6. Labor Trafficking Cases in Taiwan
6.4 Comparisons with Other Studies
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as trafficking victims when they were caught and questioned by the police.
Furthermore, they only had the idea that they were victims, but they did not understand the reasons. Those who appealed to relevant institutions just felt exhausted and had not been paid. They rarely understood the concept of human trafficking.
(4) Marriage visa interviews were not implemented practically.
In recent years, the cases of “fraudulent marriage for the purpose of engaging in work” have been increasing. Though foreign diplomatic missions carry out marriage visa interviews aimed at foreign spouses from Southeast Asian countries18, the execution is questionable. S3 said,
Those who came by means of fraudulent marriage said that they did not have to go to the foreign diplomatic mission in person. Even if they went personally, they did not know what happened because everything proceeded in Mandarin. Some came from Jakarta and said that they only took photos with fake husbands, and that everything was handled by brokers.
Talking about the fraudulent marriage, S5 expressed that,
Those from Indonesia said that they came with fake husbands and the whole process seemed smooth.
On the other hand, S6 had a different opinion about the marriage visa interview abroad, pointing out that,
Traffickers knew clearly how to pass the interview; as a result, strengthening the enforcement of the marriage visa interview would indeed stop real marriage applicants from entering Taiwan. Instead, this provided those a channel to come to Taiwan.
6.4 Comparisons with Other Studies
The research results of this thesis were generally consistent with those of previous studies. Theoretically, it is considered that push-pull theory, demand-supply theory,
18 From 2006 to 2008, by an average of 25% of marriage visa applicants were turned down. Take the year of 2008 for example, the turning down rate of marriage visa application was 35% in Vietnam,
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and rational choice theory could explain the causes of labor trafficking in Taiwan.
Push-pull theory refers to foreign laborers being trapped in poverty and thus forced to seek employment opportunities in other nations. Though the wage they obtained was unequal to that of domestic laborers, to escape from the desperate life, they had no choice but to work abroad. In this research, it was found that foreign laborers’ wages were protected by the Labor Standards Law. Even if a large brokerage fee was required before entering Taiwan, compared to the stagnation in the homeland, the job opportunities in Taiwan were quite attractive. Furthermore, they were already identified as trafficking victims because the labor force offered was out of proportion to the income obtained; nonetheless, they still hoped to return again for work.
Concerning rational choice, in the process of working abroad, foreign laborers were considered to conduct a cost-effect analysis before making a decision. Based on the research results, it was discovered that both runaway and irregular foreign laborers chose Taiwan because of the higher wages and better protection of human rights.
Irregular foreign laborers did not apply for work visas in order to escape paying high brokerage fees, to obtain higher pay, and to take advantage of the simpler visa application procedures.
In the demand-supply theory, “supply” means that the search for better lives by people in foreign labor exportation nations resulted in an abundant supply of foreign labor. On the other hand was the dying “demand” for a cheap labor force. This research found that in addition to contract foreign laborers, runaway foreign laborers and irregular foreign laborers comprised a cheap labor force. The reason was that some employers could not meet the requirements for the employment of foreign laborers and then resorted to hiring illegal foreign laborers. The basic reason for the occurrence of labor trafficking in Taiwan was that since there was no public medium between supply and demand, most of the employment relationships were facilitated through broker agencies, both those in labor exporting and those in importing nations.
In Taiwan, the CLA has set up a contract for private employment service institutions engaging in overseas manpower agency operation to govern employment service items appointed by foreign workers (see Appendix 3) as a measure to establish transparent and standard brokerage fees. In addition, foreign laborers are required to sign affidavits for wage/salary and expenses incurred before entering the ROC for employment (see Appendix 4), which record clearly the loan made and brokerage fees paid overseas to prevent foreign laborers from having to make extra payments.
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However, in order to get the job opportunity abroad, and because of a lack of information, foreign laborers could only follow the brokers’ directions, and the additional charges were not prevented. Furthermore, foreign laborers were not allowed to change employers at will19; to make money and avoid being deported, foreign laborers were obliged to endure unreasonable labor conditions or run away. Under the unequal relationship between employers and laborers, labor trafficking cases arose. As a result, in the process of the recruitment of foreign laborers, if the involvement of brokers could be reduced, foreign laborers may be able to escape exploitation by brokers. Meanwhile, if foreign laborers are permitted to change employers in Taiwan, their position in the employment relationship could be promoted. Illegal foreign laborers were even more vulnerable, and the possibility of being exploited was higher.
19 Because the change of employer should obtain the agreement from the employer, if it were foreign laborers in the manufacturing or constructing industry, once the foreign laborers were transferred, employers’ employment quota of foreign laborers will be abolished, so in fact it is difficult to change
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