C. The Failure of Constitutional Promises of 1982
6. CONCLUSION
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6. CONCLUSION
The Constitution of the PRC (1982) allocates the military command power to the CMC exclusively. The State Council as the executive has no place in the chain of command. This system is exactly independence of military command model, which performs worst in the three types of allocation of military command powers. In the Chinese context, current system impairs governmental effectiveness as well as accountability of military affairs. On the one hand, current design hinders the civil-military cooperation and the
functions of the Ministry of National Defence. On the other hand, it enables military actions to avoid the legislative oversight, and weakens the civilian control of military. What’s more, by virtue of the social changes, political reality, and development of constitutional theory, the constitutional promises of the design of CMC fail. A suggestion is to transform the current system to executive control model.
The first step is to assign the military command power to the State Council. The chain of command runs from the Premier through the Minister of National Defence to the Chief of Joint Staff. The direct subordination of the Department of Joint Staff to the Ministry of Defence shall be entrenched in law or the Constitution.
The second step is to set up strong parliamentary oversight on military affairs conducted by the executive. A Defence Committee should be set up in the NPC and its Standing Committee for inquiring military affairs. But those inquiries may not be publicly heard. In addition, it’s better for the legislature to scrutinize deployment of military overseas in advance.
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