61 Liang-fen Wang, “Yang Jiechi: Missiles Against Taiwan Are the Issue of National Security;
Should Be Understood by the U.S.,” Zhongguo Shibao, December 5, 2002, P. 11.
62 Ping Liu, “Jiang Zemin: Cross-Strait Peaceful Unification Meets U.S. Interests,” Zhongguo Shibao, October 26, 2002, p. 4.
The third generation of Chinese leaders placed economic development at the center of China’s Taiwan policy, hoping to focus their energy on solving internal problems and not the Taiwan issue, which would thereby delay or disrupt the process of Chinese economic development. At the same time, they considered “stabilizing U.S.-China relations” and “appealing to the Taiwanese people” as two basic pillars of their Taiwan policy. This policy approach can be abbreviated as the “one center, two basic pillars.”63
As to its relations with the United States, the third generation of Chinese leaders did not hope that the Taiwan issue became the main contradiction between China and the United States, because they realized that the stability of the Sino-U.S. relationship was very important to its economic development and stability. In addition, by adopting a cooperative attitude and flexible Taiwan policy, advocating the common interest of maintaining the status quo and peaceful unification, the third generation urged the United States to pressure Taiwan to cooperate with China and prevent Taiwan from moving toward independence.
Furthermore, the third generation of Chinese leaders perceived that the key to solving the Taiwan issue would be determined by the opinion of the Taiwanese
63 A Senior Scholar of Taiwan studies in Shanghai, interview with author, November 2002.
people. Taiwan’s public opinion was not only the key to determining unification, but also to assuring the restraint of Chen Shui-bian from marching toward Taiwan independence. Therefore, the third generation emphasized more and more with
“appealing to the Taiwanese people.”
On the basis of the above-mentioned judgement, after Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” was issued in mid-1999, China’s response was moderate, hoping to stabilize cross-Strait relations and thus keep concentrating on addressing internal problems.
When Chen Shui-bian’s “one-country-on-each-side theory” was issued in August 2002, China’s reaction was very low-key because military intimidation would have been harmful to Sino-U.S. relations and the feeling of the Taiwanese people, and even more detrimental to China’s economic development. This demonstrated that the third generation insisted on the priority of modernization over cross-Strait unification.
The above-mentioned judgement of the “one center, two basic pillars” can also explain why the third generation of Chinese leaders made a series of policy adjustments (concessions) to Taiwan after Chen Shui-bian assumed office. In last three years, China’s adjustments included the definition of “one China” and the conditions of the negotiation over the “three direct links.” As to the definition of “one China,” the third generation of Chinese leaders constantly made concessions, in hope
of wining the support of the United States and the Taiwanese people, and thus pressuring the Taiwanese government to accept the “one-China principle.”
Furthermore, China continued to de-politicize the issue of the “three direct links” in hope of early implementation, because the “three direct links” would help China’s economic development and be “appealing to the Taiwanese people” (cross-Strait unification).
Though more full of self-confidence in dealing with the Taiwan issue at present, the third generation of Chinese leaders felt powerless on one particular issue: public opinion in Taiwan. They realized that the public opinion in Taiwan was the only assurance to restrain Chen Shui-bian’s Taiwan independence policy, but did not know how to effectively influence the public opinion to its favor in democratic Taiwan. As a matter of fact, the effects of their policy over the past decade were primarily counter-productive. More worrisome for Chinese leaders was that, so long as Chen Shui-bian is re-elected in 2004, China might lose the last constraint of the public opinion to Chen Shui-bian.
Therefore, China’s tough policy of military intimidation and insistence that the Chen Shui-bian administration must accept the framework of the “one China principle” were both based on these kinds of concerns (the worst scenario). In this
situation, the strategy of its Taiwan policy of the third generation was very clear
--“advocating unification” was only a principle, but the most important thing was
“preventing Taiwan independence.”64
The third generation of Chinese leaders argued that as long as Taipei accepted the framework of the “one-China principle,” “three can-discusses” were negotiable and would consider the needs of the Taiwanese people. However, the third generation has not yet put forward a concrete plan of action that may be acceptable to Taiwan.
China urgently wants Taiwan to accept the framework because it is worried that Taiwan might break through the status quo, and wants to use this stratagem to propagandize inside Taiwan and amongst the international community.
For example, China proposed the new definition of the “one-China principle,”
but did not specify concrete measures to implement it in the international society;
China proposed “three can-discusses,” particularly “can discuss Taiwan’s international space” (participating the international governmental organizations), but did not form concrete ideas and consensus within China. Moreover, China’s statements were contradictory: on the one hand, Beijing said that it would face the reality of the existence of the ROC; while, on the other hand, in its policy brochure,
64 A senior scholar of international relations in Beijing, interview with author, November 2002.
Beijing argued that the legal authority of the ROC ended in 1949.
Because there is no mutual trust at present between the two sides across the Strait, and disparity of the policy positions between the both sides is huge, the two sides have hardly any common ground in the short term. The situation of cross-Strait confrontation will, thus, continue in the short term: two opposite forces -- “possible plebiscite (Taiwan independence)” and “military deterrence against Taiwan independence (plebiscite)” -- will sustain the tensions and deadlock of cross-Strait relations. Nevertheless, because China needs to develop its economy, the United States constrains and balances both sides, and the mainstream of Taiwan’s public opinion falls in the middle to maintain the status quo, the probability of Chinese use of force to coercively unify Taiwan or Taiwan’s unilateral declaration of independence is trivial.
Furthermore, because China’s national strategic goals (priority on economic development and preserving a stable international environment) are very clear, the United States and China have already reached mutual understanding on major strategic issues (including anti-territorism, international cooperation, the Taiwan issue, and the American status in the East Asia).65 At the same time, Taiwan has been
65 Two senior scholars of international relations in Beijing, interview with author, November of 2002.
close to the limit of its unilateral definition of cross-Strait relations and the expansion of its international space. Therefore, it is highly possible that cross-Strait relations could sustain peace and stability, but with deadlock, over next couple years.
Nevertheless, the “three direct links” will become the focus of cross-Strait interaction in the short- and medium-term, possibly become the catalyst and mechanism to improve the cross-Strait relations.