2. Theoretical Framework
2.3. The tree-level analysis
2.3.3. International
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recent transition to democratic and civilian life in Myanmar, the army retains extensive faculties in political and economic matters. Therefore, the responsibility of violence towards the Muslim community is largely the military authorities, led by Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the Burmese army.
2.3.2. Domestic
Since 2003, the army began a stage of democratic transition of the military government to civil.
The main objective was to build a new face of Burmese politics without
That the army was the center of attention. So they decided to agree with civil leaders to retain power from a second position but still have important powers.
In practice the power of the army, which controls 25% of parliamentary seats, the Ministry of Interior, border affairs and the Ministry of Defense, have limited Suu Kyi's performance of the country. And although the National League for Democracy, the Nobel Peace Prize party, has managed to agree with the army important reforms such as economic openness, counteract the Burmese army measures could affect the relationship between both entities causing the political paralysis, risks of governability and the pause for equally important reforms for the country.
Suu Kyi has admitted that under the current Constitution of the country the army operates independently and with some autonomy from the ruling party, which means that there is a major challenge for the civil government to obtain powers concerning military control. With everything, from the international perspective, the responsibility of the Rohingya repression will be of Suu Kyi, although inside she cannot fully control the decisions made by the army.
But neither does it seem willing to oppose that policy, mainly to avoid conflicts within the country, after a period of political stability and understanding between the civil and military power.
2.3.3. International
After the conflict began, governments and the UN itself spoke out against the Burmese Government measures. At a conference held in Geneva, Switzerland organized jointly by the UN, the European Union and the Government of Kuwait, the situation was alerted of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. To reduce the deficiencies in the reception area, the objective was to raise a total of 434 million dollars until February 2018. "This is the largest exodus from a single country since the Rwandan genocide in 1994," he said. Shameem Ahsan, Bangladesh
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Ambassador to the UN, who also criticized the position of the Burmese government in the conflict.
Just last November 24, the UN accused the authorities of trying to apply a cleaning ethnicity in the country after the intensification of border patrolling, so it summoned representatives of Myanmar to the UN to convey the international community's concern for these facts. Likewise, the same international organization has warned that there are around 3,000 children with severe malnutrition caused by the crisis. Besides, he accused that he has medical assistance and food distribution suspended for 150,000 people by the siege Burmese military. The Government of Myanmar has said that it is already negotiating with China and Russia to that block any possible UN Security Council resolution on the crisis. The former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, announced that he would lead a commission to discuss the conflict and clashes in the state of Rakhine. The goal is to start the dialogue between the political and community leaders of the state to improve the well-being of the local population, especially from the Rohingya community.
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CHAPTER 3 3. Main analysis
3.1. Rohingya situation 3.1.1. History of Rohingya
According to the Rohingya themselves they have lived in Rakhine (historically known as Arakan) for centuries. However, there are no specific evidence tied to archeological discoveries that can say who the first settlers in Rakhine were. The majority of Rohingya are Sunni Muslims and a smaller minority in Bangladesh and India are Hindu. Rohingya have their own language and culture and they represent the top share of Muslims in Myanmar. The largest number of Rohingya live in Rakhine state in Myanmar, but there are also significant populations living in Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Malaysia and India. Those diasporas migrated mainly because of the repressive politics towards Muslims by the Myanmar military regime (BBC News, 2018)45.
The exact origin of Rohingya is contested, but it is established that the ancestors of Rohingya were Persian and Arab traders who settled in Arakan as early as the ninth century (Farzana, 2017:42)46. Arakan was naturally separated from the rest of Burma by the Arakan Yoma mountain range, which is one factor explaining why Rohingya developed a different culture and identity than the rest of Burma. Nevertheless, during the Middle Ages Arakan was Buddhist just as the Burmese Kingdom. However, in 1406, the Arakan Kingdom was subdued by foreign invaders and the Arakense King fled to the neighboring Muslim Bengal. With the help of a Bengal army the Arakan King could restore his rule and during the years in exile the king had become influence by Muslim ideas which he brought back to Arakan. During the centuries to come Arakan/Rakhine developed a multicultural society where “Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism, together with Brahmanism, Hinduism, Animism and other beliefs flourished side by side”. The prosperous times ended in 1784 when the Burmese King Bodawpaya invaded and annexed Arakan into his Burmese Kingdom. Widespread unrest followed in the region and thousands of Arakanese fled to the now British colonial Bengal.
These events explained why Arakanese Rohingya favored the British and the mistrust which has continued between the Rohingya and the Burmese.
45 BBC News. 2018-01-16. “Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis”.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561
46 Farzana, Kazi Fahmida. 2017. Memories of Burmese Rohingya Refugees, Contested Identity and Belonging.
Palgrave Macmillan: New York.(pp.21-48).
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The first displacement of Rohingya refugees started in 1978 when 200,000 fled to Bangladesh.
This forced-migration occurred after increased identity policies from the Myanmar authorities targeting people who had previously been refugees. The involvement in the 1978 displacements has been denied by Myanmar and the authorities stated they are not responsible for people crossing the border to Bangladesh. Shortly after the mass-displacements the authorities agreed to let “lawful residents of Burma who are now sheltered in the camps in Bangladesh” return to Myanmar. This clearly did not involve the Rohingya refugees who are not recognized by Myanmar as lawful citizens. After the refugee crisis in 1978, Myanmar authorities became clearly hostile towards Rohingya in Rakhine.
“… the situation seems a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” – Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN News, 2017)47.
The statelessness of Rohingya in Myanmar begun when they were de facto stripped from Burmese citizenship by the Citizenship Law of 1982 (Cheeseman, 2017:471)48. Although, the Law did not specifically deny Rohingya citizenship, the Law emphasized citizenship through national race as key. The Law made ethnical/national race as the main incentive for Burmese citizenship and made clear that Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Arakanese and Shan, who have lived in Myanmar before 1823, had right to citizenship. As mentioned above, the Law created three categories of “citizens”: citizens, associate citizens and naturalized citizens. The regime did not recognize Rohingya as one of the 135 national races. Moreover, the implications of the Law excluded Rohingya from Burmese citizenship, making them stateless. This meant that no Rohingya child could obtain citizenship, because at least one of the parents must be categorized as one of the three types of citizen for the child being able to obtain citizenship. Rohingya do not qualify as citizens in none of the categories.
Riots against Muslims have occurred in Myanmar as expanded protests towards migrant workers as early as in the 1930’s. These movements gave birth to nationalist and religious slogans such as “Burma for the Burmans” and “to be Burman is to be Buddhist” (Ahsan Ullah, 2016:289)49. Riots targeting Rohingya have occurred on and on, which intensified in 2012 and
47 UN News. 2017-09-11. “UN human rights chief points to ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ in Myanmar”.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-example-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar
48 Cheeseman, Nick. 2017. “How in Myanmar ‘National Races’ Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya”. Journal of Contemporary Asia. Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 461-483.
49 Ahsan Ullah, A.K.M. 2016. “Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar: Seeking Justice for the ‘Stateless’”. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice. Vol. 32, No. 3, (pp.285-301).
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2017 (BBC News, 2018)50. The violence in 2012 begun when Buddhists living Rakhine state targeted Rohingya Muslims because of widespread religious unrest in Myanmar. These riots resulted in 200 dead Rohingya and 140,000 homeless. The situation in Rakhine has been increasingly difficult for the Muslim Rohingya since the increased hostilities in the region between Muslims and Buddhists in 2012 (Amnesty International, 2017)51. Moreover, Rohingya’s movement has been restricted by the government so that their freedom of movement is limited within Rohingya villages. Curfews have been issued in the region and only Rohingya who have a permit can travel in northern Rakhine. Even if they can travel they need to pass roadblocks monitored by the Border Police Guard (BPG).
In 2017, violence erupted again after attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on thirty police stations in Rakhine state (Albert, 2018)52. The government retaliated in so called “cleansing operations of terrorists” resulting in 6,700 dead Rohingya of which 700 were children. Additionally, according to Amnesty International many Rohingya girls and women were raped as actions of revenge (BBC News, 2018). Another immediate consequence of the latest waves of violence towards Rohingya were the displacement of 650,000 people, most of them fleeing to Bangladesh. The State Councilor of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi has denied all allegations of genocide and dismissed the international criticism as charging the hate between Buddhists and Muslims.
3.1.1.2. The legal status of Rohingya
As mentioned, Rohingya became stateless because of the 1982 Citizenship Law. UNHCR lists four main causes to statelessness and these are: gaps in national laws; people moving away from the country in which they were born; the emergence of new states and changing borders can leave some groups without a nationality; states can deprive former citizens from their nationality through laws which often are based on discriminating criteria such as ethnicity or race (UNHCR, 2018)53. Another reason could be that the affected person has lived a long time outside of his or her country of nationality and the person then become stateless. In the case of
50 BBC News. 2018-01-16. “Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis”.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561
51 Amnesty International. 2017-11-21. “Myanmar: Rohingya trapped in dehumanising apartheid regime”.
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Rohingya, the fourth explanation to statelessness is very much applicable. The Citizenship Law discriminated Rohingya rights when it simply excluded their earlier recognition as a Burmese minority group. While being stateless, the Rohingya minority have very few legal rights. There are no legal measures that protect the rights of de facto stateless persons (UNHCR, 2012:9)54. On the other hand, The Final Act to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness includes a statement saying: “that persons who are stateless de facto should as far as possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to acquire an effective nationality”. Despite this resolution, the rejection of rights connected to nationality is a result of the current human rights regime.
Nevertheless, UNHCR has set the goal of eradicating statelessness until 2024 (UNHCR, 2018).
In order to reach that goal, prevention of statelessness is as important as reinstating a nationality for people already being stateless (UNHCR, 2012:11). For Rohingya, this mindset is vital since every Rohingya child born also becomes stateless. To conclude, the majority of all Rohingya have very few rights while being considered “resident foreigners” in Myanmar. In fact, the Rohingya who are displaced have more legal rights than those who are left in Myanmar, since the Rohingya displaced outside of Myanmar are protected by the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (Riley, 2018)55.
3.1.1.3. Rohingya as minority identity
“A minority is a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in their society” (Wirth in Alam, 2017:181)56. Especially religion has a prominent basis of creating a minority identity and it can help further the group dynamic.
Krishnaswami makes three important notions concerning religious minorities which are applicable to the Muslim Rohingya minority. First, the judicial status of the minority religion and the possession of adequate rights under national law are vague in general. Second, the state uses its own criteria defining minority religions, which often are unfair to them, especially if the majority religion has a position as the state religion. Third and finally, the recognition of minority religions is absent, although unequal treatment is still a possibility. All these factors
54 UNHCR. 2012-10-01. “Self-Study Module on Statelessness”. UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency http://www.refworld.org/docid/50b899602.html
55 Riley, Jessica. 2018. “The State of the Stateless People: The Current Rohingya Crisis”. The Michigan Journal of International Law. Vol. 39. http://www.mjilonline.org/the-state-of-a-stateless-people-the-current-rohingya-crisis/
56 Alam, Jobir. 2017. “The Rohingya of Myanmar: theoretical significance of the minority status”. Asian Ethnicity. Vol. 19, No. 2, (pp.180-210)
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are applicable to the situation of Rohingya, except for the last statement since Islam is a recognized religion according the Burmese constitution (Constitution of Myanmar, 2008:
paragraph 362). The Rohingya identity is made on the basis of religion and they are thus considered to be a religious minority. The identity of minorities is often subject of debate. The current discussion on identity is based on a mixture of racial, ethnic, gender and additional politics. Minority groups on national level that seek to amend for historic repression most often choose two ways of doing so. First, are those movements who seek a fundamental split from the majority society with an aim of creating alternative forms of nationalism in the light of brutal colonial practices and the denial of fundamental rights. Second, are the movements who want recognition within the majority society seeking a life of multiculturalism where individuality is accepted. The Rohingya do not seek independence, they want Burmese nationality, thus they strive for the recognition described by the second category. There are mainly two concepts for a Rohingya identity. The lack of a national identity for any ethnic minority may lead to consequences such as marginalization and persecution. Second, long periods of suffering and despair for the same minority group “are directly relating to their politicized and weakened identity” (Taylor in Alam, 2017:187).
3.1.1.4. Rights of Rohingya
The Constitution of Myanmar protects the rights and liberties of all Burmese citizens, but Rohingya are not Burmese citizens and are thus not included within those rights. Therefore, Rohingya obtain few political and civil rights, but even so they were still allowed to vote in the 1990 election. In the general elections in 2008, Rohingya were given temporary identity cards, so called “white cards”, which gave them permission to vote. According to the Constitution of Myanmar, the Union (i.e. Myanmar) “shall guarantee any person to enjoy equal rights before the law and shall equally provide legal protection” (The Constitution of Myanmar, 2008:
paragraph 347). However, Rohingya are not granted equal rights before the law as a Burmese citizen would and the temporary identity cards were revoked in 2015, denying their right to vote. The Burmese Constitution lists persons who are ineligible to vote in the election of the People’s Representatives to the Hluttaws, which is the Burmese parliament. The persons who cannot vote are:
members of religious orders; persons serving prison terms; persons determined to be of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent Court; persons who have not yet
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been declared free of bankruptcy; and persons disqualified by election law (The Constitution of Myanmar, 2008: paragraph 392).
None of these measures disqualify Rohingya as an entity to vote, but having to be a citizen, associate citizen or a naturalized citizen do. Without the white cards Rohingya have no proof of being legal Myanmar citizens and are therefore ineligible to participate in elections.
Rohingya civil rights have been neglected in other circumstances as well. Rakhine state is one of the poorest regions in Myanmar with 78 percent of the population living below the poverty threshold. The combination of poverty, lack of sufficient infrastructure and scarce employment possibilities have created enormous distrust between the Muslim Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhists in the region. Consequently, the whole region is suffering from the mentioned disadvantages, but it is the stigmatized Rohingya minority who has been the most vulnerable.
Violence and rape have been used against Rohingya women in Rakhine during the fall of 2017 according to Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, 2017)57. Under circumstances where life and personal security are at stake, civil and political rights are insignificant and non-existing. Surviving becomes the only priority.
3.1.2. Political Buddhism in Myanmar
Political Buddhism is when the Buddhist religion is used for nationalistic and political purposes to exclude non-Buddhists and thereby gain a sense of belonging. Ethnicity and nationalism are also used to strengthen political Buddhism and being Burmese has been central for the Burmese society. The concept of political Buddhism is not unique for Myanmar and is also comparable to the equivalent of Islam or Hinduism. However, that comparison is not be elaborated on here because, Rohingya are primarily living in the context of a Buddhist majority society.
Nevertheless, Rohingya became a target of political Buddhism because they represented a group which did not belong to the Myanmar identity, they were the “others”.
According to the Burma Citizenship Law of 1982 the population of Myanmar was classified into three different categories: citizens, associate citizens and naturalized citizens. The law said that the ones who belonged to the citizen category were the so called “national races” of the country or those whose relatives settled in Myanmar before 1823. There are 135 “national races” in Myanmar who are acknowledged by the government, but Rohingya is not one of them. Consequently, this makes it nearly impossible for Rohingya to become legitimized
57 Human Rights Watch. 2017-10-27. “Rohingya Crisis: Military Use of Rape for Ethnic Cleansing”. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/blog-feed/rohingya-crisis#blog-310434
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citizens since they are not recognized as a national race and it is very difficult to prove that your relatives have lived in the country since 1823. If there are no evidence provided to qualify as a citizen, then that person would be an “associate citizen” and naturalized citizens are those who prove that their parents have lived in Myanmar before the independence in 1948.
Additionally, those who are approved for citizenship under the Union Citizenship Act of 1948, but do not qualify under the 1982 Citizenship Law are also qualified as associate citizens. For Rohingya it is practically impossible to qualify for any of the three categories (they do not qualify as associate citizens neither under the 1948 law, nor the 1982 one).
Additionally, those who are approved for citizenship under the Union Citizenship Act of 1948, but do not qualify under the 1982 Citizenship Law are also qualified as associate citizens. For Rohingya it is practically impossible to qualify for any of the three categories (they do not qualify as associate citizens neither under the 1948 law, nor the 1982 one).