Brinkmanship of a minor power could end up with the worst scenario of confronting either disastrous military attack from a major power or a diplomatic coalition of major powers. In the eight years of his presidency, President Chen’s approach to China not only irritated Beijing but also annoyed Washington. There was a
69 “South Korea ready for trains to North: rail chief,” October 19, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/19/us-korea-north-rail-idUSSEO12463120071019?feedType=RSS&sp=true
70 “North Korea, South Korea Begin Cargo Train Service,” December 10, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ag1itmBbl SsQ
growing evidence of Sino-US condominium against Taiwan’s independence in President Chen’s second term (2005-2008), given growing accusations of Taiwan’s independence from both Washington and Beijing. The PRC refused to contact Chen’s government directly, while improving relations with opposition parties and non-government sectors. Meanwhile, China also changed its approach to the Taiwan issue from insisting that “the Taiwan issue is a domestic affair that other countries have no right to intervene” to quietly engaging in persuading Washington to work together to eliminate the most probable cause for Sino-U.S. military confrontation, Taiwan independence. In other words, China attempted to form a Sino-US condominium through several international issues, the North Korean crisis in particular, with an aim to constrain Taiwan’s growing tendency of independence under Chen Shui-bian.
Associate Professor Jing-dong Yuan at Monterey Institute of International Studies indicated that Taiwan is one of the most important factors in China’s calculus, especially when it comes to cooperating with the U.S.
Beijing needs Washington's cooperation in reining in the independence elements in Taiwan. For example, one of the most important factors influencing China's North Korea policy is how it will affect Sino-US relations. Beijing has sought to maintain a good, stable bilateral relationship with Washington that serves China's interests including US willingness to restrain Taiwan from seeking
independence.71 As Yoichi Funabashi also pointed out, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited the U.S. in December 2003, he proposed a deal to his U.S.
counterpart that China would try to rein in and bring North Korea to the negotiation table while the U.S. should be self-restrained in its treatment of Taiwan.72 In addition, both Professor David Shambaugh of George Washington University (GWU) and Former US Ambassador to China James Lilley echoed this analysis. While attending a conference on East Asian Security and Taiwan held by the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University in December 2006, Shambaugh and Lilley asserted that Sino-US relations had reached a mature stage. Taiwan was no longer a core issue on the Sino-US Agenda. “Since Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met US President Bush in December 2003, both countries have dealt with the Taiwan issue in a proper way and have put the issue under control.” Shambaugh explained.73
In fact, President Chen’s approach of anti-China and pro-independence served as a driving force to make the condominium possible, for his approach was perceived by the U.S. as provocative, for Taipei was engaging in changing the cross-Straits status quo unilaterally against
71 Jing-dong Yuan, “China's new North Korea diplomacy,” Asian Times, November 14, 2006,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HK14Ad02.html
72 Yoichi Funabashi, “China’s New Thinking on North Korea Policy?,” July 12, 2005, http://northkorea.ssrc.org/Funabashi/
73 “David Shambaugh：Taiwan No Longer a Core Issue on Sino-US Agenda,” The United Daily, December 3. 2006,
http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WOR1/3631341.shtml
Washington’s favoured position of status quo.
Consequently, the Bush Administration changed its attitude toward the Chen Government from positive to negative. In July 2004, Cato Institute Vice President Ted Galen Carpenter asserted that the US should tell Taiwan that its future depended on the Taiwan people themselves, no matter if they wanted reunification with China or sought independence or the status quo Taiwanese should take all the risks for their own decision. Taking this kind of crystal clear policy toward Taiwan as the first priority, the US could avoid a war with China years ahead because big powers should not fight a war for something irrelevant of their vital interest. 74 When receiving Chinese President Hu Jintao in Washington in 2006, US President George W.
Bush, in his speech, made a long list of demands on problem like trade, counterfeit goods, human rights, North Korea and Iran.75 This shows that the US needed China’s assistance in many international issues, North Korea and Iran’s nuclear crises in particular, Washington became more and more unsatisfied with the Chen Shui-bian Government’s tough measures against Beijing. From the Bush Administration’s perspective, Taiwan was attempting to raise tension between China and the US. The Administration was especially angered at President Chen’s initiative to hold a referendum on the United Nations bid under Taiwan’s name.
74 “US Expert：America should tell Taiwan specifically that Taiwan’s future is in its hands and it should take all risks,” The China Times, July 18, 2004, http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110505+112004071800055,00.html
75 “U.S.-Chinese Relations under the Bushes, Clinton and Obama,”
http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=1714
Hence, direct accusations of the Chen Government by U.S. high ranking official appeared in 2007. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in December 2007 openly condemned the move as an unnecessary provocative policy to raise tension across the Taiwan Straits.76 This was a sharp contrast with US President Bush’s emphasis on increasing support to Taiwan in March 2001.77 Robert Sutter, a visiting professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University, also accused President Chen of promoting provocative policies and failing to take advantage of the Bush administration's goodwill over the past six years in an academic conference at GWU in December 2006. 78 As Professor Michael Wesley pointed out that Taiwan and North Korea were regarded as the two most destabilizing actors in Northeast Asia as both of them were choosing brinkmanship. As a result, big powers in this area had converging interest and growing interdependence.79
76 Ted Galen Carpenter, "Wild Card: A Democratic Taiwan," China Security, Vol. 4 No. 1, Winter 2008, pp. 47-48,
http://www.cato.org/people/ted-galen-carpenter
77 Kenneth Lieberthal, “The United States and Asia in 2001: Changing agendas,” Asian Survey, January/February 2002. Vol. 42, No. 1, p. 4.
78 “Academic warns of pan-blues' impact on Taiwan-US ties,” Taipei Times, December 3, 2006, p 1.
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2006/12/03/2003338882
79 Michael Wesley, “The Emerging Security Environment in the Asia Pacific,” Regional Outlook, Volume 1, 2004,
http://www.griffith.edu.au/business/griffith-asia-institute/publications/regional-outlook
In addition, the Chen Shui-bian Government’s intensified anti-China approach was also against the cross-Strait business community in Taiwan. President Chen Shui-bian had changed the official China investment policy from "active opening and effective management" in 2001 to "active management and effective opening” in early 2006. This policy imposed restriction on Taiwanese firms’ investment in Mainland China and urged Taiwan investors to invest more in Southeast Asia, India and Americas rather than China to avoid risk under the so-called “Southbound policy”. The change was seen as the government's move to tighten control on China investments against businesses' calls for further liberalization.80
Nevertheless, Taiwanese businessmen tend to view China not only as a huge market but as a main manufacturing base for their global strategy. That was why more than 70 percent of Taiwan’s outbound investment went to China in 2006, 81and China has emerged as Taiwan’s major trading partner as well as largest export market, despite the hostile political situation across the Taiwan Straits. It is reported that Taiwanese investment in China already exceeds US$120 billion on an accumulative basis. According to Taiwan’s Investment Commission, the ROC’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, the
80 “Westbound？Southbound？Factories only want Money-bound,” The United Evening News, August 23, 2007,
http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FIN7/3983174.shtml
81 According to the Investment Commission, MOEA, approved investment to Mainland China by Taiwanese businesses reached a recorded high in 2006, with a total of US$7.64 billion.
total amount of Taiwan’s investment in China stood at US$64.8 billion by December 2007. In 2007 alone it was US$9.9 billion. Total indirect trade between the two sides was only US$3.9 billion in 1989; the first year business contact was officially permitted. In 2004, total trade was at US$62 billion - a 16-fold increase in just a decade and a half and then up to US$102.3 billion in 2007, with a trade surplus of US$46.2 billion favorable to Taiwan. Currently, more than 40% of Taiwan’s exports head for China and Hong Kong.
By the end of Chen’s era, Taiwan who led Asia's four little dragons eight years ago was ranking the last among the four in terms of economic growth and in a weaker position in all aspects than before. “To put it bluntly, Taiwan now needs mainland China more than vice versa.”82 The previous two presidential elections have shown that the top issue for voters was the economy, which was widely seen as having lost its competitiveness during Chen's eight-year rule. Thus, Taiwanese voters shifted their support from DPP to KMT in the Legislative Yuan election in January 2008 first,83 then again in March’s presidential election in that same year.
82 Dr. William Fang, “Cross-strait ideas need correcting,” The China Post, April 30, 2008,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the%20china%20post/william
%20fang/2008/04/30/154220/Cross%2Dstrait%2Dideas.htm
83 Opposition Nationalist Party won by a landslide, gaining 81 seats in the 113-member assembly. The election outcome indicates that Taiwanese voters favor the Nationalists' engagement policy toward Beijing, against the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's provocative stance to formalize
"independence" from the mainland. 2008.01.15
South Korea
While insisting on actively engaging North Korea, the Roh Government also attempted to accommodate the Bush Administration’s requests as much as possible such as sending troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. By keeping a warm relationship, they hoped that it would eventually persuade Washington to soften its policy toward the DPRK.
On the other hand, improving relations with Pyongyang gave President Roh a leverage to play a leading role in politics in the Korean peninsula and to increase South Korea’s autonomy in the US-ROK alliance. He also planned to take advantage of North Korea’s cheap labor to increase South Korea’s international competitiveness with a view to reducing the ROK’s economic dependence on China, simultaneously preventing North Korea from integrating into China,84 and countering mounting pressure from Chaiwan enterprises ‘competition, 85 eventually making South Korea a hub of Northeast Asia’s economic integration and the axis of politics and security in Northeast Asia.
http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2008/01/15/20 0801150011.asp
84 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “North Korea in 2007: Shuffling in from the Cold,” Asian Survey: January/February 2008, Vol. 48, No. 1, p.
111.
85 Chaiwan refers to China plus Taiwan.
http://chinese.chosun.com/big5/site/data/html_dir/2008/03/25/200803250 00019.html
Generally speaking, President Roh’s active engagement of North Korea was well received in the ROK but not without opposition.86 A poll done immediately after North Korea’s nuclear detonation shows that 73% of people under the survey hoped that his engagement policy continued with only minor revision, while 15.2% favored the termination of the engagement policy. More than three fifths of the people endorsed the continuation of inter-Korea economic cooperation projects.87 However, his North Korea policy confronted increasing criticism from the opposition particularly in the wake of North Korea’s nuclear detonation in October 2006, mainly because the Roh Government refused to take tough sanction measures against Pyongyang.88
By early 2007, the Roh Moo-hyun government’s unfavourable situation turned out to be positive mainly because the Bush Administration’s North Korea policy became pragmatic and US-DPRK relations improved. The remarkable example was the February 13 document
86 “Whereas progressives emphasize prioritizing inter-Korean collaboration, conservatives underline the need for greater reciprocity from the North.”
Gi-Wook Shin and Kristin C Burke, “North Korea and Identity Politics in South Korea,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol: 15 Issue: 1, 2008, p. 299.
87 Wonhyuk Lim, “Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation at a Crossroads?,”
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07008Lim.pdf>http://www.nautilus .org/fora/security/07008Lim.pdf
88 “Seoul lacks influence over North: analysts,” The Korea Herald, November 3, 2006,
http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2006/11/03/200611030 040.asp
reached in the six party talks in Beijing in that year.89 At the same time South Korea relations with US also turned increasingly positive as well. This was demonstrated by the signing of a bilateral FTA in July 2007. 90 What is more, President Roh was finally able to realise his dream to cross the 38th parallel and subsequently had a summit with Kim Jong Il with the Declaration of Inter-Korea Development, Peace and Stability in October 2007.
Nevertheless, high inflation rates due to worsening international economic environment downgraded his government’s economic performance.91 In addition, the failure of working out a single presidential candidate in the progressive parties resulted in the emergence of conservative forces led by Lee Myung-bak.
Conclusion
Three conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis. First, the ruling elite’s subjective perceptions do have a decisive impact on their foreign and defense policies making. Second, geopolitics matters in the case of divided nations. As a result, a divided nation’s foreign and defense policies are inseparable to its siblings. The success of overall foreign policy therefore depends on whether they can maintain positive relations with their other halves. No matter what, South Korea’s North Korea
89 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm
90 To-hai Liou, “South Korea's FTA Strategy under Roh Moo-hyun,”
Taiwanese Journal of WTO Studies, No.9, pp. 177-212.
91 Sung Deuk Hahm and Dong Seong Lee, “Leadership Qualities and Political Contexts: Evaluation of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration in South Korea, 2003-2008,” Korea Observer , Vol: 39 Issue: 2, p. 208.
policy or Taiwan’s Mainland China policy should be put in front of its overall foreign policy. This is particularly true in Taiwan’s case due to the disproportionate power gap across the Straits. This echoes what former ROC’s Foreign Minister Federick Chien once said. “Cross-Straits relations should have the priority over foreign policy.”92 Third, in terms of effectiveness of policy implementation, we can also find from this analysis that in spite of the importance of perceptions of decision makers and their policy choices, the success of small and medium powers’
foreign and defense policies also relies on the other halves’ relative power vis-à-vis themselves, their responses as well as policies of the surrounding major powers.
In Taiwan’s case, ignoring the power asymmetry across the Taiwan Straits and the mounting significance of economic interactions in international relations in the 21st century, the Chen Shui-bian Government insisted on conducting a Mainland China policy characterized by promoting anti-China, Taiwan identity and Taiwan independence under the domestic political consideration.
This kind of policy orientation just fell into China’s hands, for Beijing engineered Sino-US condominium based on their common interest of anti-Taiwan independence. As a result, DPP lost its ruling power to the KMT, mainly because of Taiwan’s poor economic performance under its rule. In other words, the axis of Taiwan’s politics shifted
92 “Ma Seeking Advice, Federick Chien: Cross-Straits Policy has priority over foreign policy,” China Daily News, April 8, 2008,
http://www.cdnnews.com.tw/20080409/news/zyxw/73324000200804082 0412224.htm
from Taiwan consciousness to economic resurrection in President Chen’s second term. At the same time, rising tension across the Taiwan Straits owing largely to its pro-independence movements such as campaigns to enter into the United Nations under the name of Taiwan and so on helped Beijing and Washington work together to jointly blame the Chen Government for its pro-independence movements and make Taiwan a troublemaker in the eyes of its neighbours in Asia Pacific.93
Alternatively, the Roh Government’s North Korea policy featured with peace and prosperity not only brought about improved inter-Korea relations and increased economic interactions between the two Koreas but also helped fine-tune the North Korea policies of the US and the ROK from early 2007 through to the end of Roh’s term.
The Bush Administration, in its second term, shifted its policy toward Pyongyang from toughness to practicality in early 2007 due to the growing concern about rising China.
As a result, the agreement of nuclear disablement in exchange for energy aid was reached first between the US and North Korea and then formalized in the Six-party talks on February 13, 2007. The Roh Government served an important facilitating role in the talks.94 Nevertheless, both the Chen Shui-bian Government and the Roh Moo-hyun Government lost presidential elections respectively to their opposition parties primarily due to their poor economic
93 John F. Copper, “Taiwan’s Failed President,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 2008, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 187-188.
94 Chung-in Moon, “Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: the Six Party Talks and the Roh Moo Hyun Government,”Asian Perspective, 2008. Vol.
32, No. 4; p. 102.
performance. Another factor that brought about the victory of conservatives in South Korea was concerns about the deteriorating South Korea-US security alliance.
Interestingly enough, this horizontal comparative analysis finds that the orientation of Taiwan politics and South Korean politics in the same period changed from ideological lines to economic priority under the pressures of globalization. What is even more interesting is that the following governments of both countries take completely reversed policies toward their siblings vis-à-vis their preceding governments. The results of their policy shifts happen to attest to the second conclusion that the divided nations had better put their policy toward siblings before their overall foreign policies. Unlike the previous government’s hostile China policy, the Ma Ying-jeou Government regards Mainland China policy as the first priority ahead of overall foreign policy and has actively improved relations with China, economic interactions in particular. On the other hand, the ROK President Lee Myung-bak placed foreign policy in front of North Korea policy. In other words, North Korea policy was relegated from top priority in the Roh Government to an appendix to Lee’s overall foreign policy. As a consequence, cross-Straits relations so far have turned from negative during the Chen Shui-bian era to positive under the KMT Government, while inter-Korea ties have reversed from vibrant political and economic cooperation during Roh Moo-hyun period to the persistent tensions since the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in March 2008, exemplified by the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyeong shellings in 2010. Of course, international politics is
always dynamic, future developments of the two countries’
policies toward the other halves remain to be seen. The above conclusions are to be tested.
What is worth mentioning is that Taiwan’s economic integration with China proves the validity of functionalism emphasizing the private sector forces in the process of integration, 95 while the South Korean case is characterised by neo-functionalism stressing the important role of government in the integration process.96 Both
What is worth mentioning is that Taiwan’s economic integration with China proves the validity of functionalism emphasizing the private sector forces in the process of integration, 95 while the South Korean case is characterised by neo-functionalism stressing the important role of government in the integration process.96 Both