The vigorous opposition of the leading Liberals to the Uganda Railway Survey Vote in March 1892 did not make their responsibility more agreeable after their victory in the general election. Nor were the complaints that they were called upon to decide in a situation that they had not created effectual for relieving the Liberal Government of their responsibility. Amidst the fear before the election that if Gladstone became premier the foreign policy pursued by the Conservative Government during the last six years would be reversed, Rosebery, the prospective Liberal Foreign Secretary, declared publicly his intention to continue Salisbury’s policy.125 And he began his term of office by informing the ambassadors of the Triple Alliance, hence the whole Europe, that he meant to carry on the policy of Salisbury.126 So he did unfailingly in 1892-1895. ‘I do not think,’ Rosebery said in the House of Lords in 1895, ‘that as regards our imperial responsibilities abroad there is any great margin of difference of opinion between [Lord Salisbury] and myself.’127 And the consistency in Rosebery’ foreign policy was surprisingly firm: the aims he set or the tone he held was alike in his speeches to his countryfolk and in his communications with foreign powers. As a result, during his last ministry Gladstone’s foreign policy was assuredly that of his Foreign Secretary, devoid of liberal conscience.128 The Gladstonian tradition of making foreign policy a major division between the parties was finally broken down, with the continuity of British imperial policy greatly reinforced.129 The Rosebery administration made it sound anachronistic to recall what
be reconciled with that of a Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords.’ Ibid., same to same, 1 April 1895, 336. To this demand Kimberley agreed, and Harcourt put in a memorandum the terms of the understanding. Kimberley to Harcourt, 13 April 1895, in John Powell, op. cit., 237. But Harcourt’s complaints about his being kept ill-informed on foreign affairs continued to develop afterwards.
124 Rosebery to Victoria, 29 March 1895, quoted in Lord Crewe, op. cit., 503-4.
125 Rosebery’s speech at St. George’s-in-the-East, 23 June 1892, in Lord Rosebery, The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery: Two Chapters in Recent Politics, 1886 and 1892-5 (London: Arthur L. Humphreys, 1901), 74. Rosebery continued to support Salisbury after he resigned as Prime Minister and became the leader of the Opposition. See BL, Add. MSS. 41226, f.226, Rosebery to Campbell-Bannerman, 7 Dec.
1895.
126 This policy involved an attitude so benevolent towards the Triple Alliance that the French press sometimes wrote about the ‘Quadruple Alliance.’ Edward Grey to E. Goschen, ? 1910, quoted in G. M.
Trevelyan, op. cit., 63-64. The Pall Mall Gazette, the London’s leading evening paper, wrote in October:
‘Continental statesmen have already realized that to all practical intents ad purposes the foreign policy of England remains unchanged by the fact that a Conservative Foreign Minister has been succeeded by a Liberal.’ The Pall Mall Gazette, 17 Oct. 1892, ‘Permanency of Policy.’ Also cf. Deym to Kalnoky, 28 June 1893, in Harold Temperley and L. M. Penson eds., Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) (London: Frank Cass, 1966), 475; and PRO, FO343/3, Rosebery to Sir E. Malet, 3 Jan. 1894. Salisbury also found himself largely and substantially in agreement with Rosebery’s conducts. See Andrew Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), 592.
127 Hansard, 4th S., vol. 30, ‘Uganda’, 14 Feb. 1895, Rosebery, p. 702.
128 The Quarterly Review, vol. 189, no. 377, ‘Democracy and Foreign Affairs’ (Jan. 1899), 244.
129 Rosebery said in a public speech in 1895: ‘If there is one thing in my life I should like to live after me, it is that, when I first went to the Foreign Office as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, I argued for and
Harcourt had written about Uganda in 1892: ‘The policy of the occupation of Uganda is not the policy of the Liberal party, nor…will it have their support. If the thing is to be done, it ought to be done not by us, but by our opponents.’130
Rosebery was essential to the maintenance of the Liberal Government, for, as it was well known and well expected at the time, Rosebery’s imperial thinking acted as a counterbalance to and redress for Gladstone’s radical liberalism. Rosebery obviously had exploited the delicate balance of domestic politics to win a free hand in foreign affairs.131 The Radical spokesman Labouchere put it plainly: ‘We do wrong abroad in order that we may remain in office and do good at home.’132 To the Gladstonians, the annexation of Uganda was after all the price that they had to pay for the domestic reforms contemplated in England and Ireland. And Rosebery knew it well. Much of the tension between the right wing and the Radicals in the Liberal Party was marked when Harcourt said to Rosebery in 1892: ‘Without you, the new government would be ridiculous: with you it is only impossible.’133 Not surprisingly, Roseberianism had become the original sin to the Liberal Party in the high age of imperialism.
The fact that there were not in Uganda large tracts of uncultivated or unclaimed land always prevented settlers from taking much interest in the country.134 Political rather than economic considerations accounted for the conflict of opinion on Uganda.
Besides, by the mid-1890s the geographical mysteries had been almost solved, and the scramble for possession was approaching completion. Under such circumstances, no Powers could afford to stand idle over the spoils or adopt a let-it-be policy in their spheres of influence. Organization and promotion – from sphere of influence to protectorate, and then to colony – were the rule of the day. The hastiness in the process of colonization during this period was reflected in the fact that the British Blue Books (Parliamentary Papers) of 1892-95 contained a large number of African Agreements, all ‘laid on the table’ (i.e. presented to Parliament) without correspondence.135 The craving for African territory had cooled when the Uganda question arose. The first excitement of emulation might be over, but Britain was keen to maintain a strong position in East Africa none the less, as she saw the other nations pushing forward quickly. Therefore, the Uganda business was recognized in Parliament to be outside the sphere of party politics and not to be dealt with on party lines. Paradoxically, Gladstone always spoke strongly against the proposed retention of Uganda, but he never voted against it. And, as has been mentioned above, the Liberal Party had never been pledged to unconditional retreat.
The ‘New Imperialism’ in the late nineteenth century was to a great extent the byproduct of European power politics, which was based upon a sophisticated nation-state system. More often than not, prestige mattered more than ‘material’
maintained the principle of continuity in foreign administration.’ Rosebery’s speech at the Albert Hall, 5 June 1895, in Lord Rosebery, op. cit., 74.
130 PRO, Cab37/31/24, Harcourt’s memorandum, 22 Sept. 1892.
131 For details see R. E. Robinsdon and John Gallagher, op. cit., 320-22.
132 The Times, 7 Feb. 1893, Labouchere’s letter, 11c. Rosebery also understood such circumstances well. See BL, Add. MSS. 41226, f.226, Rosebery to Campbell-Bannerman, 7 Dec. 1895.
133 Quoted in J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith (London: Hutchinson, 1932), vol. 77. See also A. D. Elliot, The Life of George Joachim Goschen, First Viscount Goschen 1831-1907 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911), vol. II, 200.
134 For further see J. B. Purvis, Handbook to British East Africa and Uganda (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1900), 41.
135 Harold Temperley and L. M. Penson, A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books, 1814-1914 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1938), 402-3.
things in the decision-making of foreign policy, as popular politics was rapidly taking shape in the first Western democracies. Joseph Chamberlain had come to the point when he pointed out that Uganda was the point of no return: ‘Our honour is pledged… Whatever you may think about the matter, it is too late to go back,’ he said in the House of Commons.136 The national reputation – or, in the Radicals’ view, the spirit of international jealousy – dictated to the imperial government a policy of forestalling and excluding. As Edward Grey said, since Uganda was within British sphere of influence, the Government certainly had the responsibility to ‘keep other people (in this case the French and the Germans) out.’137 Pushed into the race for dividing the African continent, Britain, in ‘a somewhat rough and ready spirit’, marched into Uganda without all the finished apparatus of constitution and administration.
Imperialism was often more related to the future than to the present. Regarded as
‘a country of great possibilities,’ Uganda was very important to Rosebery and his followers in view of British territorial expansion and commercial development.138 Explaining his position on the subject of Uganda, Rosebery said to his audience at the Royal Colonial Institute in 1893: ‘We are engaged in “pegging out claims” for the future. We have to consider, not what we want now, but what we shall want in the future.’139 Being imperialistic was being looking to the future. The Uganda question was as to the future. Indeed, it was only treated as a necessary part of a far-reaching policy that the retention of Uganda could excite enthusiasm.
And the annexation of Uganda was a cheap enterprise, too. In any case there was actually no need and no question of sending a British force to Uganda, as there was no risk of a conflict of claims in regard of Uganda with any other Power. The material difficulties as regards the occupation of the country were not great: it was estimated that a small force of about 1,200 men would be able to meet all the opposition that might arise, and that about 10,000l a year ought to meet all the requirements of the maintenance of the necessary force.140 Since the start of 1893, Britain carried on the administration of Uganda at a cost of some 40,000l a year, in an anomalous and undefined manner. This expense was considerably greater than the estimate of Portal
136 Hansard, 4th S., vol. 10, ‘Uganda’, 20 March 1893, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 596. Rosebery also held such a view. He said: ‘My belief is that having put our hands to the plough in that great enterprise [in Uganda], we shall not be able, even if we were willing, to look back.’ The Times, 21 Oct. 1892, 5e.
137 Hansard, 4th S., vol. 8, ‘Address in Answer to Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech’, 6 Feb. 1893, Edward Grey, p. 588. If Britain evacuated Uganda, France might step into the vacant place (although France had promised otherwise, see PRO, FO403/173/44, Rosebery to Dufferin, 8 Oct. 1892), for an agreement as to a sphere of influence between two Powers was not binding on a third Power who was not a contracting party to it. Even Germany might treat the evacuation by the British as entitling her to disregard her engagements under the Anglo-German agreement of July 1890. But to the anti-imperial minds, it was meaningless to talk about the ‘retention of Uganda’, because Uganda was by common sense within the British spheres, where the interests of France, as represented by her missionaries, were respected as a rule. See The Edinburgh Review, vol. 179, no. 368, ‘African Exploration’ (April 1894), 296, and 300.
138 In Parliament, Grey defended the establishment of a protectorate in Uganda with all Portal’s arguments, embellished with high hopes of commercial gains, which Portal’s report had flatly denied.
R. E. Robinson and John Gallagher, op. cit., 329. In fact, Grey’s expectation was fairly realized later. In the early twentieth century, cotton and coffee were introduced into Uganda, and these two crops accounted for over 80% of her exports by independence, much to the interests of Britain, of course. See Mahmood Mamdani, Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda (London: Heinemann, 1983), 6-7.
139 The Times, 2 March 1893, 6a.
140 PRO, FO2/71/105, Kimberley’s Note, 4 July 1894; and FO84/2258/302, Memorandum on Uganda by Brigadier-General Kitchener, 18 Sept. 1892. And material for such a force could be found in the portion of Emin Pasha’s regiments which he had joined Captain Lugard earlier.
for a protectorate. It appeared to Rosebery that the British position was that of maintaining the government of Uganda with the same liability and responsibility as a protectorate, only at a greater cost.141 To legitimize Britain’s position there was, therefore, to save money.
Under the Berlin Act of 1885 and the subsequent interpretation of its clauses, Britain’s rights to Uganda could only be substantiated by ‘effective occupation.’
Likewise, the occupation of Uganda would be a firm and just claim to render valid British influence over the Nile basin beyond. That is to say, with the evacuation of Uganda Britain must cede all claim to any exclusive influence in the Upper Nile valley at least. Due to intensifying international competition, there was a limit of time beyond which theoretical rights could not run without effective occupation, even though in the Act of Berlin the condition as to effective occupation was carefully limited to the coasts of Africa. Furthermore, Uganda as a British sphere of influence was the product of a mere arrangement with Germany and Italy, which had no force as against other nations. Against them effective occupation was the only powerful barrier.
And to the annexationists, even as regards Germany and Italy, Britain could not count on eternal possession of a territory she did not develop or administer.142 Since the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 the claim of Britain to the East African sphere had been a matter of general notoriety; it was only by occupying Uganda that the integrity of the British sphere there could be secured.
The announcement in mid-1894 of the Uganda protectorate was received with satisfaction by the Houses,143 and met a general approval throughout the country. In 1892 Harcourt estimated that the policy of occupying Uganda would not command half a dozen votes in the Liberal Party. Yet, in 1894, according to Sir Charles W. Dilke, a leading Radical, only half a dozen or a dozen Liberals opposed this policy.144 Still, there was a general opinion that the action taken by the Government was not sufficient. Two statements provoked strong criticism. The first was the proposal to confine the protectorate to Uganda proper,145 the other the suspension of the
141 PRO, FO403/193/116, Rosebery’s memorandum, 12 Feb. 1894. For various estimates of the total annual expenditure for ruling Uganda, see FO83/1311, Committee Report on Administration of East Africa, 17 April 1894; FO403/194/237, A. Hardinge to Kimberley, 4 June 1894; FO2/75/53, H. P.
Anderson’s memorandum, 4 Oct. 1894; and FO403/208/15, The Treasury to FO, 9 Jan. 1895. The average number was about 49,000l. Harcourt certainly did not see the grounds for anticipating moderate expenditure in the gigantic enterprise of occupying Uganda and Upper Nile, which would entail the construction of a railway. See Cab37/31/24, Harcourt’s memorandum, 22 Sept. 1892.
142 In response to Lord Ripon’s suggestion for territorial exchange as a solution to the Uganda question, Rosebery said: ‘I am afraid your idea of exchanging Uganda for Damaraland does not smile on me… If [the Germans] wish to have Uganda, and we wish to evacuate it, they can get it without any exchange at all. The fact of its being within our sphere of influence would not be an impediment.’ BL, Add. MSS.
43516, f.57, Rosebery to Ripon, 17 Oct. 1892. Also cf. FO403/168/69, Rosebery to E. Monson, 16 Dec.
1892.
143 It was not until 1 June 1894 that the scheme of the Government was fully discussed in Parliament.
The whole question was then raised on the vote for 81,000l – the estimated cost for the first year of giving effect to the ministerial proposals. 50,000l was required to carry out the agreement so tardily arrived at with the IBEA, while the remaining 30,000l was for the coasts of administration in the territory it evacuated. After a long debate the vote was passed by a majority of 218 to 52.
144 PRO, Cab37/31/24, Harcourt’s memorandum, 22 Sept. 1892; and Hansard, 4th S., vol. 25, ‘Civil Services and Revenue Departments Estimates, 1894-95’, 1 June 1894, C. W. Dilke, p. 206.
145 Busoga, Bunyoro and Toro were all outside the limits of Uganda proper, yet, they were as much bound up with it as though they were actually parts of it. In regard of the ‘Uganda group,’ Kimberley was of the opinion that the arrangements should not go beyond such agreements with the chiefs as might be necessary for the maintenance of friendly relations between them and the Uganda protectorate, the suppression of slave trade, and facilities for trade. PRO, FO403/194/178*, Kimberley’s minute, 18
Mombasa railway project. However, since the territories in question remained a British sphere of influence, the British protectorate would in a very short time be obliged to immensely increase its boundaries, as Portal had foreshadowed in his report. This was done just a year later,146 when the commencement of the Uganda railway was declared on the other hand. Unlike some of the protectorates Britain had lately established, the Uganda protectorate was much more than a name: it involved very grave responsibilities, amounting to actual possession and direction.
Indeed, Uganda was a characteristic sign of the ‘sensible’ and successful adjustments made both by Britain as a nation and the Liberal Party as a political organ to the heightened imperial struggle in Africa since the Berlin Conference of 1885.
Debating on Uganda in 1894, Salisbury depicted in the House of Lords a new phase in imperial history:
In what would be philosophically called the diplomatic evolution of recent years, sundry new ideas of modified and limited possession have come into general use. We talk now not only of ‘protectorate,’ but also of
‘sphere of influence.’ It is a very odd metaphor... The whole doctrine of paper annexation is in a very fluid and uncertain condition. We do not admit that mere claim without any attempt to assert our position will confer permanent sovereignty.147
In the scramble for Africa, Britain had no alternative but to shake off her reliance on indirect control for imperial title, and to take a forward policy to meet the challenge from the other Powers. Rosebery continued Salisbury’s practice of running Uganda directly from the Foreign Office rather than through the Colonial Office, for British relations with Uganda were mainly of a diplomatic rather than administrative character. Thus, under the direct control of the Imperial Government, Uganda promptly settled down to its work serving British purpose.148
The quarrels among the Liberals over Uganda reflected literally their differences over Egypt; and the triumph of Rosebery over Uganda meant the prevalence of the call for annexing Egypt and the Nile valley. In the Uganda question, Gladstonianism was actually doomed from the start, because the British agents on the spot had already taken the first steps for formal colonization. The aggressive policy, for instance, carried out by the British officers in Central Africa was not approved by the home government, but no efficient check was possible, partly owing to the slowness of communications with Uganda, partly owing to the popularity of imperialist policies at home.149 A forward policy in Africa might not always be preferable, yet a policy of retreat was never endorsed. So, the hesitation and controversy over Uganda had little
May 1894; and FO2/70/21, Kimberley to Col. H. E. Colvile, 23 Nov. 1894. For further discussion see A. S. White, ‘The Partition of Africa’, The Nineteenth Century, vol. 36, no. 204 (July 1894), 26; and A.
R. Dunbar, ‘The British and Bunyoro-Kitara, 1891 to 1899’, The Uganda Journal, vol. 24, no. 2 (Sept.
1960), 231.
146 Official notification by the Foreign Office, 15 June 1895, in The Dublin Gazette, 21 June 1895.
147 Hansard, 4th S., vol. 25, ‘Uganda’, 1 June 1894, Lord Salisbury, p. 150.
148 After the proclamation of the protectorate in Uganda, a tranquil state of affairs followed, and the
148 After the proclamation of the protectorate in Uganda, a tranquil state of affairs followed, and the