There have been debates centering on the problem of representation in the realm of historiography, because history is a mediated idea that is liable to intended
distortions of truth. Distortions of history give access to the advanced control over both public and personal realms. Louis Wolf, in his discussion of government manipulation of history, urges the modern historians of our current day to “reach beyond the ‘official,’ government-issue version of ‘history’" (Wolf). There is the
obvious gap that Wolf observes that is between a sensationalized narrative disguised as truth and the sober truth in our historical texts. Meanwhile, dichotomizing fictional and factual writings has become the norm in terms of literary categorization. Yet, when it comes to the issue of reality, historical writing and fictional works do not necessarily contradict each other. History and fictions seemingly belong to different realms, but when the problem of representing truth becomes the focal point of the postmodernist age, the two disciplines: history and literature begin their interactions.
We tend to expect historical knowledge to be a truthful recount of the past, and coming from this point, the decided foundation of historical writing is factuality.
Alan Sheridan sympathizes with this view by expounding his personal analysis on the subject; he says: “'[h]istory suggests a certain assurance, sanctioned by an institution, a discipline and, ultimately, reason itself" (13). Tracing this realist thesis back to the eighth century BC, Aristotle speaks of the distinction between history and poetry.
Beverly Southgate says that Aristotle considers the significance of poetry greater than that of history, for that ‘poetry is chiefly conversant about general truth, history about particular’ (qtd. in Southgate 14). Conclusively, history is about events fixed in the past, and therefore, the particularity and certainty limit the compass of imagination and the flexibility of exploring different perspectives to ponder upon general truth.
Nonetheless, the acquisition of historical knowledge takes a linguistic turn in the twentieth century, and this trend informs us that history cannot escape narrativity.
Under the threat of the postmodernist thesis which proposes an anti-realist value, historians are confronted with the idea that whether there are truthful accounts of the past. Postmodern theory of history rests on the notion that the “past cannot be the object of historical knowledge” and therefore, “the past is not and cannot be the referent of historical statements […]” (Zagorin 13-14). This narrativist value of history entails treating history as an inevitably fictional nature that makes history
seem somehow no different than fictional stories (Zagorin 14). Postmodernism sees truth as an ideological construct especially by the hegemonic groups. History is regarded as a filtered product, changing its status with the present discourse. Thus, the postmodernist approach to history is closely linked to two theses which Zagorin points out: “anti-realism” and “narrativism” (13-14).
Historical facts, though seemingly static and enclosed, are actually open to (re)interpretations. This does not renounce the existence of facts, nor does it imply that historical writing is ultimately pointless. However, it reveals how facts cannot represent themselves without the process of interpretation. History inevitably enters the imaginative realm when it is represented.
The fact that historical representation is by no means simply the duplication of truth offers a new route to examining reality, as F.R. Ankersmit points out: “History is the first discipline that comes to mind if we think of disciplines attempting to give a truthful representation of a complex reality by means of a complex text” (3). Both the concept of reality and the process of literary construction are complex in nature.
Increasing in complexity, historical writing itself is a form of literary construction;
literary works inevitably consist of the author’s voices and adaptations of “truths.”
Thus, historical writing (representation) admittedly poses “new and interesting problems, both unstatable and unsolvable within the parameters of existing philosophy of language” (Ankersmit 3). The connection between history and
postmodernism can be further explicated with Michel Foucault’s genealogical history which substantiates the postmodernist conception of history.
As a postmodern philosopher of history, Foucault’s association with the postmodernist view of history is apparent (Thompson 74). In his essay: ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault’s genealogical history provides a non-linear view of history that probes into the concept of origin, draws attention to representations of
history, and shows its capability of self-awareness.
Paul A. Bové defines genealogical history in his analysis of the three modern genealogists—Nietzsche, Foucault and Said:
[…] genealogy is itself a systematic representation of the intellectual and of
“objects” of knowledge—even if an ironic subversion of all other
systems—and, as a result, “the relation of the individual subject to systems of representation must be reconsidered. (380)
Genealogical history focuses on representations, that is, performativity, instead of providing objective truth. In Lynn Fendler’s words, genealogy is not a statement but a performative utterance that “does” something instead of “saying” something (450). Hence, what genealogy proposes is political effectiveness—it is a performative critique, an incitement of discord and an interpretive authority that facilitates
communications (Fendler 451-53). In this genealogical sense, history is not a static, objective matter, but rather an interpreted and, therefore, politicized tool.
Behind the ideas of the event, the body and the performative role genealogical history plays, the primary concern in genealogy is to problematize the pleasing idea of origin. Jeffrey T. Nealson notes that genealogy counters the search for origins: “that is, it opposes itself to the search for conditions of possibility” (Nealson). In Nealson’s definition, what contrasts the conditions of possibility are the conditions of
emergence—Nietzsche’s “Entstehung,” and Foucault’s “event” (Nealson).
Though advocating an alternative historical view, genealogical method, much like the postmodern strategy, recognizes its limits. Understanding how each era is affected by the power relations, genealogy is aware of its “perspectival limits” of the present (Fendler 454). Although genealogical history repudiates the grand view of history, it retains its “meta-professional” authority, and this is precisely the
paradoxical characteristic of genealogical history. In addition, genealogy embodies
the contradictions by practicing what it critiques, as Habermas points out:
“genealogical historiography emerges from its cocoon as precisely the presentistic-, relativistic-, cryptonormative illusory science that it does not want to be” (qtd. in Fendler 459). With the elements above-mentioned, genealogical history best expresses itself in the form of parody, for both genealogical history and parody question origin and authoritative voice while embodying the authority. Moreover, they both perceive their restrains. In brief, genealogy opens itself up to emergence, events, and
discontinuity. Accordingly, genealogy opposes the notion of the essence in historical development; there is no center or origin from which historical events unfold.
In the intersected ground in The Enchantress of Florence, where contradicting values encounter: the East and West, the present (author’s intention) and the past (history,) and also reality and fantasy, the background text—history— becomes the open text inviting the descendants to use and abuse. Not only are the fictional characters constantly in competition with the historical figures, the parodied version of history is also continually confronted by the prior text—the officially recorded history. Furthermore, this parodied history in The Enchantress of Florence both creates and critiques, in its conscious act of performance. Conclusively, this
artificially constructed history is indispensable in the course of the inspection of the concept of history.