Chapter 7 Conclusions and future research
7.2 Future research
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from the responder to the proposer, we are able to propose the nay-based emotion and actually show that the nay-based emotion has a stronger influence than the reference-based emotion. This may suggest that the right to propose may shift some part of “energy” from one kind of emotion to the other kind. Third, there is a huge literature addressing how males and females are different in their emotional functioning (Brody &
Hall, 2010; Kennedy et al., 2013; McRae et al., 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). In this research, through the proposed two emotion indices, we can also see how men and women are sensitive to different emotions and these emotions are cued by different mediums. In all cases, women are more sensitive to the rejection (or acceptance) than men. Women seem to be more sensitive to the feeling of fairness than men in the money experiment, but when coming to chocolate men become more sensitive to the feeling of fairness than women.
7.2 Future research
To us, it is still not quite clear on to what extent the findings in this research can be related to the literature on gender difference in emotion. For example, why women are more sensitive to the nay-based emotion and why when money talking they are more sensitive to the reference-based emotion than men. Of course, a further pursuit of these questions requires us to answer, from the artificial-agent viewpoint, how we can distinguish between the reasoning agents (Chen, 2013; Duffy & Engle-Warnick, 2002) and emotion agents (Gmytrasiewicz & Lisetti, 2002) in light of the empirical observations. Our next step of the research is to see whether both the nay-based or the reference-based emotions and the resultant decision rules can be actually simulated well
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by other reasoning or strategically artificial agent models. Generally speaking, this comparison study will inevitably motivate the question: should we include warm glow and fairness as part of artificial agent design, or, alternatively, should we consider a hybridizing design (Chen, 2008). We also believe that the research cycle connecting human subject experiments and computer simulations can help us prepare what are the issues for the follow-up neuroeconomic study. This is certainly the future direction of this research.
Despite this large picture, the current study can also be improved on two aspects.
First, in this model, for simplicity, we generally assume that all agents share the same reference and the same decision rule. In the next stage of research, we may consider individualizing the reference to further ascertain the role of emotion in decision making.
We had done a small test, we asked subjects to write down his/her reference before they start their ultimatum game in a non-rigorous questionnaire. If we imply these data to predict responder’s decision by uni-variant model, we can get an excellent result (Figure 24). It looks like that no matter how we calculate the emotion index, using the setting of individualized preference to predict responder’s decision is always significant.
Figure 24 Individualized preference in Money experiment: responder
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Second, the original experimental design actually also has a package design, money together with chocolate. Would this additional element of packing (compensation) complicate the emotional influence on decision? It seems that no literature work on this topic in economy fields.
Third, we can go deeper at the neural level. The researches which reference on different mediums and effects of emotion modulation, especially embeddedness emotion, are still waiting us to excavate. These are all the issues for further studies.
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Appendix A. Relative difference: design and test
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Appendix B. List of one-shot ultimatum game results
Group Country Mean Offer Rejection rate
Machiguenga Peru 26 4.8
Hadza (big camp) Tanzania 40 19
Hadza (small camp) Tanzania 27 28
Tsimane’ Bolivia 37 0
Quichua Ecuador 27 15
Torguud Mongolia 35 5
Khazax Mongolia 36
Mapuche Chile 34 6.7
Au PNG 43 27
Gnau PNG 38 40
Sangu (farmers) Tanzania 41 25
Sangu (herders) Tanzania 42 5
Unresettled (villagers) Zimbabwe 41 10
Resettled (villagers) Zimbabwe 45 7
Achuar Ecuador 42 0
Orma Kenya 44 4
Ache’ Paraguay 51 0
Lamelarae Indonesia 58 0
(Henrich et al., 2001)
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Appendix C. Results of Ultimatum game
money chocolate
Male (total 360) Female (total 387) Male (total 360) Female (total 387) accepted,
m 44.32% 43.80% 42.77% 41.82% 43.75% 43.00% 42.55% 43.50% 44.50% 45.08%
c 46.00% 45.79% 41.50% 47.00% 44.55% 46.00% 46.67% 45.56% 44.44% 45.77%
Accepted rate
M 75.86% 68.97% 44.83% 58.62% 55.17% 86.21% 75.86% 75.86% 75.86% 86.21%
C 51.72% 65.52% 68.97% 68.97% 75.86% 86.21% 82.76% 93.10% 93.10% 89.66%
Money offer male female
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Chocolate offer male female
0 1 0.25% 1 0.23%
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Appendix D. Ultimatum Game 最後通諜遊戲指導語
Ultimatum Game 最後通諜遊戲指導語
實 驗 之 前
您所參加的是一個關於決策行為的經濟學實驗。請您仔細聆聽以下的各項實 驗說明。從現在開始到實驗結束，請勿與其他受試者交談。如果實驗過程中有任 何問題，請舉手發問。
實 驗 規 則
如果現在有一個天上掉下來的現金禮物－100 元台幣，幾乎無條件送給某甲 (提案方)，甲唯一要做的是必須找另一個不認識的人(某乙，決定方)來一起分配，
甲有優先權決定自己要拿多少，剩下的給乙，但是乙可以選擇“接受”或”不接受”
甲給乙的錢。如果乙接受，雙方將依照甲決定的分配方式各取所得；不過，如果 乙不認同甲的分法，拒絕甲提出的方案，很抱歉，二方均一無所得。
範 例
範例一：甲和乙兩人一開始手上都沒有任何東西，現在將 100 元交由甲進行 最後通諜遊戲。甲決定自己留 60 元，分給乙 40 元。若乙接受此方案，則遊戲結 束後，甲可得 60 元，乙可得 40 元。若乙不接受此方案，則遊戲結束後，甲和乙 皆得 0 元，回到一開始手上都沒有任何東西的情況。
範例二：甲和乙兩人一開始手上都沒有任何東西，現在將 8 個派交由甲進行
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最後通諜遊戲。甲決定自己留 4 個，分給乙 4 個。若乙接受此方案，則遊戲結束 後，甲可得 4 個派，乙可得 4 個派。若乙不接受此方案，則遊戲結束後，甲和乙 皆得 0 個派，回到一開始手上都沒有任何東西的情況。
實 驗 流 程
等一下會進行三場最後通諜遊戲的實驗，你將被隨機指定為提案方或決定方，
要進行的三場實驗如下：
實驗一
真的有 100 元交給你(提案方)分配時，你(提案方)覺得怎麼樣的分配方案最 好？ 若你身為決定方，你是否接受此分配？本實驗將進行十個回合，每個回合 的結果都將單獨計算。
實驗二
現在可分配的是價值約 100 元的金莎巧克力 10 顆，那你(提案方)的分配方 案為何？若你身為決定方，你是否接受此分配？本實驗將進行十個回合，每個回 合的結果都將單獨計算。
實驗三
現在請同時分配的是現金 100 元及價值約 100 元的金莎巧克力 10 顆，那你 的分配方案為何？若你身為決定方，你是否接受此分配？本實驗將進行十個回合，
每個回合的結果都將單獨計算。
實驗結束後，我們將將累計的結果依照某種換算公式，實際分配現金兩百元 及價值兩百元的巧克力給每一組成員。每個實驗的每一回合都會影響你今天的報 酬，請依自己本身的想法和偏好，用心回答每個實驗。
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立 政 治 大 學
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N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
姓名： 座位： 性別：
請問你是提案方或決定方？ □提案方 □決定方
請問你對甜點的愛好程度為何？
□非常喜歡 □喜歡 □普通 □不太喜歡 □不喜歡
請問若你為提案方，你心中認為 100 元的分法，是你拿到多少錢？
請問若你為決定方，對於 100 元的分法，你所能接受的最低金額為？
你的決策考慮為何？
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立 政 治 大 學
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N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
請問若你為提案方，你心中認為 10 顆巧克力的分法，是你拿到幾顆？
請問若你為決定方，對於 10 顆巧克力的分法，你所能接受最低數量為？
請問若你為決定方，對於 10 顆巧克力的分法，你所能接受最低數量為？