussions I intend to present these major traditions of Realism chronologically, initiating with the tradition defined by Thucydides‟ (460-395 BC) philosophy, based on his book The Peloponnesian War (1959a, 1959b). Thucydides‟ idea concerning international relations4 shall have its place in the very first phase of the examination of his tradition, and so shall his Realist insights. A revisionary proposal of his Realist proposition will be suggested and used for challenging popular textbook opinions of Thucydides‟ Realist legacy. A following discussion on the Realism of contemporary scholars who show idea features characterizing them as Thucydidean Realists constitutes another part of analysis. Besides, there shall be no doubt that their source in Thucydides‟ philosophy will be traced as a reflection of Thucydides‟ influence on contemporary Realists.Since the Political Realism has been recognized as a school of disciplinary theory in the realm of international relations, Thucydides has come into scholars‟
minds5 as the most ancient Realist antecedent (Lebow, 2003, p. 112). Explaining the outburst of the Peloponnesian War in terms of relative power, Thucydides is tagged with the label of Political Realist. His work The Peloponnesian War has been credited
4 By which I mean inter-polis relations in regard to the political units at that time.
5 Such as Hans Morgenthau, Robert Gilpin, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Robert Jervis, and Michael W. Doyle (Lebow, 2003, p. 112).
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Firstly, power determinism. Contemporary Realists, especially textbook Realists, believe that the dominative force of power is the most, and perhaps the only one, important factor explaining interplays between international actors. The other is the theory of balance of power, an equally important assumption in Realism for many Realists7. As it will be presented in this chapter later, both of these two fundamental ideas are grounded on the recognition of disjunction between the reality and normative conventions. Besides these two commonly recognized idea components, this thesis proposes another equally, perhaps even more, important core idea component which characterizes Thucydides‟ Realism, namely, the argument of stasis.
The idea of stasis is argued here for being the most distinguishing feature to characterize Thucydides‟ Realist legacy in his work The Peloponnesian War.
Thucydidean Realism
Aspiring to be an influential historian to the followed generations, Thucydides
6 Thucydides‟ remarks allow open-end interpretations for different theorists to acclaim roots from. For example, Richard Ned Lebow maintains that Thucydides is both a realist and a constructivist (Lebow, 2003, p. 166). And it is actually a popular topic debated by scholars on whether Thucydides is a Realist or not (Carlsnaes, Risse, & Simmons, 2002, p. 362n; Crane, 1998, pp. 37-38; Lebow, 2003, pp.
113-114). However, Thucydides‟ The Peloponnesian War does consist of a sizable portion of Realist accounts.
7 “If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance of power is it” (Waltz, 1979, p. 117).
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has chosen the materials carefully for his documentation (Thucydides, 1959b, p. 13).
One can easily find out that the entire The Peloponnesian War is themed around the opposition between the Spartan and Athenian camps in the 5th century B.C. From his insistence of being a scrupulous historian, he gives his readers a preliminary message concerning how his accounts are Realist: he emphasizes on the reality instead of the ideal. Being a historian, he naturally paid more attention to historical facts than normative ideas. What is real is real. Even though it may sound tautological, this concept is actually important in unraveling the core essence of Realism, especially here for the Thucydidean tradition.
Filled with numerous speeches8, notwithstanding the authenticity is questionable, Thucydides‟ The Peloponnesian War conveys a principal belief for Realists‟ theory
building: what actually happened matters. “Thucydides was obsessed with the need to
probe beyond deceptive appearances and to reveal forces that, though often hidden, nevertheless drove events. … Thucydides wanted to study the “real world” and was thus a “realist”” (Crane, 1998, p. 37). According to Crane, it is the fact that Thucydides wanted to study the “real world” makes him literally a Realist vis-à-vis an
Idealist9. Putting an emphasis, sometimes exclusively, on the reality over the normative ideas is a very fundamental factor to discern a Realist account. We don‟t
8 Except for the Book VIII which he didn‟t have a chance to finish it.
9 See Carr (1956) for a better understanding of the contrasting idea between Realism and Idealism.
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know if Thucydides has consciously selected certain events and speeches to document or he has been just as impartial as he could have10. But what we do know from that is that he distinguishes and puts an emphasis on the disjunction between the reality and the ideal11. Besides, Thucydides is not only seen as a historian dedicated to document the history discreetly, he has also been accredited as the first historian who attempted to reveal the true casual relations in the progress of historical events (Xie, 2000, pp.
17-19). This stance shed light on the positivist tint in Realism－a theoretical approach looking for casual relations from accounts of what it is instead of what it should be.
Power Determinism
The sharp contrast between the reality and the ideal has often, although not always correctly, been argued for asserting the deterministic role played by power in the realm of international affairs over the elusive moral principles by some Realists.
Thucydides‟ tragic ontology12 simply means that “the reality” is not only irresistible but also inevitable. The inconsistence between the reality and the conventional moral
10 Thucydides‟ objectivity as a scientific realist historian has been questioned (Crane, 1998, pp. 40-48).
11 For example, Thucydides has specifically pointed out that some agreements or accords were not observed by the parties. Instead, those agreements and accords were constantly broken by the parties out of expediency. The craft that the Plataeans pulled on Thebans is a bloody instance. Not only the Plataeans pulled a cunning scheme on the Thebans, they even broke their vow and slew all their Theban prisoners (Thucydides, 1959b, pp. 91-93).
12 His ontology is basically fundamentalist. Fundamentalists believe that there are some things actually exist out there in this world, such as “the reality” in Thucydides‟ philosophy as well as in most Realists‟
accounts. On the contrary, the anti-fundamentalist would argue that there are no such things which actually and concretely exist in this world. The interpretists can be categorized into the camp of anti-fundamentalists.
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principles implies the decisive role of power in the international relations. At least this is what we have often been told.
To scholars who hold the commonsense Realism, Thucydides‟ work The Peloponnesian War is of no doubt the typical literature illustrating power determinism,
especially in the epic narration of the Melian Dialogue. The naked coercive nature of power is demonstrated plainly in numerous condescending sentences addressed by the Athenian envoy such as the famous dictum“… in human disputation justice is then only agreed on when the necessity is equal; whereas they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get”
(Thucydides, 1959a, p. 365). In other words, the Melian Dialogues gives the message that power determines justice. The strong can do whatever they are able to do to the weak whereas the weak have to accept what they have to. The Athenians tried to make the Melos realize that a dire destruction would be incurred upon the Melos if they counted on frail and intangible beliefs. Having faith in moral conventions (such as just,
bond between allies, and glory) and expecting the Lacedaemonians would dash to rescue them from the Athenians‟ invasion, Melos insisted not to succumb under the
Athenians. But the miserable outcome of the Melos shows how despotic the rule of power is in international relations. Until today, the Melian Dialogue “remains the starting point of discussion about the relative role of ethics and interests”, according
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to Lebow (2003, p. 26).
It could also be argued that the idea of power determinism is present not only in the Melian Dialogue but also many times in other parts in The Peloponnesian War.
For instance, in book I, after the Corinthians accused the Athenians of besieging its colony Potidaea and requested the Lacedaemonians to declare war against the
Athenians, the Athenian representative defended themselves like so: “it hath been ever a thing fixed for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger” (Thucydides, 1959b, p.
44). In order to justify their doing of military suppression, the Athenians appealed to the preexisting rule of power and claim its normalcy. Many passages could be easily cited to endorse power determinism.
For commonsense Realists, power is absolutely the most defining characteristic of Realism. It is worth noting that Jack Donnelly equalizes Political Realism with power politics (Donnelly, 2000, p. 6n). However, since the original aspiration of this thesis is to unravel the richness and diversity in Realism‟s tradition, I have to disagree with this oversimplified definition. At least four traditions, as proposed previously, are there suggesting the plurality in interpreting Realism. To our misfortune is that the important role played by many of them are either omitted or neglected by writers of international relations who hold a commonsense understating of Realism.
Commonsense Realism simplifies theoretical content of the school of Realism into a
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dominating version of Realism which emphasizes the role of power to an almost paranoid extent. The struggle of power indeed is a very important aspect in the realm of international affairs but power per se can hardly define this immense family of Realist scholarship. Power may be at most seen as an important explanatory factor of behaviors in a Realist setting, but what makes power so indispensible in this school of theoretical thoughts is more important than power per se. In other words, though we can find a vast array of passages suggesting power determinism in Thucydides‟ The Peloponnesian War, it does not define his theoretical legacies. Power is a way of
application of Thucydides‟ Realism as well as of other traditional inaugurators‟.
Stasis vis-à-vis Homonoia
Although the role of power and the theory of balance of power (which will be discussed shortly) are two popularly recognized elements of Thucydides‟ Realism in his work The Peloponnesian War, they are believed as auxiliary points in Thucydides‟
argument of stasis. The differentiation of real world from the normative discourses (or, ideal world) gives rise to the important role of power and consequently to the theory of balance of power. As Crane quotes, T. L. Knutsen suggests that “Thucydides depicts a condition in which power wields the ultimate authority in relations among states, so that „the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what
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they have to accept‟” (Crane, 1998, p. 63). However, the “real world” does not only
have one invariable side. Within the context of his time, Thucydides discerns in depth the diverse nature between usual times and tumultuous times.
The distinguishing trait of Thucydides‟ Political Realism is that it emphasizes on the conditions of being in a time of stasis (a turbulent time, a war, a civil war, a revolution, or a factional violence)13. A time of stasis is basically a time of instability, antagonism, insurrection and turmoil. In contrast, when people are in times of homonoia (which literally means being of one mind together) people construct their
identity as members of the same community14. As it will be shown, Thucydides reveals clear awareness of that the situation of being at a stasis is vastly different from that of homonoia.
Although stasis vis-à-vis homonoia is a rather difficult word to define in modern language15, an excerpt from Constantinou can give readers a fine hint about its conceptual contour. Constantinou suggests that the ancient Greek stasis “acquired the exclusive sense of destructive factionalism and insurrection, in the process idealizing the polis as a harmonious whole that had universal and permanent interests”
13 “In discursive terms, this means that stasis … acquired the exclusive sense of destructive factionalism and insurrection, in the process idealizing the polis as a harmonious whole that had universal and permanent interests. Within such idealization, homonoia, concord or same-mindedness, became a prime political principle and stasis got linked exclusively to dichonoia, or apart-mindedness, whose end result was the destruction of the polis. Stasis acquired the sense of a political disease (nosos) that could be located not only in the assembly but also in language („the sedition of names‟ in Thucydides that cause wars)” (Constantinou, 2004, p. 8).
14 The Aristotelian tint in Thucydides‟ accounts is herein shown.
15 For a more comprehensive and elaborative discussion, see Constantinou (2004).
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(Constantinou, 2004, p. 8). Also, he makes a contrast of it with the idea of homonoia:
“Within such idealization, homonoia, concord or same-mindedness, became a prime
political principle and stasis got linked exclusive to dichomoia, or apart-mindedness, whose end result was the destruction of the polis” (Constantinou, 2004, p. 8). Hence, the ideas of stasis and homonoia are obviously in opposing positions. Therefore, a time of stasis basically means a process of disintegration of a community where people share same principles and norms.
In times of stasis, norms and conventions, social or religious, are ignored and violated, not to mention when plagues and famines are both rampant as well (Thucydides, 1959b, pp. 118-119). “By removing the constraints and obligations arising from convention, stasis encouraged expression of the worst human impulses”
(Lebow, 2003, p. 145). The sense of homonoia (being in a community) vanishes.
People do not feel connected with others anymore. Macro-structural forces of stasis draw people‟s unrestrained passions out. The want for superior values such as love, glory, or justice in one‟s life is overshadowed and overwhelmed by the need of
self-preservation. “And the common course of life being at that time confounded in the city, the nature of man, which is wont even against law to do evil, gotten now above the law, show itself with delight to be too weak for passion, too strong for justice” (Thucydides, 1959b, pp. 206-207). Expediency is hailed. Morality is
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meaningless in such a chaotic situation and the paramount goal of a man wherein, and reflectively as for a nation, is to survive. The basic trust for fundamental moral bindings perishes away with all expedient deeds unleashed. “All of which enable us to state to cardinal calamity of stasis: trust disappear from society, and with it society itself. Stasis destroys nothing less than the infrastructure of civil trust” (Orwin, 1988, p. 837). Thus, ultimately, moral conventions lose their foothold to stand on. Expedient deeds such as struggle for power come into play to a much more substantial extent than before. This is “the reality” of being in times of stasis and it is “the reality” in Thucydides‟ The Peloponnesian War.
Different form St. Augustine (whom will be discussed in the next chapter) who posits the corruption of human nature, Thucydides illustrates how human beings are capable of doing morally horrible deeds in situations of extreme. As we shall therefore see, the real concern of Thucydides is the transformative force of extraordinary
situations. Scholars even make a bolder extrapolation saying that “phusis16 varie[s]
according to the environment” (Lebow, 2003, p. 145). In times of peace, and when
people are connected to each other, there is no threat to their lives and property, ethical conventions are generally adhered. The attraction of expedient thoughts such as to struggle for power is relatively small. To a certain extent, power even yields way
16 Phusis is a Greek word often translated into English as “nature.”
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to moral principles in the time of homonoia. When the wildest passions are in check by the moral conventions, the deterministic authority of power is limited. In other words, people do not always struggle for power. As Lebow pertinently points out, morality has never been left behind, only the worst part of human nature are given a free rein to dominate in a time of stasis (2003, p. 145). Macleod also notes that, for Thucydides, “in stasis as in war, human nature is revealed” (1979, p. 52)17. Furthermore, not only the dark side of human nature is unveiled, extreme conditions
of stasis are also prone to distort human nature to an even more abhorrent degree.
“Difficult times, no less than good times, shape men in their image. War creates
violent passions as much as it release them” (Donnelly, 2000, p. 72).
In this regard, the Melian Dialogue is a piece of material that helps Thucydides illustrate the argument of stasis vis-à-vis homonoia. After all, the uncovered arbitrariness of power is revealed in the dialogue between the Athenian and the Melian representative instead of in Thucydides‟ own remarks (Donnelly, 2000, p. 24).
The Melian Dialogue is, from this point, merely recounted as a piece of reflection of the tumultuous time of stasis.
Lebow also shows a disagreement against the popular interpretation of the Melian Dialogue:
17 Quoted from Donnelly (2000, p. 72).
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“To maintain its hēgemonia [hegemony] Athens had to act in accord with the principles and values that it espoused, and offer positive political and economic benefits to allies. Post-Periclean leaders consistently chose power over principle, and, by doing so, alienated allies and third parties, lost hēgemonia and weakened Athens’ power base. Viewed in this light, the Melian Dialogue and the Sicilian expedition are radical departures from rational self-interest.” (Lebow, 2003, p. 126)
As revealed in the excerpt above, it is to general readers‟ surprise that Lebow
interprets the Melian Dialogue and the Sicilian expedition as irrational behaviors conducted by Athens. However, if a scenario has been pictured, one may find it is difficult to define the so-called “rational doings” during a time of stasis. “The received value of names imposed for signification of things was changed into arbitrary.
For inconsiderate boldness was counted true-hearted manliness…” (Thucydides, 1959b, p. 204). It was the passion aroused during such an era of wildness caused the whole irrationality which was considered not only rational but also honorable by the public in the time being, as Thucydides implies in The Peloponnesian War (1959b, p.
207). Desires for whether aggrandizement, glory, or interest in terms of power were driven by the unusual atmosphere of the fervent era. This rationale of explaining the disregard of moral conventions constitutes the core idea of Thucydides‟ Realism.
Balance of Power
Many scholars recognize Thucydides as a Realist because of his accounts of the
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cause of the Peloponnesian War. However, Thucydides‟ accounts on the cause of the war are not as it seems to be so ostensibly clear. On one hand, in the Book I of his work The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides straightforwardly attributes the rise of Athenian power as the truest reason: “the truest [cause], though least in speech, I
conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power, which putting the Lacedaemonians into fear necessitated the war” (Thucydides, 1959b, pp. p14-15). On the other hand,
he also suggests that if only Pericles had survived the plague, things wound be completely different (Thucydides, 1959b, p. 125). Therefore, scholars like Lebow
(2003, pp. 65-96) maintains that the agential factor composes a significant part of the real cause which Thucydides actually implies behind his remarks. So what‟s the real
intent of Thucydides, besides the fact that we know he admires Pericles‟ reign in Athens18? Sure if Thucydides had the chance to finish his The Peloponnesian War and made few more commentaries, we might probably have a better chance to grasp his real intent. Unluckily, he didn‟t. Between the structure force and the agential force,
intent of Thucydides, besides the fact that we know he admires Pericles‟ reign in Athens18? Sure if Thucydides had the chance to finish his The Peloponnesian War and made few more commentaries, we might probably have a better chance to grasp his real intent. Unluckily, he didn‟t. Between the structure force and the agential force,