The earthquake that occurred on 25 January 1999 in Eje Cafetero in Colombia had a significant impact on the departments of Risaralda, Caldas, Antioquia and Valle. The Coffee Growers Organisation, which was already well established in the region, started collecting data on the needs and priorities of the coffee growers just days after the disaster, working through the existing structure of local and regional committees. They were conscious of the risks of becoming the passive recipients of aid from government and NGOs, and took a proactive role to develop their own plans, which were later administered through the federation of regional committees. The management of the funds provided by central government was carried out by growers themselves, developing their own scheme which was designed to respond to the needs of the members of the organisation, and included loans, subsidies, technical aid and information. This was implemented through contracts between the local organisations and the beneficiaries, which also involved a housing subsidy and an additional loan.
The reconstruction was overseen by engineers contracted through the organisation, to ensure the structures were earthquake-resistant and complied with environmental and regional planning standards. The approach offered many benefits: freedom to explore a range of different solutions; encouraged beneficiaries to utilise matching funds from other sources; take a direct part in the work such as learning construction skills; and supporting a process of self-determination that allowed beneficiaries to take responsibility for their own housing projects. The technical supervision and advice provided by the engineers created a relationship that allowed the beneficiaries, many of whom had only limited formal education, to develop appropriate, low-cost solutions to the restoration process (Davidson et al., 2007).
BOX 5
Social engagement is a big challenge when dealing with a post-disaster situation, given that the affected communities will have suffered disruption and will initially be concerned about resolving their immediate needs of shelter, water supply, food and other basic needs. However, to ensure that these are adequately addressed and benefits are equitably distributed, effective engagement is essential to mobilise the affected population. An inclusive discussion is required as well as a common agreement on the priorities and, above all, eligibility criteria that determines who will be entitled to benefits from the emergency and restoration programmes.
In the longer-term, effective engagement is a
prerequisite for being able to move from an emergency response to providing opportunities that will allow the people affected by the disaster to re-establish
their communities and livelihoods without creating ties of dependency on the government and other agencies responsible for disaster relief. In this process, it is essential to ensure that all sectors of society are involved, since the priorities and perceptions of women and men, young people and the elderly, may differ significantly – all of which may be missed by the more formal structures of political representation such as the local government.
The systematic review of academic literature also analysed the significance of stakeholders in post-natural disaster reconstruction projects (Shafique & Warren, 2016), where they are considered as any group that can affect, or be affected by, the achievement of the objectives of the organisation. The review finds that managers of emergency responses are now giving more significance to sustainable reconstruction, where
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post-disaster reconstruction is being considered as an opportunity for the stakeholders to build back better.
The conclusions emphasise the importance of clearly identifying and defining stakeholder groups and their interests. Furthermore, the success of post-disaster reconstruction projects is determined by stakeholder engagement. However, while researchers have emphasised the need to engage with stakeholders in reconstruction programmes, these approaches have not always been implemented on the ground.
In a comparative study of community participation in post-disaster housing projects, four case studies were examined (one each from Colombia (Box 5) and El Salvador, and two from Turkey), comparing the participation of the affected people (users/
beneficiaries) in the reconstruction (Davidson et al., 2007). The study applies the “ladder of citizen participation” (Arnstein, 1969), where levels of participation range: from passive acceptance (manipulation by outside interests, over which the beneficiaries have no control); through the provision of information (where they are merely informed about what will happen); to consultation about needs and wants; to collaboration, in which there is participation;
and to empowerment, where affected people
eventually take over the key roles involved in decision making.
Engagement Discussion Group, Acaiaca, Minas Gerais
Photo: Marcelo Matsumoto/WRI Brasil
3 Governance of the Rio Doce after the Fundão Dam failure – Who are the stakeholders?
From the perspective of a long-term source-to-sea (S2S) system, the governance of the Rio Doce involves a myriad of stakeholders from diverse institutions with different perspectives and roles.
In an ideal situation, state institutions, including the legislative, executive and judiciary, would work together to engage in governance at all levels and create a favourable political, legal and economic environment. In parallel, the private sector (investors, producers, retailers, etc.) would generate opportunities for people and manage and mitigate impacts on the natural environment, going beyond compliance and supporting the State in its efforts to implement policy.
Additionally, civil society, from diverse fields of action from the academia, religious groups, community organisations, media and non-profit organisations, among others,15 would mobilise the participation of people as stakeholders and rights-holders, as well as drive business towards more ethical approaches by changing values and consumption patterns (GIZ, 2019). If all three sectors could work together toward a common vision for the region, this would allow the emergence of more responsive systems of governance to promote desirable outcomes for society as a whole.
While the restoration of the Rio Doce cannot be
expected to resolve all the systemic limitations of typical Brazilian institutions, such as overlapping or competing systems of decision-making, problems of credibility and trust, excessive bureaucracy, political patronage, lack of technical expertise and limited social mobilisation, it could, through a proactive approach, encourage a more effective and efficient relationship between government agencies and civil society.
The stakeholder map presented in Figure 4 identifies some of the key stakeholders involved in the
15 Increasingly, these groups are forming coalitions to counteract State and private sector powers and allying with international advocacy and multilateral organisations to ensure their voices are heard.
restoration governance of the Rio Doce after the Fundão Dam disaster.
While each group of stakeholders has its own role and importance in the Rio Doce S2S governance system, CBH-Doce is the only institution that formally includes the three sectors (state, private sector and civil society) in its decision-making processes. In accordance with the PNRH, CBH-Doce has been structured in a way that allows it to be participatory and conceivably impartial in decisions related to the management of Rio Doce watershed’s water resources. CBH-Doce would be able to apply a landscape approach to the governance of the watershed. State institutions as a whole, such as the judiciary and the state governments of Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo, could also play important roles in empowering the overall participatory governance of the region.
After the Fundão Dam failure, different institutions were involved in the restoration of the Rio Doce watershed (Figure 4), and a transitional governance system was inaugurated with the creation of Renova Foundation and the Inter-Federative Committee (CIF).
Given the impact of the disaster, the investments that are required for the restoration, although temporary, are of such proportions that they offer a window for empowering the long-term organisation needed to achieve a more effective and responsive governance of the watershed and related coastal and marine areas.
On the other hand, the restoration governance and its investments, if not well integrated with the long-term institutions, could have a negative impact on the region’s overall governance long after the restoration has been completed.
A brief overview of CBH-Doce and its programmes is presented in the next sections as well as the ad hoc
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