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Body Concepts in Western Philosophy and Sociology

2. Literature Review

2.1. The Concept of Body

2.1.1. Body Concepts in Western Philosophy and Sociology

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among cultures (Turner and Zheng, 2009:7). Different cultural traditions produce different types of embodiment and in turn these different forms of embodiment reinforce different cultural traditions (Turner and Zheng, 2009). In times of globalization, embodiment in different cultures are challenged and become increasingly hybrid through embracing a mixture of body cultures, which then create new artistic, but also social and cultural possibilities (Turner and Zheng, 2009).

Based on the acknowledgement that the ‘Asian body’, as well as the ‘Western body’ will vary in itself, the thesis that there are distinctive traditions of embodiment in the East and West will be underlying in this research. It is of interest to see the greater differences or similarities that the ‘East’ and ‘West’ exhibit and to ask oneself whether or not those concepts still play a role in modern society and if so, how. Since both Eastern and Western philosophy have filled countless books on this issue, it is by all means unachievable to sum all of them up in just this one thesis. Thus, I will only focus on some of the main ideas in Western thought, that have for long concentrated mainly on a body-mind-dualism whilst the Eastern thought, where I will focus on Confucianism, is more strongly represented by a holistic approach.

2.1.1. Body Concepts in Western Philosophy and Sociology

Within sociological study the status of the body is a disputed issue and some writers claim that the field has traditionally taken a disembodied approach to the study of the body (Malacrida and Low, 2008). Important thinkers have looked at this subject under different aspects ranging from physical to medical questions, body-politics, embodiment, and personal identity.

Although in ancient Rome and Greece the body was glorified by sculptors, painters, and potters who celebrated the beauty of naked human beings (Synnott, 1983), public discourses of the body already emphasized a separation of the mind from the body, as well as a higher valuing of the mind over the body (Malacrida and Low, 2008). Socrates (466-399 BC) described the soul as a ‘helpless prisoner, chained hand and foot in the body’(Plato, 1963 quoted in Synnott, 1983:38). Plato (c. 427-348 BC) maintained this dualism, stating that ‘soul is utterly superior to the body…the body is no more than a shadow which keeps us company’ (Plato, 1963 quoted in Synnott, 1983:38). And, perhaps unsurprisingly, Aristotle (384-322 BC), a former student of Plato’s said: ‘we can dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and body are one:

it is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its shape are one’ (Aristotle, 1984 quoted in Synnott, 1983:39).

This division between soul and body was also made among early Christians, where the body was understood to be merely a temple or container for the soul. These dualistic bodies culminate in the Renaissance with René Descartes’ (1596-1650) concept of Cartesian Dualism, where the body is understood to be separate from the mind and emotions (Malacrida and Low, 2008). Descartes is famous for his quote ‘I think, therefore I am’ and was a strong believer that mind and body are two things entirely distinct from each other. ‘I considered myself, firstly, as having face, hands, arms, and the whole machine made up of flesh and bones, such as it appears in a corpse and which I designated by the name of body’ (Synnott, 1992:41).

Since the state had always exercised the right to take away life, to inflict pain, to remove parts of the body, to tattoo or brand the body, to quarantine individuals in times of plague; and both church and state had traditionally forbidden many physical activities (such as masturbation, self-mutilation, abortion, suicide,…), the body had never been entirely private or autonomous and there had always been surveillance and control over the body (Synnott, 1992:42). However, the strong adherence to body-mind dualism is sharply contrasted in the 20th century, which marks a turning point in the political anatomy of the body in Europe with thinkers, such as Freud and Sartre.

Sigmund Freud showed in his Studies on Hysteria (1895) that psychological phenomena can be converted into physical phenomena. Thus, body and mind are one - a theory that seemed to call into question the traditional Cartesian concept (Synnott, 1992). In Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre insisted that the body is the self, and that the self is the body: ‘I live my body…The body is what I immediately am…I am my body to the extent that I am’ (cited in Synnott, 1992:43). His perception goes against the notion that the body is similar to a “tomb”

or a “temple” - for him body is a representation of the soul.

Placed in a broader historical context, these events can be seen as the result of changes initiated in the 19th century when clothes and the presentation of body shifted from being signs of social place to become manifestations of personality (Sennett, 1974 cited in Shiling, 1993:11). In contemporary culture this has promoted the experience of both becoming the body, as in identifying oneself either negatively or positively with the ‘exterior’ of the body, and of being regularly anxious about the possibility that the body will let one down or ‘fall apart’ (Shiling, 1993:11). We are continuously looking for ways to keep the body in a shape that is not just

pleasing ourselves but also the people around us because we have learned that people use appearance to place each other into categories (Sanders, 1989). A person’s physical appearance affects his or her self-definition, identity, and interaction with others (Cooley, 1964) and attractiveness has considerable impact on our social relationships. The fact that the attractive body has become a strong focus of our attention is historically seen not a natural consequence but more a sign of the declining importance of other forms of expression such as traditional clothing, rituals and other traditions (Fuchs, 2000).

As mentioned, not all Western scholars agree with the mind-body dualism. Käll (2016) writes

“the body is something that we are, much more than only something we have or own as a possession” (Käll, 2016:3). It is more than primarily an object of knowledge as Plato and Aristotle believed, but rather the necessary condition for experience, knowledge and different forms of objectification (de Beauvoir, 2010 cited in Käll, 2016:3). We have the body, and we

are the body, for “treating one’s own body as an object to be worked on and perfected creates

another sense of distance” (Käll, 2016:4).

Michel Foucault contributed to the study of the body an “enhanced self-reflectiveness about the project of body study itself” (Frank, 1990:14). In his book Discipline and Punish: The Birth

of the Prison (1995) he argued that in the realm of prisons power is implemented through the

use of a disciplinary gaze; seeing and judging are vehicles of power, and the gaze is a ubiquitous mechanism of social control in modern societies (as cited in Malacrida and Low, 2008).

Foucault argued that between the meticulous daily discipline of institutional routines and the constant possibility of surveillance, prisoners began to engage in their own preventative self-policing. These forces of social relations working on the body, that he named ‘biopower’, would eventually produce the ultimate product of a ‘docile body’ that will comply with social regimes readily and willingly (Malacrida and Low, 2008:5). His model, however, can be extended beyond prison life to include students, soldiers, hospital patients, factory workers – practically to all citizens of modern societies. Foucault’s notion of governmentality thereby describes micro-power relations where bodies are controlled by the state through local institutions and authorities.

Another sociologist that has become a foundational figure in defining a sociology of the body is Pierre Bourdieu, who developed a range of terms that are conceptually useful for the study of body (Shiling, 1993; Turner and Zheng, 2009). He was interested in the habitus as an ensemble of dispositions that shape and determine our taste for cultural objects and expanded

Marxs’ notion of economic capital to a model of four other kinds of capital, that can be manipulated to achieve economic capital: social capital (networks of friends, family, and mentors who can help us to transcend our class position); symbolic capital (our ability to manipulate symbols such as language or clothing to our advantage); cultural capital (cultural competencies such as gestures, dispositions, tastes, and abilities); and physical capital (originally conceived as a subsystem of cultural capital, meaning the uses of the body to convey one’s social position and display culturally valued physical attributes) (Shiling, 1993; Turner and Zheng, 2009). These four capitals can explain a person’s place in society, how they are perceived and perceive themselves within their environment. All four capitals are in direct relation to each other: for example, expanding my social capital (meeting new friends) might lead to changing my symbolic capital (attaining a tattoo) or vice versa.

His concept of these different forms of body capitals might go in hands with a contemporary idea that the body is something we can transform, improve and work on – whether it be physical exercise, plastic surgery or other body modifications, such as tattoos that express individuality.

We try to make our bodies “correspond to our inner sense of who we are and desires of who we want to be” (Käll, 2016:4). Our bodies stand in correlation with each other and desires are triggered by outside forces and experiences. Transforming our own bodies can have an impact on others and sharing it on today’s media outlets extends the massive pool of creative inspiration that each one of us can fish from.

The “21st century body” is thus framed in both “personal responsibility and free choice as something we do in order to make the most of who we are and to achieve power, success, and happiness” (Käll, 2016:4). Taking this further, it seems as if the historical process of capitalism is infecting more and more spheres of our life, which is something that already Marx pointed out. Something that is new however, is that individuals are valuing their self-worth depending on a “current market value” (Fuchs, 2013:83), meaning that their self-worth is not only depending on their skills but also on their body as it seen by the others, also known as body

image. Alas, the relation between having and being becomes: I am what I have.

Although Western discourse emphasizes a dualistic approach, the concept of body as one is not foreign and there will most certainly not be signs of universal agreement in the near future. I have tried to lay out that western literature is dominated by the early thought that the body is merely a container that we’ve been given and that this idea is also influencing contemporary discourse as more and more people put emphasis on shaping, changing and enhancing their

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outer appearance. Taiwanese society is in the midst of an individualization process, so the concept of shaping one’s body is becoming more represented in young Taiwanese attitudes.

Traditional Taiwanese perception of body has been for long shaped by Confucian values, however, which still play a role today but slowly seem to be replaced with new concepts.