We have seen very strong reasons to suspect that resemblance is ontologically gratuitous in Trope Particularism. It is interesting to see that
“resemblance” does not signify a metaphysically genuine relation in Universalism, either. Resemblance is redundant in Universalism in that once it is explained in terms of (partial) identity, there is no need to describe the reality in terms of resemblance. Universalism does not need to have resemblance in its ontological bag. The question now is whether the denial of resemblance as an ontologically genuine relation would render unintelligible the notion of
“resemblance.”
I certainly do not think so. Indeed, I have a more radical proposal to offer. I not only think that it is very likely false to take resemblance to be a metaphysically genuine relation, but also think that it is very likely false to take the phenomena of similarity to be mind-independent. I think it is a metaphysical dogma: that it is a plain and mind-independent fact that two objects are similar in shape or color or along whichever dimension. It is a metaphysical dogma that the phenomena of similarity are mind-independent.
I suspect that the overall consensus of thinking of resemblance as mind-independent comes from the long Universalist tradition that has shaped our major metaphysical presumptions. On the Universalist view, similarity is partial identity. Since identity is mind-independent, it is natural to think that resemblance is mind-independent as well. But I think that this consensus
requires some justification. I am not saying that it is illegitimate for philosophers to take the phenomena of similarity to be their metaphysical explanandum.
And, I am certainly not objecting that one cannot have both a metaphysics and an epistemology for the phenomena of similarity. What is questionable is that by doing that, metaphysicians exclude outright the possibility that the phenomena of similarity may ask for, and solely for, a psychological explanation.
Philosophers need to provide a rationale for ruling this possibility out before they take the phenomena of similarity to be on the list of their metaphysical inquiries. This is especially urgent for Universalists, since explanation of the phenomena of similarity solely in psychological terms would render redundant the positing of universals. An illegitimate Universalist answer would be that it is a well-established tradition that the phenomena of similarity have been undoubtedly a legitimate explanandum of metaphysics. Another illegitimate Universalist answer would be that the phenomena of similarity constitute an appropriate subject matter for metaphysical inquiry because the positing of universals has well explained them. Both answers beg the very issue concerning the rationale of ruling out the possibility I raised.
Trope Particularism does not do any better. Recall that both Trope Particularism and Universalism are theories competing for providing a better explanation for the phenomena of object level similarity. We were then puzzled why Trope Particularism ends up with assuming trope-level resemblance as a primitive. It seems that this leaves the project of explaining the phenomena of similarity incomplete.
But, once we have moved to the point of denying resemblance its metaphysical status in Trope Particularism, why not move further into
considering the possibility that “resemblance” is solely an epistemological or psychological notion. Indeed, why not move further into entertaining the possibility that the phenomena of similarity call solely for a psychological explanation? I would like to advocate a consideration that may favor this possibility, a consideration that sounds even more plausible given the above reductive analysis of resemblance. Consider once more the world in which there are only two red patches. Since resemblance is an internal relation, the fact that the two red patches resemble will be ontologically nothing more and nothing less than the mere fact that there are the two red patches. However, the description that the two red patches resemble seems to be relatively more informative than the mere description that there are the two red-tropes. After all, “resemblance” is a concept that is neither empty nor unintelligible.
Taking trope level resemblance to be an internal relation cannot explain the relative informativeness of the description stating that a certain resemblance holds between two tropes. If so, the relative informativeness of the description that they resemble will have to come from a non-ontological source. A natural candidate for this is our psychology. It is our psychological working that contributes to the relative informativeness in the description that the two red patches resemble. Seeing things to be similar (or dissimilar) is one of the fundamental ways of our cognizing the world we encounter. But this psychological working is not groundless. As has been said, since resemblance in its complete form is ontologically reduced to a second order greater than (or some other internal relations) over two first order darker than (or some other internal relations), these internal relations will provide the ontological basis for our psychological working in cognizing which resembles more than which.
On this epistemological conception of resemblance, the phenomena of brute similarity no longer pose difficulties for Trope Particularism, for they will be a chapter of psychology. The suspicion that mere resemblance differs from exact resemblance in kind will be removed. Moreover, the problems posed by the Uniformity Principle no longer arise. Since trope-level exact resemblance is not a metaphysically genuine relation, the Uniformity Principle does not apply to it. The dilemma disappears as well.
Furthermore, one implication of the epistemological conception of resemblance, consistent with Orthodox Nominalism, is that kinds (or types) are not real. Kinds, according to Trope Particularism, are formed out of exactly resembling tropes. The kind Red, for example, is the class of all exactly resembling red-tropes. Since resemblance is epistemological, kinds (or types) will be epistemological as well. Kinds are not out there to be discovered; they are products of human cognition. This is a new form of conceptualism with regard to kinds. Although natural kinds are much more complicated than simple kinds such as square, red, etc., they do not call for a different treatment.
It nevertheless does not follow from this conceptualist position that kinds are arbitrarily constructed. For, first of all, as was pointed out, the psychological working in conceptualizing similarities is not groundless. It has its ontological ground in the greater than or some other internal relations holding between two first order internal relations between tropes such as darker than or heavier than, etc. Secondly, we need not confine ourselves to perceptual similarities. Functional or causal similarities and structural similarities are allowed. And, certainly, there is no reason to exclude the deep-level microscopic similarities.
An objection has been raised against this epistemological conception of resemblance. It is that, on this conception, if there were no human beings, nothing would be similar to anything else. But, why is this an objection?
Does my proposal exhibit “anthropocentric arrogance”? I see this accusation unjustified. The reason why we think it an objection to the epistemological conception of resemblance is probably that we have long been told that the existence of the phenomena of similarity is something suitable for metaphysical inquiry — especially when a Universalist mind-independent explanation is readily available. It is true that on the conceptualism currently offered, if there were no humans, nothing would be similar to anything else and nothing would be dissimilar to anything else. But, why is this a problem? Since descriptions in terms of resemblance in its logically complete form are reduced ontologically in the sense that they are grounded in other genuine internal relations such as greater than, darker than, and heavier than, the above hardly constitutes an objection. I thus conclude that Trope Particularism does not require (trope-level) resemblance as one of its primitives.
VII. Conclusion
In dispensing with resemblance in Trope Particularism and proposing that the phenomena of similarity call solely for a psychological explanation, I probably have revived a tradition beginning with Aristotle down to Leibniz at least. But I do not share their radical view that all relations are “mental comparings.” What has been denied all along is only the ontological status trope ontologists have traditionally ascribed to resemblance. I do think that causation, trope compresence and internal relations (and probably spatiotemporal
relations as well) are mind-independent and are metaphysically genuine relations. On the other hand, psychological explanations of our conceiving of similarities are certainly legitimate and have recently occupied a central place in psychology. I believe that Trope Particularism does not lose much by taking resemblance to be epistemological or psychological. The next step will be to provide an epistemology for the phenomena of similarity based on trope ontology and human psychology.
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