Personnel and Infrastructure Working Together
FIGUre 2.6 KSC core business statement.
What Is the KSC Story? 27
FIGUre 2.7 KSC guiding principles.
“Strategic”
Planning
“Implementation”
Planning
Proactive:More Helping define future &
requirements Reactive:More
Defining how to meet requirements
NASA
Enterprises /Programs
KSC Directorates
FIGUre 2.8 KSC’s responsive and proactive approach.
Provide safe, cost-effective space access and contribute to extended human space exploration by satisfying current and future KSC customers Launch Vehicle Processing SystemsLaunch and Range Systems
Extended Human/Robotic
Mission Spaceport Supp
ort Systems
Landing and Recovery SystemsPayload and Payload Carrier Processing Systems Command, Control, and Monitoring TechnologiesProcess EngineeringSpaceport Structures and Materials
Fluid System TeBiological chnologiesSciences Launch and Range TechnologySpaceport Science Vehicle and Payload Processing Technology Core Competency Core CompetencyCore Competency
RLV ServicesELV ServicesISS/Payload Services
Objectives
KS C Ex ternal Lines of Bu siness and Pro duc t/S er vice Lines
Spaceport Technology and ScienceSpaceport Design and Systems Development
Spaceport Operations Range Technologies
Tech Readiness Level
Requirements (Tech Pull) (Tech Push) FIGUre 2.9KSC product and service map.
What Is the KSC Story? 29
FIGUre 2.10 KSC strategic roadmap (March 1998 version).
would have to take place for the implementation of the strategic intent defined by the preceding seven strategic products.
As shown in Figure 2.11, taken together these eight elements guided KSC’s evolu-tion. Further strategic direction products were developed from the foundation pro-vided by these eight core products. As will be discussed in the next chapter, these products led to specific actions. Over time, KSC refined this concept of its strate-gic direction to be an accepted center that focused on three elements: operations, development, and enabling functions. The push to increase the development function became a major focus for KSC.
Where WAS KSC IN 2002?
To understand and learn from the KSC transformation, one needs to understand where KSC was in 2002. I choose the end point for this case as 2002 because with the Columbia accident in 2003, a new era within NASA was beginning. As shown in Table 2.4, in 2002 KSC was operating in an external environment focused on the war on terrorism.
KSC’s credibility and presence within NASA was significant. KSC alumni held significant management positions within the NASA structure (e.g., Roy Bridges eventually became center director at Langley Research Center, Lesa Roe was deputy director and then became center director at Langley Research Center, Jim Jennings became deputy associate administrator for Institutions and Asset Management within NASA HQ, Dave King became the center director at Marshall Space Flight Center.) Furthermore, the role of operational knowledge in new vehicle development was sup-ported. KSC’s strategic direction was supported by NASA HQ in principle. There was significant program affiliation with vibrant roles in Shuttle, ISS, and the Launch Service Program (LSP). KSC continued to have limited funded roles in research and development activities. KSC’s state at the beginning of 2002 is summarized in Table 2.4.
WhAT ChANGeD IN KSC FroM 1995 To 2002?
Table 2.5 compares KSC in 1995 to KSC in 2002. KSC changed significantly during this time. From a short-term perspective, KSC could be viewed as being successful:
Shuttle,
• Expendable Launch Vehicle, and ISS missions successfully met Transition of Shuttle processing to SFOC
•
Transition of the
• Expendable Launch Vehicle program to KSC
All of these were accomplished while responding to national political (presiden-tial and congressional) and NASA initiatives, and at the same time downsizing the workforce. Some would say KSC had not been successful because it did not succeed in becoming a development center. KSC has not received a development program to directly support a large portion of civil service employees for technology develop-ment efforts. In the remainder of this book, we will explore and understand how KSC made these changes.
What Is the KSC Story? 31
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KSC’s true long-term success may be in moving to a culture to develop and imple-ment a disciplined strategic manageimple-ment and business process. KSC’s strategic man-agement initiative accomplishments include:
Moved to a strategic management approach
•
Developed and continued to refine a strategic context and intent to reflect
•
the ever-changing environment
Published numerous strategic implementation plans
•
Successfully gained ISO and
• VPP (OSHA Voluntary Protection Program
for Flag) certification
Developed and implemented a process to connect both expectations and
perfor-•
mance requirements from the NASA strategic plan to the individual level (e.g., KSC roadmap, Directorate objectives, and employee performance alignment) Developed a systematic process for identifying priorities for technology efforts
•
Revitalized the infrastructure in an environment where resources were scarce
•
Formed partnerships with universities to enhance research and
develop-•
ment capability
Focused KSC’s workforce on core competencies
•
Formed partnerships with the Air Force and the State of Florida
•
KSC’s success can also be measured by its agility or ability to continuously understand the environment and position itself to continue to bring value to NASA and the space industry. Consider the changes in direction that both NASA and KSC experienced:
Downsize to reduction in force to no reduction in force to hire more civil
•
service employees to transfer of civil service employees to contractor or private sector positions.
TABLe 2.4
Summary of KSC’s Situation at the Beginning of 2002
Category KSC in 2002
External environment • Terrorism and war KSC’s credibility
within NASA
Significant number of KSC alumni in leadership positions within NASA
•
Value of operational knowledge is appreciated and sought
•
KSC direction • Space launch operations
Launch Service Program (LSP) lead
•
Spaceport and range technologies designation
•
Spaceport and range technologies
•
KSC workforce • 1,773 civil servants
354 civil servants supporting Shuttle operations
•
6,557 contractors supporting Shuttle operations
•
What Is the KSC Story? 33
Commercialize Shuttle processing (transition to SFOC and surveillance) to
•
move for more government involvement in ground processing (in response to Air Force launch failures) to privatize/commercialize Shuttle to a return to greater government involvement in Shuttle processing.
Various scenarios for ISS emerged from ship-and-shoot (where very
lim-•
ited testing is performed at KSC) to multiple element integrated testing (where various elements are tested in an integrated fashion), all the while dealing with various definitions of what “station complete” meant — what would the final configuration of ISS be in space.
Looking back at the transformation from the perspective of NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration, KSC successfully maintained the critical operational knowledge needed for the new effort [e.g., (1) the ground processing of launch vehicles and spacecraft, and (2) developing and operating ground support equipment and facili-ties]. NASA is now in need of this knowledge as it helps prepare for the next gen-eration of spacecraft and launch vehicles beyond the Shuttle Transportation System TABLe 2.5
Comparison of KSC in 1995 to 2002
Category KSC in 1995 KSC in 2002
External environment • Reinvent/downsize government
NASA: Goldin, “faster, better,
•
Gets the operational job done
• • Significant number of KSC alumni in
leadership positions within NASA Value of operational knowledge is
•
appreciated and sought KSC direction • NASA does research, KSC is
an operational center Reduce civil service role in
•
operations
Space launch operations LSP lead
•
Spaceport and range technologies
•
Spaceport and range technologies
• KSC workforce • 2,196 civil servants from a
reduction of 2,498 in 1993 1,075 civil servants
•
supporting Shuttle operations 7,299 contractors supporting
•
Shuttle operations
1,773 civil servants (29% reduction
•
from 1993 to 2002)
354 civil servants supporting Shuttle
•
operations (63% reduction from 1993 to 2002)
6,557 contractors supporting Shuttle
•
operations (10% reduction from 1993 to 2002)
— the crew exploration vehicle and crew launch vehicle. During the mid-1990s, the ZBR pushed for downsizing the KSC civil service workforce to about 1,400 civil servants. If this had occurred, KSC might not now have the right level of competency (both numbers and knowledge) necessary to perform its goal of completing existing missions (e.g., Shuttle and ISS), executing ongoing missions (e.g., LSP) while build-ing the infrastructure for the future, and providbuild-ing operational knowledge to vehicle development. KSC is executing the core contribution it defined in the mid-1990s:
providing operational knowledge for new designs, current operations, and commer-cial success.
Finally, the success of KSC can be measured by how well the management team accomplished what it set out to do. As a result of the first series of strategic conversa-tions, the management team defined an overall strategic agenda to transition from its current state. As shown earlier in Table 1.1, we shall understand and connect the dots of the actions that KSC took from 1995 to 2002. We shall further use this map of activities to understand how KSC evolved through strategy. We will explore the details of this map in the rest of the book.
ChAPTer CLoSUre
The intent of this chapter was to provide a brief historical perspective to the situation KSC faced and a high-level view of what changed within KSC. We shall use this perspective to understand the lessons learned for such a transformation.
eye oN The LITerATUre
These sources can be useful to help the reader further understand the space industry and evolution of NASA and KSC during this period:
NASA history website (http://history.nasa.gov/)
•
KSC history website (http://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/about/history/
•
index.html)
Reinventing NASA: Human Spaceflight, Bureaucracy, and Politics
• by
Roger Handberg
A History of the Kennedy Space Center
• by Kenneth Lipartito, Orville R.
Butler, and Gregg A. Buckingham
orGANIzATIoNAL SeLF-APPLICATIoN TASKS
Here is a set of questions to ask to better understand the applicability of the concepts presented in this chapter. You can use these questions to determine your organiza-tion’s needs and practices for transformation.
What Is the KSC Story? 35
undErStAnd your orgAnizAtion’S pASt Evolution
Pick a major time of change in your environment or organization’s life.
How did the environment change?
•
What were the forces acting on our organization?
•
What challenges did the environment and forces create for our organization?
•
How did our organization respond?
•
What worked well in this response?
•
What did not work so well in this response?
•
undErStAnd your orgAnizAtion’S CurrEnt Evolution
How is the environment changing?
•
What forces are acting on our organization?
•
What challenges are the environment and forces creating for our
•
organization?
How is our organization responding?
•
What is working well in this response?
•
What is not working so well in this response?
•
reFereNCeS
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Review of Issues Associated with Safe Operation and Management of the Space Shuttle Program (Nov 1996), ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/
reports/1996/asap_summary.txt (accessed November 16, 2008).
Boeing, Boeing Updates Assessment of Launch and Satellite Businesses in Weak Commercial Space Markets, 2003, http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2003/q3/nr_030715a.html (accessed November 16, 2008).
Kennedy Space Center, Kennedy Space Center Story, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/
about/history/story/kscstory.html (accessed November 16, 2008).
Kennedy Space Center, Kennedy Space Center Implementation Plan, 1997.
McCurdy, H.E., Faster, Better, Cheaper: Low-Cost Innovation in the U.S. Space Program, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2003.
National Academy of Public Administration, “A Review of the Joint Base Operations and Support Contract Kennedy Space Center/45th Space Wing,” 2002.
NASA, The Report of Space Shuttle Management Independent Review Team, 1995a.
NASA, NASA HQ RELEASE: 95-73, Headquarters, Washington, D.C., 1995b.
NASA, Review of Issues Associated with Safe Operation and Management of the Space Shuttle Program, Nov. 1996.
NASA, Concept of Privatization of the Space Shuttle Program, September 2001.
NASA and U.S. Air Force, Advanced Spaceport Technology Working Group: Baseline Report, November 2003.
NASA and U.S. Air Force, Advanced Range Technology Working Group: Baseline Report, March 2004.
Office of Science and Technology Policy and National Security Council, “The Future Management and Use of the U.S. Space Launch Bases and Ranges, Report of the Interagency Working Group,” February 8, 2000.
Right Associates, “Organization Measurement Consulting Services offered to NASA Kennedy Space Center,” February 1996.
Space Launch Vehicles Broad Area Review Report Nov 1999, http://klabs.org/richcontent/
Reports/Failure_Reports/Space_Launch_Vehicles_Broad_Area_Review.pdf (accessed November 16, 2008).
United States Congress, “Commercial Space Act of 1998 (PUBLIC LAW 105–303)—OCT.
28, 1998.”
II Section
Introduction to Section II — The Seven Transformation Lessons Learned
The purpose of this section is to answer the seven transformation questions identi-fied in “Why Should You Read This Book.” In this section, we shall provide the les-sons learned from the Kennedy Space Center experience described in the previous section.
39