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Candidate Nomination in Taiwan—A Historical Overview

一、國際合作研究過程

II. Candidate Nomination in Taiwan—A Historical Overview

Mainstream literatures have long focused on distribution of power when analyzing a party’s candidate nomination process. It is often seen that, for example, scholars use a dichotomous “centralized vs. de-centralized” scheme to compare candidate nomination among different political parties (Ranney 1981; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Wu 2008). By examining the procedures of candidate nomination against certain criteria of power centralization, these studies have concluded various types of political parties with respect to internal democracy. Also, by extension, there are factors contributing to different shapes of candidate nomination. A party’s candidate nomination processes might differ from its counterparts due to its distinct history or other political factors (e.g., leadership). Meanwhile, the distribution of power within a political party may also change over different periods. Consequently, the processes and outcomes of candidate nomination have evolved multifold in different political parties in different countries.

In Taiwan, political parties have experienced different formats of candidate nomination over the past decades. Some of them are common to other countries’

experiences but some are unique. For one thing, candidate nomination in Taiwan has closely related to the distribution of power within a political party which resembles to other counter-part countries. Equally important, political parties in Taiwan have also adopted different procedures of candidate nomination over different periods. Yet, as a new democracy, the development of candidate nomination in Taiwan can be best understood under the perspective of political democratization. The implementation of candidate nomination can be regarded as a product of party competition along the process of democratization.

In the discussion of the origins of political party, Duverger (1954) had pointed out the distinction between intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political parties. There are many differences between the two types of political party. Among these differences, Duverger indicated that, in a relatively term, the intra-parliamentary political party had a tendency of power de-centralization while the

extra-parliamentary political party had a tendency of power centralization. The relationship between the origins and power distribution of political party is also applicable to the case of the KMT and the DPP in the process of candidate nomination.

The KMT’s origin carries a strong component of extra-parliamentary political party. It was a revolutionary political party aiming at overthrowing the Qing dynasty by force before 1911. The distribution of power in the revolutionary group was more centralized than de-centralized then. It was not until the 1911 that the KMT began to transform itself from an armed force group into a political party to run a new Republic.

Comparatively, the KMT has the longest experience of nominating candidate in elections. These experiences can be traced back to the founding periods of the Republic in mainland. The KMT had appointed various delegates to enact the

Republic’s constitution and form the parliament. Unfortunately, the new Republic did not sustain without difficulties since her establishment. The war between China and Japan and later the civil war between the KMT and the CCP had obstructed the new Republic from becoming a real democracy. The continuous warfare had also

facilitated a centralized tendency of power within the KMT. It is difficult to have a complete picture of how the KMT selected its candidates due to the lack of historical materials. Yet, it is reasonable to argue that the selection process would tend to be less institutionalized and more contingent on political expediency.

Unlike the period in mainland China when elections were not able to put into practice, the KMT in Taiwan began to implement local elections since the early 1950s and provided opportunities for candidate nomination within the KMT. Plenty of studies pointed out that the main purpose of the KMT’s implementation of local elections was to strengthen its grass-rooted support on the island. These local elections also served as a sharp contrast between the KMT’s regime and the CCP’s Communist China. The KMT regime was thus able to create a democratic image to garner international support. Yet, owing to enduring confrontations with the CCP, the KMT had maintained an authoritarian political system and a centralized party

structure. Its process of candidate selection has less to do with democracy. Instead, candidate nomination in the KMT was no more than an expression of power of party leaders. Candidate was chosen by the KMT because of his/her loyalty to the party (or party leaders). The results of local elections were certainly unable to jeopardize the KMT’s political dominance in Taiwan. To some degree, candidate nomination was an extension of political control over the society.

Other than the local elections, the KMT initiated a limited opening of legislative elections in the late 1960s (only a few seats were opened for election, but not total re-election of the legislators). Yet, the nomination of legislative candidates revealed similar pattern like the local elections. Candidates for legislative elections were

mainly decided by party leaders. The selection process of legislative candidate normally follow a basic format: both the local party branch and the central headquarter seemed to co-share the authority for nomination. For example, as indicated in Table 1, the three levels of party organization, local party branch, provincial party headquarter, and central party headquarter had participated in the decision of choosing legislative candidates. However, these regulations did not carry on significant implications. More often than not, legislative candidates were decided by higher level of party organizations, i.e., the provincial or central party headquarter rather than local party branches. In particular, the central party headquarter would provide a candidate list to local party branches before elections taken place. It was not unusual to find different task forces in the central party headquarter to take charge of candidate nomination. The members of task force were assigned either by the party leader or by the party’s most power organization, the Central Standing Committee. In spite of opinions and reviews provided by the local party branch, the central

headquarter had the final say in the candidate list. This pattern did not change until the late 1980s when party primary was adopted by the KMT.

Table 1: District Candidate Nomination of the KMT and the DPP

Year KMT DPP

1969 Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members, then reviewed by the provincial party headquarter, and finally decided by the central party headquarter

NA

1972 Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members, then decided by the central party headquarter

NA

1975 Same as 1972 NA

1980 Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members and reviews of local party officials, then reviewed by the provincial party headquarter, and finally decided by the central party headquarter

NA

1983 Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members and reviews of local party officials, then

NA

the provincial party headquarter doubled the number of nominee, and finally decided by the central party headquarter

1986 Same as 1983 NA

1989 Candidates produced by party member primary (under one half block vote formula), then decided by the central party headquarter

Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote

1992 Candidates produced by party member primary (under a plurality system) (50%), and reviews of local party officials (50%), then decided by the central party headquarter

Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote

1995 District candidates produced by opinion consultation of local party members, or by opinion polls, or by reviews of local party officials, then decided by the central party headquarter

Party list candidates were decided by the central party headquarter

Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote

(50%) and party official reviews (50%)

1998 Same as 1995 Candidates produced by

compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote

(50%) and party official reviews (50%)

2001 Candidates produced by party member primary (50%), and opinion polls (50%), then decided by the central party headquarter

Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote

(30%) and opinion polls (70%) 2004 Candidates produced by party member

primary (30%), and opinion polls (70%), then decided by the central party headquarter

Same as 2001

2008 Same as 2004 Same as 2001

2012 Candidates produced by opinion polls, then decided by the central party headquarter

Same as 2001

Note: The nomination of party list candidates is not included.

Source: Data before 2012 were adopted and revised from Wang (2008, 143-170).

The method of candidate selection in 1989 was notable in terms of party

members were introduced formally to participate in the process of candidate selection.

Local party members cast their votes in the primary under the block vote system (each member had one half of votes in the candidate list) then the final results would be decided by the central party headquarter. Unlike the previous processes of candidate selection that local party branch and members played only facial roles, the 1989 party member primary did provided a clear mechanism by which party member’s opinions can be aggregated. Even though the central party headquarter continued to maintain the power for final decision, it was witnessed that, in general, the decisions of the party headquarter did echo to the results of party member primary. There was a shift of power between the local and center party organizations and the later did not monopoly the power of candidate nomination. Local party members or part officials were asked to participate more actively ever since. The balance of power between the local and central party organizations shifted again in 2001 when citizens were

introduced into the party primary. In that year, both the local party members and citizens have an equal say in the decision of candidate selection. The final results of party member primary and citizen primary were combined and sent to the central party headquarter. It was the first time in the KMT that citizens played a significant role in the process of candidate nomination. The importance of citizen’s participation continued to increase in 2004. In 2004, the result of citizen’s opinion poll accounted for 70% as compared with 30% of the party member primary. This format continued to effect in 2008 and 2012.

Unlike the KMT’s long experiences, the DPP did not engage in candidate nomination until its formal establishment in 1986. Moreover, the composition of the DPP’s leadership did not come from a unified group but from various anti-KMT individuals or groups that occupied offices at the local representative bodies. This unique pre-party history makes the DPP a de-centralized pattern of power distribution.

This de-centralized pattern also extended to the process of candidate selection. As indicated in Table 1, negotiations and compromises became the major ways to produce legislative candidates. If the party leaders were unable to reach a consensus, then party member would ask to cast a vote to decide the final candidate. In practice, leadership of the DPP would try to reach a consensus through compromises. It was rare to see party member votes in the 1980s.

The DPP’s method of candidate nomination took a different shape in the 1990s.

Previous process of consensus making remained, but if the process failed, the party official reviews were added to the party member votes as two equally methods to decide the candidate list. The introduction of party official reviews signaled an increasing political importance of local party branches. However, the importance of local party officials diminished in the early 2000s when the DPP emphasized the need for citizen’s participation in the process of candidate nomination. In 2001, party member vote counted only 30% while the citizen’s opinion poll 70%. Compared to the KMT counterpart, the DPP upheld even higher weight on citizen’s opinion. From then on, citizen’s opinion poll results become the main method of candidate selection.

It is obvious that the development of candidate nomination evolves along with the process of political opening in Taiwan. Top party leaders played decisive roles in the process of candidate nomination in early periods. Then, as the KMT regime began to initiate political liberalization in the 1970s, local party branches and members were allowed to participate and express their opinions of candidate selection. The

expansion of participation by party members was resulted from a need to increase the KMT’s social support at that time on the one hand and respond to the increasingly challenges by the opposition DPP. It is even clear that the candidate nomination methods adopted by the DPP have been more decentralized than the KMT. In recent elections, despite the parties’ headquarters remain important in the process of

candidate nomination, their decisions tend to be more ceremonial than before. Instead, the results from the district levels are more likely to take command. Moreover, both parties have begun to encourage citizens to join the decision of candidate nomination in their own districts. As more citizens participate in the nomination process, the results will carry more legitimacy that party headquarters find them difficult to ignore.

The power of candidate nomination has thus more often resided at the local levels than at the central levels.

In a recent survey conducted by Election Study Center at National Chengchi University (Taiwan), voters were asked whether a close primary (vote by party

members) or a polling primary can be regarded as a better way for a party to nominate candidates. Figure 1 suggests that about 65% of the respondents favor a polling primary while only 22% of them are in favor of a closed primary. It seems that Taiwanese voters do believe that polling primary is a way to engage more voter participation in the nomination process.

Figure 1: Is Close Primary or Polling Primary a Better Nomination System?

closed primary polling primary

0.00.10.20.30.40.50.6

Finally, it is also noticeable that there are snowballing effects between the two major political parties. In particular, the expansion of citizen’s participation in the selection process firstly initiated by the DPP was later imitated by the KMT. In other words, the implications of party competition also contribute to the change of

nomination methods. Both the KMT and the DPP would not only consider candidate selection as an exercise of power but also a reality of internal democracy within the parties. Using citizen’s opinion polls as a means of candidate selection can be easily applied to those difficult-to-settle nomination competition among competing

candidates. This has been especially important when the original SNTV system was replaced by the Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) system since 2008. In most of the cases, the existence of multiple seats in one district under the SNTV system demands the political party to nominate an optimal number of candidates in one district. In other cases, the political party could flexibly over-nominate or

under-nominate the number of candidates if the party was unable to convince all its competing candidates. Such flexibility does not continue to exist under the MMM system in which single member district is implemented in election. Among the total 113 seats, 73 seats are elected from single member districts, 34 seats are elected via proportional party lists, and 6 seats are reserved for two aboriginal districts. Due to the high proportion of single member districts (64.6%), it is important to nominate candidate who can compete one-on-one in each of the 73 districts. As the Duverger’s

Law asserts that the plurality rule election system tends to favor a two-part

competition, we do observed that once Taiwan switched from the SNTV to the current system, the number of effective number reduced dramatically from 3.26 to 1.75. With few exceptions, the two major parties normally compete against each other in most of the 73 single member districts. It is rare, if not impossible, for an independent or non-partisan candidate to win a plurality in a typical single member district. In the following sections, we will discuss the current candidate selection mechanism for both parties in details.

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