Defining Religion

It is a common way to start an introduction of a topic by the definition of its subject. This definition will give a general picture about the subject and it will help the reader to understand what he has to deal with. But the definition has another important function too, not only for the reader but for the writer or researcher: to show his point of view about the topic, by revealing which kind of phenomena contribute to the research and which kind leads off topic. In the field of religious studies most of the authors first try to define the meaning of religion, and than based on this definition they would describe all the phenomena that corresponds to it. But in the case of religious studies this first step is still without much success: the given definitions are not satisfying and not generally accepted.

We could ask the questions: why is the definition that important? Is not the phenomena of religion so evident that we could skip the definition and just get in to the middle of research? I think most of the people thinks that, even without definition, the phenomena of religion can be clearly understood. Moreover they would think the definition only makes it confusing. And this is exactly why it becomes problematic: the 'religion' seems a concrete, evident concept, but if we try to define it, try to understand its essence, then we realize that there is no any concrete reason to explain why do we call something a religion. It is evident that in the daily life usually everybody is able to use the word 'religion' with high certainty, and seemingly without any confusion in the discourse. But we would like to emphasize that even if a word has a well-known place in the common social life, that does not makes the word more then an useful tool in communication. And it certainly will not make that word a bearer of a meaning which refers to concrete phenomena in the world, consequently it not necessarily can be the object of scientific research in the world only in the language.

The claim for a correct definition is important, if the religious studies wishes to be treated as a scientific method. The mathematics, as the basic example of the scientific ways, is excellent about definitions. We can imagine what would happen with the reputation or seriousness of the mathematics if the definitions of its objects would not be exact, but mere thereabouts. And the precise definition is a requirement in every field of science, not only in the mathematics.

In our opinion the need for a correct definition is quite sound, because by the absence of the

exact definition of the research's object a misunderstanding can be created. This is not only a misunderstanding appears for the reader, but it can represent the author's too. Even it would seem that there is some real communication, but how does the author and the reader understands the topic is not necessarily the same. Concerning the difference between a word's daily and scientific usage this problem can lead to the mixing up of different phenomena and unite them under one word. Or in the other case, similar concepts can be separated merely by the discriminating habit of daily thinking or language, and their similar qualities are overlooked.

The question is that whether the phenomena is 'religious' in itself because it has certain qualities or it became 'religious' because our thinking endows it with that attribute. In the first case there must be a distinctive quality or qualities that belong only and only to the so called 'religious' phenomena, and any exceptions has to be removed from this category irrespectively of the habitual categorization of the given phenomena. The same process should be applied for the phenomena that are not called 'religious' in the daily language but fits in the category described by the definition. If this selection does not happen that would be the violation of the logical coherence and the querying of the scientific credibility of the given methodology. Still we can see numerous times that academics ignoring this very important and basic logical and scientific rule.

Moreover the definition itself has to give a clear explanation of the phenomena without leaning on any presuppositions and what is more it can not contain any element that can be understand only in the light of the definition. In other words: in order to avoid circular argumentation the definition of religion can not rely on words that can only be understood or defined by the word 'religion'. For example, if the presence of the 'sacred' is the central point to define religion⁴⁴, and the meaning of the 'sacred' can only be understood through the concept of religion, then it is a circular definition.

Generally there are two main ways to define religion: to define by substance or by function. We can call these substantial and functional definitions. The first one tries to grab some essential characteristics of the religions, showing what religion is. The second focuses on what religion does, it tries to describe those processes that are working functions in all religions. To give examples: the concept of the absolute or the supernatural, as basic characteristic of the religions, are typical examples of the substantial definition. The functional definition would find the common part of the religions, for example in a social characteristic, like uniting people, or its effect on individuals as

44 Like the definition of Émile Durkheim.

comforting them.

Every definition of religion would use one or both of these ways. There are numerous definitions, but none of them is generally accepted. Probably every significant scholar has his own.

Not only there is no generally accepted definition, but sometimes the differences are so wide that they can exclude each other. Nevertheless there is one common element that all of them silently agree with: the division of the humanity to religious and no-religious individuals, and religious and non religious activities, ideas etc. The logical consequence of this division is that the definition of religion and the descriptions of religious people can not be the same with the descriptions of the non-religious. If there is an overlap or similarity between these two, then not only the definition is problematic, but the division of the object of definition itself can be questionable.

The problematic nature of the definitions is always present. If we take a functional definition, we should find a social function that is only peculiar of the religious phenomena, but in our opinion, there is no such a function. All the functions described in the definitions - after they are striped of their own ideological point of view - can be found in every society, on every level of it manifesting by different forms.

There is an other way to describe religion based on Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory of Family resemblance.⁴⁵ It is a philosophical idea that states that a category can contain elements not necessarily connected by one essential common feature. Among these elements one may connect with an other by similar characteristics, but not with every element. These actual connections between some elements will form an overall connection between the whole by a series of overlapping similarities. Using this kind of description of religion there is no need to find one common feature.

But this kind of description, even though it really talks about what we call 'religion', has two serious problems. First, it does not say anything about why we call something 'religion' and what religion is. But that would be the main goal of a definition, so in this sense it is not a definition.

Second, this description will not eliminate the problem that arises from the separation of the religious from secular. If we start to examine how different phenomena resemble each other by sharing some similar elements we will still exclude some others, even they are also having similarities, only because they are not called 'religious'. Among the group of religious phenomena

45 Wittgenstein (1953)

there are elements that does not resemble each other directly, only they are connected through resemblances with other elements. If we would really use the theory of family resemblances to observe the resemblances between different phenomena, probably we could make more connections and cover every human activities in the world. The problem lies in the situation that even before the description, we already have an idea about religion, so we include only those elements that will fit our presupposition. We will not connect elements that would still fit the criteria of family resemblance if they are not included in our presupposed idea of religion. In the light of the narrative theory the whole system of family resemblance can be examined from a different point of view. The narrative theory treats every descriptions as a creative process. Driven by the plot, there is a selection of elements, from the unlimited possibilities, and they appear as connected to each other according to the story, a synthesis of heterogeneous elements. This means that there are no 'resembling' phenomena in themselves, they are created through the description. According to this there can be numerous different narratives creating different family resemblances, but before the narrative there were no any resemblance in itself. The narrative theory will be explained in Chapter IV.

An other possibility would be to name all the phenomena that is considered as religious, and by making a list, defining religion. It would contain all the specific activities, ideas and customs described in a very specific way referring to their location too. It would be necessary to be specific otherwise we could associate to the similar non-religious phenomena too. But in this case it would be only an enumeration of different phenomena and there would be no any reasonable explanation why it is forming a category, besides the habit of convention. And this would not be a definition and not a basis for research, we could make any kinds of enumerations and start a new discipline of study. But this would not mean that there is an objective, separable phenomena, only that there is discriminative habit without necessary solid base out of itself.

There is an other problem the researcher has to face: there is no objective way to proclaim any kind of thinking or belief about the nature of the world as superior, or at least, it should not be the duty of the religious studies to do so. For example, the belief that God created the universe and the belief the the Big Bang created it should be treated on the same level. Worshiping a guru or a pop star in front of a private altar also should be the same. If with the definition we can not get any reliable answer we should consider to review and think over our concepts and ideas about the

phenomena of religion.

The faulty in the definition can be examined in a twofold way: on the one side the definitions never can cover the whole field of phenomena that the 'religion' is supposed to nominate. On the other side the definitions are also giving descriptions of numerous non-religious phenomena. If we can get rid of the habitual separation of these two and examine the definitions in this way, we will realize its illusory nature. The definitions are not discoveries of hidden essences and descriptions of a group of phenomena, but creative processes: arbitrary selection and descriptions of the researchers own categories, effected by his own environment.

For example, Émile Durkheim writes in his book, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life:

“A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, i.e., things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite in one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”⁴⁶

Durkheim always tries to avoid any references to the concept of the 'supernatural', because he thought it is a relatively new idea, appeared as an opposition to the idea of natural, through the descriptions of the sciences. With this we totally agree. He focused on the idea of the 'sacred' as the core of every religions. He defined sacred things as:

“...simply collective ideals that have fixed themselves on material objects... they are only collective forces hypostasized, that is to say, moral forces; they are made up of the ideas and sentiments awakened in us by the spectacle of society, and not of sensations coming from the physical world.”⁴⁷

The idea of sacred brings out its opposite the profane, these are parallels with the religious-secular distinctions. The problem with the idea of the sacred is that it does not really bears more information than 'something important'. The feeling that the 'religious' people concerning some ideas and rituals performing something sacred, which is different from the other very important activities in their lives is probably the product of the researcher's imagination. There are accentuated days, ideas and objects in everybody's life. Within a community these are shared interests. But these are parts of their daily lives. It seems that the word 'sacred' is just a substitute for the word 'supernatural', that the definition tried to avoid. Most of the societies have no words for these categories of the sacred or profane, it is the product of European religious thought. The experience

46 Allan (2005) p. 115.

47 Lukes (1985) p. 25.

with sacred things describes the world of the observer. Moreover, even in the secular life there are things can be called sacred, for example, the family, the country, the national flag, certain objects or places that are not allowed for others, or even someones personal sphere. Commonly shared important ideas, moral values and symbolic object can be found in every community, these are the factors that make a community.

To illuminate the situation why is it so difficult to get rid of a category that seems does not have a concrete meaning, lets examine another, but closely connected topic: the concept of ideology and later the narrative theory. Through this we can get a better understanding about the nature of human thinking and the results of the reasoning we will use in our topic by setting a parallel between these fields of studies.