In order to control the damage done by the ASL legislation, China has made some compensation to Taiwan. In early March 2005, Chinese President Hu Jintao said that both sides could gradually develop cross-Strait passenger chartered flights during festivals into a regular practice as well as negotiate the issue of cross-Strait cargo chartered flights through private civil aviation organizations. Ten days later, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proposed negotiations with Taiwan over passenger chartered flights, Taiwan’s agricultural exports to China, and China’s fishery workers to
Taiwan. By the end of April, the Chinese government has sent two invitation letters through an authorized private organization to the Taiwanese government seeking a quick resumption of talks on cross-Strait cargo and holiday chartered flights arrangements.
In addition, China utilized its untied front tactics to isolate the Taiwanese government. China invited Chairman Lien Chan of the Kuomintang (KMT, Taiwan’s biggest opposition party) and Chairman James Soong of the People First Party (PFP, Taiwan’s second largest opposition party) to visit China in late April and early May.
Through these visits, China further demonstrated its compensation to Taiwan and utilized these visits to reduce the tensions caused by the ASL. Particularly, these visits gave China a very good opportunity of propaganda to show its goodwill gestures toward Taiwanese people. Generally speaking, these visits have three major impacts on cross-Strait relations and China’s ultimate goal was to pressure President Chen to accept the one-China principle.
First, China’s exploitation of both visits of Lien and Soong to relieve its pressure from international community was very clear. In late April, in explaining China’s position to the American military, Chinese Geneal Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of the general staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, used the example of Lien’s and Soong’s visits to exemplify that the ASL had not created cross-Strait tensions.39 On May 5, Chinese President Hu Jintao took the initiative to explain these visits to U.S. President George W. Bush. Accordingly, President Hu asked the United Stated to support China’s policy toward Taiwan.40
Second, the so-called 1992 consensus did not create an opportunity for political dialogues between Taiwan and China. In September 1996 and April 2000, then ARATS Vice Chairman Tang Shubei denied twice that both sides reached the
39 “China: The ASL Did Not Cause Tensions,” Zhongguo Shibao [China Times], May 1, 2005, p. A4.
40 “Bush and Hu Made a Phone Call,” Zhongguo Shibao [China Times], May 6, 2005, p. A1.
consensus of “one China but different interpretation” in 1992. During both visits of Lien Chan and James Soong, China has never accepted this interpretation of the 1992 consensus and insisted the one-China principle as its core of the 1992 consensus.
Third, China has been more flexible with respect to the cross-Strait economic issues, promising many unilateral opening measures and proposing cooperative measures. Clearly, Beijing has already become adept at manipulating economic issues as leverage to pressure Taipei into abandoning its opposition to China.
VI. Conclusion
With respect to Taiwan’s China policy, the Chen Shui-bian administration of the second term would uphold the DPP principle: democracy, peace, and prosperity.
Taiwan’s future constitutional reforms would not involve the change of the status quo by means of changing its national name, national flag, and constitutional territory. In addition, the major mission of the Chen Shui-bian administration would be
“constructing a framework of interaction for peace and stability” in the Taiwan Strait with commencing negotiation over direct links and other economic issues as the first step.
In turn, China’s Taiwan policy is still focused primarily around “economic development,” and essentially founded upon two pillars: “utilizing the United States to suppress Taiwan” and “appealing to the Taiwanese public.” Although Beijing had strong suspicion on Taiwan’s future constitutional reforms, there is no urgency or rationale to resort to military action against Taiwan in the near future.
Despite current cross-Strait stalemates over the ASL, based on the experience of cross-Strait interactions over the past four years, it is highly possible that dialogue on chartered flights will resume after a certain period, as the negative impact of the ASL subsides. Taiwan has yet to respond to China’s invitation to negotiate on both
passenger and cargo chartered flights, which Taiwan has been advocating since late 2003. Nevertheless, Taiwan has neither rejected China’s invitation nor changed its
“proactive liberalization with effective management” policy. That is, Taiwan reserves its decision to resume dialogue on economic issues after the disruptive impact by the ASL.
As a matter of fact, since mid-2004, the MAC has proposed a long list of economic issues to negotiate with China: currency clearance, investment protection, financial supervision, avoidance of double taxation, product importation, protection of intellectual property rights, judicial assistance, commercial arbitration, fisheries dispute arbitration, personal security, chartered flights and direct transportation links, tourism, repatriation of illegal migrants, joint crime prevention, marine pollution, and fisheries labor negotiations.41
Overall, in spite of the uncertainties, perhaps the strongest likelihood is that cross-Strait relations will see a sustained peace and stability, while continuing to be deadlocked in terms of political reconciliation over sovereignty in the next couple years. In the near future, cross-Strait relations will focus on the negotiation of economic issues, which will be the only way to break the gridlock. As the negative impact of the ASL subsides, cross-Strait relations will gradually return to a state at the beginning of this year during negotiations for cross-Strait lunar new-year chartered flights.
41 Jaushieh Joseph Wu, “ The Opportunity for Cross-Strait Chartered Flights Talks: Reflections and Prospects on the Sixth Anniversary of the Koo-Wang Talks,” Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, October 14, 2005,
http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/macpolicy/wu931014.htm, accessed April 20, 2005.