Chen-kuo Lin (National Chengchi University, [email protected])
In understanding tradition not only are texts understood, but insights are gained and truths acknowledged. But what kind of insight and what kind of truth?
Hans-Georg Gadamer59 Let me start from meditating on the main theme of the conference, “Religion and Philosophy,” from the perspective of Asian traditions.60 Nowadays it has become commonsensical to claim that unlike the European traditions, Asian religion and philosophy have never been separated from each other since the beginning, the feature of which is often considered as the core of tradition. By contrast, the dualistic conflict between religion and philosophy is said to occur in the modern West only. However, if we look into what happens in Asia, we will see that there is no exception to the
disintegration of philosophy and religion as the result of the world-wide project of Enlightenment. A new episteme arose in the late eighteenth century in Japan and China when the lexicons of zongjiao (shūkyo 宗教) and zhexie (tetsugaku 哲學) were coined as the equivalents of “religion” and “philosophy” to account for both European and Asian traditions.61
59 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Introduction,” Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1975), p. xi.
Institutionally, philosophy as an academic discipline was established in East Asia a century before, while in Chinese-speaking regions the study of religion has appeared in the university system only in last two decades. The belatedness of the study of religion is an interesting phenomenon, which can be interpreted differently in light of local and global change. On the one hand, this phenomenon can be taken as a sign of the re-enchanting effect of post-modernity in the age of globalization, indicating Asia is no exception to the returning of the sacred in the overwhelming tide of secularization. On the other hand, it indicates that the separation of philosophy and religion as part of the project of Enlightenment has been
60 This presentation is based on my previous two articles, “Truth and Method in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra” (Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 37: 2, 261-275, 2010) and “Phenomenology of Awakening in Zhiyi's Tientai Philosophy” (presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Chicago, Nov 1-3, 2008). Since both articles deal with the same topic in truth and method, they are brought in the comparative framework to make explicit the gist of Buddhist philosophy in general.
61 Hsi-yuan Chen, Confucianism Encounters Religion: The formation of Religious Discourse and the Confucian Movement in Modern China (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1999).
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finally localized. Regardless the apparent conflict of interpretations, the mission for reclaiming the holistic unity of religion and philosophy, if there is any feasibility of such kind of project, becomes ironically and equally urgent for the East Asian traditions.
I must say that my proposal is not driven by the romantic anti-modernist sentiment. I have no any intention either to do the negation of philosophy and religion as the separated domains or to promote traditionalism, because, as claimed by Jürgen Habermas thirty years ago, the project of the Enlightenment in the differentiation and specialization of different cultural domains is directed to “the enrichment of everyday life.”62 However, we should not overlook the reified autonomy of philosophy and religion which leads to the disintegration of human existence. As the response to the above-mentioned situation, I therefore attempt to show the way in which one can rigorously and critically do philosophy within the methodical context of religious practice. For doing so, strategically I choose to focus on the relationship between truth and method in two Buddhist schools, namely the Yogācāra School in India and the Tientai School in China. The theme I focus here is reminiscent of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s magnum opus, Truth and Method. For Gadamer, what concerns him mostly is the experience of truth that “transcends the sphere of the control of scientific method wherever it is to be found.”63 Following Heidegger’s steps, Gadamer is skeptic of the concealing function of positivistic method in the human sciences. In opposite to Gadamer’s anti-methodic stance, however, Paul Ricoeur’s proposal of hermeneutic detour seems much appealing to me when he claims that truth can be disclosed only through the dialectics of multiple methods, including semantic analysis, philosophical reflection, archeology of the subject, critical theory, and so on. As for Ricoeur, we must “resist the temptation to separate truth, characteristic of
understanding, from the method put into operation by disciplines which have spring from exegesis.”64 That is, the disclosure of truth cannot be possible without the mediation of method, although concealment as the result is inevitable. As we will see later, the Ricoeurian methodological pluralism comes closer to the Buddhist position.
As for this paper, “method” is referred to the diverse ways of religio-philosophical exercise, including doing logic and epistemological analysis, whilst “truth” refers to realization of things themselves either in the form of proposition or in the experience of true being. In the Buddhist terms, “method” is called “dharma-gate” (fa-meng 法
62 Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity versus Postmodernity,” New German Critique, 22 (1981): 9.
63 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Introduction,” Truth and Method, p. xii.
64 See Paul Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics,” in The Conflict of Interpretations (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 11.
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門), the gates through which the dharma (truth) can be attained. According to the Buddhist tradition, the dharma-gates as the pedagogical instruments are as numerous as the diverse propensity of sentient beings. Those methods are conceived as upāya, i.e., the means for enlightenment and liberation. In this connection, doing philosophy is merely one of the numerous dharma-gates through which radical freedom can be achieved at the final stage.
Regarding the Buddhist conception of truth, there is more than one equivalent in Sanskrit. Among the others, satya is the first candidate for truth. Derived from the root √ as (be, exist), etymologically satya means “reality” at the first place. It is used as an ontological concept. However, the etymological origin of satya does not prevent its derivative usage as “truth expressed in words.” A good example is seen in the Chinese rendering of satya as di 諦, meaning “correctness” or “rightness” expressed in words. Satya meaning as both “reality” and “correctness” is also witnessed in the Buddhist theory of Two Truths, i.e., the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) and the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). The ultimate truth is referred to as the reality that can be immediately and ineffable experienced, whereas the conventional truth is referred to as the reality expressed in words. Although truth in words is always considered as conventional only, it is nevertheless required in the Buddhist tradition as the necessary step for the realization of the ultimate truth.
In addition to satya, there are also several Buddhist terms for the meaning of truth, such as tattva, tathatā, and bhūta. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, however, the central conception of truth is “tathatā” (in Chinese, zhenru 真如). Similar to the usage of
satya, the meaning of “tathatā” can be known in its two usages, namely truth as
correctness and truth as fact, which reflect two Buddhist theories of truth, i.e, logicism and factism. Logicism is more concerned with the judgment of truth and falsity in propositions, while factism is rather committed to the disclosure of facticity.65 As we will see below, truth in Indian Buddhism is conceived from both the perspectives of ontology and epistemology. In this paper, truth as the disclosure of facticity is named“ontological truth,” while truth as correctness is named “propositional truth.”
65 According to Hakamaya Noriaki’s etymological exegesis, as derived from the adverb stem tathā (thus), tathatā is firstly used to mean “thusness” or “sheer fact.” Although this etymological interpretation has been commonly adopted in exegesis, Hakamaya also points out another usage of tathatā as “correctness,” which is said to derive from the adjective stem tatha (true, correct). See Hakamaya Noriaki, Yuishiki no Kaishakugaku 《唯識の解釋學》 (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1994), “Preface,”
ii-iv, 86-88; also cf. Hakamaya Noriaki, “Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy,” Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, eds., Jamie Hubbard and Paul Swanson (Honolulu:
University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 56-80.
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According to Indian Buddhism, truth is realized within the course of meditation in the sequence that the knowledge of propositional truth must precede the knowledge of ontological truth. Put it in another way, the ontological truth can be disclosed only because one has acquired the propositional truth first. However, if we look at Chinese Buddhism, we will see that they have completely different conception of truth. For instance, the Tientai Buddhist holds the view that the full disclosure of truth cannot be separated from mundane knowledge. Truth is possible simply because ignorance exists. If there is no ignorance, there is no truth either. The paradoxical theory of truth
in ignorance, which was rarely seen in Indian Buddhism, becomes the hallmark of the
Chinese Buddhist thinking.Truth and Me thod in Yogācāra Buddhist Meditation
Taking the Indian Yogācāra Buddhist School as an example, I will try to demonstrate the way how the ontological truth can be realized in the final stage of meditation through the logical and epistemological analysis, which is conducted at the middle stage in the progressive course. Let us look at the Yogācāra Buddhist manual of meditation. First, there are two pre-requisites which should be fulfilled before
practicing calming and discerning, i.e., relying on scriptures and dwelling on the vow of attaining the Supreme Wisdom of Enlightenment. In the initial stages of meditation, reading scriptures plays a vitally important role. A Buddhist text is taken as a
hermeneutic device, which has two features. First, it is the hermeneutical vessel carrying the experiential message of enlightenment. Second, particularly in light of the Abhidharma heritage, a Buddhist text provides an inclusive taxonomy by which all states of affairs can be classified for contemplative analysis.
After reading scriptures, the course of meditation is further divided into four steps in accordance with four meditation objects: (1) "the image of object with
non-discrimination" (nirvikalpa-pratibimba),66 (2) "the image of object with discrimination" (savikalpa-pratibimba),67 (3) "the limits of states of affairs"
(vastu-paryantatā)68 and (4) “the accomplishment of the task” (kārya-pariniṣpatti).69 The first step is to fix one’s mind on an image without any conception and thinking.
66 Alex Wayman’s rendering of nirvikalpa-pratibimba (無分別影像) is “the image devoid of predication.” See Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript, 86. Vikalpa refers to a wide range of mental activities, including perception, conception, and judgment.
67 Alex Wayman’s rendering of savikalpa-pratibimba (有分別影像) is “the image attended with predication”. See Analysis, 86.
68 vastu-paryantatā 事邊際.
69 kārya-pariniṣpatti 所作成辦.
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This is called “calming" (śamatha), that is, the calming down of the mind-body.70 As far as one’s mind-body is calmed down, then he is qualified to move forward to discern/analyze the object of contemplation. The method of discerning is called
vipaśyanā.
Insofar as all states of affairs are categorized as the meditation objects, e.g., "five aggregates," "twelve sense bases," "eighteen realms," and "four noble truths," the practitioner is ready to attain "all-inclusiveness of knowledge" (yāvadbhāvikatā 盡所 有性). More important is the realization of "all-inclusiveness of truth"
(yathāvadbhāvikatā如所有性) insofar as the truth (tathatā) of each and every state of affair is realized.71 For enlightenment will not be completed and liberation will be impossible, if there is any truth of a particular state of affair is left unrealized.
Seeing the states of affairs as they are in the concentrated state of mind is achieved at the third stage of meditation, i.e., the stage of "the limits of states of affairs." In this stage, calming and discerning are operating synchronically. By the same technique of mediation, due to the unfailing efforts of calming-discerning meditation one is finally capable of attaining the fundamental transformation (āśraya-parāvṛtti 轉依) in the last stage of “the accomplishment of the task.” Only after one’s mind has been fundamentally transformed to non-discriminative insight, the Buddhist practitioner is able to attained the ontological truth, that is, experiencing the things in themselves without any conceptual trace left.
As our problematic is concerned, we want to ask: in which stage of meditation can we find the conventional activity of philosophy? The philosophical activity, such as analysis, reasoning, argument and justification, which is called yukti in the Indian Buddhist tradition, takes place at the stage before the final realization, i.e., the stage of
“the limits of the state of affairs.” In that stage, a practitioner is said to be able to comprehensively know the truth of all existents. It should be noted that these truths are stated propositionally. The well-known example is Four Noble Truths. The Yogācārins will add another truth-statement to the list: “All conditioned existents are consciousness-only.”
70 Alex Wayman’s rendering of śamatha as "calming the mind" seems to fail to take into account the fact that the body also needs to be calmed. It is stated in the text that both bodily alleviation
(kāya-praśrabhhi) and mental alleviation (citta-praśrabhdi) are required as the preconditions for philosophical contemplation. See SNS, T.16.698.a; Lamotte, 89.
71 The term yāvadbhāvikatā (盡所有性) is defined in the SNS as the limit of all states of affairs, pure and impure, such as those comprised in five aggregates, six internal sense bases, and six external sense bases. See SNS, T.16.699.c. The same account is also seen in the Śrāvakabhūmi, T.30.427.b-c.
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As the objects of contemplation, those propositional truths are investigated with the method of philosophical analysis (yukti). The Yogācārins practice four methods of reasoning, i.e., (1) reasoning to know the dependence of existence on others
(apekṣā-yukti 觀待道理), (2) reasoning to know the effectual function of existence (kārya-kāraṇa-yukti 作用道理), (3) reasoning for proof (upapatti-sādhana-yukti 證 成道理), and (4) reasoning to know the true nature of existence (
dharmatā-yukti 法
爾道理) are employed to examine the basic Buddhist truths.72 Among them, the reasoning for proof as the prototype of the Buddhist theory of knowledge is mostly important. The truth that is analyzed with the method of reasoning cannot be other than the propositional truth, while the ontological truth would be disclosed only consequently at the final stage of meditation, i.e., the “accomplishment of the task.”At the final stage of meditation, the “accomplishment of the task,” the propositional truths need to be deconstructed and substituted by the intuition of ontological truth.
The distinction between the final stage and the previous stages lies in the radical transformation of cognition. At the previous stages of meditation, the objects in the form of images are known by the analytical mind. The truth of these objects is
attained through logical and epistemological analysis. However, it is at the final stage of meditation that one comes to know the objects devoid of image/concept through pure perception, which is also called “non-conceptual insight.” That is, the ontological truth of the state of affairs is fully disclosed at the final stage. By contrast, the
propositional truths attained at the previous stages have their provisional function only.
As mentioned above, reading the scriptures in which the Buddhist truth is embodied is hermeneutically required at the beginning stage of meditation. However, a practitioner does not merely accept the Buddhist truths as dogmas. She is rather asked to examine and verify by herself the truths that have been taught. In the course of meditation, such sort of examination and verification of the propositional truths is carried out in the method of reasoning for proof. Five conditions are said to be fulfilled for the validity of proof: (1) direct perception (pratyakṣa), (2) inference that is based on perception, (3) analogy (upamāna), (4) soundness of argumentation, and (5) scriptural authority (āgma).73
72 Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.451.c. Also see Yoshimizu Chizuko, “Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra nitsuite shishu no yukti ni tsuite,” Journal of Noritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies, 19 (1996): 160. Whether the meaning of yukti is understood as “reasoning” or “reason” will be explained below.
Among the five conditions, perception, inference and scriptural authority are considered to be the valid means of knowledge (
pramāṇa) in Buddhist
73 SNS, T.16.709.b; Lamotte, 156, 263.
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epistemology.74
In sum, as the relation between truth and method is concerned, we found that, for the Yogācārins, truth would not be obtained without being situated in the course of meditation. Truth and method are mutually related. On the one side, the Yogācāra’s methodical practice is designed as a progressive course of meditation. On the other side, the levels of truth are also differentiated in accordance with different stages of meditation. Roughly, there are two levels of truth, i.e., propositional truth (truth expressed in propositions) and ontological truth (true being). The latter is obtained at the last stage of meditation, while the former is obtained at the stage preceding to the last stage. Between two stages, there is radical transformation of mind, i.e., from the conceptual mind to the non-conceptual mind. The conceptual mind takes
propositional truth as its object, while the non-conceptual mind takes ontological truth as its object. Between two levels of knowledge, the deconstructive practice called
“wedge-evicted-by-wedge” is required for achieving such a radical transformation.